

*Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932–1945*



# Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932–1945

THE LIMITS OF ACCOMMODATION

*Edited by David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu*

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

STANFORD, CALIFORNIA

2001

Stanford University Press  
Stanford, California  
© 2001 by the Board of Trustees of the  
Leland Stanford Junior University  
Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Chinese collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945 : the limits of accommodation /  
edited by David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-8047-3768-1 (alk. paper)

I. China—History—1932-1945. 2. Collaborationists—China. I. Barrett,  
David P. II. Shyu, Lawrence N.

DS777.519.C45 2000

951.04'2—dc21

00-039486

⊗ This book is printed on acid-free, archival-quality paper.

Typeset by Robert C. Ehle in 11/14 Adobe Garamond

Original printing 2000

Last figure below indicates year of this printing:

10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

# Contents

Preface	vii
<i>David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu</i>	
Note on Romanization	ix
Maps	x
Contributors	xiii
Introduction: Occupied China and the Limits of Accommodation	i
<i>David P. Barrett</i>	

**PART ONE | NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN:  
OFFICIAL, UNOFFICIAL, AND COVERT**

1. Wang Jingwei and the Policy Origins of the “Peace Movement,” 1932–1937	21
<i>Wang Ke-wen</i>	
2. Regional Office and the National Interest: Song Zheyuan in North China, 1933–1937	38
<i>Marjorie Dryburgh</i>	
3. Nationalist China’s Negotiating Position During the Stalemate, 1938–1945	56
<i>Huang Meizhen and Yang Hanqing</i>	

**PART TWO | CLIENT REGIMES:  
GENESIS, CHARACTER, AND JUSTIFICATION**

4. The Creation of the Reformed Government in Central China, 1938	79
<i>Timothy Brook</i>	

5. The Wang Jingwei Regime, 1940–1945: Continuities and Disjunctures with Nationalist China 102  
*David P. Barrett*
6. Survival as Justification for Collaboration, 1937–1945 116  
*Lo Jiu-jung*

**PART THREE | ELITE COLLABORATION:  
OPPORTUNISM, OBSTACLES, AND AMBIGUITIES**

7. Japan's New Order and the Shanghai Capitalists: Conflict and Collaboration, 1937–1945 135  
*Parks M. Coble*
8. Patterns and Dynamics of Elite Collaboration in Occupied Shaoxing County 156  
*R. Keith Schoppa*
9. Resistance in Collaboration: Chinese Cinema in Occupied Shanghai, 1941–1945 180  
*Poshek Fu*

**PART FOUR | THE HINTERLAND:  
COLLABORATION, RESISTANCE, AND ANARCHY**

10. The War Within a War: A Case Study of a County on the North China Plain 201  
*Peter J. Seybolt*
11. Communist Sources for Localizing the Study of the Sino-Japanese War 226  
*Odoric Y. K. Wou*
- Notes* 237
- Index* 285

## Preface

This volume originated in a conference on the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45 held in Vancouver, Canada, in December 1995. A number of presentations were concerned with an aspect of the war that has received little attention, Chinese collaboration with the Japanese occupiers. What emerged was a highly complex picture of collaboration. Common to all papers was the theme of necessary accommodation to a powerful enemy. But how far accommodation went toward *collaboration*, or willing, let alone enthusiastic, association with the enemy, which is what the word *collaboration* implies in its more common pejorative sense, remained the challenging question. The essays in this collection suggest how far along the spectrum of collaboration various political actors and social groups in China went as they accommodated themselves to the realities they faced.

The conference, in conception and organization, was the work of Larry N. Shyu of the University of New Brunswick, Fredericton. Generous support was provided by the Joint Committee on Chinese Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies, the Military and Strategic Studies Program of the University of New Brunswick, the Historical Society for Twentieth Century China (HSTCC), and the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation in Taipei, Taiwan.

In the production of this volume, we wish to thank Dr. Zhao Jian of the Nagoya University of Commerce and Business Administration for his time and expertise. We thank Mrs. Wendy Benedetti of the Department of History, McMaster University, for her assistance. We also want to acknowledge the many excellent suggestions offered by the outside readers of the manuscript of this volume. Finally, we extend our appreciation to Ms. Muriel Bell and her helpful staff at Stanford University Press.

*David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu*




## Note on Romanization

With only a few exceptions, the pinyin system is used to transliterate Chinese. Discretion has been left to individual authors as to whether to use pinyin or the older form of certain well-known names. These are as follows: (pinyin given first): Jiang Jieshi/Chiang Kai-shek; Hu Shi/Hu Shih; Beijing/Peking; Beiping/Peiping; Rehe/Jehol; Chaha'er/Chahar; Xiamen/Amoy; Yangzi/Yangtze; Manzhouguo/Manchukuo. Sun Yat-sen is used rather than Sun Zhongshan.



Provinces of China Under the Republic, 1930



Japanese Military Occupation of China Proper



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# Introduction: Occupied China and the Limits of Accommodation

DAVID P. BARRETT

For those in the West, the Second World War began either on September 1, 1939, with the German invasion of Poland, or two days later, when Britain and France declared war on Germany. When the war is seen in its European aspect, these dates are justifiable. When seen as a global conflict, the starting point is more difficult to determine. It was not until December 7, 1941, that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the British Southeast Asian colonies brought an end to American neutrality and extended the war to the Pacific. But if this is when the war truly became a world war, where do the origins of the Asian phase of the war lie? The search for these always leads back to China. The incident at the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao) on July 7, 1937, set off an undeclared war between Japan and China which led Japan, almost inexorably it seems in hindsight, into war with the Western powers four and a half years later. If the Second World War is to be seen in its full global dimension, it began that ill-fated day in July 1937.

## THE UNWINNABLE WAR

The Sino-Japanese War, known in China as the Anti-Japanese War or the War of Resistance, lasted just over eight years and brought in its wake immense destruction and uncountable casualties, as well as epochal political and geopolitical changes to China and the region.<sup>1</sup> No accurate figures can be produced for the number of deaths, but twenty million lives lost is the commonly accepted estimate. The overwhelming majority of these were civilians, though losses in the Chinese Nationalist armies were high; perhaps a million or more lives were lost. The Japanese invasion in 1937 had as its principal target the capture of the capital Nanjing and the elimination of the Nationalist Chinese presence in the Lower Yangtze Valley, the most economically advanced part of the country at the time and the power base of the government led by Chiang Kai-shek. The decimation of the capital and its population in December 1937 did not bring about Nationalist surrender, so the war continued, reaching farther inland to Wuhan, spreading out through the villages of northern China in response to growing communist guerrilla activity, and extending even to Canton and other strategic points along the coast.

By the end of 1938 the Japanese front lines had largely taken on the shape they would retain until the end of the war, with the exception of a short period in 1944 when Operation Ichigo linked up Japanese positions in southern China. From the Great Wall in the north to Canton in the south, the cities and major towns of eastern and central China were under Japanese occupation, as were the communication routes, primarily railway lines, that linked them. Initially, the countryside was assigned little military importance; but increasingly the Japanese army directed punitive missions against villages thought to harbor communist guerrillas. It was not until 1941 that the Japanese began a systematic effort to clear large areas of the Lower Yangtze hinterland of resistance, and establish their control firmly at the village level.<sup>2</sup> Despite the local success of these “rural pacification” campaigns, the reality of the Japanese position in China was expressed in the two words, “points” (*dian*) and “lines” (*xian*). Japanese forces, which stood at approximately one million men throughout the eight years of war, were strung out through China’s vast interior, capable of firmly holding their points and lines, but unable to push far into the surrounding countryside or push any farther up the Yangtze into the Nationalist redoubt in the southwest.

For the Japanese, the war was unwinnable. It was likewise unwinnable for the Chinese Nationalist Government, which could only try to hold on until allies came to its aid, as finally happened in December 1941. The Japanese soon discovered in 1937 that Chinese resistance was more tenacious than expected, and that even after suffering almost endless defeat during 1937 and 1938, Chiang Kai-shek's government would not surrender.<sup>3</sup> This left the Japanese political and military leaders in a quandary. Up until the eve of Japan's own surrender in 1945, they struggled to find a solution to what they persisted in calling the "China Incident," as if this euphemism lessened the harsh reality facing them. There were only two ways of settling the war: either by military defeat of Nationalist China, or by diplomatic settlement with it. But a military solution, while often talked about, would have required an enormous increase in Japanese manpower in central China, which in turn would have weakened the Japanese position in Manchuria and northern China, where the Soviet Union without and the Chinese communists within required that the Japanese maintain a large military presence.

It was not only the above factors which hampered the Japanese. Nationalist Chinese weaknesses that became increasingly evident in the latter stages of the war should not be read back into this earlier period. The head of the Soviet military mission and chief military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, General Vasilii Chuikov, reported that despite their deficiencies, the Chinese Nationalist armies in 1941 were capable of effective defense, and that a Japanese offensive against the Nationalist base would suffer enormous losses, without guarantee of success.<sup>4</sup>

If there was to be a diplomatic solution to the "Incident," the Japanese wanted to be assured of gains sufficient to justify the losses they had already suffered. In essence, this meant recognition by the Nationalist Government of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo) as an independent state, acquiescence to the stationing of Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia and select areas of northern China for "defense against communism," complete prohibition of all anti-Japanese propaganda and all anti-Japanese organizations within China, an open door to Japanese investment and business, and the free movement of Japanese citizens within Chinese territory. Until the Nationalist Government came to such terms, Japan would maintain its forces in China. General Tojo, speaking as Prime Minister and War Minister, expressed the official Japanese position cogently at the imperial conference on November 5,

1941, which rejected the American demand that Japan withdraw its troops from China:<sup>5</sup>

As I understand it, withdrawal of our troops is retreat. We sent a force of one million men [to China], and it has cost us well over one hundred thousand dead and wounded . . . , hardship for four years, and a national expenditure of several tens of billions of yen. We must by all means get satisfactory results from this.

Thus Japan made its position clear: unless China was prepared to grant Japan satisfactory results, the war would continue. And the war did continue, but since it was unwinnable for Japan, a deadlock ensued in China until the Americans forced Japan's surrender in August 1945.

#### CLIENT REGIMES

For the Chinese people living in the occupied areas, the war meant between six and a half and eight years of living under the Japanese military presence and under direct or indirect Japanese administration. Upwards of two hundred million people found themselves under the occupation. Until a settlement of the war was reached, the Japanese would have to administer this population. For their part, the Chinese would have to come to terms of some sort with the occupiers. If we are to ascertain the nature of politics and everyday life in occupied China, and if we are to gain some hold on the slippery term *collaboration*, the best place to begin is at the top, with the client regimes sponsored by the Japanese to aid them in administering the territory they had occupied. The essays in this collection are primarily concerned with those regimes based in the Lower Yangtze Valley from 1938 to 1945.<sup>6</sup>

There is good cause to focus on the two successive Nanjing regimes, the Reformed Government of 1938–40 and the Reorganized National Government of 1940–45. The course of the Yangtze River from Shanghai to Wuhan, and the Shanghai-Nanjing-Hangzhou triangle of the Lower Yangtze, constituted the richest and most developed part of China, with a population upwards of a hundred million. It was the core area of the Nationalist Government before 1937. As the capital of China from 1928, Nanjing could be presented by the Japanese-sponsored regimes set up in that city as the new

capital. It is true that the Japanese North China Area Army already had set up a “Provisional Government” in Beiping in December 1937, but this regime had only local pretensions and remained very much under tight military control. In March 1940, it was reclassified as the North China Political Council, theoretically subordinate to the new National Government in Nanjing. In fact the north remained a separate administrative enclave throughout the war, with only peripheral connection to the supposed national government in Nanjing.<sup>7</sup>

The first Nanjing-based government was set up in March 1938, and was staffed by a number of politicians from former northern warlord regimes. It is associated with the name of its leading figure, the president of the Executive Yuan, Liang Hongzhi. The pioneering essay by Timothy Brook explores the motivations of the actors, Japanese and Chinese, and the unpredictable negotiations which led to the emergence of the “Reformed Government of the Republic of China.” This government laid claim only to the three provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui, and in these its reach went little beyond the major urban areas. Its administrative structure was never completed; likewise, it was thin on administrative personnel. This regime rallied little popular support. Its military strength consisted of a number of small Nationalist army units that had changed sides after being cut off in the retreat the previous year. Thus, when the eminent Nationalist (Guomindang) politician Wang Jingwei indicated his interest in forming a new “National Government” based on an end to the war, the Japanese quickly brought Liang Hongzhi’s regime to an end. On March 30, 1940, the “Reorganized Government of the Republic of China” was proclaimed in Nanjing.<sup>8</sup>

Much symbolism was attached to the new regime. The phrase “return to the capital” (*huandu*) was used thereafter to signify that Nanjing was the legitimate capital of China, not Chongqing, where the Nationalist Government had withdrawn in 1938. Wang called on the nation to turn to his “Peace Government”: Chiang Kai-shek, he averred, was no more than a regional military usurper in the southwest. Chiang had betrayed the principle of Greater East Asianism by persisting in a destructive and fruitless war of resistance: Nanjing was now the guardian of party orthodoxy.<sup>9</sup> Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People (*sanminzhuyi*), which had gone into abeyance under the Reformed Government, were once again declared the state ideology. Wang had also convinced the Japanese to allow him to fly the

Nationalist flag, with its twelve-pointed Guomindang star in the upper left-hand corner, although he was compelled to attach a pennant to it bearing the words, "Peace, anti-communism, construction," in order to distinguish it from Chongqing's flag. In every respect but one, the crucial question of peace with Japan, Wang Jingwei portrayed his administration as a continuation of the pre-1937 Nationalist government.

Beneath the rhetorical facade of independence, Wang found his government severely constrained by the terms of agreement he had signed with Japan, not to mention the demands of the Japanese army on site in China. When Wang left Chongqing in December 1938 and announced his peace mission, he justified himself by reference to Japanese Prime Minister Konoe's three principles for ending the war: neighborly amity, anticommunism, and economic cooperation—with no annexations or indemnities thrown in as well. But when it came to the hard negotiations to set up a government, Wang found the price to pay very steep. Japanese demands were remarkably consistent. First indicated to Wang in June 1939, when he met high-level government members in Tokyo, then worked out in detail in the secret Shanghai (Chongguangtang) negotiations with Wang's representatives in late 1939, and finally given binding force by the Basic Treaty for Re-adjusting Sino-Japanese Relations of November 30, 1940, these terms placed the Nanjing government in a position of inferiority that not even its most fulsome propaganda could hide. Wang had to agree to the severance of Manchuria, the indefinite stationing of Japanese forces in northern China, Amoy and Hainan, the withdrawal of Japanese troops from central and southern China only when peace was attained (and then with a two-year grace period), special economic concessions in the north and in the Lower Yangtze Valley, and the prohibition of all expressions of anti-Japanese sentiment. The treaty was described by Chongqing as punishment meted out by the victors to the defeated enemy.<sup>10</sup> Why Wang agreed to such terms remains the challenge to explain. The original "peace mission," as Wang Kewen argues, can be understood in the light of Wang's despair over China's unequal struggle with Japan. The terms accepted by Wang when he established his government might be seen as an extension of this position, that is, China would achieve no better terms regardless of how long it fought on. Whether or not this is the explanation of Wang's decision, it is his establishment of the Nanjing government under such humiliating conditions, and

not the original peace mission itself, that has done the most to blacken Wang's name.

The balance of the history of the Nanjing regime is taken up with Wang's efforts to strengthen (*qianghua*) his government and to gain sovereignty and independence (*duli zizhu*) for it. As I suggest later in this volume in Chapter 5, Wang tried to convince the Japanese that he was an ally to be entrusted with political responsibility and military power. He enthusiastically participated in the rural pacification campaigns launched by the Japanese in 1941, not so much because of his convinced anticommunism as because his regime would expand its reach into the villages, and at the same time increase its military capability. In the cities Wang sought to infuse a new public spirit into the populace through the New Citizens Movement, which he took close personal interest in developing. Wang persuaded the Japanese to allow his government to declare war on the United States and Great Britain in January 1943, thus raising Nanjing to the status of ally of Japan. The Japanese, who had initiated a New China Policy, now that the Pacific War was turning against them, removed the objectionable pennant from Wang's flag, returned the foreign concessions, including their own, to Wang's government, began the process of returning property seized earlier in the war by the military to Chinese ownership, and on October 30 signed a new Treaty of Alliance to replace the Basic Treaty.<sup>11</sup>

Japanese concessions came too late to gain Wang credibility for his government. In most cases, they were hedged with exceptions or special clauses: Japanese personnel remained in office in the former foreign settlements; the Japanese military would continue to occupy Chinese property if military necessity warranted it; Japanese troops were to remain in China until peace was signed, only now they would leave immediately after such an agreement was signed. Little had changed. With the Japanese high command expecting an eventual American landing in eastern China, Japanese troop strength south of the Great Wall remained at about one million men until the end of the war. As Huang Meizhen and Yang Hanqing demonstrate, Japanese peace efforts designed to extricate themselves from the China theater were conducted solely with Chongqing. Nanjing was bypassed, and by the time Wang died in November 1944 his regime had become an irrelevancy to Japan. Even if Wang's last will is not genuine, the frustration expressed in it and the awareness of how excoriated his name would become have the ring

of truth about them.<sup>12</sup> Wang had never intended to be a puppet, but he had willingly maneuvered himself into a position from which he found it impossible to escape.

#### COLLABORATION AND ACCOMMODATION

In treating wartime France, historians have drawn a distinction between *collaboration* and *collaborationism*, the latter term being reserved for “committed, ideological identification” with Nazi Germany by French fascist groups.<sup>13</sup> This distinction serves as a useful starting point for a consideration of the phenomenon of collaboration in China. If collaborationism is to be understood as ideological identification with Japan, then the term has little applicability to wartime China. What is left, then, is collaboration: working with the enemy for a variety of reasons, whether out of self-interest or for sheer survival, but not out of ideological commitment to the enemy’s cause.

The reasons for the virtual absence of ideological identification with Japan are not hard to find. They lie both in the everyday experience of people in the occupied areas and in the Greater East Asian theory that Japanese propagandists espoused. To begin with, the Japanese presence in China was quantitatively and qualitatively different from the Western imperialist presence that China had experienced over the preceding century. Westerners were relatively few in number and they were concentrated very much in the treaty ports. The sporadic wars and punitive campaigns waged by the Western powers were short-lived and limited in scope. In contrast, the Japanese army for almost eight years occupied all the major cities and communication routes of coastal China from the far north to the south, and it could reach out at will into the surrounding countryside. The number of Japanese troops in China south of the Great Wall varied between 800,000 and one million.<sup>14</sup> Shanghai was the headquarters of the China Expeditionary Army; Nanjing, the capital of the Wang regime, was the headquarters of the Thirteenth Army. The much feared Japanese military police, the Kempeitai, operated in all major Chinese cities. Japanese military advisors were attached to most units of the Nanjing army.

It was not only the Japanese military who were omnipresent. The usual colonialist admixture of businessmen, adventurers, and ordinary folk were also to be found, but in numbers that dwarfed those of the Western powers.

More than 100,000 Japanese were in Shanghai; upwards of 20,000 were in Nanjing. The impact of the Japanese invasion on the economy was also much more immediate than in the case of Western economic imperialism. In the early stages of the war, the Japanese army and navy had occupied a wide range of Chinese factories, offices, and businesses, the pretext always being that of military necessity. The occupiers proved extremely difficult to dislodge. Furthermore, the Japanese army, in order to support its huge numbers, forcibly requisitioned at artificially low prices agricultural produce from the territory it occupied. Finally, as Parks Coble shows, the Japanese policy-makers, even when they talked of economic cooperation, assigned a decidedly subsidiary role to their would-be partners. The Chinese economy was to supplement Japanese needs, or at most complement them. China was primarily to supply Japan with raw materials and purchase Japanese finished goods: China was never to challenge Japanese industrial preeminence. However tempted Chinese capitalists might have been to collaborate, they quickly discovered they would never enjoy equality with the occupiers.

When ideological reasons for the failure of collaborationism are sought, what stands out above all is the cultural exclusivism of imperial Japan. Its irreducible minimum was the emperor cult, Shinto, and the unique national bloodline. By definition these were unexportable. Even if it might be argued that the emperor extended his beneficence over all East Asia, the emperor as head of the national “family state” remained uniquely Japanese. Against such notions the theories of Pan-Asianism or Greater East Asianism could never prevail. Yet it was precisely on the basis of a supposedly shared race and culture (*tongzhong tongwen*) that both the Chinese peace mission and the collaborative Sino-Japanese relationship were justified. To do this, Wang Jingwei had strenuously reinterpreted Sun Yat-sen’s principle of nationalism, so that Chinese nationalism now was to be realized within a greater regional nationalism, that of East Asia. Vast quantities of propaganda were devoted to demonstrating this syllogism. Nanjing sponsored public bodies such as the Greater East Asia League and the Sino-Japanese Cultural Association, but they proved incapable of formulating details of the new East Asian order. In view of the fundamental cultural exclusivism of Japan and the oppressive Japanese presence in China, such a task was futile.<sup>15</sup>

What is at issue, then, is collaboration in the sense of working in some way with the enemy, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. In the face of the Japanese invasion, some people fled to the interior, but within the civilian

population it was mainly the political elite and the well-to-do who were able to do so. In any event, as was often stated by the Wang regime leaders after the war, the whole population of occupied China could not have fled to the southwest: most would have no choice but to remain where they were. Some joined the resistance, which meant Nationalist or, more commonly, communist guerrilla units in the hinterland. But this still left a huge population in the cities and towns, and in the adjacent rural areas. All of these were under firm military control. Whether through the urban gendarmerie or through rural punitive expeditions, the Japanese military ruthlessly suppressed any overt resistance. For the great mass of the population in occupied China, there was no alternative to living with the enemy.

How far accommodation went varied according to a number of factors. Three of the essays in this volume discuss how local elites responded to the occupation of their communities by the Japanese army. R. Keith Schoppa examines Shaoxing, which was under long-term occupation from 1941 to 1945; Lo Jiu-jung looks at the one-month occupation of Zhengzhou in 1941; while Peter Seybolt concentrates on market towns and villages in Neihuang County in northern Henan. In each instance, the Guomindang administrative and military elite fled in the face of the invaders. This left local elites, usually the chamber of commerce or an association of guilds, to take charge of dealing with the enemy. These local elites were motivated both by self-interest and community loyalty; and, in any case, the turbulence of the warlord years had put in place mechanisms for handling armies suddenly at the town gates. This time it was the Japanese; but, as David Strand has illustrated in his book on 1920s Beijing, local elites were well familiar with local Chinese warlord armies, who often appeared as alien and threatening as did the later Japanese.<sup>16</sup> What the local elites wanted was order and stability, which meant a quick handover of administration to the incoming regime in order to reduce the dangers of a power vacuum. In some cases, such as Shaoxing, the commercial elites found the occupation not necessarily unwelcome, as it brought an end to labor turmoil and other challenges to their position.

As during the warlord period, the sudden change of power entailed by the Japanese invasion provided the opportunity for many nefarious social elements to rise to the surface. In the cities gang leaders forged alliances with Japanese security units. But it was in the countryside that the impact of the invasion was most tellingly felt by the populace. In many areas the Guo-

mindang administrative stratum was very thin to begin with. The disappearance of this elite created a vacuum, which, in contrast to the cities and towns, the Japanese could not fill. Foraging parties or punitive expeditions were within the Japanese capacity to mount, but anything more than temporary control of select hinterland areas was not. Into this vacuum moved a host of competing forces, most of them characterized by ruthless exploitation of the local population. Some of them lined up with the Japanese, but their calculated opportunism made them unreliable and even dangerous allies. This was the “war within a war” that Peter Seybolt depicts in detail. It was from this return of much of the hinterland to the Hobbesian state of nature that the communist movement built its fortunes by securing the lives of the peasantry against both Japanese invaders and local predators.<sup>17</sup>

Of the elites who collaborated with the Japanese, only some of the rural “lumpen elite” might be said to have done so enthusiastically, but they were a dubious addition to the occupiers’ cause. The political, economic, and cultural elites sought a *modus vivendi* with the dominant power, but they always worked from a position of weakness, as the successive regimes in Nanjing illustrated. This was true as well of unoccupied China, in areas where regional powerholders confronted Japanese power directly. Marjorie Dryburgh examines a case in point, that of Song Zheyuan, the Nationalist commander in north China, who found himself caught between popular pressures for resistance and the consequences which would immediately befall him if he acted upon such pressures.

The same strained nature characterizes collaboration in the cultural world. Here a measure of passive resistance, or escape into “internal exile,” was a possibility, something not open to those who belonged to the worlds of politics or business. The populace could ignore the endless propaganda generated by Nanjing about Sino-Japanese solidarity. And where the Chinese cultural elite came into direct contact with Japanese sensibilities, as in the big business world of the Shanghai cinema, it was possible on grounds of commercial necessity to escape for the most part from the celebration of a new East Asian culture. The public lined up for films of romance and fantasy. As Poshek Fu concludes, Shanghai film producers, if they were to survive, had to work with the Japanese; but at the same time they could reduce almost to nonexistence the political and cultural message that the Japanese sought to propagate in China.

For the great majority of the population, the Japanese presence appeared

unalterable in the foreseeable future. Up to the end of 1941 Nationalist China confronted Japan alone. Until the entry of the United States into the war, there was no reason to believe that the Japanese position in China was under challenge. It was only towards late 1943 that it became evident that Japan would not win the war. However it was in the Pacific, and not in China, that Japan was on the retreat. At the end of the war there were still one million Japanese troops in China. Communist base areas in the hinterland, especially in the north, had grown almost exponentially during the war, but the original territories occupied by Japan at the end of 1938 remained almost completely in Japanese hands at the time of the surrender. And the surrender itself came unexpectedly, a year or more earlier than everyone expected.

#### HISTORIOGRAPHY AND RESEARCH

Given the wide experience of enemy occupation during the Second World War, it may initially seem surprising that study of collaboration in wartime China should have begun only recently. Reevaluation of wartime occupation in western Europe began in the 1970s, with Vichy France the major subject of attention. In China, two pathbreaking studies appeared in 1972, written by American scholars John H. Boyle and Gerald E. Bunker, detailing Wang Jingwei's covert negotiations with the Japanese from 1937 to 1939.<sup>18</sup> But it was not until the mid-1980s that Chinese scholars began to publish on the general theme of wartime collaboration. Documentary collections came first: these were invaluable research materials, but they could be presented without interpretive commitment. Then followed a steadily increasing number of articles and monographs, which widened the range of knowledge about wartime collaboration, though authors never countered the official judgment that all who worked with the enemy were traitors: *hanjian*.

The lack of attention given by Chinese historians to the topic of wartime collaboration may be traced first of all to the particular circumstances in which the war in China ended. In contrast to Europe, where Allied armies took control of the remaining German-held areas immediately upon the German surrender, the sudden surrender of Japan left China in a divided and unsettled state. Japanese forces undefeated in battle still controlled the points and lines. Large areas of the countryside had fallen into communist

hands, especially in the north, or into the hands of regional powerholders, many of whom had links to the former collaborationist regimes. For the Nationalist Government, which sought to reclaim the Japanese-occupied areas as quickly as possible in order to preempt the communists, possession of all armed force, regardless of its former loyalties, was essential. Thus the armed strength of the Wang Jingwei regime, from its regular army down to its peace preservation and police units, was absorbed into the Nationalist forces. This explains why almost the whole military command of the Wang regime escaped prosecution for collaborationist offenses.<sup>19</sup> Nor was the position taken by the communists much different. They too accepted the conversion to their cause of Nationalist commanders who had served Wang Jingwei. But such converts were few: ideological affinities meant that the Nationalist government was their home.

In sharp contrast to the fate of military collaborators, harsh treatment was meted out to high-level political collaborators after the war. Most political collaborators surrendered to the Nationalists, hoping that the latter would accept them back as patriots who had undertaken a disagreeable but necessary task in working with the Japanese occupation authorities. They were soon disabused of such expectations. The senior leaders of the wartime collaborationist regimes were put on trial and either sentenced to death or to long terms of imprisonment. By the end of 1946 most of the political cases had been disposed of by the Nationalist courts.

Unlike military collaborators, political collaborators had little or nothing to offer the Nationalist government as a *quid pro quo* for leniency. With few exceptions, these political figures had belonged to groups in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek before the war, or at best had been in uneasy alliance with him. Once the war ended calls for punishment of the *hanjian* (traitors) swept the nation. Whatever the merits of their case may have been, the political collaborators were disposable. An intriguing footnote lends support to the notion that the postwar trials were driven as much by immediate political advantage as by dispassionate consideration of justice. In 1949 the Nationalist government released from prison all collaborationists sentenced to less than life imprisonment, rather than see them fall into communist hands. In the end these people, who were excoriated so roundly at their trials as *hanjian*, served less than four years for their association with the Japanese.<sup>20</sup>

The ambiguous postwar disposition of the *hanjian* issue by the Nationalists left collaboration an awkward topic on Taiwan, and hence best ignored.

The matter was simpler on the mainland. Both in the aftermath of 1945 and in the years following 1949, the communist government could maintain uncompromising hostility to wartime collaboration, on both nationalistic and ideological grounds. During the Civil War, punishment was meted out to real or suspected collaborationists as part of the class war being carried out in the villages. In the anti-counterrevolutionary campaigns of the early 1950s, a number of former collaborationist police and military who had remained in China were rooted out. The life-term prisoners inherited from the Nationalists remained incarcerated until the late 1970s, when amnesty for the elderly survivors was granted. But apart from occasional brief appearance on the public stage by former collaborators, little mention was made, apart from terse pejorative references, to the phenomenon of wartime collaboration.

The curtain also had fallen on the topic in the West, despite the fact that scholars there did not labor under the constraints that silenced their counterparts on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The principal reason for this was the inaccessibility of sources. China was completely closed while Taiwan was closed on all issues of political sensitivity. Western language sources were few in number and sketchy in character, especially for the years after Pearl Harbor when Western access to occupied China was closed off. Some Japanese sources, particularly memoir literature, were to be found, and these were used effectively by John Hunter Boyle and Gerald Bunker to reconstruct the origins of Wang Jingwei's peace movement and government. But many Japanese documentary sources were lost forever, either destroyed in wartime air raids, as in the case of the Greater East Asia Ministry records, or by systematic culling in the days immediately following the surrender, as in the case of many Army records.<sup>21</sup>

Western libraries were not entirely bereft of research materials. Soon after the war the Hoover Institution at Stanford acquired an invaluable collection on collaborationist regimes, and in 1954 published an annotated guide to them by Frederick Mote.<sup>22</sup> But these materials appear to have been little utilized until the 1990s. To some extent this may be due to the fact that many of these documents are of an official nature, and hence may have appeared initially to offer limited insights into the dynamics and character of life in occupied China. However, as China scholarship of the post-1949 years showed, close reading of the official sources can be highly fruitful. The sheer

richness of the Hoover collection makes it an essential resource for study in the West of Chinese collaborationist regimes.

Another likely cause of Western neglect of the topic of wartime collaboration lies in the ideological predispositions of China scholarship in the West during the 1960s and 1970s, especially in the United States. The academic atmosphere was powerfully influenced by the teleological notion that Maoist communism was both the rightful and inevitable historic destiny of China. This meant that it was the Maoist past that should be studied. Thus the Nationalist Government was pushed into something of a backwater, except where it served as a foil to the communist movement, while puppet regimes in occupied China were dismissed as no more than cardboard structures that did not merit serious concern.

It was the dismantling of the universal Maoist orthodoxy in China in the post-1978 period by the Communist Party itself that set in motion the historiographical changes that would make the study of occupied China at last possible. The first steps taken in this direction were tentative. In the early and mid-1980s several collections of key documents on the peace movement and the various collaborationist regimes were published, along with a first chronology of the Wang Jingwei regime. The major documentary collections, as well as the first volume of topical essays, were produced by a group of scholars at Fudan University in Shanghai, foremost of whom was Professor Huang Meizhen. In Beijing the lead was taken by the late Professor Cai Dejin, who compiled the first chronology of the Wang regime, and then went on to write many articles and monographs on its history.<sup>23</sup> These publications from the 1980s unreservedly condemned all collaborationists as *hanjian*, and made generous use of terms such as bogus (*wei*) and fascist to describe anything touching collaboration. Nevertheless, these works were groundbreaking in character, offering great amounts of new information and innumerable references to hitherto unknown sources.

Once the topic of wartime collaboration had been opened up, the range of literature expanded. Both academic and anecdotal works began to appear in the late 1980 and early 1990s.<sup>24</sup> Of particular value to researchers were the memoirs that were published, most of which had remained restricted (*neibu*) since the time of their compilation in the 1950s and 1960s. Some of the larger research projects, such as the eight-volume documentary collection on the Wang Jingwei regime planned by Fudan University, have been

terminated because of new market forces driving university publishing.<sup>25</sup> But in the burgeoning periodicals sector, articles and documents continue to appear treating the whole extent of wartime collaboration. Two of the most prominent journals are *Minguo Dang'an: Republican Archives*, published by the Second Archive in Nanjing, and *KangRi Zhanzheng Yanjiu: The Journal of Studies of China's Resistance War against Japan*, published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Modern History in Beijing. The most valuable sources of primary materials in journal format are the *Wenshi Ziliao* (Historical Materials), published at the national, provincial, and local levels. Many first-person accounts were collected in the 1950s, when memories of the war were fresh, and they were noted down by official researchers in remarkably dispassionate prose. Publication of *Wenshi Ziliao* resumed after the Maoist years, and the former *neibu* restriction was dropped. These materials not only afford insights into life at the top of the political structure, but reach into many facets of life at the grassroots level.<sup>26</sup>

The major research sources remain archival. First in importance is the Second Archive in Nanjing. It holds the files of the various collaborationist regimes, apart from those, usually of a military nature, which were removed to Taiwan with the Nationalist Government. Since the mid-1990s the Second Archive catalogs have been open to researchers. The next step is to computerize the present handwritten volumes. A comprehensive guide to the collections held in the Second Archive for the entire Republican period was published in 1994.<sup>27</sup>

Also of major importance is the Shanghai Municipal Archive, recently rehoused in an excellent modern facility. Archival working conditions for non-mainland scholars vary with time and place. The open door (*kaifang*) policy was interpreted liberally for some years at the Second Archive, but less so of late. Research accessibility in provincial and municipal libraries is unpredictable. Local concern about bearing responsibility for unwanted academic opinions is largely to blame. Access to some important collections can be gained only after prolonged cultivation of contacts. Yet other archives, sometimes in places more off the regular track, have welcomed the rare guest. In sum, the researcher will continue to face problems both expected and unexpected, but may proceed in the knowledge that the study of the occupied areas and the whole wartime era is now a legitimate field of historical enquiry in China.

Two major challenges face Chinese scholars in the study of collaboration. The first is to exploit the vast reservoir of archival and published sources in order to focus more on collaboration beneath the level of the state. Achieving this end may be largely a matter of time. The second challenge, a more difficult one, is to break free from the moralistic framework in which wartime history is viewed. If the conflicting motives, tactical concessions, sheer helplessness, and all the other existential uncertainties that characterized the lives of people living in occupied China are to be understood and explained, then current prejudgmental dogmas need to be eliminated. But this will prove a difficult task. The moralistic interpretation of history, which holds the historian's task to be that of assigning "praise and blame," has its roots in 2,500 years of Confucian historiography. More immediately the historian must contend with the demands of the Chinese state, which reserves to itself final judgment on all historical questions. Given the rise of Chinese nationalism in this century, and the consistent identification of the Chinese state with nationalism, it will be difficult for Chinese scholars to transcend categories which are not only officially mandated, but which many of the scholars themselves fully accept as correct judgments on wartime collaboration.

This volume has been made possible by materials that have become available largely since the 1980s. The essays contained here address some of the many topics to be found in this unexplored and complex period of China's modern history. The hope is that these essays will stimulate further interest in such topics, and, beyond that, suggest some of the areas in which future research might fall.



PART ONE

Negotiations with Japan:  
Official, Unofficial, and Covert



ONE

## Wang Jingwei and the Policy Origins of the “Peace Movement,” 1932–1937

WANG KE-WEN

In December 1938, Wang Jingwei flew to Hanoi and announced his peace proposal to end the seventeen-month-old Sino-Japanese War. That proposal eventually led to his organization of a collaborationist regime in occupied China. To this date, Wang’s “peace movement” remains one of the most enigmatic and controversial episodes in modern Chinese history. Previous studies of the Wang regime have focused mainly on its formation and have given only marginal attention to Wang’s policy toward Japan in the prewar period, during which he served as China’s premier. The few studies that discuss the prewar background to the wartime regime often describe Wang as the leader of a “pro-Japanese” faction in the Chinese government, and his “peace movement” as simply the continuation of his prewar “policy of appeasement.”<sup>1</sup> This latter interpretation, while suggesting certain consistencies in Wang’s Japan policy throughout the 1930s, fails to appreciate the evolution of Wang’s views and the complex links between his prewar and wartime positions. A reexamination of Wang’s management of Sino-Japanese relations between 1932 and 1937, which is the focus of this study, may help identify those links more clearly and thus provide a better understanding of his thinking behind the decision of 1938.

## RESISTING WHILE NEGOTIATING

In January 1932, Wang joined hands with Jiang Jieshi, his principal rival in the Guomindang (GMD) since 1926, to form a new national government in Nanjing. The Wang-Jiang coalition, based on an informal power-sharing agreement between the two leaders, was formed amidst the national crisis arising out of the Manchurian Incident of September 1931. Wang's principal task as premier (President of the Executive Yuan) was to deal with the pressing problem of Japanese aggression. Although anti-imperialism had been a major element in the ideological formulation of Wang's Left Guomindang movement from 1927 to 1930, the catastrophe in Manchuria had much moderated Wang's views.<sup>2</sup> On the eve of his assumption of the premiership, Wang convinced Jiang and other GMD leaders of the failure of both the "non-resistance" policy adopted by Jiang during the Manchurian Incident, and the "non-negotiation" approach experimented with by Sun Fo, Wang's immediate predecessor as premier.<sup>3</sup> It is not clear, however, whether a new policy toward Japan was formulated at this time.

Wang's ability to handle the Japanese threat was put to test the day he became premier, January 28, 1932, when the Shanghai Incident broke out. As the Nineteenth Route Army responded to the Japanese attack with fierce resistance, Wang indicated that the government had decided to "resist on the military front and negotiate on the diplomatic front." China's bottom line (*zuidi xiandu*) in handling the crisis, Wang declared, was not to lose her territory and sovereignty: "Below that line we will never yield, above that line we will not engage in lofty words" (i.e., China will be ready to compromise).<sup>4</sup> Jiang, still in retirement, voiced his support for the new policy. Shortly afterward, at Wang's recommendation, Jiang was appointed chairman of the Military Commission.

What emerged from the Shanghai crisis was a new Chinese response to Japanese aggression, which Wang soon made a cornerstone of his foreign policy. It was a formula he called "resisting while negotiating" (*yimian dikang yimian jiaoshe*). The new formula departed from Nanjing's previous Japan policy in two major aspects. First, it implied China's willingness to negotiate directly with Japan. Simply relying on arbitration by the League of Nations was dilatory and impractical, Wang argued, and China had to "rely on herself instead of others" in settling her disagreements with Japan.<sup>5</sup> Second, the approach included a military dimension. Chinese forces would

have to effectively obstruct the Japanese military advance so as to make negotiation an attractive option to Japan. However, Wang distinguished "negotiation" from "making peace," and "resistance" from "declaring war." Because of military and economic weakness, China could not sustain a full-scale war with Japan, he said. She could only engage in passive and temporary "resistance" in hopes of stopping Japan from conquering more Chinese land. Yet the price of any long-term peace settlement would be Chinese recognition of the *fait accompli* of Japanese control of the lost territories. To "negotiate," therefore, meant only to resolve conflicts on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis without concluding any formal treaties.<sup>6</sup> A combination of these two methods was, in Wang's opinion, the only feasible way for China to survive under the Japanese threat.

Wang was apparently satisfied with the first product of his new policy, the Shanghai Truce Agreement in May 1932. The agreement was confined to military matters, and the Japanese troops withdrew from the Chinese city. Wang had foreseen, on the eve of signing this agreement, that the truce would not be well received by the Chinese public. Indeed it was not. Anti-Japanese sentiment ran high in the country, and any negotiated settlement with Japan was seen as compromising national dignity. Even within the Nanjing government, Wang's work aroused criticism. As soon as the truce was signed, the Control Yuan impeached Wang on the ground that the agreement had not received prior approval from the Legislative Yuan.<sup>7</sup> Wang was able to ward off this attack with Jiang's support, but he must have been alarmed by the fact that, as head of the government, he was now to take the blame for the unpopular task of dealing with Japan.

In the wake of the Shanghai Truce, an important meeting took place at Lushan in June, attended by Jiang, Wang, and other top GMD leaders. It was at this meeting that Jiang's doctrine of "domestic pacification before external resistance" (*xian annei hou rangwai*) was formally adopted by the government.<sup>8</sup> This agenda provided an additional rationale for Wang's "resisting while negotiating" policy, as its implementation necessitated postponement of any confrontation with Japan. However, the doctrine also presented a potential obstacle to Wang's policy. With China's best troops in Jiang's hands and devoted to "domestic pacification" of the Communists, the task of "external resistance" would have to be shouldered by regional forces. Poor in fighting ability and of questionable loyalty to Nanjing, these forces soon posed a new set of difficulties for Wang.

## THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY SEPARATISM

Following its seizure of Manchuria, the Japanese Guandong Army continued to expand its territorial control along the Great Wall. When Zhang Xueliang, the Manchurian militarist who carried out the “non-resistance” policy in 1931, failed to respond to the new Japanese attack in Jehol in August 1932, Wang demanded Zhang’s resignation. In a circular telegram to Zhang, Wang blamed him for the loss of Manchuria and accused him of continuing the “non-resistance” policy in Jehol while making unreasonable requests on Nanjing for financial assistance. Wang announced that he himself was resigning “as an apology to Zhang” for being unable to meet Zhang’s financial demands and asked Zhang to resign with him “as an apology to our countrymen” for failing to defend the country.<sup>9</sup>

Wang’s attack on Zhang, which shocked the country, has been widely interpreted as motivated by revenge. It was Zhang who, in September 1930, had undermined Wang’s anti-Jiang regime in Beiping by launching an “armed intervention” from Manchuria. Grudges from the past may indeed have contributed to the Wang-Zhang dispute of 1932, but to interpret the incident solely as such underestimates the sense of urgency Wang felt about finding an effective policy toward Japan.<sup>10</sup> Both during and after the Shanghai Incident, Wang urged Zhang to take military actions against the Guandong Army in Manchuria, but each time Zhang ignored his request.<sup>11</sup> Immediately upon the Japanese invasion of Jehol in July 1932, Wang asked Zhang about his intentions. Instead of responding to Wang, Zhang turned to Jiang Jieshi for instructions.<sup>12</sup> Wang then sent a telegram to the military leaders in all provinces asking them to “unite and defend” the country—an implicit criticism of Zhang’s lack of cooperation. In retaliation, the Beiping Political Affairs Committee under Zhang issued a manifesto suggesting that the “fundamental approach to long-term resistance lies in the improvement of domestic administration,” which, of course, was Wang’s responsibility.<sup>13</sup> Angered and humiliated, Wang waited for Jiang’s show of support, but this did not come. On August 5, Wang announced his intention to resign.

The dispute illuminated Wang’s predicament as China’s premier and foreign policy maker. His policy of “resisting while negotiating” relied heavily on military action to strengthen China’s position in any negotiations. “Resistance” and “negotiation” were, as Wang put it, complementary.<sup>14</sup> In fact, for Wang it was the “resistance” component that made his formula more effective in defending the country than Jiang’s earlier “non-resistance”

policy. Only by fighting back could China force Japan to the negotiating table and attract international sympathy. Failure by China's military leaders to perform their minimum tasks, therefore, would virtually bankrupt Wang's strategy. In Jehol, Zhang's generals were not even making an effort to hold the line.

Military separatism, Wang concluded, was at the core of China's problems. As long as the military leaders saw only their own self-interest and remained independent of the government's control, China would be incapable of organizing effective resistance to Japan.<sup>15</sup> Later, in April 1933, Wang reiterated this argument in his report to the GMD Central Political Council. Recalling the Shanghai Incident of 1932, Wang described the difficulty Nanjing encountered in mobilizing regional forces for battle in Shanghai. Some of the Sichuan military leaders, for example, had agreed to send troops, but internal strife in the province, which was beyond Nanjing's control, made any troop movement impossible. The leaders of Guangdong, who were allied with Hu Hanmin in regional opposition to Nanjing, shouted anti-Japanese slogans but obstructed military action against the Japanese. Wang lamented that China was still not a unified country. Any grand plan of waging an anti-Japanese war, he said, was utterly unrealistic.<sup>16</sup>

The problem of military separatism was further demonstrated by the irresponsible financial demands made of Nanjing by the regional military leaders (and which was a major complaint of Wang's against Zhang). Only the five provinces under Nanjing's firm control (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi and Hunan) were paying their taxes to the central government, as Wang stated in a 1932 circular telegram. Leaders of the other provinces customarily devoted most of their revenue to supporting their own forces, "about whose size and shape the central government had no right to even inquire." Yet, as soon as the central government ordered provincial leaders to use their own troops for external resistance, they asked for special funds before making any move. It would be impossible, Wang said, to save the country if this financial disunity continued.<sup>17</sup>

Wang's charges were supported by the events of the time. Between April and December 1932, wars were launched by regional militarists in Guangdong, Shandong, Sichuan, Guizhou and Xinjiang, with the conflicts in the latter two provinces lasting well into 1933. Nanjing could only be a bystander to this blatant display of "residual warlordism." Ironically, just a few years earlier, Wang had allied himself with regional militarists in his attempt to topple Jiang's government.<sup>18</sup> Now, as head of the government,

Wang realized the crippling effect these militarists had on China's potential for survival.

Under pressure, Zhang Xueliang resigned as head of the Beiping Pacification Headquarters, but Jiang Jieshi soon appointed him acting head of the newly organized Beiping Branch of the Military Commission. Zhang's leading position in North China remained intact. Enraged by this development, Wang on August 21 took a "sick leave," and left two months later for Europe. He did not return until March 1933, when the Japanese occupation of Jehol forced Zhang in turn to resign and leave the country. Resuming the premiership, Wang must have felt vindicated by Zhang's departure, yet the fundamental problems that had undermined his Japan policy still remained unresolved.

#### "THE TASK OF LI HONGZHANG"

Wang's observations during his trip in Europe left him disillusioned with the prospect of international assistance to China. While in Geneva in January 1933, Wang issued a declaration pleading the League of Nations to adopt tough sanctions against Japan, but it fell on deaf ears.<sup>19</sup> Two months later Japan withdrew from the League of Nations, making coordinated Western intervention in Sino-Japanese affairs even less likely. In private correspondence shortly after his return to China, Wang predicted that from now on "an isolated China would face an isolated Japan."<sup>20</sup> In another letter he indicated that his response to Japanese aggression had changed from "crying for help" to "quietly waiting for help." Before that help arrived, if it arrived at all, the Chinese could rely only upon themselves, trying their best to "slow down the Japanese advance and the Chinese retreat."<sup>21</sup>

The battles along the Great Wall in early 1933 again exemplified Wang's "resisting while negotiating" formula. In March, Wang told his GMD comrades that "we need to resist before we negotiate . . . the stronger the resistance, the more likely our negotiations will succeed." He admitted that China would not win the war by resisting, "but resisting is much better than not resisting."<sup>22</sup> Privately, Wang expressed his wish to "gather the best of our Party strength and fight it out [with Japan], leaving the task of Li Hongzhang to others." This, however, he admitted, would be irresponsible, because it would leave North China in ruins and under Japanese occupation.<sup>23</sup>

Li Hongzhang, the late Qing official who negotiated the peace treaty with Japan after China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, was frequently used as a metaphor by Wang and other GMD leaders to describe the task of dealing with Japan during this period. The opposition leaders in Guangdong, for example, discussed among themselves the possibility of "playing the role of Li," once the Nanjing government had been broken in the war they were urging it to fight.<sup>24</sup> The liberal journal *Duli Pinglun* (Independent Review), ordinarily critical of the GMD, received the epithet "Li Hongzhang" because it supported Nanjing's willingness to compromise with Japan. The journal retorted that Li's failure was not due to compromise, but to not knowing how to compromise.<sup>25</sup> Wang evidently agreed with *Duli Pinglun*. He told Hu Shih, editor of the journal, that he could not find a qualified person or group in China—other than himself, that is—who knew how to compromise, and thus only he could "shoulder the task of Li Hongzhang."<sup>26</sup>

One person who seemed willing to attempt the role at this time was Huang Fu, a close friend of Jiang Jieshi's and the Nanjing government's chief negotiator in the Sino-Japanese talks during the battles along the Great Wall. Huang shared Wang's pessimism about international assistance and Wang's resentment of the irresponsible militancy displayed by some Chinese. Wang's instructions to Huang during the talks were clear: apart from signing any agreement which recognized the puppet state of Manchukuo or ceded the northeastern provinces (Manchuria), all other Japanese terms were acceptable. Wang also assured a frustrated and worried Huang that he would take full responsibility for the concessions made to Japan. His promise, in sharp contrast to Jiang's ambiguous public statements at the time, had an enormously comforting effect on Huang.<sup>27</sup>

Ultimately, the terms of the truce were determined by the situation on the battlefield. Chinese forces along the Great Wall collapsed during March and April. By mid-May, the Japanese were approaching the Beiping-Tianjin area. Unlike the situation in Jehol in 1932, Chinese troops did fight in 1933, but the result was still disappointing. Poor in weaponry and equipment, they could not hold out for long. In late May, Wang and Jiang authorized Huang Fu to sign the infamous Tanggu Truce Agreement, which recognized Japan's de facto control over eastern Hebei. Some years later Chen Gongbo recalled that Wang's confidence in China's ability to resist Japan by force was destroyed by the battles along the Great Wall.<sup>28</sup>

What discouraged Wang was not just the poor equipment and weaponry

of the Chinese troops. Throughout the conflict, Nanjing was unable to send any reinforcement to the northern front. In a message to He Yingqin, Jiang's deputy in the north, Wang apologized that the "troops in Jiangxi [for the anti-Communist campaign] cannot be moved, while the troops elsewhere refuse to move."<sup>29</sup> There was, in fact, little distinction between the two situations. Jiang's forces in Jiangxi could not be moved, and Jiang in any event would have refused to use them against the Japanese. The final decision was not in Wang's hands. Meanwhile, the battles along the Great Wall had produced a budgetary deficit of 50 million Chinese dollars, crushing the back of Wang's government.<sup>30</sup>

While the Tanggu negotiations were going on, Wang's finance minister and deputy premier T.V. Soong reported from the United States that an Anglo-American intervention might occur and that China should take a tougher position against Japan. When he returned to China later that year, Soong brought with him an American promise of support, at the price of a \$50 million cotton-and-wheat loan. Wang regarded such "support" as unreliable and costly.<sup>31</sup> China should not place her hope on help from the West, he confided to Hu Shih. Even if a world war should break out between Japan and a coalition of Western powers, China's best hope, in Wang's view, was to remain neutral, since a pro-Western stance would certainly provoke invasion and conquest by Japan. However, at present, China lacked the necessary military and financial strength to sustain that neutrality. It would be very unwise, therefore, to wish for an immediate confrontation between the West and Japan. What China must now do was buy as much time as possible in order to nurture her strength, so that neutrality would be sustainable in the future world war.<sup>32</sup>

The Tanggu Truce met with Nanjing's minimum conditions; the agreement was formally limited to military, not political, matters, and it made no mention of Manchuria. But in practically surrendering Chinese sovereignty in eastern Hebei, the truce marked one more step in yielding to Japanese territorial ambitions. Wang later expressed dissatisfaction with this second product of his "resisting while negotiating" policy. The Chinese had conducted their side of the negotiations poorly because of the "grudges, recklessness and insubordination" which characterized their behavior.<sup>33</sup> Wang was probably referring to the fact that he was not in full control of the negotiations, as Chen Gongbo suggested in his recollections.<sup>34</sup> But he may also have been complaining about the obstruction mounted by "hard-liners"

such as Lo Wengan and T. V. Soong. In order to have greater control over Japan policy, Wang himself took over as Foreign Minister from Lo, and Soong was dismissed as Finance Minister. These changes were jointly made by Wang and Jiang. From late 1933 until late 1935, Wang, Huang Fu (as head of the Beiping Political Reorganization Committee from May 1933), He Yingqin, and Deputy Foreign Minister Tang Youren were to bear the main responsibility of negotiating with Japan.

#### A PRO-JAPANESE FACTION?

Sino-Japanese negotiations during 1933–35 centered on the reestablishment of rail and postal links between North China and Japanese-occupied Manchuria, and, more importantly, on the efforts being made by Japan to reduce Nanjing's authority in North China. As a rule, the Japanese position was backed by the threat of military action. Wang, for his part, became increasingly hesitant to implement the "resistance" component of his formula following China's easy defeats along the Great Wall. In September 1933, Wang, Jiang, and the other GMD leaders met again at Lushan and agreed on an overall policy of "conciliation" in regard to internal and external matters affecting Japan. The negotiations on rail and postal links between North China and Manchuria, for example, ended with further major concessions by Nanjing.<sup>35</sup> For their acceptance of such demands, Wang and his associates soon came to be labeled the "pro-Japanese faction" in the Chinese government.

The most consistent and vocal critics of Wang's Japan policy were the members of the "Southwest Faction" in Guangzhou, whose leader was Hu Hanmin. Having been squeezed out of the center of power in 1931, Hu and his followers stood in vehement opposition to the Wang-Jiang coalition in Nanjing. Their favorite target was the Nanjing government's conciliatory attitude toward Japan.<sup>36</sup> With no responsibility for the actual management of foreign policy, they could afford to take the nationalistic high ground and accuse Wang and Jiang of being traitorously pro-Japanese.

In Nanjing, the official policy toward Japan was frequently criticized by Sun Fo (who had lost his position as premier to Wang in 1932) and the CC Clique (which had close connections to Jiang), as well as by a number of party elders. Although aware of the fact that policy was formulated jointly

by Wang and Jiang, they chose to focus their attack on Wang for fear of retaliation by Jiang. During the rail and postal links negotiations, Li Liejun, Wu Zhihui, and a few other party elders attempted to topple Wang on the grounds of his Japan policy and to reinstate T. V. Soong as premier.<sup>37</sup> In a telegram to Huang Fu, Wang said that he was “not angered but saddened by the pretension and grandiloquence of the Chinese.”<sup>38</sup>

Another group of Nanjing leaders who disagreed with Wang’s policy was the so-called “pro-Western faction,” which included T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung (Kong Xiangxi) and Lo Wengan. They favored a posture closer to the Western powers, and thus more hostile toward Japan, in the hope of enlisting Western support to deter Japan.<sup>39</sup> Hu Shih sympathized with this group. In a letter to Wang in late 1933, Hu advised Wang to pay more attention to the “idealistic trend in international relations” in recent years, and to have greater faith in the eventual arrival of Western aid. “What we need to do from now on,” Hu said, “is to cease yielding, and to begin gradually toughening our position.”<sup>40</sup>

Wang of course disagreed with Hu’s assessment, but to describe Wang and his associates as “pro-Japanese” overlooks the fact that their approach, which was to avoid for as long as possible a military confrontation with Japan, represented a consensus within the Nanjing leadership. The difference between Wang’s policy and that of the “pro-Western faction” lay in tactics rather than overall strategy. Before 1933, Wang also had placed hope on Western assistance, but he soon concluded that the Western countries, motivated by their own self-interest, would not save China from Japanese encroachment.<sup>41</sup> Thus he responded to Hu Shih’s advice with suspicion and cynicism. Western assistance was unreliable, he maintained. Furthermore, China possessed too much of what the foreigners wanted, and it would be naive to believe that once the Western powers drove out Japan they would not exploit China just as Japan had done. This was why China would find it difficult to preserve her neutrality in a world war.<sup>42</sup>

As for those who called for immediate war with Japan, but were not in a position to face the consequences of such a move, Wang viewed them with disgust and contempt. They “sang the high-flown tune” (*chang gaodiao*) in order to gain popular acclaim, he said, but offered no real solutions to the country’s problems. Wang compared them to the moralistic gentry-officials at the end of the Ming Dynasty, whose militant opinions had misled the government and contributed to the dynasty’s demise. “They knew nothing

about warfare, yet they attacked any peaceful settlement as traitorous," he charged in 1933, "and when the country was overrun by the enemy, they had no way to save it but could only perish with it."<sup>43</sup> In a letter to Hu Shih, Wang declared that he would rather be Yuan Chonghuan, the Ming general who was wrongly executed on charges of appeasement and treason, than Geshu Han, the Tang general who suffered disastrous defeat after being forced to lead an offensive against the enemy.<sup>44</sup> It was this reading of history that led Wang to sympathize with the pragmatic Li Hongzhang, who had to endure "high-flown" attacks from the "purist" (*qingliu*) party of his time.

To Wang the only guarantee of China's survival and independence was her own military and economic strength. In public statements he repeatedly emphasized the need for material and mental preparation for the inevitable showdown with Japan. That "showdown" might in fact be no more than the assertion of Chinese neutrality in an international conflict, but it nevertheless would require a degree of strength that China did not yet possess in the mid-1930s. A premature commitment to war therefore was suicidal.<sup>45</sup> In July 1935 Wang suggested to the new Japanese ambassador, Ariyoshi Akira, that he could only search for solutions to Sino-Japanese problems which might last for "five or ten years," because Japan's ambitions in China seemed impossible to satisfy. "What more does Japan want China to do?" he asked the ambassador bitterly.<sup>46</sup> Wang clearly saw the ultimate futility of appeasement, yet he deemed it necessary to maintain peace for at least "five or ten years," so that the domestic and international environment might change in China's favor.

Such a "pro-Japanese" view was shared by virtually everyone in the GMD leadership, including Jiang Jieshi. At their meetings in Lushan in 1933 and in Nanchang in 1934, Jiang invariably endorsed Wang's position in the ongoing talks between China and Japan.<sup>47</sup> At times Jiang appeared to be more "pro-Japanese" than Wang. In December 1934, in response to criticisms from Japan that China was "insincere" in her efforts at improving mutual relations, Jiang published the celebrated article, "Enemy or Friend?" (*Dihu youhu*), under Xu Daolin's name. Widely regarded as an important policy statement by Jiang on Sino-Japanese relations, the article criticized Wang's "resisting while negotiating" approach as ineffective. It also attacked the view that China could fight against Japan or the view that China could remain neutral in a future world war. The article proposed instead the search for a "genuine and lasting peace" between the two countries.<sup>48</sup> It was the first

time since 1932 that Jiang had indicated disapproval of Wang's Japan policy, and it was for not being conciliatory enough.

Yet anti-Japanese elements inside and outside the government continued to focus their criticisms on Wang. In mid-1935, in the humiliating wake of the He-Umezu Agreement and Qin-Doihara Agreement, Wang came under renewed attack. Wang later recalled that during the He-Umezu talks the defense of Beiping was extremely weak, and that the only alternative to a settlement would have been Japanese occupation of the city. Wang's observation was confirmed at the time by reports from He Yingqin, but those who were not well informed of the military situation in North China accused Wang of "selling out" the country.<sup>49</sup> Tired of defending his policy, and suspecting that Jiang was behind the attacks, Wang took another "sick leave" and then submitted his resignation in August. Jiang again came to Wang's comfort, and Wang soon resumed office. Wang, apparently, did not really want to give up his premiership, while Jiang's tactic was to maintain their alliance but to constantly remind Wang of his political vulnerability.

#### 1936: THE TURNING POINT

Wang's return to government lasted less than three months. On November 1, 1935, an assassination attempt brought Wang's guidance of Japan policy to an abrupt end. While undergoing treatment in hospital, Wang watched developments in the political situation in Nanjing. He was understandably dismayed when in December Jiang decided to assume the position of premier for himself. In February 1936 Wang took another trip to Europe, leaving his wife and other key assistants at home to monitor the condition of the Wang-Jiang coalition.<sup>50</sup> Wang's departure also sealed the end to his "Japan policy team." Huang Fu had resigned shortly after the conclusion of the rail and postal negotiations, and Tang Youren had been killed by an assassin two months after the attempt on Wang.

Many scholars have described Nanjing's Japan policy as taking on a beligerent character in Wang's absence.<sup>51</sup> On closer look, however, one finds that the underlying premise of Nanjing's position did not change during 1936. The battles in Suiyuan and the talks between the new Foreign Minister, Zhang Qun, and the Japanese represented a continuation of the formula of "resisting while negotiating." Under Jiang's premiership, China's basic position remained the same: all issues were negotiable except for the cession

of Manchuria and its recognition as Manchukuo. Despite Japanese instigation of the so-called "North China Autonomy" movement and rampant Japanese smuggling in the north, Jiang avoided full-scale conflict with Japan. His "final moment" (*zuihou guantou*) speech in November, generally regarded as signaling the emergence of a "hard-line" policy, did not depart from the theme of Wang's "bottom line" (*zuidi xiandu*) statement of 1932.<sup>52</sup>

Correspondence between Wang and his wife, Chen Bijun, suggests that Wang was ready to return to China as early as mid-1936, but two factors were causing him to waver as to precisely when to do so. On the one hand, Jiang was finally coming forward and conducting direct negotiations with Japan. It would be politically advantageous to Wang if he stayed away for a while and let Jiang take his due share of the blame for Nanjing's unpopular Japan policy. On the other hand, Nanjing was planning to convene a National People's Congress for the formation of a "constitutional government," and Wang wanted to return before the Congress closed so as to seek the presidency.<sup>53</sup> (The Congress was subsequently postponed.)

The detention of Jiang Jieshi in Xi'an by Zhang Xueliang in December must have been seen as a godsend by Wang and his followers. Wang obviously had no sympathy for Zhang Xueliang, but Jiang Jieshi's demise would leave him as the most prestigious leader in the GMD.<sup>54</sup> (Hu Hanmin had died earlier in the year.) Yet the Xi'an Incident was resolved peacefully while Wang was hastening back from Europe. The dramatic settlement of the crisis further enhanced Jiang's prestige as national leader. Moreover, as implied in the settlement, Jiang was now prepared to form an anti-Japanese united front with the Communists.

These developments surprised and frustrated Wang. Upon his return to Nanjing, Wang reiterated his old Japan policy formula: "In negotiating, we work for a return to diplomatic normalcy; in resisting, we fight to prevent any loss of national territory or sovereignty."<sup>55</sup> He called for the continuation of "domestic pacification before external resistance," and criticized the united front talks under way. There is no question as to the strength of Wang's anti-communism: his hostility dated back to 1927 and the Wuhan debacle and Guangzhou Commune of that year. But an equally important reason for Wang's opposition to the united front was that Jiang had been forced under duress to agree to it. The fact that the initiator of such a major policy change was Zhang Xueliang, whose unwillingness to fight the Japanese had so angered Wang, made it even less palatable to him. "China was sacrificed," he later recalled, "as ransom to Jiang's kidnappers!"<sup>56</sup> Wang also

believed that, as Jiang's partner in the coalition, he should have been consulted before a policy which he had publicly supported for years was abandoned. He showed his dissatisfaction in repeatedly citing the Xi'an Incident for its "disastrous effect" on the government's "overall plan and specific steps of national salvation."<sup>57</sup> When the Third Plenum of the GMD Fifth Central Committee, meeting in February 1937, signaled the party's readiness for a united front, Wang reminded members that decisions which proved to be "very inappropriate" could be reversed at a later plenum.<sup>58</sup>

#### ORIGINS OF THE "PEACE MOVEMENT"

Wang's conciliatory policy toward Japan in the early 1930s clearly resulted from his lack of confidence in the Chinese military. The poor performance of China's armies compromised Wang's policy of "resisting while negotiating" when he served as premier from 1932 and 1935. He could not expect those armies to sustain a long-term, full-scale war against a powerful Japan. Moreover, as a civilian leader, Wang had no control over military matters and thus could effect little improvement in the situation. In formulating a response to the Japanese threat, Wang therefore was limited in his options by the intentions and abilities of a military largely independent of the party and the government. Although Wang only protested against the incompetence and disobedience of the regional militarists, he would have realized that military separatism was but one aspect of the larger issue of military domination in GMD China. His government was powerless in handling either the regional military leaders or the "central military leader," Jiang Jieshi. Unless Jiang, who commanded the largest military forces in the country, agreed to fight, no one could enforce an armed resistance against Japan.

Wang's dilemma was compounded by his support for Jiang's principle of "domestic pacification before external resistance." Throughout the prewar years, Wang defended this agenda by suggesting that "domestic pacification" and "external resistance" were actually the same task. In order to fight effectively against Japan, he maintained that the government first had to eliminate the Communists, because they always obstructed the government's anti-Japanese efforts.<sup>59</sup> Like Jiang, Wang may have been too optimistic about the prospects of the anti-Communist campaigns. These campaigns

further reduced the resources available for Wang's "resisting while negotiating" policy, and forced him to compensate for ineffective resistance by increasing the dosage of humiliating negotiation. Wang, as premier, took a greater share of the blame for this than Jiang.

To relieve himself of this ineffectual and thankless job, Wang certainly had the option of resigning. His repeated "sick leaves" and resignations in the prewar years indicated that he was aware of this option. But, as a politician, Wang desired to be in the government and to enjoy at least the facade of power. The experience of opposition and defeat in 1928–31 taught him a painful lesson. Until the outbreak of the war, he never completely gave up hope in the Wang-Jiang coalition. To justify remaining in office, Wang provided himself with an unusual rationale. In 1935, when advised to resign from the unpopular post of Foreign Minister, Wang told his loyal follower Chen Gongbo that he would continue in office. Now in his fifties, he was "willing to be a sacrifice" in the dangerous work of dealing with Japan.<sup>60</sup> In 1936, Wang told his wife similarly that he was prepared to take full responsibility for Nanjing's Japan policy, because "someone else" (i.e., Jiang) could not share it with him at this time "due to certain considerations." It was a worthy act, Wang proclaimed, to sacrifice one's life or reputation for the sake of one's country.<sup>61</sup> There may have been a large measure of truth in his avowals. That romantic longing for martyrdom, which had once motivated Wang to attempt the assassination of the Manchu regent in 1910, helped transform his political predicament in the 1930s into a further opportunity for self-sacrifice.

This self-image was reinforced by some of the positive assessments Wang received as a policy-maker before the war. His courage to speak frankly of China's weakness and to shoulder the unpopular task of making compromises with Japan had won him praise among the country's leading intellectuals. In their political commentaries in *Duli Pinglun*, Hu Shih, T. F. Tsiang, and Fu Sinian not only regarded Wang's Japan policy as responsible and practical, but considered Wang's administration as a much needed civilian balance to Jiang Jieshi's military rule.<sup>62</sup> For their part, the Japanese, adopting a strategy of "divide and rule," repeatedly indicated their trust in Wang, and their preference in dealing with him ahead of any other Chinese leader.<sup>63</sup> All of the above enhanced Wang's confidence in his credibility as a negotiator with Japan. He once proudly informed Hu Shih that he could

find no other person equally capable of “handling foreign policy within the broad perspective of national military and economic conditions . . . in a spirit of unselfish sacrifice.”<sup>64</sup> Later, this confidence would embolden him to challenge Jiang and the “purist” party with a new Japan policy.

The “new” policy proposed by Wang was essentially the “old” policy he had pursued in the prewar period. While Jiang had abandoned his “domestic pacification before external resistance” agenda after the Xi’an Incident, Wang still insisted on “resisting while negotiating” as the best approach to the problem of Japanese aggression after the war broke out. In fact, Jiang’s commitment to armed resistance in 1937 allowed, for the first time, an actual implementation of Wang’s formula. But Jiang’s decision to use his best troops in the opening months of the war led Wang to believe that China was quickly exhausting her military strength. Wang remained pessimistic about the unity and capability of the Chinese military. The easy victories gained by the Japanese in late 1937 through 1938 at Nanjing, Wuhan, and Canton confirmed him in his pessimism. Even Jiang Jieshi, according to one source, had estimated shortly after the outbreak of the war that China could hold out for only six months.<sup>65</sup> In late 1938, therefore, Wang concluded that the Chinese had put forth an admirable but unsuccessful effort in “resistance,” which had also been costly to Japan, and that it was again time for “negotiation.”<sup>66</sup>

On the diplomatic front, the new wartime situation seemed to echo Wang’s prewar experience. By late 1938, China still had not formally declared war against Japan, and the West still had not offered real assistance to China. Jiang’s hope for intervention by the Nine-Power Treaty signatories had proven to be as unrealistic as his earlier dependence on the League of Nations. Meanwhile, Konoe Fumimaro’s *aite ni sezu* announcement, breaking off all contact between Japan and any Chinese government headed by Jiang Jieshi, had created an impasse to Sino-Japanese rapprochement that had to be removed. Still putting his faith in direct negotiations, Wang believed that the loss of the critical Lower Yangtze region necessitated new compromises, such as the recognition of Manchukuo, in order to reopen talks with Japan.<sup>67</sup> The government’s positive response to German mediation in December 1937, shortly before the fall of Nanjing, convinced Wang that not only were new compromises acceptable to his comrades, but that his approach of “resisting while negotiating” still represented the consensus of the GMD leadership.<sup>68</sup>

To point out the consistency of Wang's position on Japan before and after the war broke out is not to ignore new power politics considerations that now entered his thinking. In the prewar years, Wang had demonstrated his indispensability to the GMD government foremost in the area of negotiating with Japan. But once the Nationalist government was in open, if undeclared, war with Japan the need for such services began to diminish. At the same time, Jiang's power grew rapidly due to the exigencies of wartime command. Wang therefore saw the reopening of peace negotiations as a chance to regain the power he had lost to Jiang. Indeed, if the peace initiative was to prove successful, Wang and his followers would likely dominate the post-war Chinese government. The irony is that, in order to challenge Jiang's "military dictatorship," Wang needed the backing of other "barrels of the gun." His initial plan in 1938 was to seek the support of regional militarists, whose independence he had bitterly criticized in 1932–35, to help topple Jiang's government in Chongqing.<sup>69</sup> The desperation of Wang's plan reveals the predicament of civilian politicians in Republican China.

Wang, of course, could not predict the success of his "peace movement" when he launched it in Hanoi. What was certain to him was the belief that the alternative to peace, continued resistance, would only bring defeat and destruction to China. To avoid this terrible consequence, Wang decided once more to play the role of "Li Hongzhang." It was a role with which he was familiar, and it might also lead to the restoration of his prewar influence. If it did not do so, he was ready to become a martyr. As he declared in 1933, negotiating with Japan was like "jumping into the fire" (*tiao huokeng*).<sup>70</sup> He would be willing to forsake his reputation for the survival of the country. That strange mixture of romantic longing for self-sacrifice and shrewd calculation of political advantage now came to the forefront again, and now propelled Wang onto the precarious and ultimately tragic course of his "peace movement."

T W O

## Regional Office and the National Interest: Song Zheyuan in North China, 1933–1937

MARJORIE DRYBURGH

The tensions in the region-nation relationship that so dominated the domestic politics of interwar China also influenced China's relations with Japan. In the crucial prewar years of 1933–37, as Japanese China policy was increasingly governed by military preoccupations and priorities, the Japanese armies in the field moved to extend their political and military influence in the provinces of north China, developing independent contacts with regional leaders and sidelining the central government in Nanjing. Thus the contestation between center and region for power and responsibility, which affected domestic issues such as administrative reform and taxation, also impinged on China's quest for security and international equality; and the national interest in relations with Japan lay in the hands of those who held regional office.<sup>1</sup>

The occupation in 1931–33 of the four northeastern provinces by the Kwantung Army (*Kantōgun*) and the establishment of the puppet state of Manchouguo extended Japanese military and political control as far as the Great Wall. In the immediate aftermath of the Japanese attack on Manchuria in September 1931, the Chinese central government had ap-

peared unwilling to engage the Japanese authorities in direct bilateral discussions. This omission was to be cited as a principal reason for the ensuing deadlock in government-to-government talks.<sup>2</sup> Thereafter north China, in particular the provinces of Hebei and Chaha'er, became the stage for an intense political struggle between the Chinese central and regional authorities, and the Japanese armies based in the region: the Kwantung army and the Tianjin-based North China Garrison Army (*Kaboku chūtongun*: NCGA).

The Japanese armies focused their efforts on undermining structures of central authority in Hebei-Chaha'er; and their success in this enterprise threw the burden of dealing with the Japanese authorities onto provincial officials. The progressive exclusion of the central government from discussions in north China on issues of national importance inhibited the development between center and region of a coordinated response to the Japanese threat, increasing the vulnerability of the north and eroding the credibility of the central government. By early 1935, when Nanjing began systematic efforts to establish a productive dialogue with the Japanese government, it was not formal diplomatic contacts in Nanjing or Tokyo but informal discussions in the north between regional officials and the Japanese armies that underpinned developments in the Sino-Japanese relationship and defined the limits of the possible.

The escalating Sino-Japanese confrontation has generally been represented as a simple clash between the forces of Japanese imperialism and a fragile but growing Chinese nationalism; but it rather should be seen as a web of smaller conflicts whose interrelation was governed by internal tensions and shifting allegiances. This essay will focus on the conflict between the Japanese armies, the Chinese central government, and the regional authorities in Hebei-Chaha'er under the leadership of 29th Army commander Song Zheyuan, who served successively as provincial governor of Chaha'er, garrison commander of Beiping-Tianjin, and chairman of the supra-provincial Hebei-Chaha'er Political Council.

An examination of the development of these regional Sino-Japanese interactions and Song Zheyuan's role therein offers insights into shifting perceptions of regional and national interests and prerogatives and the relations between them. In this essay, I shall begin by examining the early career of Song Zheyuan as it informed his position as a regional leader within a national context. I shall then outline the processes by which the

Sino-Japanese relationship became regionalized, tracing the shift of focus in Japanese military pressure from central to regional structures in the north, before moving on to specific examples of interactions between Song Zheyuan and the Japanese armies.

FROM NATION TO REGION:  
THE EARLY CAREER OF SONG ZHEYUAN

Song Zheyuan was regarded by the mid-1930s both by the Chinese central government and by the Japanese authorities as a figure of essentially regional importance and attachments, yet the evidence of his career is more ambiguous. He was born in 1885 in northwestern Shandong. His father was educated but had no official post and made a precarious living as a teacher and secretary. Song himself was educated by his father and grandfather from the age of seven, but in 1901 had to give up his studies and take work to support his family. According to his biographers, the national disasters from the 1890s onwards had a powerful effect on him. Song would have been aware of the Sino-Japanese war of 1895 and of the German occupation of Jiaozhou Bay; and he was visiting Beijing with his father at the time of the Boxer rebellion in 1900.<sup>3</sup>

In 1906, the year after the Russo-Japanese war, Song's father used family connections to get Song admitted to military school in Beijing. After graduating in 1910, Song served first the imperial government, then the Beijing-based regimes that succeeded it.<sup>4</sup> Under the command of Feng Yuxiang, Song was chiefly involved in the suppression of anti-centrist challenges: the Bai Lang rising of 1914, the "National Protection" (*huguo*) movement in 1916, and the embryonic federalist movement in 1920.<sup>5</sup> There is no evidence that the alternative China proposed by the federalists, with its radical reformulation of the center-region relationship, held any appeal for Song. In his early career, his interests and allegiances remained with regimes that, although they could not wield control from a stable center over a unified China, nonetheless based their claims to legitimacy on their adherence to the goals of reunification and centralization.

With the shift of the political center to Nanjing after the Northern Expedition, Song's position changed. Having begun his career on the national stage in 1910, Song was confined after 1927 to the marginalized and shrink-

ing region of Hebei-Chaha'er-Rehe, an area that was increasingly threatened through the 1930s by Japanese advances from Manchuria. While his political roots were not in a "regionalism" expressed as a rejection of central authority, his personal political horizons were now defined by his regional office: he had had a regional role thrust upon him.

Although Song switched his allegiance *de facto* to the central government of the day, joining forces with Nanjing and the Guomindang (GMD) under the leadership of Feng Yuxiang in 1927, his relationship with the Nanjing government was to remain uneasy. In 1929, with Feng and Yan Xishan, he rebelled against Nanjing in protest at the proposed military reforms in the north. He was expelled from the Party and dismissed from all his political posts. However, in 1930, as the Yan-Feng coalition began to crumble and the intervention of Zhang Xueliang made its defeat seem inevitable, Song sided once again with the center and thereby contributed to the collapse of the northern revolt. This last move secured his position in north China as Nanjing began efforts to bring the region more fully under its control. In late 1930, Feng Yuxiang admitted defeat and retired to Taishan, and his North-western Army (*Xibeijun*) was reorganized into the 90,000-strong 29th Army under Song's command. In December 1931 Song was appointed to the Northeast Political Council, chaired by Zhang Xueliang. He rode out the political storm which blew up over Zhang Xueliang's resignation from his north China posts and was appointed governor of Chaha'er province in August 1932.<sup>6</sup>

Song and the 29th Army played a major role in resistance to the Japanese advance through Rehe in spring 1933. The heroic, if doomed, struggle of Song's forces at the battles of Xifengkou and Luowenyu caught the national imagination and established Song's reputation as a hero of national resistance. Books devoted to the bloody exploits of the 29th Army were appearing in Shanghai by March, and the Patriotic Book Company (*Aiguo shudian*) published a biography of Song in May.<sup>7</sup> Song Zheyuan remained at this point close to the Nanjing line on limiting the scope of resistance. When Feng Yuxiang emerged from retirement to organize the People's Anti-Japanese Allied Army (*Minzhong kangRi tongmengjun*) in Chaha'er in May 1933, Song dissociated himself from Feng. When Feng withdrew, the residue of these forces was passed over to Song.<sup>8</sup>

Thus between 1927 and 1933 Song Zheyuan survived the successive crises which afflicted north China, while gradually enhancing his personal position

in the region. His military status was assured by his command of the 29th Army. The troops of the former Northwestern Army were, by the standards of the time, well trained and well equipped, and in the campaigns of 1933 had proved themselves dedicated, if ultimately ineffective in the face of Japanese military superiority. Song's position as commander after Feng's retirement appeared unchallenged: as one of Feng's five "tiger generals" he seemed a natural successor to Feng, and his peers—Lu Zhonglin, Liu Yufen, Zhang Zhijiang, and Li Mingzhong—did not challenge his assumption of command of Feng's forces. Song's immediate subordinates in 1933–37, from his second-in-command Qin Dechun to divisional commanders Liu Ruming, Zhang Zizhong, and Feng Zhian, were all long-standing associates of his.

Song's political position was rather less secure. Key officers of the 29th Army, for example Qin Dechun, filled important posts in the Chaha'er provincial government, yet outside Chaha'er province Song's power base was limited. Along with other major political and military figures in the north, Song was appointed to supra-provincial organizations such as the Beiping Branch Military Council (*Junshi weiyuanhui Beiping fenhui*: BMC) and the Beiping Political Affairs Commission (*Beiping zhengwu zhengli weiyuanhui*: PAC). However, these organizations existed principally to serve as channels for the transmission of orders from the center, and to formalize the position of their chairmen, He Yingqin and Huang Fu, as representatives of the central authority in the north. These organizations did little to give voice to the concerns of northern leaders.<sup>9</sup> Song's relations with He Yingqin and Huang Fu were not good, and he was handicapped by his lack of important personal contacts at the center.<sup>10</sup> Yet while Song's confinement to the endangered north might imply political as well as geographical marginalization, the threat facing north China meant that he remained a key figure in national affairs.

#### THE REGIONALIZATION OF THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT: FROM THE TANGGU TRUCE TO THE NORTH CHINA AUTONOMY MOVEMENT

The early years of the Sino-Japanese conflict in north China had been dominated by the Japanese military occupation in the twenty months between September 1931 and May 1933 of the three northeastern provinces and Rehe.

This primarily military phase of the conflict was formally ended by the Tanggu ceasefire agreement of May 1933. It was succeeded by a fierce political struggle for control of the north.

The five-clause Tanggu agreement itself was an unexceptional document. It stipulated that Chinese and Japanese forces were to withdraw from the conflict zone in east Hebei, demarcated in the north by the Great Wall and in the south by a line drawn from Yanqing in northwest Hebei through Tongzhou, near Beiping, to Lutai on the coast. The Chinese authorities undertook to refrain from any provocative or disruptive actions, and the Japanese command was granted the right to verify Chinese withdrawal. In the demilitarized zone order was to be kept by Chinese Peace Preservation Corps (*baoandui*: PPC). Two further provisions were not made public in China at the time. The first of these was that units hostile to the Japanese were not to be included in the PPC; the second was that any disturbances that the PPC could not settle would be resolved by agreement between the Chinese and Japanese authorities.<sup>11</sup>

For the Nanjing government, the Tanggu agreement was initially seen as a purely military agreement with no wider political significance, and its provisions were assumed to be limited to the immediate aftermath of the conflict. Thus the humiliation of accepting the demilitarization of a large area of east Hebei, and of concluding an agreement in which the burden of blame was placed not on Japan but on China, was seen as preferable to prolonging a conflict which threatened to engulf the key cities of Beiping and Tianjin. However, in the hands of the Japanese military, the Tanggu agreement became an infinitely flexible instrument; and its creative reinterpretation assured it a place as a key text not only of the military phase of the conflict but also of the political phase which followed.

In practice the Japanese armies treated the agreement as effective *sine die*, and through progressive reinterpretation of its clauses made it the basis for extension of Japanese political and military control in Hebei-Chaha'er. The ceasefire agreement was cited to justify repeated Japanese forays into the demilitarized zone. The exclusion of Chinese army units from the area allowed bandit activity to flourish. Japanese commanders accused Chinese officials of lacking commitment to peacekeeping, and assumed a near-autonomous role in suppressing disturbances. Provincial governor Yu Xuezhong lamented the restrictions that this Japanese arrogation of author-

ity imposed on Chinese political power in east Hebei, and accused Japanese forces of taking advantage of the unpoliced state of the demilitarized zone to continue the smuggling of drugs and silver between Hebei and Manchuria.<sup>12</sup>

The Japanese armies also aspired to extend the scope of the original agreement in geographical terms. In early 1935, a dispute over the Chaha'er-Rehe border resulted in renewed fighting between Manchurian forces and units of Song's 29th Army. Invoking the spirit of the Tanggu truce, Japanese officials demanded a northward extension of the demilitarized zone, by removing a line of villages along the Great Wall from the control of the provincial authorities. This extension of Japanese control would also threaten an expansion into Chaha'er of the disorders besetting east Hebei, and in effect would extend still further the territory of Manchuria.<sup>13</sup>

However, the most damaging uses of the ceasefire agreement were political. The stipulation that the police force of the demilitarized zone should not be composed of units hostile to Japan was transformed by mid-1935 into an assertion that hostility toward Japan on the part of any provincial official in Hebei constituted an infringement of the spirit of the agreement. In May 1935, bandit units created further disorders in the demilitarized zone, and two newspaper editors known for their close Japanese connections were murdered in Tianjin. The NCGA, alleging official collusion, again invoked the Tanggu truce to demand the dismissal of a number of Hebei officials, including the provincial governor, Yu Xuezhong.<sup>14</sup> Thus, on the basis of the ceasefire agreement, the Japanese military were able to gain considerable freedom of action in those parts of Hebei-Chaha'er which bordered on Manchuria. They were able to secure official Chinese compliance with their actions in the region, and to exercise a veto over even senior political appointments.

Even before the Japanese utilization of the ceasefire agreement for their own interests became apparent, the Nanjing government recognized that the Japanese presence in Manchuria had serious implications for the north. Just as the relatively low level of training of many northern armies left the north militarily weak, so did the inherent tensions in the relationship between the center and the north leave the region politically vulnerable. Provincial officials in the north were appointed by Nanjing and reported to the center, yet it was felt in Nanjing that the integration of these people into the national project fell far short of the center's expectations. The regional government was dominated by northerners who had little apparent sympathy with

GMD ideology or Nanjing's centralizing ambitions. There was ample opportunity for the Japanese military to advance their position in the north by playing on regional tensions with the center.<sup>15</sup>

Nanjing therefore sought from mid-1933 to strengthen its position in the region from within. Senior central officials were appointed to lead key regional organizations: He Yingqin replaced Zhang Xueliang as chairman of the Beiping Branch Military Council and Huang Fu was installed as head of the newly established Political Affairs Commission. These organizations were responsible for the management of north China affairs, which were directly related to the Japanese presence, as for example the restoration of transport and communication links between China and Manchuria. The councils included in their membership most of the senior political and military leaders in north China, such as army commanders and provincial governors, along with a handful of eminent figures including Beijing University president Jiang Menglin. However, the councils reached their decisions only after discussion with the central government in Nanjing, and their general business remained in the hands of He Yingqin, Huang Fu, and a few close aides. For northern representatives, appointment to the councils did not imply participation in decision making or even in important discussions.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, while the councils appear at first sight to be bridging organizations between center and region, their integrative functions were purely nominal, and their impact on the management of north China affairs was limited. When relations between central and regional authorities did improve, it appears to have been the result of relationships forged between individuals. For example, Liu Jianqun, who was assigned to the 29th Army as political education officer, regarded his major achievement to have been the winning of Song Zheyuan's personal confidence. Liu made little claim to have furthered Song's appreciation of GMD ideology.<sup>17</sup>

For a time the Japanese armies accepted that it was both necessary and possible to deal with the BMC and the PAC. However, this central presence became increasingly unwelcome, and Japanese political initiatives became more overtly anti-center as they gathered momentum. By mid-1935, the BMC and the PAC were themselves classified by the Japanese as part of the problem of the north. Nanjing was accused of draining the north's resources to fund them. The councils were described as redundant and unable to find solutions to concrete problems such as cross-border trade; they were identified as irredeemably central and therefore inappropriate partners in the quest

for regional solutions to regional problems; and they were accused of sheltering officials hostile to Japan and of fomenting anti-Japanese feeling.<sup>18</sup> With the signing of the He-Umezu Agreement in June 1935, the central presence in the political and military infrastructure of the BMC and PAC was eliminated. Central army and police units under the BMC were withdrawn from the region, and the BMC political education division was closed down, as were all GMD party branches in Hebei.<sup>19</sup> At the same time, the response of the central authorities showed observers in the north that while Nanjing was gravely alarmed at the prospect of withdrawing central army units from Hebei-Chaha'er, the sacrifice of regional officials such as Yu Xuezhong to the Japanese was not incompatible with the "national" interest as defined in the capital.<sup>20</sup>

By late June 1935, both He Yingqin and Huang Fu had returned to the capital, believing that their continued presence in the north would only further provoke the Japanese. With their departure Japanese political initiatives flourished.<sup>21</sup> By autumn, a movement to promote "autonomy" for the five north China provinces of Hebei, Chaha'er, Shanxi, Shandong, and Suiyuan had taken shape. Autonomy here was defined as freedom—under Japanese tutelage—from the financial and political control of the Nanjing government. Under the direction of Doihara Kenji, Kwantung Army special services chief in Changchun, Japanese army pressure on northern political leaders to participate in an autonomous north China regime was intensified. Retired politicians such as Cao Kun, Wu Peifu, and Duan Qirui were also targeted.<sup>22</sup> By late autumn the semblance of a pro-autonomy popular base had been created in Beiping, Tianjin, and parts of rural Hebei.<sup>23</sup>

This emergence of the autonomy movement brought the provincial governments into direct contact with the Japanese; and it is in this context that Song Zheyuan moved toward center stage. Nanjing was uneasy with the prospect of entrusting the defense of north China to provincial authorities. The BMC and the PAC had been created precisely to avoid this. The only involvement to date of regional officials in Sino-Japanese discussions had been in transmitting responses decided at the center, which they had no power to influence.<sup>24</sup> Huang Fu was openly mistrustful of northern officials, and reports from north China suggested that Song Zheyuan did not possess the resolve and subtlety needed to withstand Japanese threats and blandishments.<sup>25</sup> This distrust was reciprocated: the dismissal of Yu Xuezhong and later of Song Zheyuan himself showed that provincial officials in conflict

with the Japanese could not be sure of receiving the support of the center. The withdrawal of central army units in June led to further doubts about Nanjing's commitment to the defense of the north.

Pro-autonomy agitation developed under Doihara's guidance in October and November 1935 into an open movement for the formal secession of the five north China provinces, yet the movement ultimately failed to achieve its goal. It peaked in November 1935 with the establishment at Tongzhou, east Hebei, of a Japanese-sponsored regime under the nominal leadership of Yin Rugeng, a minor Hebei official who had neither the political stature nor the military resources of Song Zheyuan. In December, Nanjing moved to reestablish some form of administrative control in Hebei-Chaha'er. Nanjing dissolved the BMC and established a new Hebei-Chaha'er Political Council in its place with Song Zheyuan as chairman. The council reported directly to the Executive Yuan, and had responsibility for political and military affairs in the two provinces. Nanjing formally withheld from Song the full autonomy which the Japanese military continued to demand for him, but the lack of any effective mechanism of control meant that in practice Song could act without reference to the center.

#### PATTERNS OF REGIONAL INTERACTION: SONG ZHEYUAN AND THE JAPANESE ARMIES

From the autonomy movement of late 1935 until the outbreak of war in 1937, Song Zheyuan had to maneuver within an extremely narrow territory of coexistence with the Japanese, avoiding provocation of them on the one hand and submission to them on the other. Faced with national crises such as the Xi'an Incident, and with Japanese demands for discussions on the political and economic future of north China, he was obliged to balance the conflicting demands of personal survival and moral accountability.

The ambiguity of Song Zheyuan's position throughout the autonomy movement stands in contrast to the apparently unrelieved hostility of his attitude toward the Japanese armies before mid-1935. Song's anti-Japanese credentials, established during the Rehe campaign of 1933, were reinforced by a series of incidents in Chaha'er in 1934-35, from the arrest of Japanese nationals for failing to produce proper travel documents to clashes between his 29th Army and Japanese or Japanese-sponsored forces on the Chaha'er-

Rehe border. While the central government urged regional officials to adopt a resolute attitude in their dealings with Japan, Song, by inviting retaliation from the Japanese forces, was thought to go too far. When the detention by 29th Army officers of two Japanese special services officers in May 1935 again provoked the anger of the Kwantung Army, the central government removed Song as governor of Chaha'er. Unlike Yu Xuezhong, Song Zheyuan was not offered the face-saving option of resigning from his post; and he was at first given no indication of what his next appointment might be.

Former associates record that between his dismissal in June and his appointment in August as Garrison Commander of Beiping-Tianjin, Song Zheyuan began to cultivate, either directly or through his subordinates, more amicable relations with the Japanese. Explanations of this new approach vary. On the one hand, it is suggested by Song's secretary Wang Shijiu and his gambling partner Qi Xiemin that it was pique at his dismissal, and fear that the loss of his position in Chaha'er would lead to the breakup of the 29th Army and the dissolution of his own power base, that diverted Song from resistance into the more dangerous waters of cooperation.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, Xiao Zhenying, the senior aide most closely involved in discussions with the Japanese, recalls that Song took this step only reluctantly. Xiao appears to suggest that it was Song's desire to remain in north China at the forefront of resistance to Japan that forced him into a hollow show of amity; he also states that Chiang Kai-shek was aware of Song's intentions.<sup>27</sup> Whatever Song's motives, his stature as a military and political leader attracted the attention of the Japanese armies as they sought a senior Chinese figurehead for the proposed regime. Although Song was not the only recipient of Japanese overtures, no other leading official in the north was so assiduously courted.<sup>28</sup>

The pattern of Song Zheyuan's dealings with the Japanese at the time of the autonomy movement suggests a substantial degree of alienation on his part from the central government. As the Japanese stepped up their efforts in late 1935 to promote autonomy for north China, Song was repeatedly mentioned in reports to Nanjing as the target of Japanese overtures. In response he persistently denied any personal involvement in Japanese plans for establishment of an autonomous regime, and rejected any suggestion that he was linked to this movement through his aide, Xiao Zhenying.<sup>29</sup> Only after months of rumors, when he was presented by Doihara with an ultimatum to declare autonomy for north China or face military reprisals,

did he hint that he might have taken a more active role in discussions with the Japanese than he had previously admitted; and in this respect he presented himself as the passive object of Japanese intrigues and threats. On November 19, 1935, he cabled Chiang Kai-shek:<sup>30</sup>

We have had no choice but to begin exploratory discussions with them, while supporting the centralized system and remaining within the following limits: non-intervention in China's domestic politics, non-infringement of China's territory, equality and mutual amity. . . .

Chiang replied immediately with the rebuke that Song was exceeding his powers as a local official and risked being drawn into Japanese schemes for the north. He ordered Song to suspend his contacts with the Japanese and assured him, without providing any details, that the center would find a solution to the crisis. It was only with some difficulty that Song disentangled himself from his discussions with the Japanese. Liu Jianqun, who was sent by Chiang for talks with Song in late November, stated that it was only by refusing to play second fiddle to Yin Rugeng in a declaration of autonomy that Song managed to extricate himself.<sup>31</sup>

Thus Song had been drawn into discussions with the Japanese armies, which he concealed at first from the central government; and he had hinted at the extent of those discussions and appealed for central support only when it appeared that he was on the verge of being held to a compromising agreement. This pattern was repeated in 1936 when, as chairman of the Hebei-Chaha'er Political Council, he was presented with Japanese demands for political, military, and economic cooperation in Hebei-Chaha'er.

In spring 1936 the NCGA proposed joint political and military action to defend Hebei-Chaha'er against the spread of communism. There were widespread rumors in the press of these discussions and, according to Japanese sources, an agreement was concluded on March 30. However, even in mid-April Song's subordinates Xiao Zhenying and Qin Dechun were still assuring Nanjing that they saw the suppression of communism as a question of China's domestic politics in which Japan could have no role. It is interesting to note that when they echoed Song's words calling for recognition of Chinese sovereignty and non-intervention in China's domestic affairs as the basis of any discussion, the center did not repeat Chiang's admonition of November 1935 that they were exceeding their power as regional officials.<sup>32</sup>

In late summer and autumn 1936, Song discussed with the NCGA com-

mander Tashiro Kan'ichirō the possibility of joint Sino-Japanese economic development of the region with an initial focus on mineral extraction, agriculture, textile production, and communications.<sup>33</sup> According to Japanese sources, a preliminary agreement was concluded by October 1, but it was not until several weeks later that Song reported the content of these discussions to Nanjing.<sup>34</sup> Between the conclusion of the agreement and his report to the central government, Song had, at Chiang Kai-shek's request, sent a representative, Zhang Yueting, to Nanjing. Zhang met Chiang and He Yingqin, but returned to Beiping without attending the discussions on north China affairs and without, it appears, mentioning the outcome of Song's discussions with Tashiro. Zhang later recalled Chiang Kai-shek's concern that Song be in closer liaison with the center.<sup>35</sup> Nanjing responded to Song's report of his discussions with Tashiro by warning that no agreement on joint economic enterprises would be considered valid without the center's prior approval.<sup>36</sup>

After the talks on economic cooperation were suspended, Song found himself in a more constrained position. In the winter of 1936–37, following the Japanese attack on Suiyuan, Song appeared to watch and wait, avoiding any open declaration of his position. This prompted speculation in Nanjing that Song secretly welcomed the Japanese attack on the province. However, the Japanese were also uneasy with Song's policy of "resolute neutrality."<sup>37</sup> Song controlled railway freight traffic west from Beiping, and thus could materially affect the conduct and outcome of the campaign. Neither Nanjing nor the Japanese were confident of his cooperation.<sup>38</sup> Song, however, was most aware of the need not to antagonize the Japanese. According to a report received in Tokyo in early December, Song had declared that despite the efforts of Chiang Kai-shek to involve him, he sought to exercise the "greatest caution" in approaching the Suiyuan problem.<sup>39</sup>

During the Xi'an Incident, however, Song began to move cautiously toward realignment with Nanjing. On the night of December 12 he was informed of the event by Zhang Xueliang, who invited him to send a representative to Xi'an for talks. Song declined to do so; instead, he urged Zhang to consider the national interest and the long-term implications of his actions, and to ensure Chiang's safety. In correspondence with He Yingqin, Song referred to the incident as an act of treachery (*panbian*) and a product of communist influence on Zhang. When pressed by the NCGA to make a public statement on the incident, he declared his intention to maintain

order in Hebei-Chaha'er and, undoubtedly to the irritation of the Japanese, his intention to follow the orders of the center, regardless of Chiang Kai-shek's personal situation. Thereafter he avoided further meetings with the Japanese, pleading illness. He also dissociated himself from the position taken by the Shandong provincial governor, Han Fujun, who openly praised Zhang Xueliang's actions. Subsequently he persuaded Han to recant and give his support to a political solution to the crisis.<sup>40</sup>

Despite these moves toward Nanjing, Song responded to the Lugouqiao Incident in July 1937 in a manner designed to alarm and exasperate the center. He ignored Nanjing's orders to leave the Beiping-Tianjin area and conduct the defense of Hebei from Baoding, and he failed to keep the center informed of his own troop movements and intentions. Diplomatic and military authorities in Nanjing alike complained of the absence of detailed reports from him. The Foreign Ministry alluded to "grossly inadequate communication between center and region."<sup>41</sup> As with the earlier autonomy movement, Nanjing feared that Song would be duped by aides and hangers-on into betraying the national interest. News reaching the capital of Song's approval of the ceasefire concluded on July 11 appeared to confirm this. Tang Shengzhi fulminated on July 14, "Song is already pursuing compromise beyond the limits permitted by the center. . . ." <sup>42</sup> Song himself did not report the ceasefire terms to Nanjing until July 22, commenting that he had intended to cable for instructions but had been prevented from doing so by renewed fighting.<sup>43</sup>

Reports from officials sent to the north China front were no more encouraging: Xiong Bin of the General Staff commented that officials in Hebei showed little understanding of Nanjing's intentions; his colleague Sun Lianzhong went further, describing officials in Baoding as "hostile and deceitful"; and there is abundant anecdotal evidence that other central officials found Song himself distinctly uncooperative.<sup>44</sup> Gradually, however, central officials came to understand the delicacy of Song's position. They saw his noncommittal public stance as evidence of his fear of provoking an escalation of the incident rather than of complacency or reluctance to resist. Nanjing therefore adopted a more appreciative tone in its communications with him.<sup>45</sup>

Song's efforts to prevent escalation of the incident were in vain, and Beiping fell on July 29. Song offered his resignation on July 30, but it was refused. He was blamed by many for the loss of Beiping. There were attempts in Nanjing to have him impeached by the Control Yuan, and he

received letters and telephone calls that reproached him for failing to defend the ancient capital and accused him of selling out the nation's interests. Chiang Kai-shek defended Song, saying that he had followed the orders of the center, and appointed him to a senior post in the reorganized resistance forces, with responsibility for the First War Zone.<sup>46</sup> Song retained this post until his retirement on grounds of ill health in 1939.

#### PERCEPTIONS OF REGIONAL INTERACTION

Given the disruptive potential of Song's dealings with the Japanese, how were Song's activities seen by the central government? Was he, as a regional official, recognized as an adequate guardian of the national interest? Nanjing undoubtedly saw Song Zheyuan as a problem. Yet, as Japanese opposition to the central presence in the north grew from late 1935, there was in practice little the center could do to restrain him, and he was able to ignore with impunity orders it passed down. Once established as chairman of the Hebei-Chaha'er Political Council in December 1935, Song could not be dismissed, as there was no obvious, reliable candidate to replace him.

Unable to command Song's unconditional obedience, Nanjing was obliged to cultivate his allegiance, assuring him of the center's confidence in his rectitude and loyalty, while furthering personal relations between him and its officials. The appointment of Feng Yuxiang as co-vice-chairman of the Military Affairs Commission in November 1935 created a direct personal link between Song and the center. On the evidence of their correspondence, Feng sought to engage Song more deeply in the political side of his position, and to remind him of its national implications.<sup>47</sup>

Song was perceived less as a potential defector than as an honest if sometimes misguided ally. If he risked jeopardizing the national interest, he did so through a genuine inability to appreciate the complexities of the situation confronting him, and not through treachery, however conceived, nor through a neglect of the national interest in pursuit of personal advantage. Thus while Huang Fu was able to write in general terms of "shameless" northern officials intriguing with the Japanese military, specific references to Song portray him as the dupe of cunning and ambitious advisers rather than as their leader or inspiration. References were made to his alleged lack of

sophistication, to the supposed crudity of his intellect, and to fears that he would be led astray by bad elements.<sup>48</sup> However, it was only rarely suggested by Nanjing, which identified the regional interest with the national interest, that Song was working to promote a specifically regional agenda that was incompatible with national goals.<sup>49</sup>

Song Zheyuan's own assessment of his predicament is less clear. The delicacy of his position, and the readiness of the Japanese armies to interpret any attachment to the national interest, let alone to the central government, as an act of provocation, left him with little freedom to express in public a personal view on the state of China. Moreover, he appears, despite his education, as an actor and pragmatist rather than a thinker or ideologue. Even after the restoration of his GMD membership, he showed little enthusiasm for the Party, and closed down all local Party branches in Chaha'er in 1933.<sup>50</sup> Song is remembered by former colleagues for his adherence to the Confucian virtues rather than for his attention to the Three People's Principles: 29th Army officers were issued with pictures of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, which they were expected to carry at all times, but they also carried *baihua* selections from the Four Books and Five Classics.<sup>51</sup> The higher authority to which he usually referred in his political speeches was the nation, and not the Nanjing government or the GMD. Nevertheless, while his loyalty to the Nanjing government was highly conditional, central officials who worked closely with him, such as the political education officer Xuan Jieqi, do not appear to have doubted his patriotism, and Song himself did not dissent from the concept of a centralized unitary China.<sup>52</sup>

In Song Zheyuan's view, discussions with the Japanese armies were forced upon him not only by the circumstances prevailing in north China but also by the center's refusal to assume its responsibilities in dealing with Japan. He hinted as much in his communications with Nanjing, commenting to Feng Yuxiang in February 1936 that "as long as the center has a policy, the region will follow it. . . ." <sup>53</sup> Later that year a General Staff report bluntly paraphrased Song's position: "If they [the center] had a solution to north China's problems, he would follow it, but if they had no specific solution, north China had no choice but to find an answer for itself."<sup>54</sup> Song rejected criticism by the center of his efforts to find a solution to north China's problems. When he was warned, after the Lugouqiao incident, of the dangers of continuing negotiations with the Japanese, he retorted that no agreement to

which he was party could be more damaging than the He-Umezu Agreement of 1935.<sup>55</sup> The national government as portrayed by Song Zheyuan was itself a poor guardian of the national interest.

## CONCLUSIONS

The regional impact of Song Zheyuan's interaction with the Japanese military was highly variable. The practical effects in north China of his discussions concerning economic cooperation and action against communism were relatively slight. Japanese enterprises were reluctant to invest in an unstable region, and any economic initiatives suffered from a chronic lack of capital: even key enterprises, such as the Huitong airline company, struggled.<sup>56</sup> Anticomunist cultural organizations were established by the Japanese authorities in Tianjin and elsewhere in Hebei, but Chinese provincial authorities were not involved in them. There was no clear progress on other matters such as the exchange of intelligence and troop dispositions.<sup>57</sup> However, these issues later surfaced in more formal discussions at the center. Regional discussions thus formed a first step in the escalation of Japanese demands to the national level.

Song's engagement in negotiations with the Japanese at the time of the autonomy movement in 1935 undermined Nanjing's efforts to maintain a presence in the north and, while Song managed to escape formal commitment to an explicitly Japanese-dominated order, the perception in the Kwantung Army that he was willing to consider switching his allegiance from Nanjing lent credibility to the autonomy movement and its authors. At the time of the Suiyuan campaign, where Chinese armies prevailed over Japanese-sponsored forces for the first time, his noncommittal stance demonstrated the power of the Japanese presence to limit his freedom of action and detach him from vital national enterprises. His independent negotiation after the Lugouqiao incident of a ceasefire agreement, which he then failed to report to Nanjing, also hampered the center in its pursuit of a diplomatic solution, as Japanese diplomats insisted that the agreement must form the basis of any discussions in the capital.<sup>58</sup>

The establishment of regional officials such as Song Zheyuan as custodians of the national interest underlined China's vulnerability to the Japanese

threat. The generally low level of integration of the northern provinces, and the ability of the Japanese forces to capitalize on the weakness of center-region bonds prevented the development of a coordinated response to Japan. Differences between center and region were not, however, rooted in an assumption that national and regional interests were necessarily in conflict. The dismay of central observers as they watched events in the north unfold arose from their inability to reconcile Song's admittedly infrequent assurances of patriotic intent with his actions, and a lack of understanding on their part of the practical constraints which Japanese military superiority placed on him. Song's actions, which appear confused when interpreted as moves in service of a regional agenda, are more easily explicable as responses to the specifically regional pressures to which he was subject.

The effects of weakness and disunity, and the gap between aspiration and realization, remind us that formulation of a coherent response to Japan was not merely a matter of choosing resistance over appeasement; and the destructive impact of center-region dislocation on the Chinese response to Japan suggests that, if Chinese nationhood was created under the pressure of Japanese aggression, external pressure had the power to divide as well as to unite.

T H R E E

## Nationalist China's Negotiating Position During the Stalemate, 1938–1945

HUANG MEIZHEN AND YANG HANQING

Translated by David P. Barrett

The eight years of the Sino-Japanese War were marked by continuing peace negotiations, conducted at various levels of openness and formality. According to the evidence available, more than twenty such initiatives were undertaken during that time. The years from late 1937 until the end of 1940 might be characterized as the high tide of Sino-Japanese negotiations, but contacts continued up until the eve of the Japanese surrender.

Scholarly opinion on the intentions and significance of these contacts is divided. The purpose of this chapter is not to add another subjective evaluation, but to step back and see these peace initiatives in relation to their historical circumstances. This essay opens with a narrative of the principal negotiations carried out during the years of stalemate from late 1938 until 1945. This period has been less explored than the initial period of the war, from the Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident of July 1937 to the fall of Wuhan in October 1938. The intent here is to convey some sense of the negotiating style and the principal negotiating positions held by the two parties, Tokyo and Chongqing.

Additionally, this chapter provides a number of observations concerning

the historical role of Jiang Jieshi and the National Government in the many negotiations during the war years. Most noteworthy is the consistency of the Nationalist position on certain key issues, the two most important being nonrecognition of the Japanese client state of "Manzhouguo" and nonalienation of North China to Japanese interests, neither issue admitting any compromise. Jiang's commitment to the national struggle stands out clearly in the record of China's negotiations with Japan.

In the opening stages of the Sino-Japanese War, Japan proposed negotiations in order to complement its military strategy of a "quick war quickly decided" (*suzhan sujue*). The Japanese peace offensive was meant to force Jiang Jieshi and the National Government to accept terms so harsh that they would have led to what many Chinese regarded as national extinction (*wang Hua tiaojian*). When the Lugouqiao Incident occurred, the Japanese hoped to knock out the 29th Army and turn North China into a second Manzhouguo. However, the National Government refused to yield, even though it was unable to hold North China. When the battle of Shanghai began in August, the Japanese thought that by destroying the elite Nationalist armies, Chiang Kai-shek's government would be forced to capitulate. But the result proved to the contrary.

Japan then opened up a channel of communication through the German Ambassador to China, Oskar Trautmann. The minimum Chinese position was expressed in the phrase, "restoration of the situation as it existed prior to the Lugouqiao Incident." But when Nanjing fell in December 1937, the Japanese saw themselves as victors in the war. They felt that China now had no alternative but to accept a draconian peace.

Accordingly, the Japanese declared on January 16, 1938, that they "would not treat with the National Government." Their intent was to eliminate Jiang Jieshi. However, the National Government continued to resist. This forced Japan into the awkward position of simultaneously pursuing the elimination of Jiang while trying to negotiate a settlement with the government he headed. Thus, well before the January 16 conditions were dropped at the end of the year, the Japanese had initiated peace diplomacy. In the Guomindang, both the "real power faction" under Jiang and the out-of-power faction under Wang Jingwei supported peace talks. Jiang covertly ordered Foreign Ministry Asia Bureau chief Gao Zongwu, Chief of Staff He Yingqin, and Finance Minister Kong Xiangxi (H.H. Kung) to approach the Japanese. Their efforts all encountered the same obstacle: the demand by the

Japanese that Jiang step down from office. But Jiang remained firmly in control. In the hope of weakening Jiang's position, the Japanese decided to support Wang Jingwei, who had come to the conclusion that the war must be ended at once. Thus the year 1938 ended with Wang's defection from Chongqing on behalf of his "peace movement." This was Japan's sole success of a nonmilitary nature.

#### THE KONG XIANGXI PEACE CHANNELS (NOVEMBER 1938 – SUMMER 1940)

With the victory at Wuhan in October 1938 the Japanese reached the limits of their military and economic prosecution of the war. The tenacity of the Chinese resistance now had to be admitted. On December 6 the Japanese leadership concluded that the "military offensive stage" had ended and that Japan was entering a period of "political offensives and protracted war" (*zhenglue gongshi, zhanlue chijin*). In effect, the war of stalemate had begun.

Negotiations between Japan and China now took a new course, proceeding in two parallel directions, one official in nature, the other unofficial. The official avenue is illustrated in the contacts arranged by the senior Guomindang minister and confidant of Jiang, Kong Xiangxi. Kong's representatives operated out of his former private residence in Shanghai while Kong's son, Kong Lingkan, was posted to Hong Kong. There he set up a radio transmitter to relay messages between Shanghai and Chongqing, with Kong's negotiators using code numbers. While none of Kong's negotiating efforts went beyond the exploratory stage, three of his attempted peace channels will be examined here because they indicate Chongqing's developing position on negotiations in the post-Wuhan period.

The first channel initiated by Kong is the Hu Egong Operation, begun in November 1938 shortly after the fall of Wuhan.<sup>1</sup> Kong initiated this by sending his political and economic adviser Hu Egong to meet with Japanese negotiators Tsuda Shizue and Imai Takeo. The discussion focused on the Japanese demand that Jiang Jieshi retire from office. Tsuda and Imai posed the question that if their government withdrew its demand, "How could it not suffer a great loss of face?" Hu replied that Jiang was recognized by the Chinese people and army as their leader, and that if the Japanese wanted

peace they would have to deal directly with Jiang. The talks immediately reached an impasse on this key issue of Jiang's office and his involvement in the negotiations.<sup>2</sup>

Following Wang Jingwei's flight from Chongqing in December 1938, Kong assigned Hu Egong to work aimed at blocking Wang's "peace movement." Hu met Tsuda and Funatsu Tatsuichiro on several occasions. Hu explained to Funatsu that Wang had forfeited all leadership credibility by leaving Chongqing, and that Wu Peifu would not throw his lot in with Wang. Hu declared that Japan would have to deal with Jiang Jieshi if it wanted real peace in China. Hu also warned that if Japan were to try to utilize either Wang or Wu to this end, the final result would be failure, regardless of any short-term success.

In his discussions with Tsuda, Hu also raised the issue of Chongqing's refusal to countenance the two Japanese client states already in existence in China. Tsuda replied rather disingenuously that Japanese support of the Provisional Government (*Linshi zhengfu*) in North China and the Reformed Government (*Weixin zhengfu*) in east-central China was not driven by the desire to conquer China, but was intended instead to remove these areas from direct Japanese military rule. In response to the Japanese demand that a joint agreement be signed to promote anticommunism in China, Hu pointed out to Tsuda that Jiang already had "exceptional expertise" in handling the local communists, and that it would be unnecessary for Japan to station troops in China for this purpose.<sup>3</sup>

These talks were not pursued. During early 1939 the "peace movement" evolved into a plan to set up a "peace government" under Wang Jingwei. After much internal disagreement, the Japanese authorities decided to support this new government, but they stipulated that "repentant" members of the Chongqing government should be invited to join.<sup>4</sup> Subsequently the Japanese promoted this proposed arrangement as the "convergence" of Nanjing and Chongqing (*Ning Yu heliu*).

When Tsuda and Hu Egong met in September 1939, Tsuda proposed that Jiang work through Wang Jingwei in negotiating a settlement to the war. Hu replied that the Japanese proposal to use Wang, a man expelled from the Guomindang and whose arrest had been decreed, to conduct peace talks amounted to "building a wall to block genuine peace between China and Japan."<sup>5</sup> If Japan intended to discuss peace, Hu declared, it would have to

drop its sponsorship of Wang Jingwei and his proposed government. Since Japan was unwilling to do so, this negotiating attempt by Hu Egong also met with failure.

The second channel of negotiation opened under Kong's auspices was conducted by Fan Guang.<sup>6</sup> Fan had studied in Japan before the 1911 Revolution and had joined the *Tongmenghui* (Alliance Society) there. In November 1938 Fan was sent to Shanghai to hold secret talks with Imai Takeo, Doihara Kenji, and Kita Seiichi. The discussions centered on the retirement from office of Jiang Jieshi and the disposition of the communist question. Later, the proposed establishment of a separate government by Wang Jingwei became a major issue.

Fan told Imai at their first meeting that the Japanese demand that Jiang step down was "not only wrong, but in China's present circumstances completely impossible."<sup>7</sup> In May 1939 Fan again emphasized to Imai that Japan must treat with the National Government as it was presently constituted. In September, when presented with the same demand by Kita, Fan asked: "If Jiang steps down, who is there to take charge of affairs, especially one so crucial as arranging peace?"<sup>8</sup> By November 1939 the Japanese had become more flexible, dropping their demand that Jiang resign. However, their new condition now was that Jiang work together with Wang Jingwei in negotiating a peace settlement.<sup>9</sup>

Concerning the communist question, Imai told Fan in April 1939 that this was the one issue dividing Japan and China. If Jiang publicly declared total noninvolvement with the communists, the Hiranuma cabinet would be prepared to discuss peace.<sup>10</sup> The cabinet was not prepared, however, to disavow the possibility of Wang Jingwei establishing a government. Fan Guang reiterated that Jiang was unalterably opposed to such a move. On the Wang issue the Fan Guang Operation came to naught.

The third negotiating probe linked to Kong Xiangxi was conducted by Wang Zihui.<sup>11</sup> In the summer of 1939, a channel was opened to the commander in chief of the Central China Expeditionary Army, Hata Shunroku, and his chief of staff, Itagaki Seishiro. This new channel was the work of Wang Zihui, the Minister of Industry in the collaborationist Reformed Government in Nanjing. In May 1940 Wang Zihui transmitted a set of proposals to Kong's personal representative Jia Cunde. These originated in the local Japanese military headquarters and consisted of five main points: anticommunism, economic cooperation, abolition of the Wang Jingwei government,

an armistice, and withdrawal of Japanese troops. Itagaki further stated that he was prepared to send Kong a formal, signed document to the above effect, and that he wished to meet Kong in person. At this time, however, the Yichang offensive was under way and Chongqing was being subjected to heavy air attacks. Kong angrily told Jia Cunde to inform Itagaki that these actions "gravely impeded" his efforts to discuss peace with Jiang. Since Kong's own involvement in these activities was coming to public attention, he decided to desist from peace contacts for the time being.

In the late summer of 1940, Jia Cunde and Wang Zihui renewed their discussions. The key issue now was anticommunism. For the Chinese the Japanese position on stationing troops in select areas for anticommunist defense seemed too much a pretext for the long-term occupation of China. The Japanese counterproposal was that, since the dispatch of troops to China for anticommunist defense caused China loss of face as a sovereign, independent nation, China should present Japan with a formal request for stationing troops. Jia came to the conclusion that Wang Jingwei and the Japanese were acting in collusion on this matter, and withdrew from the meetings. Once more, an effort by Kong Xiangxi to find a basis for peace negotiations failed because of Japan's intransigent position on a question crucial to China's national interest.

#### LOW-LEVEL CONTACTS: JAPANESE CIVILIAN NEGOTIATORS (JANUARY 1939–DECEMBER 1940)

A parallel line of more informal negotiations was pursued through a series of civilian figures (*minjian renshi*) who enjoyed "very close relations" with Jiang and other senior Guomindang figures.<sup>12</sup> Jiang placed high value on these potential mediators. In March 1939 he sent his wife Song Meiling to Hong Kong to oversee these contacts. The first of these unofficial representatives was Kayano Nagatomo. The Chinese negotiators Liu Yunlong and Du Shishan advanced the following Chinese position: equality and mutual concessions, Chinese territorial integrity and national sovereignty, restoration of the pre-Lugouqiao situation, Japanese withdrawal of troops from China, conclusion of an anticommunist agreement, economic cooperation, and amnesty for Reform and Provisional government personnel. The issue of Manzhouguo could be set aside and treated separately. After the meeting,

Du Shishan telegraphed Jiang, urging him to enter into discussions with Japan before Wang Jingwei did. Jiang replied, "If we secure our two goals of territorial integrity and national sovereignty, I am prepared to discuss adjustments [i.e., concessions] regarding the other matters."<sup>13</sup>

In late March 1939 another civilian intermediary, Kogawa Heikichi, joined the discussions in Hong Kong. Kogawa brought with him an aide-memoire which called on Jiang to change his policy from one of "cooperation with the communists and opposition to Japan" to one of "elimination of the communists and friendship with Japan." When Kayano enquired whether elimination of the Chinese Communist Party was possible, Song Meiling replied that it could be arranged through secret agreement. Jiang wired his approval of the proceedings. Kogawa then wrote to Jiang in June urging him to begin peace discussions at once. He said that he and Kayano were ready to go to Chongqing for this purpose. But there was no reply from Jiang.

Jiang's evident change of attitude may have reflected fear of national disparagement as a "traitor" and "Japanese lackey." He definitely foresaw opposition within his government from the rival Guangxi faction. He also knew there would be stiff opposition from the communists, and he feared that, should he be driven from the political stage, "power might fall into the hands of the Red Army." Jiang's adjutant Yang Jie informed the Japanese that the communists had learned of Kogawa's letter, and that their discovery had forced Jiang to "keep to the agreement he had made at Xi'an." Domestic political considerations made Jiang unwilling to venture any hurried moves towards peace. However, Jiang let it be known that he wished to keep contacts open.

Meanwhile, in early June 1939 Wang Jingwei met Prime Minister Hiranuma and other senior government members in Tokyo to discuss the establishment of a new central government in China. When he learned of this meeting, Du Shishan informed Kogawa that "there is still time to achieve peace before Wang sets up an administration, but should Wang set up a government . . . the question will be difficult to resolve."<sup>14</sup> Du told Kogawa, who was about to return to Japan, that Jiang was determined to negotiate peace and that Kogawa therefore should use every possible means of blocking the "successful realization of Wang's plans."

Upon his return to Japan, Kogawa did his utmost to convince the Hiranuma government that Jiang was sincere in his desire for peace negoti-

ations, and that the time was not yet ripe for a move to Wang Jingwei. Kogawa also informed Kayano of the urgent need to reopen channels with Chongqing. This coincided with an initiative on the part of Du Shishan, who wrote Kogawa and Kayano that Jiang "is ready to break with the communists, and moreover is ready to discuss peace."<sup>15</sup> Jiang himself informed Kayano that "if Japan allows the Wang Jingwei movement to become a concrete reality [i.e., an established government], then all hopes of peace will disappear."<sup>16</sup> Kogawa immediately passed on this intelligence to the cabinet, which gave him a letter to transmit to his Chinese opposites, in which Chongqing was requested to send Kong Xiangxi or someone of equal rank to conduct talks. The location of these talks was to be Hong Kong, Chongqing or any other place the Chinese might wish to designate. Kogawa indicated that should the talks fail, Japan would push ahead to set up a "new government."

Jiang now told his representatives in Hong Kong confidentially that he was using the current reorganization of his government to prolong the talks with the Japanese civilian negotiators and thus impede the inauguration of a government under Wang. When intelligence reached Chongqing that the latter was not imminent, Jiang changed his position on the Kogawa talks, which no longer appeared to be of importance. He did so despite the fact that Japan had publicly proclaimed it would support Wang Jingwei in setting up a "central government." In October 1939 Kayano returned to Japan.

On March 30, 1940, the Wang Jingwei government was officially inaugurated, but Tokyo did not immediately grant it recognition. The Japanese still hoped for a peace settlement with the real power in China, the National Government. Jiang had not succeeded in preventing the birth of the Wang regime, but he now hoped to block Japanese recognition of it. Since Kogawa and Kayano were now "inactive," it was Chongqing that took the initiative. On June 21 Jiang wired Du Shishan, asking him to invite Kayano to Hong Kong for talks. Kogawa agreed to send Kayano there in early August. However, by this time others had come into the negotiating picture. Itagaki Seishiro was deeply involved in the Tong Operation, and Foreign Minister Matsuoka in the Qian Operation. (These operations are discussed below.) The Japanese were unwilling to see negotiations further complicated, and so Kayano's trip was cancelled.

In early November 1940 Toyama Shuzo, son of Sun Yat-sen's friend and colleague Toyama Mitsuru, arrived in Macau and informed Du Shishan that

Japan was about to recognize the Wang government. Du immediately contacted Jiang Jieshi, who replied that He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi had just ordered the Communist New Fourth Army to withdraw within five days to the north of the Yangtze River. Du wired this information about the active measures Jiang was taking against the communists to the foreign ministry in Tokyo, and he strongly emphasized the harm that would befall Sino-Japanese negotiations if the Wang regime were recognized. However, by this point the Japanese had come to feel that their efforts to bring Jiang to a peace settlement had failed. Tokyo felt obligated to grant formal recognition to the Wang Jingwei government, which it gave on November 30. The use by Chongqing of unofficial Japanese middlemen had offered only an illusory hope of obstructing Japanese recognition of the Wang government.

For the Japanese civilian negotiators, attainment of a genuine peace was also an illusion. Despite their untiring efforts to find an end to a war they saw as terribly destructive to both parties, they were bound by the limits set by their own political and military leaders. Under such circumstances their attempts to achieve peace and equality between the two nations had no possibility of success.

#### HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS: IMAI TAKEO AND THE TONG OPERATION (FEBRUARY–APRIL 1940)

In December 1939 University of Hong Kong Professor Zhang Zhiping arranged contact between the Japanese military attaché in Hong Kong, Col. Suzuki Takuji, and Song Ziwen's (T.V. Soong's) purported younger brother, Song Ziliang. (Song Ziliang was in fact an agent by the name of Zeng Guang sent by Juntong, the Chongqing military intelligence bureau.) This introduction drew the immediate attention of the Japanese political and military authorities. In February 1940 this channel became officially known as the Tong Operation (in Japanese, Operation Kiri). General Headquarters staff officer Col. Usui Shigeki, Col. Suzuki and China Expeditionary Army staff officer Imai Takeo were assigned to the meetings in Hong Kong. Jiang sent his Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chen Chaolin, along with former diplomat Zhang Yousan and "Song Ziliang," to negotiate on his behalf.

The two sides met from March 7–10. The Japanese required the follow-

ing from Chongqing for a peace settlement: recognition of Manzhouguo; termination of the policies of resistance to Japan and toleration of the communists (to be complemented by the signing of a joint anticommunist accord); permission for Japan to station troops in North China and Inner Mongolia; employment of Japanese military and economic advisers; and agreement to cooperate with Wang Jingwei. Jiang's representatives said they were unwilling to formally recognize Manzhouguo but were prepared to tacitly accept its existence. They stated that formal recognition of Manzhouguo would be opposed not only by the communists but also by the hardline resistance elements within the Guomindang. Jiang's negotiators said that the Japanese proposal of "common defense against communism" was agreeable in principle. However, they would not accept the stationing of Japanese troops in North China, nor countenance any cooperation or congruence between Chongqing and the proposed Wang regime. On March 10 this first set of talks ended.

The Japanese urgently sought a "comprehensive peace" with Chongqing, but they could not obtain the response they desired from Jiang. They had no alternative now but to allow the "return to the capital" (*huandu*) on March 30 of Wang Jingwei's "peace government." Chongqing followed with a new wave of anti-Wang attacks, which severely hampered the Tong Operation. Despite this, Japan still did not give up its hopes for a settlement. The threat of a new "National Government" had not induced Jiang to cooperate with Wang, so the Japanese now placed their hopes on achieving Chinese cooperation after the event. Japan decided to postpone diplomatic recognition of the Wang government and carry on with the Tong Operation.

In concert with this maneuver, Japan intended to apply military pressure on Jiang. Before his departure for Hong Kong on February 22, Japanese negotiator Usui observed that the "success of our strategy will be determined by the continued application of military force." It was this line of thinking that led Japan to launch the Yichang offensive following the collapse of the March peace discussions. Yichang was occupied in June. Chongqing was subjected to indiscriminate bombing, and the Burma Road was closed by Britain in July under Japanese pressure. Jiang Jieshi found himself in the most serious position since the outbreak of the war.

Japan pressed forward with the Tong Operation. Talks were resumed in Macau from June 4–6. The central issues once more were Chinese recognition of Manchuria and Japanese stationing of troops in North China. The

Chinese representatives stated that these were at the very root of the dispute, and that if the dispute were to be resolved China needed an unambiguous statement of Japan's position. The Japanese wanted a summit meeting between Jiang, Wang, and Itagaki Seishiro. The Chinese agreed to a meeting of Jiang and Itagaki. On July 22 the two parties exchanged a memorandum agreeing that Jiang and Itagaki would meet in Changsha in early August. Then Jiang suddenly announced cancellation of the meeting, giving as his reason Japanese failure to unambiguously revoke the January 1938 declaration not to have further dealings with the National Government. On October 8, General Headquarters in Tokyo decided they had no choice but to terminate the Tong Operation.

Throughout this operation, the Japanese suspected that the Chinese strategy was to obstruct the establishment of the Wang regime.<sup>17</sup> This was not a misplaced supposition: it was the chief objective of Jiang Jieshi and Juntong head Dai Li. These men did not succeed in their plan, but they were able to delay the emergence of the Wang regime long enough to cast further doubt on Wang's claim that he was establishing a new and genuine "central government" in China. The negotiations also made clear to Japan the minimum Chinese position: "absolute refusal" of any kind of cooperation with the Wang regime; "absolute opposition" to the stationing of Japanese troops in North China; and "immense difficulty" in handling the Japanese demand for official recognition of Manzhouguo.

#### HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS: MATSUOKA AND THE QIAN OPERATION (JULY–NOVEMBER 1940)

The Tong Operation had not yet finished when Matsuoka Yosuke, Foreign Minister in Konoe's second cabinet, opened up a direct channel for peace talks with Chongqing through the financiers Qian Yongming and Zhou Zuomin. In July–August 1940, Nishi Yoshiaki, acting as Matsuoka's unofficial envoy, met Qian Yongming on four occasions in Hong Kong. Nishi stated that Matsuoka was determined to resolve the "very serious problems" in Sino-Japanese relations and that he was "eager to restore peace between the two countries as soon as possible."<sup>18</sup> When Nishi persuaded Qian to try brokering a peace agreement, Qian responded with three minimum conditions for his participation: a united National Government (i.e., merger of

Chongqing and Nanjing); complete withdrawal of the Japanese army; and conclusion of a mutual defense treaty between China and Japan. On his way back to Japan, Nishi stopped in Nanjing to gain the support of Wang Jingwei and Zhou Fohai. Zhou wrote to Matsuoka that he was "strongly of the opinion that China must be united, and that Chongqing and Nanjing must work together to achieve this."<sup>19</sup> On September 17 Nishi and Qian's deputy, Zhang Jingli, arrived in Tokyo with Qian's proposals.

In early October Matsuoka indicated his willingness to accept the proposals as the basis for negotiations. He sent Tajiri Aigi, Funatsu Tatsuchiro, and Nishi Yoshiaki to Hong Kong to transmit this information to Chongqing through Qian Yongming and Zhou Zuomin. Qian presented Matsuoka's letter to Jiang Jieshi at the beginning of November. It contained the following proposals: Chinese recognition of Manzhouguo (to be done secretly, with the signing to be arranged later); joint defense against communism; economic cooperation (with some concessions by Japan); withdrawal of Japanese military forces; deployment in China of some Japanese forces for maintenance of public order (but not in the Lower Yangtze Valley, which would become a demilitarized zone); removal of the demand that Jiang step down from office. The Japanese side held high hopes for this initiative. However, Chongqing not only did not directly reply to it, but instead issued a sharply worded statement a week later stating that all Chinese who discussed peace between China and Japan were to be regarded as traitors. Jiang Jieshi's rejection of the proposals was conveyed to Qian on the 12th.

The following day the Imperial Conference met in Tokyo and declared that Japan's objective must be the "exercise of every means to break the resistance of the Chongqing regime and compel its submission."<sup>20</sup> The decision was taken to recognize the Wang Jingwei government. But in order to try one last time for a peace settlement, recognition of Nanjing was to be delayed until November 30, in the hope that contact with Jiang might be established. If no progress had been made with Jiang by that date, Japan would grant recognition of the Wang Jingwei government, the war would continue, and Japan would work for international acceptance of the Wang government.

When Jiang learned of Japan's latest intentions, he sent Zhang Jiluan to Hong Kong on November 17 with two demands: Japan's agreement in principle to remove all its troops from China, and cancellation of its planned

recognition of the Wang Jingwei regime. If these conditions were “sincerely” met, the National Government would be prepared to undertake peace talks with Japan. Chongqing declared its “support in principle” for Matsuoka’s proposals, and stated its expectation that Japan would not recognize the Wang government.

From November 22–25 the Japanese Five Ministers’ Conference discussed Chongqing’s conditions, then decided to go ahead with recognition. However, if Chongqing immediately designated an official representative for talks, Japan would move the date for recognition to December 5. On November 24 this stipulation was communicated to the Japanese Consulate General in Hong Kong. When no response had been received from Chongqing by the 28th, Japan decided to go ahead on schedule with its recognition of the Wang government. On November 29 Chongqing named Xu Shiyong and Zhang Jingli as official envoys, but by this point Japan could no longer defer its plans for recognition. On November 30 Special Ambassador Abe Nobuyuki and Wang Jingwei formally signed the “Basic Treaty for Sino-Japanese Relations.” Japan had now recognized the rival National Government.

On December 2, Jiang Jieshi declared that recognition of the Wang government added a crucial new element to the “history of enmity between Japan and China.” Zhou Fohai noted at the time in his diary that Qian Yongming “had full scope for discussion with Jiang,” yet had been “absolutely unable to make Jiang accept the [Japanese] proposals.”<sup>21</sup> The prospects for future peace negotiations between Nationalist China and Japan were poor indeed.

#### PEACE CONTACTS DURING THE PACIFIC WAR (1941–1945)

With the outbreak of the Pacific War on December 8, 1941, China followed the United States and Britain in declaring war on Japan. On New Year’s Day, 1942, China signed the “Joint Declaration of the United Nations” in Washington with the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and twenty-three other nations. The signatories stated that none of them would break ranks to sign an armistice or peace treaty with an enemy power. It was at this meeting that the Allies first recognized China as one of the great powers.

Jiang Jieshi saw his international prestige rise. This new global dimension made Chongqing confident of its prospects of victory in the Anti-Japanese War. On December 1, 1943, China, the United States, and Britain issued the Cairo Declaration, which proclaimed the return to China of all territory forcibly taken from it (Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores) as a major war goal. The effect of these developments was to raise the terms of any future negotiations with Japan in China's favor.

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Japanese limited themselves to intelligence operations against Chongqing. They expected that success on the battlefield, combined with other forms of pressure, would sufficiently destabilize Chongqing so that Japan could move on to what was called "surrender-inducement work" (*qifu gongzuo*).<sup>22</sup> However, the war picture began to change very quickly for Japan with the disastrous defeats suffered at Midway and Guadalcanal in the months after June 1942. To end the China impasse, it was decided at an imperial conference in Tokyo on December 21 to implement a "New China Policy," which had as one of its main features the entry of the Wang Jingwei government into the war as Japan's "ally." It was also decided that no further peace initiatives would be made to Chongqing. This was the second time in just under five years that Japan had refused to have dealings with Jiang Jieshi.

On January 9, 1943, the Nanjing government declared war on the United States and Great Britain. Nanjing and Tokyo signed a "Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration" for the common prosecution of the war, as well as agreements for the return to China of the foreign concessions and the abolition of extraterritoriality. The intent of these moves was to strengthen the Wang regime politically. On October 30 Tokyo and Nanjing signed the "Sino-Japanese Treaty of Alliance." In a protocol to the treaty, Japan agreed to remove its troops from China as soon as the war was over. All of the measures taken in 1943 were aimed at increasing popular support for the Wang regime and stimulating enthusiasm for the regime's participation in Japan's "Greater East Asia War."

However, as the Japanese leaders faced the facts of their retreat in the Pacific and the ineffectiveness of the Wang regime as an ally, they found themselves with no alternative but to once more undertake "peace operations" with Jiang Jieshi. The formal decision to do so was taken by the Liaison Conference on September 21, 1943, and was expressed in its "Outline of Political Work towards Chongqing." This document stipulated that the

National Government would not be expected to declare war on the United States and Britain, but would have to sever relations with them and demand they withdraw all troops and weapons from Chinese soil. On this basis a comprehensive peace could be attained.<sup>23</sup> This policy, aimed at creating a split between Jiang and the Allies, signified the beginning of the “peace enticement” (*youhe*) strategy. For all purposes, Japan had now abandoned its long-held ambition of bringing about the “destruction or capitulation” of the Jiang government. This meant that Japan’s second refusal to deal with Jiang Jieshi had also met with failure. Japan, nevertheless, still hoped to hold on to as many of its special interests in China as possible. Chongqing did not respond to this initiative.

After the fall of the Tojo cabinet in July 1944, the new premier, Koiso Kuniaki, offered a settlement based on the principle of “full equality.” Japan’s terms for a comprehensive peace were once again lowered. Japan would not require China to break relations with the United States and Britain, provided that China adopted a policy of genuine neutrality. Jiang Jieshi should return to Nanjing and set up a government of unity, to be arranged with representatives of the Wang administration. The Treaty of Alliance between Nanjing and Tokyo would be annulled, and once a peace settlement was in place Japan would sign a treaty of friendship with China. If the Americans and British withdrew all forces from China, Japan would do likewise. Inner Mongolia would now be deemed an internal Chinese question and Chinese sovereignty would be restored over Hong Kong. However, as far as Manzhouguo was concerned, there would be no change of the status quo.

In order to advance this peace plan, Koiso dispatched the Vice-minister of War, Shibayama Kaneshiro, to Nanjing for talks with the Wang government, which was in the process of trying to establish contact with Chongqing. Former foreign minister Ugaki Kazushige was also sent to “travel” in China, in the hope that he would find channels open for dialogue with Chongqing. Neither of these efforts drew a response.

The position reached by Japan at this point may be summed up as follows. Direct talks with Chongqing were the priority, matters of “face” were no longer an issue, and the Wang regime would be “liquidated” when the time was right.<sup>24</sup> It was clear from the Koiso proposals that the Wang regime had become increasingly a burden, and that Japan would not hesitate to dis-

pose of it. But Japan still required that China recognize Manzhouguo, and that China "assist" Japan, while "separating itself" from the United States and Britain. With both the Sino-Japanese War and the World War in effect already decided, Jiang was not to be drawn away from the winning Allied side by such "sale price" terms.

While undertaking the above moves, Japan still maintained great military pressure on Chongqing. In 1944 Japan launched the largest-scale offensive of the war, the Henan-Hunan-Guangxi Campaign (Operation Ichigo). The National Government's armies suffered a series of major defeats. However, Japanese victories did not bring about a change in Chongqing's position. On December 13, 1944, just after the termination of the campaign, Japan decided that China Expeditionary Army commander in chief Okamura Yasuji should undertake immediate political work aimed at the National Government. Okamura established regular radio contacts with Chongqing. Okamura's principal proposal was that the Japanese army withdraw within one year to Shanhaiguan (i.e., into Manchuria); Chongqing's position was that Japan would have to withdraw to Fushan (i.e., into Korea). Once again, the result was an impasse between the two powers.

On February 14, 1945, Okamura met Jiang's personal representative, Yuan Liang, in Shanghai. Yuan forwarded three general propositions: Sino-Japanese cooperation was of the greatest importance for East Asia; talks between China and Japan would be arranged at a suitable opportunity; both sides in the meantime should exercise the greatest restraint toward each other. Shortly thereafter on March 4, He Yingqin sent an envoy to Nanjing to transmit peace terms. Okamura, however, held to his earlier position, which was unacceptable to Chongqing.<sup>25</sup> But the initiative, in reality, now belonged to the Chinese side.

As Japan stared at defeat, Koiso resorted to desperate measures. On March 16 the vice president of the Examination Yuan in the Nanjing government, Miao Bin, arrived in Tokyo, claiming that he had been sent by Chongqing to negotiate with Japan. The contents of his so-called "Sino-Japanese comprehensive peace proposals" were as follows: The Nanjing regime would at once voluntarily liquidate itself; Chongqing would simultaneously recognize a National Government Nanjing Rear Area Office (*liushoufu*) made up of prominent citizens; Chinese and Japanese representatives would meet in Macau; and, once an armistice was signed, the Chong-

qing government would return to Nanjing. On March 21 Koiso presented Miao Bin's proposals to the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War.<sup>26</sup> This move, however, met with strong opposition from war minister Sugiyama and foreign minister Shigemitsu, who were dubious of Miao's credentials, and attacked Koiso's maneuver as "reckless." The emperor also advised: "We should not adopt this kind of strategy." The Miao Bin operation was called off. Having lost his colleagues' confidence, Koiso resigned on April 5.

For his part, Koiso's successor, Suzuki Kantaro, declared that he too would work "with determination" to negotiate an end to hostilities.<sup>27</sup> On July 9–10, 1945, Imai Takeo met Chinese representative He Zhuguo in the north of China for talks. The Chinese demanded that Japan evacuate all troops and return to China all territory it had occupied. By this point in the war the Japanese had no leverage for negotiation. At this late moment Imai established a direct channel to Chongqing through his contacts with Generals He Shizhen and Gu Zhutong. It is an irony that Imai, the man who throughout the war had given his utmost to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict, now found himself ordered to Zhizhang to represent Japan at the surrender. With Japan's defeat, eight years of fruitless peace negotiations had come to a close.

#### GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

In looking at the various peace contacts between China and Japan, we can offer the following conclusions.

In its negotiations, the National Government had three specific objectives in mind. The first was to stall for time in order to gain a breathing space for its army. While China had achieved a certain degree of preparedness prior to the outbreak of hostilities, it was still far from being Japan's equal in fighting a long-term war. It was the loss in succession of Beiping, Tianjin, and Shanghai, and the immediate threat to Nanjing, that brought about Jiang Jieshi's acceptance of the Trautmann mediation.

The second objective of the National Government during its peace negotiations was to forestall Japanese encouragement and, subsequently, recognition of Wang Jingwei's client government. After Wang's flight from Chongqing, one of the most pressing concerns of the National Government

was blocking the creation of such a regime. When Japan extended diplomatic recognition to the Wang government in November 1940, negotiations between Chongqing and Tokyo for all purposes came to an end.

The third objective of the National Government was to use the negotiations as a major bargaining counter to prompt the United States and Britain into offering it aid. Jiang saw that word reached the Allies in late 1940 of Japanese efforts to draw Chongqing into a compromise peace. America immediately loaned Chongqing one hundred million U.S. dollars, and Britain followed with ten million pounds.

In undertaking peace negotiations, the Japanese were driven by the following four factors. First, they needed to resolve the growing gap between the demands of the steadily widening war and their limited national strength. Japan was a resource-poor nation that relied primarily on imports for its strategic materials. It could not sustain a long war. When the war began, Japan adopted a dual political-military strategy, and hoped for a quick, decisive victory. Secondly, a negotiated settlement would enable Japan to withdraw forces bogged down in China and use them for deployment either against the Soviet Union or for an advance to the south. Hitherto, Japan's preference had been to concentrate its troops on the Soviet frontier, but the commitment of so many troops to the China war meant that Japan could not contemplate any such undertaking. By the time the stalemate set in, Japan had committed 24 divisions to the China theater. With the Japanese home islands and Korea each assigned a division, this left only 8 divisions for Manchuria. In contrast, the Soviets deployed 28 rifle divisions and 18 air groups along the Manchurian frontier. Japan could strengthen its position against the Soviet Union only by extricating itself from China. But with the China war ever more a quagmire, the reality for Japan was that neither a northern or a southern advance could be considered until the war was settled. Thirdly, through continuing their negotiations with Chongqing, the Japanese ensured that Wang Jingwei remained in a compliant position. If the Japanese were successful in effecting a convergence of the Jiang and Wang governments, their influence would extend far into China. Finally, Japanese negotiations were complicated by high-level rivalries within the government and the armed forces. The army was split into Chongqing and Nanjing factions who actively involved themselves in the negotiating process to further their own local interests.

The Chinese and Japanese positions were subject to revision as the war

developed and the international situation changed. Prior to December 1941, the basic Japanese position may be summarized in the following seven demands: retirement from office of Jiang Jieshi; recognition of “Manzhouguo”; recognition of the Wang Jingwei government or “convergence” of Nanjing and Chongqing; recognition of Inner Mongolian autonomy; recognition of Japan’s right to station troops in China; recognition of Japanese economic privileges in China; and cooperation with Japan in joint defense against communism.

Jiang Jieshi’s basic position may be summed up in his own words: “No Japanese peace terms can be accepted until Japan restores the situation prevailing before the war,” and “There must be no threat to or infringement of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and administrative independence of North China.” These were the two central issues in any negotiations. And if Japan wanted to continue the war, Jiang declared that China “would never lay down its arms.”

After December 1941 the international situation and the East Asian war began to turn in China’s favor. The Japanese were slowly forced to lessen their demands. However, three major stumbling blocks to a peace agreement remained fixed: the Japanese demands for recognition of Manzhouguo, recognition or acceptance of the Wang regime, and agreement to the stationing of Japanese garrisons in specified areas of China. Japan refused to yield on the first point—the recognition of Manzhouguo—until the eve of its surrender in 1945. Regarding the Wang regime, the Japanese were ready for the return of Jiang Jieshi to Nanjing as head of a new united government. They also declared their readiness to withdraw all troops from China once the Americans and British withdrew theirs.

As the war progressed, China steadily raised its demands. In the early days, when China stood alone, Jiang stated that the preservation of “territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence” defined China’s fundamental negotiating position. In November 1939, following the outbreak of war in Europe, Jiang stated that his minimum position was restoration of the situation that prevailed prior to the Lugouqiao Incident. Then, with the Cairo Declaration of December 1943, China’s minimum position moved beyond the return of Manchuria to the return of Taiwan as well. By time of the “He Shizhen Operation” in 1945, China’s conditions were the full withdrawal of Japanese troops and the punishment of those responsible for the 1931 Manchurian Incident.

Throughout the whole war, a persistent lack of realism regarding Chinese conditions hampered Japan in working out a China strategy. This lack contributed to Japan's ultimate defeat. Japan did not have a realistic grasp of the wartime Chinese balance of power. Three political forces existed: the National Government of Jiang Jieshi, the Wang Jingwei regime, and the Chinese Communist Party. Japan overestimated Jiang's readiness to compromise, believing that a combined political-military offensive would make him yield. The Japanese never took into consideration the domestic forces to which Jiang was subject, and which would keep him in the war, whatever his personal convictions might have been. The Japanese overestimated the political standing and influence of the Wang Jingwei regime. Wang's defection failed to help Japan settle the China Incident; in fact, it drove negotiations between Japan and Chongqing into a blind alley. And as for the Communist Party, it was committed to the United Front and the prosecution of the war until victory was attained.

In sum, Japanese peace terms continually exceeded Jiang's tolerance level. In the five months between the outbreak of the war and the fall of Nanjing, Japan steeply raised its peace conditions. They proved far harsher than the Twenty-one Demands of 1915. Following the fall of Nanjing, Japan not only refused to modify these conditions when the war was going in its favor, but also refused to modify them to any substantive degree even when the war began to go badly. Once the Pacific War broke out, Japanese expectations that a settlement with China could be reached on their terms alone were completely unrealistic.

One might speculate that if Japan had not been so overbearing in its demands, but had taken a more realistic approach and had allowed the Chinese an "honorable peace," it is possible that Jiang might have come to an agreement. It is a fact that the National Government was prepared to tacitly recognize the existence of Manzhouguo and to defer the question of Inner Mongolia. And certainly Jiang's virulent anticommunism gave him an interest in common with the Japanese powerholders. Jiang had been compelled to join forces with the communists following the Lugouqiao Incident, and he very much feared that they would "sit back [during the war] and turn into a future problem." The Japanese saw Jiang's position very clearly and therefore continued to propose a joint anticommunist policy. The Nationalists indicated "agreement in principle." If a peace settlement had been reached, it may be presumed that an anticommunist understanding would

have been part of it. (Here it should be recalled that at war's end Jiang "readily welcomed" General Okamura's offer of Japanese troops for use against the Communists.)

But the Japanese remained overbearing in their demands, and Jiang Jieshi would not surrender, even if he was prepared to make certain concessions. Jiang held firmly to his irreducible position of "territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence." This position was unacceptable to those in Japan who sought to dominate China. Thus the Japanese finally gave up on Jiang, and belatedly turned to Wang Jingwei, whose offer of a local peace in fact reduced even further the limited prospect of a comprehensive peace throughout China.

PART TWO

Client Regimes:  
Genesis, Character, and Justification



## The Creation of the Reformed Government in Central China, 1938

TIMOTHY BROOK

On the evening of March 14, 1938, Japanese soldiers escorted six hundred Chinese from the New Asia Hotel to the Shanghai Railway Station and put them onto an armed express train bound for Nanjing. Other Japanese soldiers met the Chinese at their pre-dawn arrival in the capital and took them to the Central Hotel, there to await the inauguration of a new regime two days later. The visitors got a bleak reception, as neither electricity nor running water had been restored since the rape of Nanjing. Their initial dismay was modest compared to their distress when Japanese officers arrived at the hotel at dawn to say that the ceremony was off and that they would all have to go home. Not until evening of the following day were they able to reboard the train and get back to Shanghai. They negotiated their way back into the New Asia Hotel to wait for the next move.<sup>1</sup>

That move came eleven days later, when the same group of people—the administrative core of the new regime—followed the same script on a second jaunt to Nanjing. Arriving at the Great Hall of the former National Government on the cloudless morning of March 28, they were greeted by an honor guard. At 10:00 a.m., as a military band struck up the new national

anthem, “Auspicious Clouds,” thirteen presidents and vice-presidents of yuans and ministries in the new government filed into the hall. In the front rank stood Liang Hongzhi, president of the Executive Yuan and ex officio head of the regime. Beside him was Wen Zongyao, president of the Legislative Yuan. Liang stepped onto the dais to recite the manifesto of the new regime, and following him several Japanese rose to read statements of congratulation. When the indoor formalities were completed, the new leaders filed outside for the obligatory group photograph: the two presidents at the front, six ministers in the middle row, and five assorted vice-ministers in the back. Then Liang led his cabinet to the courtyard outside the Great Hall and raised the flag of his new republic. The ceremony was completed, and the politicians returned to the train station to head back to Shanghai and start administering the new realm from their closely guarded perch in the New Asia Hotel.<sup>2</sup>

So began, on second try, the brief life of the Reformed Government (*Weixin zhengfu*). For the next two years, this regime—its detractors called it the “Hotel Government”—administered occupied Central China, until obliged to dissolve on March 30, 1940, to make way for the Reorganized National Government under Wang Jingwei (1883–1944). So too began, for the second time, the public life of Liang Hongzhi (1882–1946), an early Republican politician of the Anfu faction whose political career had ended a decade earlier with the dismantling of Duan Qirui’s regime in North China.<sup>3</sup> Neither Liang’s surprising reemergence into high politics nor the sudden appearance of the Reformed Government could have happened without Japanese support, as everyone knew. Even Liang candidly admitted a year later that people, at the time of the inauguration, “if they didn’t label me a puppet straight out, pointed to me as a traitor.”<sup>4</sup>

The disarray of the March 16 inauguration appears to confirm the popular judgment. So too does Japan’s orchestration of the March 28 inauguration. The negotiations leading up to these events, reconstructed here for the first time, will not alter the view that the Reformed Government was Japan’s creation. But they do suggest that the process of regime creation was more complex than the charge of puppetry allows: that the March 16 inauguration was not an embarrassing fiasco but the sort of unavoidable error integral to any political process when it is not under the firm control of any one party; and similarly, that the March 28 inauguration did not simply follow a Japanese script but confirmed a regime that was unacceptable to many Japanese,

not least the Cabinet in Tokyo. It would take two years of intense politicking before Japan could remove the Reformed Government to make way for Wang Jingwei's administration, through a drawn-out process that utterly compromised both regimes.

Liang's presidency is regarded as so insignificant, and his regime so inconsequential, that most accounts of modern Chinese history do not deign to mention either. My purpose in reviving their memory is not to endow a brief regime or a minor politician with a significance neither deserves, but to use what is admittedly an extreme case to raise questions about the political process we call collaboration as it unfolded in wartime China.

Collaboration is the dark subtheme that runs through every narrative of occupation. A narrative of occupation, told from a nonoccupation or post-occupation perspective, figures in the historiography of almost every country that has been subjected to military or colonial occupation. Such a narrative celebrates the heroic achievement—against all odds—of a nation's sovereignty, not on its own, but in relation to a larger destiny that identifies this achievement of sovereignty as a necessary historical step in the progression of the nation toward full self-realization in the present. To place the occupation event within this historic destiny, the narrative of occupation must render the occupied nation as temporarily bereft of its sovereignty. In the narrative, this phase of powerlessness is explained in terms of the capacity of an occupying power to impose all the terms of occupation. This state of heightened and abnormal hegemony is conveyed in the narrative alongside the knowledge that the occupation will ultimately fail and that the inevitable outcome will be the expulsion of the occupier. The narrative of occupation thus tells a story of both powerlessness and provisionality. Within this narrative, collaborators require a complicated double portrayal. On the one hand, they are depicted as evil enemies of the nation's self-realization, feasting off that powerlessness for the sake of personal glory, financial gain, and the settling of old scores. On the other hand, in keeping with the narrative's portrayal of the provisionality of occupation, collaborators are also pictured as powerless, paralyzed by the ravenous desires of the occupying power and thereby permanently blocked from being able to establish a durable indigeneous regime.

Characterizing the history of an occupation in this way poses two difficulties. First, the narrative travels backwards—beginning at the end—by portraying the occupying power's defeat as a necessary outcome, and

explaining prior events solely in relation to that defeat. In its teleological enthusiasm for national liberation, the narrative neglects the contingency of events as they were unfolding, as well as the volatility of subjectivity and perception among those who witnessed the events. Many in 1938 predicted that the Japanese occupation of China would fail and that the Reformed Government would be swept into the proverbial dust heap, but no one had certain knowledge of that eventuality.

The second difficulty with the narrative's characterization of history arises from the assumption that an occupation regime is sustained solely through military violence, without significant recourse to the more subtle arts of administration, propaganda, and reliance on personal connections that come into play in any other political regime. The story of an occupation is usually recounted as a monologue of power, in which the occupiers enjoy relatively complete hegemony, and the only morally legitimate role for the occupied is nonengagement, resistance, or flight.

This approach becomes problematic when dealing with the issue of collaboration. An approach committed to narrating the defeat of an occupation as a step toward national self-realization can only regard collaboration as an anomaly. In such a narrative, collaborators are portrayed as members of the nation, but not as representatives of its destiny, and so they must be removed from its history. This removal is usually accomplished by reducing collaboration to a personal rather than a social choice. Some terrible moral flaw in a person can then be invoked to account for each instance of collaboration, thereby dismissing the decision to collaborate rather than explaining it. The narrative of occupation also regards the actions of collaborators as ultimately unimportant, either in influencing the monologue of occupation or in shaping the teleology of its ultimate demise.

This narrative falls short of the actual practice of occupation. No occupying power—indeed, no state—can impose its will unilaterally. It must enter into some measure of dialogic interaction with, even reliance on, the occupied. In the most concrete sense, the occupier needs many assistants—local administrators, political fixers, revenue collectors, police, public utilities personnel, to name only a few—to float an occupation regime. More abstractly, the regime that an occupier sets up has to take cues from the local political environment if it hopes to establish any credit in the occupied zone. The dialogic nature of occupation has emerged as a theme in recent scholarship on prewar colonial regimes in Asia and on wartime regimes in Europe.<sup>5</sup>

This scholarship indicates that collaborators are rarely dupes of the occupier. Rather, they act in ways that frustrate the goals of occupation and induce errors and miscalculations that the occupier has difficulty correcting. As much as collaboration enables occupation, it also works against it. It involves more than one patron and one client; it is sustained through relationships that mutate unexpectedly as power shifts; and it almost never produces results that the occupier dictates. By examining the sometimes canny, often selfish, and frequently disastrous choices that collaborators made and the contexts in which they made them, we move away from the conventional narrative of resistance that is popular in the history of every occupied nation on its way to independence and modernity, and approach the complex ambiguities of state sovereignty under occupation in a less partisan manner. Only then can we begin to gain some distance from the popular political syndrome that selects acts of resistance for commemoration and acts of collaboration for repression, and attempt a more historical reading of events.<sup>6</sup>

A dialogic approach requires that we consider the possibility that collaboration might not be the exact opposite of resistance. This denial poses a considerable challenge to standing assumptions both in the field of Chinese history and in popular attitudes. By habit and historiography, we carve up the terrain of the war into these two camps, with nothing in between. In the first major study of wartime collaboration in China, John Boyle noted the ambiguities of collaboration and called for “a healthy ambivalence” when examining the popular denunciations of wartime leaders in the occupied areas,<sup>7</sup> but no one followed up this suggestion. More recently, Poshek Fu has proposed that we acknowledge “a complexity and ambiguity of moral choices that defies simplistic stereotyping.”<sup>8</sup> Yet heroes and villains continue to throng the stage of popular memory, thanks to the longevity of the resistance leaderships in both the Communist and Guomindang parties. Their separate hegemonies and bitter rivalry have effectively silenced Chinese reconsideration of the blunt judgments glorifying armed resistance and demonizing anyone who accommodated in any way with the Japanese. Like the Gaullists in France, Guomindang leaders were willing to sweep collaboration under the rug in the interests of reintegrating the postwar polity, reviving the economy, and falling into line with Cold War international alliances. The Communists, on the other hand, again like their French comrades,<sup>9</sup> found it politically advantageous to pursue collaborators with a

vengeance. Communist rhetoric still cannot bear to name a political organization or position of that period without sticking the label “counterfeit” (*wei*) in front of it, just to ensure that everyone knows who is good and who is bad. Postwar Chinese continue to locate their national identity within these terms, though as the wartime resistance leadership disappears, the old certainties may erode and syndrome give way to history.

The Reformed Government, which lasted barely two years and engaged no one of national political stature, is at first glance hardly a case amenable to pleading that occupation be analyzed in dialogic and nonteleological terms. But there is value in arguing the extreme case, particularly when it involves a regime formed in the early months of the occupation, for this was a time when war imposed its terrible uncertainties and no one could predict where events would lead. To make the argument, I rely in this chapter on documents preserved in archives in Nanjing, Shanghai, and Tokyo, in addition to published Japanese documents and the war diary of General Hata Shunroku. The interpretation that I derive from these materials is that the Reformed Government was not purely imposed by the Japanese, even though at most points the Japanese had the upper hand. Rather, it was negotiated among various Chinese and Japanese interests through a dialogic process that was not bound to any necessary outcome.

#### MAKING CLAIMS TO AUTONOMY AND UNITY

To explain why their regime deserved popular recognition, the founders of the Reformed Government had to take into account the two leading ideals of the modern nation: autonomy and unity. Both ideals were egregiously placed in question by collaboration. To appear legitimate, the new regime had to assert its authenticity as the sovereign government of its country as a whole. This assertion was difficult, given that the regime relied on Japanese patronage and that its sovereignty extended northward only to the Huai River, that is, only to the boundary of the territory that the Japanese invasion force, the Central China Area Army (CCAA), controlled. North of the Huai was within the control of the North China Area Army (NCAA) and its sponsored administration, the Provisional Government of the Chinese Republic (*Zhonghua minguo linshi zhengfu*). Unless the Reformed Govern-

ment could claim autonomy and unity, it could not establish its authority as the government of China.

Claims of autonomy and unity are made explicitly in the “Manifesto of the Founding of the Reformed Government,” which Liang recited at the inauguration.<sup>10</sup> After a long preamble reviewing the disastrous consequences of the Guomindang regime (“the most evil government throughout all of China’s history”), the Manifesto affirms that the Japanese (“the people who are the same [as us]”) had acted out of righteous anger to rescue China and had sponsored the Reformed Government to help the Chinese people start afresh. Acknowledging the problem of autonomy, the Manifesto says that the solution lies with the Reformed Government, “its sole mandate being to restore territorial sovereignty to the prewar situation and return the ruptured relationship with our neighboring country to cordiality.” Committed to re-establishing China’s territorial integrity, the Reformed Government claimed that it was taking the realistic path toward autonomy. The claim was an awkward one, given Japan’s armed presence, but it had to be made.

On the matter of national unity, the Manifesto acknowledges that the jurisdiction of the new regime extends only to “Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and such provinces,” but insists that this limited territorial sovereignty will end when it merges with the Provisional Government in North China. The Manifesto thus anticipates the charge of illegitimacy in setting up a regime that does not rule all of China, but does so without affirming that the Reformed Government must eventually be dissolved in favor of the Provisional Government. It concedes only that “those matters under the jurisdiction of a future central government that cannot be divided up will of course be handled through discussion with the Provisional Government,” not that the latter will absorb it. The Reformed Government thus presents itself as opposed to dividing up the country, without giving away its own future. By phrasing Japan’s commitment to unity negatively—that there not be “two opposing governments in the country”—the Manifesto implies that the Japanese should be held responsible for the unification problem, not the collaborators. The comment papers over the intense conflict among Japanese officers and politicians over the wisdom of creating and maintaining multiple regimes in China, a conflict that had still not been resolved by inauguration day.

The important issue here is that the Reformed Government had to make

a plausible claim that it was committed to achieving autonomy and unity. The image it desired to cultivate was not as a puppet regime, but as a legitimate state body capable of representing China in negotiating a new relationship with Japan. The leaders of the Reformed Government may not have been as successful in the negotiations as they might have wished with regard to gaining or guaranteeing autonomy and unity for China. Nonetheless, as the following reconstruction of the details of these negotiations that led up to the reading of the Manifesto on inauguration day will show, the emergence of their regime was the outcome of a dialogic process that in some measure compromised the hegemony that Japan aspired to impose over China.

#### BUILDING A REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

The CCAA, the force that invaded the Yangtze Valley in 1937, was the motor behind the creation of the Central China regime. As aggression yielded quick gains, both the CCAA and its counterpart based in Beijing, the NCAA, wanted permanent political expression for their Chinese conquests on the model of Manzhouguo. This model was the precedent for regime-founding under conditions of military occupation. In the north, the NCAA was already entertaining the idea of sponsoring a Chinese regime early in September and arguing for it in Cabinet early in November. The Army General Staff in Tokyo was reluctant to commit the resources needed for a China war and pressured the Konoe Cabinet for a diplomatic solution to the "China Incident."

During the autumn of 1937, however, the mood in the Cabinet shifted toward the idea of a comprehensive solution, which meant abandoning negotiations with Jiang Jieshi and promoting his replacement first by individual politicians, then by entire regimes, sympathetic to Japan. On December 1 the Supreme Command authorized the formation of a regional government in North China (the Provisional Government headed by Wang Kemin was inaugurated on December 14) and on the same day gave the green light to General Matsui Iwane, commander in chief of the CCAA, to advance on Nanjing. As James Crowley observed, these two decisions "inherently broadened the political and military nature of the China incident."<sup>11</sup> Japan had thereby committed itself to occupation, not just invasion.

The CCAA speedily drew up plans for its own puppet regime. A top-secret CCAA report of December 4 spells out the options that the assault on Nanjing presented.<sup>12</sup> Should Nanjing withstand the Japanese offensive, the CCAA would pressure the National Government to reorganize by forcing Jiang out of power and replacing him with politicians who would sue for peace. Should Nanjing fall, the CCAA would immediately set up an anti-Jiang, pro-Japanese regime. The choices were thus to transform the existing Guomindang government or replace it, and the report preferred the latter course. It conceded that building a new regime would not be simple but hoped that the larger Shanghai region might provide such a regime with a sound financial base. That regime would have to coordinate its efforts with what the report calls the “new political circumstances” in North China, but it was not ruled out by those circumstances. The main task was to recruit political and military figures from the various factions thought willing to work with Japan.

On January 16, 1938 Prince Konoe issued his surprising *aite ni sezu* [*will cease to deal with*] declaration against Jiang Jieshi, declaring that “the Japanese Government will cease from henceforth to deal with that Government, and they look forward to the establishment and growth of a new Chinese regime.”<sup>13</sup> Two days later, the CCAA’s *Tokumubu* or Special Service Department (SSD) produced three internal documents laying out strategy for setting up a “new Chinese” regime. The first, “The Program for Establishing a New Regime in Central China,” advises that the regime be set up as soon as possible to provide a counterweight to anti-Japanese political forces and revive the economy of the occupied areas. It says that Japan will cover the operating expenses of the regime, but toys with the idea of gaining financial support from the Shanghai underworld. The second planning document, “The Program for Political Guidance in Central China,” lays out Japan’s foreign policy and economic and political goals in creating the regime.<sup>14</sup> These goals indicate that the SSD was conceiving of a strategy more ambitious than simply transferring administrative tasks to Chinese during the occupation, and wanted to create a prototype for a self-sufficient post-occupation government run by Chinese. “The Program for Political Guidance” acknowledges the inevitability of merger with the Provisional Government in North China, without bothering to reflect on how this might be achieved.

How to manage this relationship was the thinnest ice over which the

CCAA had to skate to get a Nanjing regime in place. Outside CCAA circles it was generally understood that Tokyo gave priority to the Beijing regime, not from any particular enthusiasm for the Provisional Government but out of concern for defending the northern border against the Soviet Union; basing a national regime in Central China was regarded as unrealistic.<sup>15</sup> Yet CCAA commander General Matsui understood that the CCAA would have no clout in negotiating future political solutions for China if it were the patron of just another regional regime. Optimal for the CCAA was that its regime be the chrysalis of the new national government, which would then be based within its control. The issue is raised briefly in the third of the SSD's January 18 documents, the top-secret "Strategic Plan for Central China."<sup>16</sup> There the SSD accepts the idea that Nanjing and Beijing will unite but postpones it to "an appropriate time," noting that the balance between the regimes will depend on the circumstances that prevail at the time unification takes place. CCAA strategy was to play for time and hope that postponement would work to the advantage of a Nanjing-based regime. The CCAA and its Reformed Government would end up devoting the next year and a half to fighting an expensive and demoralizing battle for priority over the North China regime.

#### RECRUITING A POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

The first stage in regime-building under the occupation was to recruit political figures with the skills needed to steer this precarious project through the thick shoals of opposition. An SSD progress report of mid-February 1938 says that through December and January it pursued "important people who have remained behind" in Shanghai, men of political reputation and experience who had chosen not to flee with the departing regime.<sup>17</sup> The report acknowledges the difficulty of recruiting collaborationist leaders in a region where support for Jiang Jieshi was strong and opposition to Japan even stronger. Even with "the termination of the incident," as the SSD hopefully phrased the taking of Nanjing, and the westward retreat of the Chinese army, Jiang's clandestine forces in the International Settlement and the outlying areas around Shanghai continued to resist and pose a terrorist threat. So long as there was hope that the Japanese Army might withdraw and the

international status of Shanghai offered them protection, it would be difficult to induce potential leaders to come forward.

The SSD looked for leaders along the fault lines that politics in the Republican era had created, notably among men from the 1920s whom Jiang Jieshi's rise to power had shut out of power. Their first choice was Tang Shaoyi (1861–1938), a Guomindang elder whose opposition to Jiang had forced him into retirement in the French Concession in Shanghai after several failed political challenges in the early 1930s. General Matsui approached him in December to see whether he could be enticed out of retirement to lead a regime against Jiang. The SSD report reveals that Tang appeared interested in the invitation, even boasting that he could mobilize a number of important people to join the regime. But Tang set a condition Matsui could not meet when he declared that the success of the venture rested on the territorial unity of China. All China had to be placed under his command if he hoped to attract the best people, and Matsui could not oblige him as long as Wang Kemin's Provisional Government ruled North China. The CCAA decided to save Tang for a later stage in the regime-building process, though Tang would be assassinated before that could happen.<sup>18</sup>

The SSD meanwhile approached two men who had been members of the pro-Japan Anfu Club.<sup>19</sup> Tang's second-in-command was to be Li Sihao, one of that group who had served as head of finances in the old Beijing government and had already been courted by the NCAA. The SSD officer in charge of the day-to-day tasks of setting up the regime, Colonel Usuda Kanzō, met with him several times during the middle of January, but Li remained aloof. Then Usuda approached Liang Hongzhi. Where Li was noncommittal, Liang was willing. Liang's association with Japan went back to his childhood, which he had spent in Nagasaki with his grandfather, the Chinese consul in that port. He had graduated from the Imperial University, served in the new republican government in the 1910s, and gained prominence as one of the eight members of the Anfu Club who sought safe haven in the Japanese embassy when his patron Duan Qirui was ousted by competing factions in 1920. Liang had held middle-level posts after Duan returned to power in 1924, but resigned in 1925 and drifted into the Japanese orbit. When the Japanese Army invaded Manchuria in 1931, Liang retreated to scholarly retirement in Shanghai and there gained a modest reputation for his classical verse and his art collection. Now, at the start of 1938, the Japanese offered Liang an opportunity to reenter politics.

Fearing that this recruitment effort among its old enemies might succeed, the Guomindang stepped up its intimidation. Li was frightened into withdrawing entirely from consideration, and Liang Hongzhi fled to Hong Kong. "Flight" may not be quite the right word, for Liang used the visit to meet with associates of the Guomindang financier and faction head T. V. Soong (Song Ziwen, 1894–1971), who was acting as an unofficial conduit between the Japanese and the Guomindang and was considered by the SSD as a potential ally of the Central China regime. Liang may have used his flight to Hong Kong as an opportunity to test Soong's support for collaboration. He may also have hoped to negotiate some immunity or room for maneuver from the Guomindang, though no record of what transpired at these meetings appears to have survived.

With Liang's defection to Hong Kong, the SSD's recruitment process in Shanghai was stalled, but only briefly. Japanese agents had managed in the meantime to recruit Wen Zongyao (1876–1947), an associate of Sun Yat-sen prior to 1921 and a manager of a Guangdong native-place association in Shanghai who had been drawn into relief work during the Japanese assault the previous fall. They also recruited former Guomindang official Chen Qun (1890–1945). These two remained on the scene. General Matsui's own unofficial representative to T.V. Soong, Li Zeyi, had returned from Hong Kong the day before Liang fled to confirm that the negotiations with the Guomindang were dead. Li Zeyi advised Matsui to get the new regime going as soon as possible. The day after Liang decamped, the general ordered the SSD to go ahead with its plans. A preparatory committee that included Wen Zongyao and Chen Qun was struck the next day. Unsuccessful in gaining access to T. V. Soong, Liang decided not to languish in Hong Kong. He returned to Shanghai within a week to join Wen and Chen in their planning. By February 10 they had consolidated themselves as the regime leadership. Four days later at a meeting that Li Zeyi arranged with SSD head Harada Kumakichi, the triumvirate pledged themselves prepared to float a regime on behalf of the Japanese Army.

A file of curricula vitae of the top nine prospective leaders (including Liang, Wen, and Chen, as well as Li Sihao) sent to the Ministry of War in Tokyo at the end of February furnishes a group profile of the emerging leadership.<sup>20</sup> The CVs reveal an age range from forty-five to sixty-seven, with an average age of fifty-six (Liang was a year under the average). All were born south of the Yangtze River, the majority from Fujian and Guangdong

provinces. Seven of them had studied abroad: four in Japan, two in Hong Kong and the United States, and one in France. All had held public office, half under regional regimes and half under the Guomindang, though most had watched their careers collapse in the 1920s and none had risen to a position of real prominence.

A missionary at the time observed that those who came forward to work with the Japanese were men “cast aside by the present party.” Having languished in the political wilderness for a decade, they were considered by most Chinese as “too old and set in their ways.”<sup>21</sup> The intelligence section of the British consulate general in Shanghai called them “a queer amalgam of survivors of the old northern Anfu clique and of southern Kuomintang dissidents.”<sup>22</sup> A Guomindang agent in Shanghai phrased popular opinion more pointedly: “In terms of the credit they have within society, all are bankrupt.”<sup>23</sup> This judgment may be realistic, but it is also partisan. These men may have been powerless under the Guomindang dispensation, but they nonetheless represented a conservative alternative to what they perceived to be the Guomindang’s commitment to reckless Western-style modernity. The SSD dared to think that it had been reasonably successful in its recruitment, though a closing comment in its February report worried about “what kind of people they will muster and what kind of organization they will select for the regime” and advised that “continuous direction and intense support from within will be needed to lend substance” to the regime.<sup>24</sup>

The next step was to design the regime. SSD officers and their Chinese associates worked together on some plans, separately on others. These were finalized on February 19 at a meeting between the triumvirate of Liang, Wen, and Chen and the CCAA, newly renamed the Central China Expeditionary Army (CCEA), whose command had just been assumed by General Hata Shunroku. It was agreed that the name of the regime would be the New Government of the Republic of China, its flag the five-barred flag of the early Republic, its structure a constitutional democracy, and its capital Nanjing, though with offices in Shanghai.<sup>25</sup> Among the documents approved at the meeting was a ten-point “Political Program” (*Zhenggang*), which originated from the Chinese side. It promised a tricameral, multiparty constitutional government devoted to anticommunism, economic reconstruction, and the replacement of modern “shallow doctrines” with “China’s traditional moral culture.” Its policies were consistent with traditional notions of good government: lightening taxes, recruiting meritorious offi-

cials, and eradicating corruption. In foreign policy, it declared that China would respect the equality of nations and “respond to current world trends and work toward peace in East Asia.”<sup>26</sup> Both sides approved this program, along with a manifesto, organizational outlines for national, provincial, and city governments, rules regarding personnel appointments, and an announcement to foreign governments regarding treaty obligations.<sup>27</sup> These documents were telegraphed to Tokyo two days later on February 21, and the unveiling ceremonies booked to take place five days hence at the New Asia Hotel.

#### NEGOTIATING WITH OTHER CENTERS OF POWER

Up until February 19, SSD officers had worked out all these agreements with their Chinese counterparts without consulting either Beijing or Tokyo. Now they had to negotiate this package with the other players. The friction of interests that shaped the agreement up to this point would prove mild compared to the tussle that was about to occur.

Tokyo did not respond immediately to the SSD documents. These were resent the following day, but still no answer came. As the days went by, the silence from Tokyo became deafening. The CCEA soon realized that the Cabinet would not rubber-stamp the proposal. After a week of waiting, Colonel Usuda sent his assistant, Lieutenant-Colonel Chō Isamu, to Tokyo to find out what had happened. Chō discovered that the Cabinet regarded the CCEA's plan as tantamount to setting up a regime to compete with Beijing.<sup>28</sup> A month previously, on January 18, Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki had affirmed to the British ambassador in Tokyo that the Japanese government “had no desire to encourage the creation of a number of ‘autonomous’ governments”<sup>29</sup> and desired that a single government rule over a unified China. Despite giving permission to the CCEA to set up a Nanjing administration, that position had not changed. The CCEA should have anticipated Tokyo's unhappiness, in particular over the presumptuous first article of the organizational outline, which read: “The Government of the Republic of China reserves the right to rule the Republic of China.”<sup>30</sup> The Cabinet had no intention of conceding this “right” to the new regime. The Cabinet declared that the CCEA could not go ahead without having first worked out an

agreement with Wang Kemin in Beijing; it was also unimpressed with the quality of the men recruited to lead the regime.

The SSD's first problem was how to present this setback to Liang Hongzhi. Liang was growing anxious as the days passed without authorization from Tokyo, then was badly shaken when he learned on March 8 that his prospective minister of pacification had been killed. The assassination caused panic among the leadership group, who fled to the New Asia Hotel or went underground elsewhere in the Japanese concession of Hongkou. Usuda feared that Tokyo's condition on forming the regime would cause Liang to back out and his entire plan to unravel. He decided to tell Liang nothing and wait to see how events developed.<sup>31</sup> They developed better than the CCEA could have hoped. Negotiations between the CCEA and Tokyo through the first week of March led finally to Tokyo's approval on March 10 for creating a regime in Central China.<sup>32</sup> General Hata's announcement that day that the "Japanese Army is prepared to cooperate with a new organ created in the Central China area" helped overcome the effect of the assassination. The meeting rooms of the New Asia Hotel were once again abuzz with planning.

Details of the negotiations that broke the deadlock are not available, but as the vice-minister of the Navy reported in a telegram to the head of naval forces in Central China, the agreement was something the CCEA could live with. First of all, and remarkably, it was agreed that the relationship between the regimes in North and Central China would be sorted out at an appropriate future time. The assertion that the regime "reserves the right to rule the Republic of China" was excised from the organizational outline, as was another statement that the Nanjing Judicial Yuan would have authority over the "entire country."<sup>33</sup> Among other changes, the third point in the Political Program stating that the regime would "respond to current world trends and work toward peace in East Asia" was revised to read: "promote cordiality between China and Japan in order to consolidate peace in East Asia."<sup>34</sup> It appears that China's relationship to Japan could not be left obscured behind a vague reference to world trends, but had to be featured as a founding principle of the regime. These changes amounted to relatively modest rhetorical concessions. The way seemed cleared for setting up largely what the CCEA had wanted, slightly shorn of language the Chinese side had chosen, but otherwise intact.

A final sticking point needing quick resolution was the name. The CCEA hoped for something like “New Government.” February planning documents from the Chinese side used “New Government of the Chinese Republic,” and dared occasionally to drop “New” entirely. The CCEA was obliged to abandon this language because of the implied claim that this regime governed all of China. The Army backtracked to “Republican Government in Central China,” and then went much further back to the more regional-sounding “Government of the Republic in Central China.” In the March 10 telegram to the Army Ministry reporting on the second version, the CCEA chief of staff noted that final agreement had yet to be reached. Tokyo responded the following day allowing that “republic” was acceptable so long as it was counterbalanced with some designation indicating this was not the sole government in China. It offered three new possibilities: “Government of the Republic of China in Nanjing,” “Provisional New Government of the Republic of China,” and “Reformed Government of the Republic of China.” The Chinese side disliked the first because it localized the regime to Nanjing, exposing the unity problem. “Provisional New Government” was unacceptable because it suggested the regime had only a temporary character, and in any case sounded too much like the name of the regime in North China. That left “Reformed Government” (*Weixin zhengfu*), with its comfortable terminological echo of the Meiji Restoration (*Mingzhi weixin*), as the only viable alternative, and it was accepted.<sup>35</sup>

The next round of resistance came from Beijing. Wen Zongyao had sent a representative to Beijing to explain to Wang Kemin the terms under which the Central China regime would emerge. Wen believed Wang had been mollified; instead, his intervention put Wang on the alert. Liang sent Wang a bridge-building letter on March 12 telling him that his regime would be inaugurated within a few days. In the letter, he made an injudicious comment that he was inaugurating his regime under coercion from the Japanese Army. Knowing that he had to act to save his own regime, Wang promptly informed Tokyo of what Liang had written. Tokyo told Hata, who was then in the awkward position of having to deny that he was putting any pressure on anyone. He called a final preinauguration meeting with the triumvirate the following day to do just that, assuring the Chinese side that it should not in any way think it had been coerced into creating this regime. The Chinese used this moment of embarrassment to press their advantage and demand from Hata an assurance of unlimited material support from the CCEA as

the price of their continuing involvement.<sup>36</sup> He caved in, and so it seemed that the deal still held. The following evening Liang led his party of six hundred to Nanjing for the founding.

The deal had not held. Wang Kemin complained to Tokyo that the founding of the regime in Nanjing was further evidence of the sort of duplicity the Army Ministry had shown in carrying on the Trautmann negotiations with Jiang Jieshi without Wang's knowledge. Livid that the Japanese would sponsor a "republic" in Nanjing, whatever modifier might be placed in front of it, and fearful that his regime would lose control of taxes and customs revenues, Wang mobilized every minister in his cabinet as well as every organization in Beijing and Tianjin he could muster to barrage Tokyo and Shanghai with telegrams on March 12 and 13. He declared to his Japanese advisers that he would dissolve his regime if Japan recognized the one in Nanjing. The rumor in Shanghai was that he had ordered that any representative of the Central China regime who came to Tianjin or Beijing be assassinated.<sup>37</sup>

Wang's bluff worked. Tokyo telegraphed the CCEA on March 13 to order a stay of inauguration. After a long evening meeting at CCEA headquarters while Liang's train was en route to Nanjing, the Army conceded that it could take no other course. The SSD decided it would be too great an embarrassment to inform Liang and Wen of what had happened, so it told them instead that the inauguration was too important to be rushed, and that a new date would be settled within five days.<sup>38</sup> Five days must have seemed optimistic. On the other hand, the pressure of time was at work. The CCEA needed inauguration to happen soon, for the longer it took the regime to emerge the weaker it would seem, and each day further reduced the chance that the regime would have any authority. The CCEA had to move quickly to negotiate terms with Wang.

The task was given to Liang's acting minister of pacification, a canny politician named Ren Yuandao. Ren went north with SSD chief Harada Kumakichi and Colonel Kusumoto Sanetaka to meet with Wang Kemin and his ministers on March 18. At his meeting with Wang, which he conducted without the Japanese being present, the two were able to work out an arrangement.<sup>39</sup> Ren made significant concessions. He agreed that statements be inserted into his regime's manifesto declaring that the new regime did not wish that China be governed by two governments; that it administered only three provinces and only until such time as the rail link between North and

Central China was reestablished; and that it conceded to the Provisional Government control of such national affairs as foreign relations, military affairs, finances, currency, laws, transportation, and personnel appointments. It looked as though Ren was giving everything away, yet he was able to secure a coda to the effect that the actual management of foreign and military affairs had yet to be negotiated, winning the Nanjing regime some breathing space in these critical areas. It seems that the principal concern for the North China side was not really the loss of the dignity attached to a national regime but the threat of losing control of resources. Customs receipts, tax income, a national bank, financial disclosure, and currency were all spelled out in the agreement as falling within the purview of the Provisional Government. Again, however, Ren won a concession on the most sensitive question of all, which was how the revenue that the two regimes collected was to be redistributed.

Wang and Harada met the following day, March 19, and came out with a three-point agreement acknowledging that a bank in North China would control national finances and currency, that financial policy and other central functions would be handled by the Provisional Government, and that laws in North China would not be contradicted in Central China—except where the local character of a region dictated otherwise. The CCEA was willing to live with this loose understanding and the NCAA appears to have been mollified, for on the following day the heads of the two expeditionary armies, Hata and Terauchi, put their names to an outline agreement that offered only slight revisions to the Ren-Wang understanding. A supplementary memorandum noted that the Central China regime should be set up as soon as possible and with the support of the Japanese side.<sup>40</sup> From a Central China perspective, this agreement achieved important concessions, for it again put off the difficult questions of when, where, and how the eventual merger would happen. At the same time, it limited the authority of the North China regime by giving the regime in Central China a role in negotiating this outcome. Most importantly, it blocked further interference from the NCAA in the affairs of the Nanjing regime.

The CCEA would discover that its worries were not over. Tokyo emerged as the new source of opposition when three days later (March 22) the ministers of the Army, Navy, and Foreign Affairs met to work out their understanding of how matters should proceed in China. Navy and Foreign Affairs

were unhappy with what the Army's field officers had come up with, and submitted a decision to Cabinet two days later that removed all the subtleties in the Ren-Wang agreement and the Hata-Terauchi memorandum that favored the Central China regime. The ministers' opening statement of basic policy baldly declared that the new regime would be a regional regime, that the Provisional Government would become the central government, and that the Nanjing regime would merge with it as soon as possible. To this end, the ministers stipulated that the Provisional Government was to be involved in revising the new regime's manifesto. The Nanjing regime was to place no obstacles in the way of the merger and should send representatives to Beijing as soon as possible to begin the process. An appended "item of understanding" left the location of the capital after the merger up to the Chinese side, however, providing yet another potential opportunity for Japan to drop its support for Wang Kemin should the Central China regime prove to be more effective and more powerful than the North China regime.<sup>41</sup>

This otherwise blunt instrument was telegraphed the day it received Cabinet approval (March 24) to the two armies in China. General Hata was appalled to discover that the Center had decided to support the North China regime at the expense of his own. In his diary entry for that day, Hata opined that the ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Navy had caved in to the persistence of North China. "Around here," he quietly observed, this policy "is taken to be rather unenlightened."<sup>42</sup> For its part, the Navy blamed the Army for the mess surrounding the founding of the new regime. The day before the Cabinet decision, the commander in chief of the China Area Fleet had reported to his vice-minister that the problems had arisen because the Army was set on the "calamitous" policy of reinforcing the North China regime in order to create "a second Manchuria." What was wanted was a compliant neighbor, not another thinly disguised colony. He said that the Navy should support the creation of the Central China regime on the grounds that it was a potent means to undermine Jiang's regime, and that the destruction of Jiang should be the principal focus of Japan's activities in China. The creation of more client states was not on the agenda.<sup>43</sup> The commander in chief's interpretation was a fair view of what was going on. Army ambition in North China, far more than Wang Kemin's intransigence, was indeed the source of the trouble. But Army ambition in Central China

played a role as well, and Navy dissatisfaction with this ambition in both places fueled interservice tension.<sup>44</sup> The occupation was not a unified Japanese project.

Harada and Kusumoto got back to Shanghai the day that news of the Cabinet decision arrived. They decided, once again, not to show it to their Chinese associates. They would push through the inauguration without having committed themselves or the Chinese to the new terms. To ensure that the rift between North and Central China did not come to public attention, the CCEA sent messages to Tokyo and Beijing two days before the inauguration reminding them to send telegrams of congratulation. The CCEA felt that a message from the “Beijing Provisional Government” would be particularly appropriate.<sup>45</sup>

Not until March 30, two days after the Reformed Government had been set up, did Harada send a carefully worded memo to the Army vice-minister acknowledging receipt of the Cabinet’s plan and managing to reintroduce ambiguities favoring Nanjing.<sup>46</sup> In the spirit of the Hata-Terauchi agreement, he quietly suggested to his vice-minister that laws and revenue-collection would conform with North China practices—but would also have to be adjusted to the circumstances particular to Central China. He also noted that the CCEA would “oversee” revenue collection in Central China and “cooperate” with foreign-affairs issues that came up for the regional government, thereby strengthening the patron if he couldn’t beef up the client. The implementation of other policies would have to be worked out in relation to the “current situation”—his way of saying politely that the CCEA could not be counted on to carry out what Tokyo or the NCAA thought it could dictate. Finally, Harada took the issue of regime merger into Army hands by saying that only after the CCEA and NCAA had reached their own agreement should a Chinese conference on merger go ahead, and that the location of this conference required further study, thereby opening the possibility of shifting it from Beijing down to Shanghai.

Six days after the inauguration, on April 3, Liang Hongzhi and two of his ministers went north to Beijing to meet with Wang Kemin.<sup>47</sup> Their formal meeting was scheduled for the 5th, but Wang met them privately the evening before. He showed Liang the Cabinet decision of March 24 giving clear priority to the North China regime. This was the first time Liang had seen the document. Major-General Kita Seichi, Special Service head for the NCAA, had shown Wang a Chinese draft translation the week before on an

unofficial basis to reassure Wang of the integrity of his regime. The revelation embarrassed the Japanese side, especially Kita, who had leaked the document confidentially. He realized that it was too late for Japan to issue a unilateral statement giving priority to the North China regime, now that the second regime had been publicly launched. All Kita could do was complain loudly to his Ministry that the SSDs of both armies should work on the basis of a common policy.<sup>48</sup> His reaction indicates that Harada had won this round. By protecting Liang from the Cabinet decision, Harada had succeeded in bringing his regime into life without having agreed to the NCAA's conditions. The NCAA may have won in Cabinet, but not on the ground.

The April 5 meeting went ahead as planned. Present at this melancholy affair were Wang and Liang, Kita and Harada, plus Foreign Affairs and Navy representatives. Liang's nemesis pushed his advantage by listing a series of demands, principally fiscal, that were designed to ensure that the the Cabinet decision would be adhered to on terms favorable to North China. Liang responded by observing that he had only learned of the Cabinet decision the night before, could not offer any views on the issues newly placed before the meeting, and would have to return to Shanghai to consult before replying to Wang's demands. The foundation was set for the acrimony and distrust that poisoned the relationship between Liang and Wang for the next two years and induced the Japanese eventually to replace Wang with someone more tractable, and Liang with someone more charismatic. For this someone, the Japanese would turn, of course, to Wang Jingwei.

#### RECONSIDERING COLLABORATION

Japan needed Chinese collaborators to set up a regime that was sympathetic to Japan's aims on the continent, but still recognizably Chinese, if it hoped to erode Jiang Jieshi's legitimacy in domestic and international eyes. Given the high cost of military occupation, Japan also needed collaborators to raise revenues to feed this regime, for it was expected to operate at Chinese expense, not as a colonial administration paid for from imperial revenues. The politics involved in setting up the regime in Central China proved to be difficult, as we have seen. Despite the Foreign Ministry's declared commitment not to carve China up, the Japanese Army units on the ground were keen to strike deals advantageous to their positions in the direction of the

war: the rivalry between the two expeditionary forces made it impossible for the Cabinet to prevent the emergence of multiple regimes. This rivalry provided the collaborators with opportunities for pressing demands that were unacceptable to Tokyo and resulted in a fractured occupation that Tokyo could not control effectively, though this situation often put collaborators in a reactive position to an agenda that was being set elsewhere.

First among the liabilities that the Chinese side faced in floating a legitimate regime was national disunity, a condition of the deep division within the Japanese military it could not control. Even though this condition prevented the Reformed Government from claiming national jurisdiction, it did open space that the new leadership needed to usher their regime into existence at the expense of the Provisional Government and in defiance of the Cabinet's wishes. That opening quickly became a major chasm that neither the Beijing nor the Nanjing regime could cross, since neither of their backers could prevail unilaterally in the contest of who would sponsor the new national government of China. The solution would be to scrap both regimes when Wang Jingwei's Reorganized National Government was installed in 1940. But that move exposed the reversibility, and hence the insubstantiality, of whatever regime was lodged at Nanjing, especially when a separate administration continued to operate independently in North China, albeit it under a different name. The unification that had eluded the early collaborators and was supposed to have been achieved by creating Wang Jingwei's central government was conspicuously not achieved.

The Reformed Government that emerged from these confining restrictions was not a purely Japanese creation, therefore, but the result of a political process of negotiation, misrepresentation, and subterfuge in which Chinese were involved as more than passive puppets of their Japanese masters. It is true that most of the elements of the regime's structure, and the terminology used to designate them, were originated by the Japanese officers in the Army's Special Service Department, yet the outcome was not entirely by Japanese design. The Reformed Government was a compromise between a conservative interpretation of Chinese ideals of republican government (shorn of the elements of one-party tutelage imposed by the Guomindang) and Japanese aspirations for administrative units within Greater East Asia. The process through which this odd compromise was reached had to be dialogic: for the Japanese, because they had to make entry into an occupation regime attractive enough to enlist Chinese who could be assassinated for

doing so; and for the Chinese, because they could not assemble a regime under conditions of military occupation without taking Japanese demands into account.

If the actual achievements of the Chinese side seem modest, the dialogue they pursued deserves to be recognized if the history of the war is to be written as something more complex and realistic than a drama of moral triumph. Acknowledging the dialogic character of the regime's creation need not compromise the conclusion that the Reformed Government was weak and its leadership venal, nor exonerate the collaborators for their responsibility in facilitating Japanese control over the eastern half of China. But it does require that historians of twentieth-century China set aside the postwar syndrome of Chinese war triumphalism that dismisses the motivations and impact of the collaborators, and recognize that the political elites who collaborated with Japan did so within more complex terms of agency than is usually allowed, even if their pursuit of the ideals of unity and autonomy might seem to their detractors utterly compromised by the realities of power.

## The Wang Jingwei Regime, 1940–1945: Continuities and Disjunctures with Nationalist China

DAVID P. BARRETT

Studies of wartime collaboration in Europe point to many local regimes that enjoyed support from broad segments of the community, either because the war pushed aside hitherto dominant political and social classes, or because the war facilitated the overthrow of previously dominant political ideologies. German antisemitism drew much popular support in occupied Europe because of the prominence, real or imagined, of the Jewish community in economic and political life. Vichy France initially enjoyed strong popular support because it drew on widespread rejection of the liberal, secular, and supposedly Jewish-influenced Third Republic. In central and eastern Europe a number of conservative regimes, often with a pronounced clerical admixture, adopted a public fascist style, and willingly linked themselves to Nazi Germany's anti-Bolshevik, antisemitic ideological obsessions.<sup>1</sup>

A number of monographs on specific European collaborationist movements or regimes have been published, but the comparative study of such phenomena is only beginning. In the case of China, studies exist for the early years of the Provisional Government in Beiping and the negotiations that led to the establishment of the Wang Jingwei government in Nanjing.<sup>2</sup>

Apart from a few articles in English and Chinese (mostly the latter) on specific aspects of collaboration, the study of collaborationist governments, both in terms of their intrinsic nature and the overall record of their collaboration, remains to be done.<sup>3</sup> Beyond this lies the challenge of comparing the Chinese experience of collaboration with that of the European nations. In this essay my aim is to identify some of the prominent characteristics of the Wang Jingwei government in order to determine where it belongs in the collaborationist spectrum.

To begin with its most apparent feature, and the one which sets it apart clearly from its European counterparts, the Wang regime neither advanced a distinctive ideological agenda nor sought the allegiance of hitherto ignored social classes. Wang constantly claimed he represented orthodoxy (*zhengtong*), both as the rightful head of the Chinese government and as the guardian of correct Guomindang ideology.<sup>4</sup> Thus he sought no break with the ideological directions and practical policies of the pre-1937 Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek. Rather, his government sought to carry out these policies more effectively, realizing as it did the need to restructure Sino-Japanese relations under the rubric of a new order in East Asia. This restructuring would not constitute a redirection of party doctrine, Wang argued, as Sun Yat-sen had championed Sino-Japanese collaboration in the cause of Pan-Asianism.<sup>5</sup> The Nationalists in Chongqing maintained that this interpretation constituted a wilful distortion of Sun's concept. But, Pan-Asianism aside, Wang's political, social, and ideological programs were in no way distinct from those of the government he claimed to have superseded. In this respect Wang's regime was quite different from its European counterparts.

Both in its major features and in the principal problems it confronted, the Wang regime closely resembled the Nationalist Government, both as it existed prior to the outbreak of war in 1937 and as it existed subsequently in its southwest China redoubt. At the highest level, administration, the Wang regime was characterized by intense factional rivalry, which in turn made the supreme leader all the more essential in his capacity as arbiter. In examining factionalism in the Wang regime, it is necessary to note that rivalries existed both within the body of Wang's followers, and between Wang's followers taken as a whole and those who made up the original wave of collaborators in central China. The latter were members of the Reformed Government (*Weixin zhengfu*) of Liang Hongzhi, which had been established in Nanjing

in March 1938 and dissolved in March 1940. Positions of prestige, if not of substance, had to be found for the leaders of this regime. Liang Hongzhi, for example, became president of the Control Yuan in Wang's government.<sup>6</sup>

The important positions in the Nanjing government went to Wang's followers. Two major factional groupings existed, a lesser number than surrounded Chiang, a fact that may be attributable to the shallower roots and shorter history of the Wang regime. Exercising the greatest influence in the Nanjing political world was the Palace Clique (*gongguanpai*), whose leading members were related to Wang's wife Chen Bijun. Opposed to it was a faction centered upon the highly able Minister of Finance and Governor of the Central Reserve Bank, Zhou Fohai. Behind Zhou were former members of Chiang's party or intelligence services who had gone over to Wang in 1938–39. Positioned between these two groups, but playing a key role because of his long association with Wang, was Chen Gongbo, president of the Legislative Yuan and subsequently, in 1944, due to his independence from the two factions, Wang's successor. The military does not appear to have formed an identifiable grouping around Wang comparable to the Whampoa faction around Chiang, perhaps because those commanders nominally loyal to Wang very much went their own way. The central government in Nanjing exercised even less control over its military establishment than its counterpart in Chongqing did. If a specific military factional player is to be identified, it would be Ren Yuandao, whom Wang inherited from the Liang Hongzhi regime and who was commander in chief of Wang's most dependable force, the First Front Army.

Given the personal factionalism and weak institutional nature of the Nanjing regime, exceptional attention was focused on the leader as an integrating force. Perhaps even more than Chiang, Wang was essential to the survival of his government. It was Wang who had negotiated the return to the capital (*huandu*) in March 1940 of his National Government to replace the regional regimes in north and east-central China. And it was Wang who was vital to the Japanese if their claim of a separate Chinese "peace government" was to have any validity. For those who committed themselves to the Nanjing government, Wang, because of the prestige he carried from his more than thirty years' involvement in the Guomindang cause, was the only possible head of state. Wang was the irreplaceable leader. When illness removed him from the scene in early 1944, Chen Gongbo stood in as his

deputy, an arrangement acceptable to the competing factional interests since Chen had not built up a factional following. After Wang's death in November 1944, Chen continued to designate himself acting president, in order to indicate that no one could replace the late leader as president. More tellingly, with Wang gone, the key members of the central administration hurried off to the provinces over the winter of 1944–45 to take up governorships in a bid to build up territorial strength for bargaining with Chongqing at war's end. Chen Gongbo went through the motions of command during his nine-month tenure, but little more than the formalities of office were left to him.<sup>7</sup>

As with Chiang, a leadership cult was fostered around Wang Jingwei. Compared to the contemporary cults of Hitler and Stalin or the later cult of Mao Zedong, the rival wartime Chinese versions were quite modest. In Nanjing, the Ministry of Propaganda dedicated itself to promotion of the "leader" and the "peace movement." Innumerable editions of Wang's articles and speeches were published; Ministry journalists followed Wang on his travels and inspections of areas recovered in the rural pacification campaigns; and major dates on the regime's calendar were celebrated in the towns and cities with meetings and march-pasts lauding the leader. Photographs of Wang in the press far eclipsed those of his subordinates. Not long into the regime Wang acquired a further image, that of supreme military commander, to complement his regular portrayal as civilian leader. Wang was often shown in army uniform, sometimes in naval uniform, in both cases looking a little too fastidiously attired to be a convincing substitute for Chiang Kai-shek.<sup>8</sup> Image-building aside, Wang's position was emphasized by periodic oaths of loyalty taken by government workers and students, and, with the call in late 1941 for a New Citizens Movement (*Xin guomin yundong*) to regenerate the nation, Wang was elevated to the role of teacher and guide.

The New Citizens Movement bears obvious similarities to the New Life Movement launched in 1934 by the Nationalist Government. Both movements stressed spiritual, or ideological, training as essential to the creation of a disciplined, unified people. Both movements fostered the idea that a properly motivated populace would spur material development of the nation. Social relationships would not need to be altered, since a common ideological commitment would harmonize social differences. Both movements testify to the strong tradition of Confucian inner rectification and social harmonization present in the Guomindang. Both movements also

illustrate a common response, shared to some degree by the communists, to the immense problem of China's material weakness, which made spiritual appeals a remedy to be grasped at, in the short run at least.<sup>9</sup>

Wang Jingwei personally composed the eight-point "Fundamentals of the New Citizens Movement." This program was broadcast on New Year's Day, 1942, and publicized extensively in the following months. What is striking about it is the lack of ideological focus; in this respect it belongs to the party tradition, going back to Sun Yat-sen, of eclectic programs standing in place of a coherent ideology. Wang's first three points restated the Three Principles of the People (*sanminzhuyi*), but in such a way that the principle of nationalism now found fullest expression in Greater East Asianism, while the principle of livelihood (*minshengzhuyi*) would be realized only in conjunction with anticommunism. The fourth and fifth points exhorted the citizenry in moral virtues that drew respectively on Western and Chinese traditions: selfless dedication to the common interest, and exercise of a sense of shame. The sixth point was quite modern: the study of science and the dissemination of scientific knowledge were to be promoted. The seventh point combined the practical and the moral in regard to economic development: national production was to be increased, but accomplishment of this goal required that each citizen first curtail all personal extravagance. Finally, Wang, in the tradition of the wise and concerned administrator, promised the ruthless elimination of corrupt officials and corrupt practices in government.<sup>10</sup>

The reasons that this program had so little impact on the citizenry are reminiscent of the earlier New Life Movement. The target of Wang's movement was the urban population, specifically government functionaries and students at the middle and tertiary level. Through short training courses for the former, together with school indoctrination and special youth brigades for the latter, these groups would become the nucleus for the renovation of society. Implementation of the movement was to be carried out by the appropriate Guomintang branch. In this area, however, the institutional weakness of the Wang regime was most pronounced. At its higher levels the Guomintang had largely atrophied. Its principal offices were held by senior government members who had little time for the party, while their deputies were basically sinecure holders. At the grassroots level party offices were understaffed or nonexistent. Due to this lack of an effective mobilization

mechanism, over a year went by before the basic organization of the movement was in place.<sup>11</sup>

The year 1943 marked the high point of the New Citizens Movement. In January the Wang government's declaration of war on Britain and the United States occasioned much propaganda and many public activities celebrating the responsibilities of the new citizen to the war effort. During the summer a number of short training programs were held. But by 1944 the movement had begun to fade from view, though its bureaucratic shell survived until late in the regime.<sup>12</sup> The demise of the movement may in part be attributed to the incapacitation of Wang, who was the driving force behind it. More important explanations of its limited impact on the public are the uninspired nature of its doctrine and the top-heavy nature of its administrative structure. Bureaucratic routinization soon set in. As with the New Life Movement, even the first stage of the New Citizens Movement—the “renovation” of party and government—was beyond realization, since those charged with implementing renewal were at the same time the designated objects of that renewal.

If the New Citizens Movement existed largely in the sphere of exhortation and formalistic observance, the Rural Pacification Movement (*Qingxiang yundong*) was, in contrast, a tangible reality for the population in the Lower Yangtze Valley. Rural pacification drew heavily on the anti-Communist campaigns of the pre-1937 Nationalist Government.<sup>13</sup> The proposal for a major anti-Communist offensive was put to Wang by his Japanese advisers who had concluded that effective control of the Jiangnan region required measures more thorough than the periodic mopping-up (*saodang*) operations hitherto used. The fifth Jiangxi encirclement campaign carried out by Chiang in 1933–34 afforded a useful model. The formula advanced in that campaign, “three parts military, seven parts political,” was seized upon by Wang, as responsibility for political affairs would belong to his government, while military operations and overall command would be the responsibility of the Japanese.<sup>14</sup> But even in regard to “three parts military” Wang saw an opportunity. Chinese troops under Ren Yuandao's command, together with local Chinese peace preservation forces (*baodundui*), were to fight alongside the Japanese. This combined effort, Wang hoped, would not only gain prestige for his regime, but would also significantly augment his military capability due to the provision of war supplies and technical advice by the Japanese.<sup>15</sup>

In May 1941 the Rural Pacification Commission was set up under Wang's chairmanship, and in July the first campaign was launched to the east and northeast of Suzhou. Communist New Fourth Army guerrilla units, which were unprepared for this concentration of Japanese military force and Chinese backup support, took a high number of casualties before slipping out of the area. By the fall, the first pacification campaign was declared a success. A second zone north of Wuxi was marked off for the next campaign, to begin at once. In September and December Wang made highly publicized tours of the first pacification zone and expressed great satisfaction with the results of Sino-Japanese collaboration.<sup>16</sup>

Rural pacification strengthened the Wang government, inasmuch as the communist presence in the Jiangnan regions was seriously challenged by Japanese military operations in 1941–42. However, rural pacification did not result in a significant extension of central government authority into the pacified zone. There were two reasons for this. First, at the regional level, rural pacification provided the opportunity for its administrators to establish their own “independent kingdoms.” Li Shiqun, as head of the Commission's operational headquarters in Suzhou, took full advantage of the executive powers and generous subsidies accorded him by Wang.<sup>17</sup> With his background in special affairs (*tewu*) work and his close connections with the Japanese, Li soon came to rule his own *imperium in imperio*. Within a few months Li maneuvered himself into the governorship of Jiangsu. To limit Li's growing power, Nanjing detached from the province the districts north of the Yangtze, on the ostensible pretext of creating a special “North Jiangsu Field Headquarters” (*Subei xingying*).<sup>18</sup> Li met his end in September 1943, poisoned at dinner by his Japanese hosts, who saw Li's ambitions threatening their own interests. Despite the standard public observances and memorial publications, rumors abounded of Nanjing's connivance in Li's demise.

Li Shiqun's case illustrated the endemic regionalism of Guomindang politics. A second similarity between the Wang regime and its predecessor is to be seen in the failure of the pacification movement to win active support from the rural population. Despite the emphasis assigned by the official slogan to “seven parts political,” the reality was that “three parts military” defined the movement. This was true not only because of the obvious role played by the Japanese, but also because the Wang government's role was, in the main part, military. This was expressed in a number of ways. Each pacification zone was surrounded by barbed wire or a wooden palisade, punctu-

ated at intervals by checkpoints for traffic in and out of the zone. Responsibility for manning the checkpoints and patrolling the perimeter fell to Wang's local *baoandui*, acting under Japanese command. Within each village adult males were organized into self-defense corps (*ziweituan*). These units, which did not carry firearms, collected intelligence and maintained local patrols. At key points within the pacification zone *baoandui* regiments were stationed. Building up the *baoandui* remained a major priority for the Wang regime and the provincial governments that directly administered these forces.<sup>19</sup>

Central to the political aspect of rural pacification was the *baojia* system. Official propaganda continually stressed that the effective implementation of the *baojia* was the key to success for pacification. The function of the *baojia* was only in the first instance that of mutual security. Its larger role was to serve as the basic operational unit within the village for implementation of government directives. In each pacification area meticulous attention was given to organization of village *baojia* structures, in which everyone was enrolled.<sup>20</sup> Political work teams were sent to the villages by the Ministry of Propaganda to publicize the official teachings of anticommunism and Sino-Japanese collaboration. Use was made of song and drama troupes and mobile film projection units to reach the rural audience. The Nanjing government promised to better the lot of the peasantry through such measures as the provision of new technology and the elimination of oppressive gentry-despots (*tuhao lieshen*).

Despite claims for its constructive role, the *baojia* remained what it had always been, a social control mechanism. This was how the communists saw it, and it explains why Nanjing had such difficulty filling the highly vulnerable position of village *bao* chief. As for reconstructing the village through the *baojia*, this hope was no more than an illusion, since Nanjing lacked the money for technological investment, as well as the means and the will to challenge the traditional rural elite. Pacification, then, remained primarily a military exercise, as it was with Chiang. But in Wang's case, any accretion of strength that pacification brought to his regime was compromised, morally and politically, by the inescapable Japanese military presence.

One important further area of comparison between the Chiang and Wang governments is the role played in each by the military. The problems faced were similar, except that Wang, hindered as he was by the Japanese, could make little progress in overcoming them. Like Chiang, Wang was

nominally in command of huge forces, estimated by Western observers to approximate 300,000 men (or 500,000 if the North China Political Council is included) over the years 1943–45.<sup>21</sup> Each government had a number of units whose loyalty could be relied upon. The difference between the forces of Wang and Chiang was one of degree, not of kind, and even here the disparity was not of major proportions. Chiang may have been able to rely absolutely on 20 percent of his forces; Wang could count on 10 to 15 percent (out of 300,000 men).

The core strength of Nanjing's military was provided by Ren Yuandao's First Front Army, numbering somewhat over 20,000 men deployed throughout the Lower Yangtze; the three Guards Divisions, about 10,000 men, based in Nanjing; and the Taxation Police Corps (*shuijingtuan*), 3,000 men under Zhou Fohai's patronage, based in Shanghai. Ren Yuandao had been chief military commander under the collaborationist Reformed Government in 1938. In Wang's administration Ren occupied high official position, in conjunction with his military command. The Guards Divisions, which were graduates of the regime's Central Military Academy, were well trained and well equipped, and regarded by the Communists and the Nationalists as the best of Wang's troops. The Taxation Police Corps also rated well, and its loyalty to Zhou Fohai, the effective second in command in the Wang regime, ensured its reliability.<sup>22</sup>

In theory, all military matters were supervised by the Central Military Commission. In reality, the commission exercised little authority; its main function, like that of its attached advisory council, was to offer prestigious sinecure appointments to prospective converts to Wang's cause. The commanders of the large armies in the hinterland far from Nanjing followed their own inclinations unless it was to their advantage to do otherwise, as was the case in early 1945 when they followed Chen Gongbo's instructions to redeploy themselves in the confines of the Lower Yangtze region as Japanese power waned.<sup>23</sup>

The largest of the armies recruited by Wang were located in the north, in the general vicinity of the Henan-Shandong-Jiangsu-Anhui border. Most of these armies renounced their allegiance to Chongqing and declared themselves for peace in 1943, when Wang's regime appeared revived by Japan's New China Policy, and Chiang's looked increasingly shaky due to the prolonged war. In some cases military reverses at the hands of the Japanese determined the change of loyalty, as with the defection of the Nationalist

24th Army in western Shandong. Chiang may have given his tacit consent to such moves, in order to preserve these forces for later anticommunist use. Other Nationalist armies went over to Wang for much more straightforward mercenary reasons. In February 1941 Li Changjiang brought 20,000 men in the Taizhou area just north of the Yangtze over to the "peace camp." Li received a large supply of ammunition from the Japanese and was later promoted in rank by Wang. In return, Li denounced Chongqing for bringing untold suffering upon the Chinese people through its war of resistance. The ready changes of loyalty illustrated here underscore the difficulty in assessing Nanjing's military effectiveness.<sup>24</sup>

The only escape from the dilemma of reliance on independent generals was the training of an elite central army, which would also make it possible eventually to reduce and break the power of these commanders. Chiang had been building such an army in the 1930s, but much of this elite force had to be sacrificed in 1937 in resisting the Japanese invasion. After Wang established his government in 1940, he sought to replicate such a force. He asked the Japanese for military aid, and he set up a Military Academy in Nanjing, as well as a Naval Academy in Shanghai. These produced graduates of respectable quality: the Guards Divisions, mentioned above, and naval cadets who later distinguished themselves on the Nationalist side in the Civil War. But the financial base of the Nanjing government was weak, and the Japanese were prepared to offer little military aid to Wang. Some obsolete guns and ammunition were provided according to a 1941 agreement, and these were later supplemented by a few patrol boats for his navy and a handful of training aircraft for an air force that never took shape.<sup>25</sup>

Japanese unwillingness to allow Nanjing to build its own military base had two causes. First, Tokyo continued to hope that a deal could be struck with Chongqing to end the war; therefore, it kept the Nanjing regime weak in case it had to be readily liquidated. The second, and more compelling factor, was an underlying mistrust on the part of the Japanese Army of the Nanjing Chinese, however many protestations of a common Sino-Japanese destiny Wang might utter. The Japanese were unprepared to grant Wang's armies true operational autonomy, or to supply them with any firepower of substance. In December 1942, when General Tojo finally agreed to Nanjing's request to enter the war against the Western powers, Wang's military advisers proposed that Nanjing offer its troops for frontline fighting with the Japanese. This was turned down, perhaps because the Japanese doubted the

Chinese troops' quality, but just as likely because the Japanese mistrusted armed Chinese troops in close proximity.<sup>26</sup> Whenever the two sides fought alongside each other, as in rural pacification, the Japanese not only exercised overall command, but Japanese officers had power of command over Chinese officers of the same rank. Japanese advisers were assigned to Chinese army units, and at the top, in Nanjing, Wang was counseled by the permanent Advisory Group of Japan's China Expeditionary Army. In reality the military relationship between Japan and Nanjing was more that of officer and NCO than it was of fellow comrades in arms. Thus Wang was thwarted from creating the military strength essential to the extension of his government's authority over its putative subordinates. Ironically, attempts by both Wang and Chiang to extend their governments' power were thwarted by the Japanese; but Chiang owed his setbacks to losses in battle, while Wang's were attributable to his supposed ally.

Such are some of the more striking continuities between the Wang regime and the Nationalist Government; other continuities might be identified, but here I will turn to the question of disjunctures. In light of the Wang regime's claim to be the true representative of Guomindang orthodoxy, the disjunctures are more difficult to find. The continuities predominate; the disjunctures form more of an epilogue to the account. However, one important issue straddles the line between continuity and disjuncture, and requires consideration. This is the act of collaboration itself.

As Wang was to argue from 1939 on, his commitment to seeking both a peaceful resolution of the China Incident and a new arrangement with Japan based on Konoe's Three Principles of December 1938 was predicated on the need to act quickly to save Chinese state and society from the potential total devastation of a protracted war.<sup>27</sup> Wang justified his accommodation primarily in two ways. First, Sun Yat-sen's remarks about Pan-Asianism and Sino-Japanese collaboration were made the centerpiece of Wang's propaganda. In particular, Sun's 1924 Kobe speech, in which he spoke of the linked destiny of China and Japan, was cited repeatedly as the key to understanding Sun's concept of nationalism. Wang now redefined Chinese nationalism as attainable only within a Greater East Asian nationalism. This formula was given even more strident enunciation after the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941, but the precise manner in which East Asian nationalism and Chinese nationalism would complement and fortify each other was never spelled out. In view of Japan's military and economic record

in China, the claims made for a beneficent common Sino-Japanese destiny were unconvincing on empirical grounds; while on doctrinal grounds denial of the China-centered nature of Sun's nationalism required an exceptional effort in selective and distorted interpretation of Sun's life and works.

The second argument advanced by Wang to justify working with the Japanese was put in historical terms. It had more substance than the "common destiny" theme. All educated people, and many of the uneducated as well, knew that China had been forced to seek accommodation with temporarily stronger enemies at various times in its history. The Mongol and Manchu conquests were the most well-known examples of alien rule. Yet China had not only survived politically, it had prevailed culturally and outlasted its conquerors, who had been sinicized to a greater or lesser degree. Accommodation therefore had been tactically wise. More recently, Chiang Kai-shek had been prepared to seek accommodation with Japan from 1931 to 1937 in order to safeguard the political and economic gains made by the Nationalist Government. When Chiang turned to resistance in 1937, Wang supported him; but when resistance failed to repel the Japanese advance or bring Japan to the conference table, the time was ready, Wang argued, to seek accommodation with Japan in order to preserve the Chinese state and people.<sup>28</sup>

When Wang met the key members of the Japanese cabinet in June 1939, the conditions he advanced for his cooperation implied the establishment of an independent state that would be well-disposed toward but not subordinate to Japan. Wang was promptly disabused of his expectations of genuine independence, most bluntly by the War Minister, Itagaki Seishiro, who demanded, among other things, recognition of Manchukuo, the retention of the separatist regime in North China, and the continued stationing of Japanese troops in designated areas in the north and along the coast.<sup>29</sup> Wang, however, persisted with his efforts, and in December he agreed to terms no better than those indicated to him earlier in the year. The inauguration of his government, celebrated as the "return to the capital," took place on March 30, 1940. Eight months later Wang signed the Basic Treaty for Readjusting Sino-Japanese Relations, and on that same day, November 30, Japan formally recognized Wang's government. In return for an uncertain Japanese commitment to support him against Chiang Kai-shek, Wang acceded to Japanese conditions which Chiang had consistently refused to consider.<sup>30</sup>

History was to show that it was Wang's fatal mistake not to have backed out of the regime-building operations in the summer of 1939. His determi-

nation to form his own government was driven by a number of factors whose relative weight may never be ascertained. The professional politician's characteristic self-confidence and sometimes necessary self-deception undoubtedly lured him on in the belief that he could manage the Japanese. So did the chimera of supplanting Chiang and at last gaining the national leadership, which he believed his long party service and lengthy association with Sun Yat-sen entitled him to. When the question of Wang's collaboration was raised after the war, Chen Gongbo said that Wang had seriously underestimated the strength of the military in Japanese politics, while overestimating Konoe's capacity to deliver an honorable peace. Chen also said that Wang was convinced that a protracted war would bring the communists to power, and therefore even a one-sided accommodation with Japan was justified in China's long-term interest.<sup>31</sup>

There is one further matter to be considered in explaining Wang's collaboration. This is the balance of power as it existed in East Asia in 1939–40. China had been fighting Japan alone since July 1937. Britain and France were preoccupied with Germany, and were at war as of September 1939. In July 1940 Britain was pressured by Japan into closing the Burma Road for three months. As for relations between Japan and the United States, they had been cooling because of the China war, but there was no reason to believe in 1939 or early 1940 that war between the two nations was likely. It was only in September 1940, when the Japanese entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, and sent their troops into the northern part of French Indochina, that relations abruptly worsened between Japan and the United States and the possibility of war presented itself. And only after Japan's move into southern Indochina and the retaliatory American sanctions of July 1941 did observers on the scene begin to think of war as inevitable.<sup>32</sup> Thus, well into 1940 China fought on in near isolation, and this isolation seemed unlikely to be relieved. Under these circumstances Wang made his decision to work with the Japanese. And even after Pearl Harbor, it was not until late 1942 that the war decidedly began to turn against Japan. Only then could it be said definitively that in 1939–40 Wang had made the wrong decision about the chances of survival of Chiang's Nationalist Government.

The war ended suddenly in August 1945. The Nationalists, once reestablished in eastern China, tried the Nanjing government's senior personnel on charges of treason. But the Nationalists did not have to contend with

diehard partisans of the former regime or undo political or social policies intended by that regime to reshape society. The programs of the Wang government were not at issue, only the act of collaboration.

If collaboration, then, was the only issue setting the Wang regime apart, the question arises: was the act of collaboration a continuity or a disjuncture with the immediate pre-1937 past, as well as the more distant past? If Wang's accommodation with Japan had yielded some modest results, or if Chiang's regime had disintegrated in 1943 (as many foreign observers thought it might), would not Wang's so-called treason have been reclassified as momentary accommodation to harsh and ineluctable political realities?<sup>33</sup> But events turned out otherwise. Wang's regime disappeared almost without trace in August 1945. Within four years Chiang's regime had disintegrated, and it too disappeared from the mainland. Perhaps, in the final analysis, it may be said that the Chiang and Wang regimes were defined foremost by their continuities, and such disjunctures as existed between them paled before the explosive social forces then massing in China.

## Survival as Justification for Collaboration, 1937–1945

LO JIU-JUNG

In the postwar trials of the collaborationists, survival was often argued as a justification for wartime association with the enemy. Judges, however, were seldom willing to exonerate such suspects on grounds of extenuating circumstances, while public opinion tended to dismiss the survival argument as a clichéd pretext for self-aggrandizement. Despite this skeptical postwar atmosphere, survival was a problem the majority of Chinese people living under Japanese occupation had to face in various ways at one time or another. This applied not only to those at the top but to ordinary people as well.

A major difficulty in dealing with survival as justification lies in the shifting form and content of the argument. For instance, individual survival may be inextricably bound up with group or national survival and, as such, defy simple delineation. A further complication is that perception of what constitutes survival varies according to the social status, educational background, political affiliation, and financial resources of the person in question. Finally, as there is always a subjective element in the discussion of survival and collaboration, it is often difficult, except in a few prominent

cases, to reach an agreement on the extent to which the survival argument can be used to justify collaboration.

There are two dimensions involved in the question of survival. The first is use of the survival argument to rationalize collaboration; the second is the question of survival as a practical issue. The issue of rationalization was a theoretical problem of importance only to a small group of people, primarily the leading collaborationists, while the issue of survival was an existential problem faced by the mass of the population.

This essay deals with the two issues separately. It assumes that conscious rationalization of collaboration was confined primarily to the leading collaborationists. Attention will be given to Wang Jingwei's conception of the relationship between national and individual survival and the way in which this fitted into his rationalization of collaboration. Hobbes's argument on the absolution of the social contract will be used as a point of departure to explore whether people, once abandoned by their government, have the right to protect themselves. I will argue that Wang Jingwei's collective (i.e., national) approach did not meet the assertion made by the high-level collaborationists that they placed the highest importance on the interests of the people.

I will also examine the interaction between survival and collaboration under changing historical circumstances. The "plunge" taken by leading collaborationists like Wang Jingwei, Chen Gongbo, and Zhou Fohai is not comprehensible outside the prewar Chinese political context. Insofar as the Nanjing collaborationist government of 1940–45 defined itself as a rival to the Chongqing government, one is reminded of the power struggle between Wang and Jiang in the late 1920s and early 1930s. After the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, Jiang Jieshi bowed to the mounting national and military pressure drummed up by Zhang Xueliang and the Chinese Communists. While this switch from pacifism fully accorded with the national mood, it was not entirely free from political expediency. At stake here was not just national survival but also the survival of Jiang's political career.

As the Japanese presence in China grew, collaboration did not necessarily take a predictable course. A good example is to be found in Gao Zongwu's break with Wang Jingwei's camp. Gao, the initial architect of the collaboration enterprise, left Shanghai in January 1940 when negotiation of an agreement between the Chinese and Japanese sides had reached its final stage. Disappointed in the Japanese militarists' denial of genuine autonomy to

Wang's proposed government, Gao felt in danger of being accused of betraying the national interest.<sup>1</sup> Recognition of the complex historical circumstances in which the many forms of collaboration took place is essential to the full understanding of this wartime phenomenon.

#### INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COLLECTIVE SURVIVAL

A number of leading collaborationists asserted that they collaborated with the Japanese only after the Nationalist government had withdrawn into the interior, thus relinquishing by default its claim to the allegiance of the people left behind.<sup>2</sup> Underlying this argument is the assumption that the purpose of the collaborationist government was to safeguard the interests of the abandoned people. Residents of the occupied territory were freed of their political obligations to the Nationalist government, and they had the right to take whatever steps were in their best interest. In claiming to protect the interests of those abandoned, the collaborationist government projected an image of itself that contrasted sharply with the Nationalist government's alleged insensitivity to the people's suffering. As Wang Jingwei's widow, Chen Bijun, who had been actively involved in the collaborationist movement from the very beginning, said during her trial in April 1946:<sup>3</sup>

It was after the government and its troops took to their heels that we *laobai-xing* came forward and took charge. Is it right that the government should neglect the life and death of its own people?

Chen Bijun denied that she and her husband had ever betrayed the country or the people. Territory and people, she argued, were the two most important ingredients of a state. The Chinese state belonged to the people, not the other way around.

According to the above argument, the political power of the state did not belong to a particular government; rather, it accrued to any political body capable of safeguarding the people's interests. From the day the Nationalist government left its capital of Nanjing, the leadership of the Chinese state, at least for that part of the territory under Japanese occupation, was open to contest. By drawing a distinction between the Nationalist government and the Chinese state, Chen Bijun argued that the collaborationists owed their allegiance to the Chinese people, not to the

Nationalist government in absentia. Moreover, by defining the national interest in terms of the well-being of the Chinese people, she further sought to justify the political legitimacy of the collaborationist government through its dedication to them.

It is noteworthy that Chen Bijun depicted herself and fellow collaborationists as *laobaixing* even though they were the ones who came to “take charge.” Presumably this put them in a position both “with” and “above” the people. That is to say, despite their role in setting up the collaborationist regime, they too were victims of a government that had failed in its responsibilities to the people.

Regardless of the merits of the argument that Wang Jingwei’s government was entitled to guardianship of those living in the occupied areas, Chen Bijun’s self-defense touches upon two important questions. First, do people have the right to preserve themselves when a government in absentia can no longer protect them? Second, does the absence of a viable government make room for a rival political force to “come forward and take charge”? At issue here are such fundamental issues as what constitutes the proper function of government; and what confers political legitimacy upon government. That China was at war with a foreign invader, with a substantial part of the nation’s territory already in the enemy’s hands, gave these questions an immediate reality.

Chen Bijun’s justification for collaboration harks back to the theory of the seventeenth century English political theorist Thomas Hobbes. His *Leviathan* (1651) dealt with the relationship between subjects and the sovereign. Hobbes advocated absolute sovereignty to forestall what he saw as a “total war of all against all” in the “state of nature.” Thus he made allowance for absolution of the obedience owed by subjects to their sovereign when the latter could no longer offer them protection. Since it was presumably self-preservation that prompted human beings to give up part of their rights, the sovereign’s inability to safeguard his subjects’ well-being absolved them of any political obligations that they owed him. Hobbes put the conditions for the nullification of the covenant in these words:<sup>4</sup>

If a Subject be taken prisoner in war, or his person, or his means of life be within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporall Libertie given him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor, he hath Libertie to accept the condition; and having accepted it is the subject of him that took him; because he hath no other way to preserve himself.

The question is: What did collaborationists mean by survival when they used the term to justify collaboration with the enemy? Was their meaning the same as that of Hobbes when they argued that the Nationalist government had lost its claim to rule since it could no longer protect the people?

Rather than setting individual survival as the ultimate goal, Wang Jingwei assigned highest importance to preserving the collectivity. The full realization of the individual, he said, was possible only within the collectivity. In his 1942 lectures on the fundamentals of the New Citizens Movement, he denounced liberal individualism for having undermined the state interest. The proponents of liberal individualism, according to Wang, wrongly claimed the function of the state was to safeguard individual liberty. In reality, Wang said, the state was both an end in itself and a means towards securing liberty. Wang's understanding of collectivism was premised on an organic relationship between the individual and the collectivity comparable to that between cells and the body as a whole. Although he did not dismiss individual cells as entirely insignificant, it was his belief that they could not survive outside the collectivity. In other words, individual survival was dependent on the health of the collective whole.<sup>5</sup>

Following this logic, Wang Jingwei explained how individuals should commit themselves to promoting the collective interest. The "new citizen" was driven by altruism, and was free of egotism and selfishness. The problem with the Chinese of the post-1912 era, Wang said, was that everyone had been too selfish to work for what was in the best interests of the nation.<sup>6</sup> How far should the altruism of the new citizen go in order to defend the collectivity? Wang Jingwei's answer was self-denial to the point of sacrificing one's life. He appealed to all "comrades" in the collaboration camp to live up to this standard:<sup>7</sup>

Those who are consumed by personal interest and forget the public good should leave; those who are mindful of the public good and ignore personal interest are invited to stay. We shall strive together determined to die for our goals.

For Wang Jingwei, self-sacrifice carried both moral and pragmatic implications. He acclaimed selfless commitment to the public, or state, interest as morally good and condemned self-centered behavior as morally degenerate. At the same time, he lauded self-sacrifice because it was conducive to national survival, and thus, in the final analysis, to individual survival.

Wang Jingwei's embrace of self-abnegation may be partly explained by a character trait that had more than once affected his actions at a critical moment. Wang was described as a man with strong emotions. His quick temper sometimes led to rash decisions that he would later regret and reject. After he left Chongqing to pursue national reconciliation with the Japanese, the apparent lack of consistency in his political stand invited public criticism and ridicule. One of his friends once commented that Wang never should have gotten himself involved in politics: he was born to be a poet and a revolutionary, but was ill-suited to be a politician.<sup>8</sup> His aspirations as a youthful revolutionary to seek martyrdom found full expression in his assassination attempt on the Qing Prince Regent in 1910, and betrayed a romantic infatuation with self-denial, which was as dynamic as it was irrational. During his collaboration with the Japanese militarists in the late 1930s and 1940s, he persistently tried to evoke a similar idealistic spirit of sacrifice among the Chinese people, but to little avail.<sup>9</sup>

There was, however, another side to this exceptional emphasis on self-sacrifice. Since the late Qing dynasty, China had been embroiled in a prolonged struggle for national survival in the face of foreign encroachment. The proper relationship between individual and collective survival was subject to continuing debate. The Chinese response to Western individualism was shaped by the survival question. On the one hand, the introduction of Western individualism into China in the company of science and democracy insured it an almost certainly sympathetic audience, especially within the intelligentsia. On the other hand, the question of China's survival as a nation often led to a misunderstanding or dismissal of individualism. The urgency of this question made it difficult for people, at least openly, to champion individual preservation as a legitimate end in itself.<sup>10</sup>

Preservation of the Chinese people was one of the main reasons Wang Jingwei gave for his departure from Chongqing in December 1938.<sup>11</sup> Earlier in the year the Nationalist government destroyed the Yellow River dikes in Henan province to check the Japanese offensive. In October 1938, Changsha, capital of Hunan province, was set on fire. This latter act came particularly to stand for the haphazard implementation of a scorched earth policy, in this case the devastation of a city before Japanese forces had even neared it. These two events left several million people homeless and destitute and threw Wang Jingwei into great despair.<sup>12</sup> One need not question his sincerity in condemning the Nationalist government for its callousness: few would

not have felt deeply for those whose lives had been shattered by the catastrophes induced in the name of national survival. It remains true, nonetheless, that Wang saw the people less as afflicted individuals than as inhabitants of an afflicted nation. Personal commiseration notwithstanding, national survival rather than individual well-being remained Wang Jingwei's main concern.

Use of the national survival argument by the collaborationists to justify their wartime activities has its limitations, however. For all his emphasis on national unity and collective preservation, the pursuit of an independent course of reconciliation with the enemy by Wang Jingwei undeniably worked to counteract the unity of China at war. If unity was considered essential to winning the war against Japan, then breaking with the anti-Japanese united front was itself an act of betrayal. Japan's eventual defeat by the Allies proved that the collaborationists had been wrong in their estimate of China's chances of survival. Thus the principal way in which the collaborationists could vindicate themselves after the war was to show that they had made a vital contribution to the Chinese people's welfare. This was to be the argument favored by the leading collaborationists.<sup>13</sup> And since national survival was to be advanced as the paramount reason for collaboration, the welfare of the people would have to be presented primarily in collective terms. Measures taken to ensure the preservation of individuals would not suffice to justify collaboration, even though such actions might elicit public sympathy.

The suggestion may be made that Wang Jingwei would have benefited by adopting Hobbes's pragmatic formulation of the relationship between subject and sovereign to justify his working with the Japanese. However, Wang's organic nationalism precluded such an argument since individual survival must always yield to national survival. Selfless sacrifice was considered essential to national survival. For Hobbes, individuals retained their personal right to existence in the contract they had made with the sovereign. They could not be denied this right, since it was precisely to secure their individual survival that people had subordinated themselves in the first place to the sovereign.<sup>14</sup>

Wang Jingwei was apparently not interested in exploring the theoretical implications of the relationship between the individual and the collective. For him the ultimate justification of collaboration lay in its effectiveness in preserving the Chinese people as a nation rather than as individual human

beings. Thus, if we are to follow his logic, failure to achieve this national objective would expose collaboration to full political and moral condemnation. The extent to which that objective was reached will be taken up below.

#### SURVIVAL IN PERSPECTIVE

If we move from collaboration as a theoretical question to collaboration as a practical issue, we see survival defined in many different ways. The two categories of national and individual survival are insufficient to embrace the problem in its complexity. Survival was as much an imperative for political and military factions as it was for families and communities.

##### *(1) Political survival*

To a large extent, Wang Jingwei's collaboration movement grew out of the factional nature of Chinese politics in the post-1912 era. The struggle for power between Wang and Jiang Jieshi in the years after the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925 is well known. As the leader of the "left" GMD (Guomindang), Wang twice challenged Jiang in the 1920s by setting up rival GMD governments. Unlike Jiang, Wang Jingwei did not have his own military power base. Consequently, he had to join hands with regional militarists like Yan Xishan, as he did in 1930, in order to mount anti-Jiang campaigns. Given Wang's previous record, there was inevitably widespread doubt following his defection in December 1938 as to whether he could rise above factional interest to work for the interests of the country. Wang's contention that neither his political career nor his own person would have been jeopardized had he stayed in Chongqing may well be true. Certainly, by leading the collaborationist movement he ran the risk of being denounced as a national traitor, a *hanjian*.<sup>15</sup> But it is true to say that in pursuing a policy different from that of Chongqing, he was breaking fresh ground for his political career. If he succeeded in his negotiations with Japan, not only would the objective of national preservation be achieved, but his political career, which had long been under the shadow of Jiang Jieshi, would be resuscitated. It is therefore not farfetched to say that the survival of Wang's own political career was intertwined with the particular form national survival would take.

So far as factional survival within the Guomindang is concerned, it was

more the marginalized elements within the party than those at the party core who found themselves in the collaborationist camp. For instance, the Wang government's Minister of Justice, Luo Junqiang, had been subject to administrative reprimand in 1939 for his involvement in an extramarital scandal.<sup>16</sup> For people like Luo, joining the collaborationist movement had little to do with personal survival, but much to do with survival of their political careers. A number of CC Clique members in the GMD played an important role in the collaborationist movement, most notably Zhou Fohai, who had been a key CC member before his defection. In terms of rank, Zhou was by no means a marginalized member of the GMD: it was his profound pessimism about China's prospect in winning the war that placed him on the political margin of the Chongqing government.<sup>17</sup>

Many of the collaborators had had little or no affiliation with Jiang Jieshi's government in the 1930s. Some of them were degree holders from the late Qing dynasty. Liang Hongzhi, head of the Reformed government (*Weixin zhengfu*) in Nanjing from 1938 to 1940, was one of these.<sup>18</sup> A number of collaborators had been members of the Anfu and Zhili cliques and had occupied important positions in Peking in the years from the founding of the Republic until the mid-1920s. They had reached the peak of their political careers during the warlord era, just as Chinese nationalism was on the rise. With the establishment of the Nationalist government in Nanjing in 1927–28 following the Northern Expedition, these people found themselves excluded from power.<sup>19</sup> That the Japanese invasion was directed at Jiang's Nationalist government meant that, for the first time since 1928, these factional groupings had a chance to stage a political comeback. Despite the unprecedented nature of Japanese belligerence in China, they still thought in terms of pre-1927 factional politics. For them, national survival was seen through the lens of factional survival.

## (2) *Military survival*

The Wang Jingwei government claimed by 1943 to have under its control an armed force of 600,000 men. Some units had previously served under the Nationalist government, but most had not. Unable to convince the Japanese that a solid military base for his new regime must be built, Wang had to settle for regional troops. As shown by the composition of the Military Preparatory Committee of 1939, the Northwest Army and Northeast Army consti-

tuted the two major factions making up the collaborationist forces.<sup>20</sup> The roots of these militarists in the warlord era suggests the dubious nature of their loyalty. Self-preservation was high on their agenda, as testified by the Northwest Army generals' readiness to collaborate with the Japanese in Henan province.<sup>21</sup> Self-preservation was what immediately prompted the defection of the GMD 40th Army under General Pang Bingxun and the 5th Army under General Sun Dianying in May 1943.<sup>22</sup> In the latter stages of the war, a number of regional units surrendered to the Japanese and the Wang regime in order to avoid annihilation by Communist guerrillas. Some did so with the acquiescence of the Nationalist authorities in Chongqing.<sup>23</sup>

As pointed out by Lucian Pye in his study of warlord politics, the allegiance of regional militarists was directed more to factions and personal leaders than to the nation, and nationalism was more often used as a tool to rally support than upheld as a cause in itself.<sup>24</sup> For these people, troops were their only bargaining chips for survival in the prevailing political turbulence. Jiang Jieshi's disbandment proposals in 1929 had provoked regional militarists to rebel; a new set of national circumstances after 1937 caused many of them to align themselves with Japan if this ensured their survival. It may not necessarily be the case that these militarists were totally indifferent to national survival. But, as their own survival depended on military power, they had to think twice whether their political future would be endangered by support for the national cause.

### *(3) Family survival*

According to records of the postwar trials, family survival was often advanced as reason for collaboration. The question of how people should react when the family found itself in conflict with the national interest was one with a long historical pedigree. Dennerline's study of Ming loyalism indicates that, within the bounds of traditional Confucian officialdom, the closer the ties between such families and the imperial establishment, the stronger the manifestation of loyalty to the court.<sup>25</sup> In addition to the Confucian ethic of loyalty to the ruler, family interests constituted a major consideration linking family survival to the preservation of the dynasty. But family survival also explains why some Ming loyalists who refused to serve the new dynasty nevertheless acquiesced in family members shifting their allegiance. Despite the late Ming emphasis on dynastic loyalty, a number of

prestigious Confucian literati families not only survived the dynastic change but even prospered under the new regime.<sup>26</sup>

There were, however, some fundamental differences between the political climate of the 1930s and 1940s and that of the late Ming dynasty. First, abolition of the imperial examinations in 1905 ended an educational curriculum based on the Confucian classics that had forged a relatively homogeneous elite attitude towards state service and political loyalism for a thousand years. Second, with the collapse of political and social order after the 1911 Revolution, the structure supporting the extended Confucian family began to weaken. The attack on this powerful institution reached a climax in the 1919 May Fourth movement, when the traditional family was denounced as the source of a wide range of evils. Third, the prevailing political instability prevented families from tying their interests to a particular ruling authority. The uncertainty as to who or what represented the state meant that family survival and national survival could no longer be considered as readily linked.

So far as family survival is concerned, it is important to ask which people chose to stay in occupied territory and why they did not retreat with the Nationalist government to the interior. Their decision to stay was crucial, because it made them vulnerable to real or perceived collaboration with the enemy. The extended duration of the Japanese presence in China only increased their vulnerability.

One important reason why people stayed behind was economic. According to Ms. Wang, a survivor of the "Rape of Nanjing" in December 1937, the exodus from the capital took place in several stages as Japanese troops approached the city. The rich took flight first, then many of the middle class departed. As the former had the greater resources, they could find shelter in Hong Kong or in the Shanghai foreign concessions, should they not want to retreat into the hinterland. Middle-class people often took temporary refuge in the countryside. By the time the Japanese entered the city, the majority of the people left behind belonged to the lower social strata, who were unable to make the long journey westward.<sup>27</sup> It remains difficult, however, to determine how and to what extent family economic conditions affected the decision to stay. Among those who remained behind were small businessmen and tradespeople for whom moving was an economic impossibility.

Economic reasons, however, were not the only explanation for people not joining the exodus. Lack of political connections with the Nationalist gov-

ernment was also an important reason. In the early stages of the war, Nationalist authorities arranged transportation and allowances for government employees and their dependents to leave territory about to be occupied.<sup>28</sup> This decision was made partly on the assumption that life under Japanese occupation would be harsher for those with close ties to the Nationalist government than it would for those without such connections. In addition to the material difficulties they would suffer, such people would be exposed to various threats and temptations. For ordinary people who had no connections with the Nationalists, there was little reason why they should follow the government all the way to some strange place, leaving everything behind. Resignation and indifference both seem to have prevailed among the humbler people in this time of great uncertainty.

Family survival clearly was a key determinant in bringing about collaboration. Given the inescapable political and economic realities, it would be difficult for people to stand firm once the Japanese occupation became a part of daily life. Although there appears to be no established correlation between economic resources and initial attitudes towards collaboration, hardship, especially when it began to seriously affect family members, often pushed people to collaborate. This concern for family survival in the end forced many to adopt a harshly realistic approach to the question. For example, Major General Huang Chen resisted collaboration until the winter of 1942, more than five years after the outbreak of war. During that time he had been hiding in the countryside to avoid Japanese arrest. It was only when he had difficulty supporting his family of four that he decided to collaborate. He contacted a friend in the Wang Jingwei government and first took the job of military attaché, then became chief of staff of the Independent Pacification Army in southern Anhui. For his collaboration he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment at the postwar trials.<sup>29</sup>

Against this temporal framework, family survival became a concept in flux. One might argue that at the initial stage of Japanese occupation, when everything remained uncertain, refusal to bend to the pressure of collaboration was in itself a way to safeguard personal and family survival. However, as it became apparent that the return of the Nationalist government had been put off into the distant future, there was a gradual change in people's attitudes towards collaboration.<sup>30</sup> Rather than maintaining life at subsistence level, many people now came to see personal and family survival in the context of an improvement in their own lives: better accommodation, more

goods, increased savings, and so on. There was clearly a realistic, worldly dimension to the question of personal and family survival.

*(4) Group survival: Zhengzhou as a case study*

The fall of Zhengzhou in 1941 provides a good illustration of how people responded when both their personal survival and the survival of the community were threatened by the Japanese invasion.<sup>31</sup> The Zhengzhou case is distinctive in two ways: first, the occupation of the city lasted only a month; and, second, an inquiry was conducted by the Nationalist authorities shortly after their return. From the archival materials available it is possible to reconstruct a picture of Zhengzhou under occupation, with the reservation that the return of the Nationalist government undoubtedly affected the way people remembered and reflected upon their experiences. Nevertheless, while historical reconstruction of the occupation may be subject to certain flaws, it is still possible to gain an understanding of what happened in Zhengzhou between August 14 and September 13, 1941.

For the people of Zhengzhou, who suddenly found themselves left on their own after the departure of the Nationalist troops and officials in August 1941, collaboration with the enemy was prompted by a variety of motivations. These ranged from self-preservation through maintenance of law and order to minimization of war damage. From the testimony of people involved in organizing the Zhengzhou Peace Preservation Committee, it is obvious that in a city where a substantial part of the population depended on trade and commerce for a living, peace and stability were more important than loyalty to an absent political authority. Many later claimed that they had committed themselves to preserving the community even at the risk of being labeled *hanjian*. This professed public spirit, however, was not entirely free from selfish motivations; nor did it prevent people from taking precautions to forestall possible future accusations of treason. While not everyone in Zhengzhou was concerned with outside views on their change of political allegiance, those who were had to find ways of making their true loyalties apparent should the political winds suddenly change direction. For them it would be important to convince a returned Nationalist government that theirs was a case of “loyal collaboration.”

Close scrutiny of the membership of the Zhengzhou Peace Preservation

Committee indicates the relationship between social status and action taken when individual and group survival were being endangered. Three echelons may be identified within the membership. Leadership was exercised by the gentry both publicly and behind the scenes. The driving force within the committee, Xi Jianjun, was a gentry member with a unique position in the community. He enjoyed high prestige in local business circles, and had been on close terms with the former Nationalist authorities, which explains the confidence and determination with which he promoted the Peace Preservation Committee. Xi remained in contact with Nationalist officials after Zhengzhou's fall to keep them informed of the local scene. It is noteworthy, though, that he did not take any official position in the committee despite the active role he played in it. Instead, he persuaded Wu Futang and Chen Jisan to assume the public roles of director and vice-director. Both Wu and Chen had served prior to 1937 in government agencies in Hebei-Chahar that brought them into contact with the Japanese.<sup>32</sup> This type of background made them more suited than politically inexperienced businessmen for management tasks within the Peace Preservation Committee.

The second echelon consisted of merchants and businessmen. These people may not have had the kind of prestige or experience as those in the first echelon, but peace preservation work would have been impossible without their active participation. They not only contributed generously in monetary terms but also personally undertook bureaucratic responsibilities in matters such as goods procurement, accounting, and security to ensure the smooth running of the agency.

Finally, at the third and lowest level were the local *éléments déclassés* (*dipi liumang*), who provided much of the officership and general ranks of the Peace Preservation Corps. These were the people who hoisted flags when Japanese troops entered the city. They were not necessarily ruthless criminals, but their reckless opportunism and moral indifference made them ready to become "willing lackeys" (*zougou*) at a time when the majority of the population was still taking measure of the uncertainty that lay ahead.

The above picture enables us to draw some tentative conclusions about collaboration in the initial stage of Japanese occupation. First, the Zhengzhou Peace Preservation Committee was set up within the existing local power network. Local gentry who had a vested interest in maintaining law and order were eager to set up an agency representing the community to

deal with the enemy. Second, personal connections often constituted the most important factor for the decision to collaborate. This was not only because “maintaining law and order” under Japanese occupation called for collective efforts, but also because the local network of personal relations was the only available mechanism people had to fall back on after the retreat of the government. Third, while many claimed that they supported the local peace preservation agency, as it would ease the people’s plight under Japanese occupation, personal and family survival was also part of their concern. Theoretically, such an arrangement presumed no contradiction between public and private interest. It was only after Japanese demands began to violate people’s interests and the committee was forced to mediate in favor of the Japanese that its credibility began to suffer. Fourth, political allegiance, at least in its openly professed form, appears to have been of more concern to those in the top social strata than it was to those lower down.

## CONCLUSION

As far as collaboration is concerned, survival as justification and survival *per se* represent two problems: one theoretical and judgmental, the other existential and practical. While collaborationists in high places tended to be more conscious of the question of political loyalty and ideological allegiance, ordinary Chinese appear to have been much less concerned with such worries. For the ordinary people, collaboration was seldom a matter of choice. It was lack of choice which ruled their lives.

Throughout China’s long imperial history, the common people were not held directly responsible for the fate of a dynasty. Postwar trials of the collaborationists, however, saw a large number of ordinary people charged with treasonable offenses. Although the accused were not entirely denied the plea of extenuating circumstances, the fact that they had to stand trial and receive punishment indicated the change in political climate that had come about since the fall of the Qing dynasty. The Nationalist government regarded neither self-preservation nor low social status as sufficient grounds for exoneration.

If securing people’s welfare can justify expedient political actions, some credit must be conceded to Wang Jingwei and his followers. Eyewitness

accounts testified to the contribution made by the Wang Jingwei regime to relieving the Chinese people's suffering under occupation. Despite widespread disapproval of Wang Jingwei's collaboration with the Japanese, many critics nevertheless conceded that the existence of his government had helped ameliorate the situation in which they found themselves. Nowhere was this sentiment more strongly felt than in the former capital of Nanjing, which had experienced such suffering following the Japanese occupation. One resident remembered that after the establishment of Wang Jingwei's government, Chinese people could go through city gate checkpoints without bowing to Japanese soldiers. While this may appear trifling in view of the overall havoc wrought by the Japanese occupation, the unceasing indignities inflicted on ordinary Chinese people caused no small degree of distress. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that the collaborationist authorities had to some extent served as a cushion between the Chinese and the enemy. This may explain why in the postwar period people who had lived in the occupied zone, especially those who had had little or no personal contact with the Japanese, tended to be more tolerant towards those accused of collaboration than did those in unoccupied China.<sup>33</sup>

Survival is not simply a question of safeguarding individual security, as Hobbes assumed. Rather, between individual and collective survival there lies a wide range of different types of survival, giving rise to conflicts of interest as well as divided loyalties. Survival of the individual has not always been considered a value in itself in modern Chinese political culture. From Yan Fu and Liang Qichao in the late Qing dynasty to Jiang Tingfu and Qian Duansheng in the 1930s, Chinese intellectuals were inclined to adopt a collective approach to the question of national survival. As a result, whenever there was a conflict between individual and collective liberty, or individual and collective survival, the collective interest more often than not emerged the stronger. The sizable number of intellectuals who joined politicians in emphasizing collective survival reflected the enormity of the threat China faced during the first half of the twentieth century. The dominant mentality was thus one which placed nation before people.

As suggested by Hobbes's contractarian theory, the most powerful argument Wang Jingwei and his fellow collaborationists might have used in their defense was that everything they had done was for the people of China. Not only would this have given collaboration a measure of moral righteousness,

but in the postwar trials it might have cast the Nationalist government in an unflattering light, especially in view of its exploitative record after returning to the former occupied areas. Wang Jingwei's unwavering emphasis on collective survival made it difficult to use promotion of individual well-being as a justification for collaboration. The collaborationists, thus, stood or fell on their success in defending the national interest in the face of Japanese aggression. In view of the paucity of their attainments, it proved impossible for the collaborationists to argue their contribution to national survival after the war's end.

PART THREE

Elite Collaboration:  
Opportunism, Obstacles, and Ambiguities



# Japan's New Order and the Shanghai Capitalists: Conflict and Collaboration, 1937–1945

PARKS M. COBLE

The Form of East Asiatic Independence and Co-Prosperity: The states, their citizens, and resources, comprised in those areas pertaining to the Pacific, Central Asia, and the Indian Oceans formed into one general union are to be established as an autonomous zone of peaceful living and common prosperity on behalf of the peoples of the nations of East Asia. . . . The Japanese empire possesses a duty as the leader of the East Asiatic Union.

—(*Draft of the Basic Plan for Establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere*)<sup>1</sup>

In August 1940, Japan proclaimed as its goal the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which was to be “an autonomous zone of peaceful living and common prosperity.” Yet the final shape of this sphere, had Japan won the war, was never precisely clear. Would indigenous capitalists, for instance, have been granted a role in the “new order”? Or would the outer areas merely have supplied natural resources for the industrial machine of the homeland?

China in 1937 could certainly be characterized as a poor and largely undeveloped country; yet a small but vibrant modern sector of the economy existed. Indeed, Shanghai and its environs had a substantial concentration of modern industry, commerce, and banking. Although a portion of this modern sector was controlled by foreign businesses, including many Japanese firms, the Chinese capitalists of the Shanghai area represented a significant social and economic force.

When Japan invaded China in 1937, many of these capitalists saw their enterprises and assets either devastated by the fighting or confiscated by the Japanese. Some Chinese capitalists fled to unoccupied China, but most chose the safety of foreign concessions in Shanghai or Hong Kong. From these new locales Chinese capitalists attempted to operate their factories, businesses, and banks. When the Pacific War erupted in December 1941, however, even the safe havens in Shanghai and Hong Kong came under Japanese rule. For better or worse, Chinese capitalists in the Shanghai area found themselves living in the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

But did this “autonomous zone of peaceful living and common prosperity” really hold any place for Chinese capitalists? Japanese propaganda suggested that the sphere would liberate East Asians from the oppression of Western imperialism and create a new era of East Asian development. Yet few outside of Japan took these assertions at face value. Indeed, most Chinese had long assumed that the goal of Japan’s policy was to “industrialize Japan, agriculturalize China” (*gongye Riben, nongye Zhongguo*). China would supply raw materials for modern industry which would be located in Japan. If factories were to be maintained in a Japan-dominated China, they would be owned and operated by Japanese *zaibatsu*. In such a scheme, local capitalists in China would have only a marginal role.

Further, Japanese military authorities had been unsympathetic to unfettered capitalism in any form, much less when undertaken by the conquered Chinese. In their “Outline for Economic Construction in Manzhouguo” announced on March 1, 1932, Japanese military leaders had noted that “In view of the evils of an uncontrolled capitalist economy, we will use whatever state power is necessary to control the economy.” In a world of unlimited possibilities, therefore, Japanese military planners would have implemented a state-planned and state-controlled economic program in China.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps the fundamental problem for Chinese capitalists who found themselves “in the autonomous zone of peaceful living and common prosperity” was that their activities competed too closely with the metropole. Unlike such classic colonial matchups as Holland and the Dutch East Indies or Belgium and the Congo, in which the imperial country and the colony produced almost totally different products and maintained different levels of technological development, the economies of Japan and Lower Yangtze China were far more similar. Japan was certainly more advanced in heavy

industry than China, but broad sectors of Japanese industry, such as textiles, might be viewed as in competition with China.

Indeed, Japanese theorists, in forming their ideal of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, realized that this might be a problem even in agriculture. One Japanese economic journal editorialized in April 1938 that:<sup>3</sup>

The question of assisting in the technical improvement of agriculture on the continent requires special attention since there are many Chinese agricultural products which are also produced in Japan. Application of advanced Japanese methods to the production, for instance, of cotton and wool, which are not competitive with Japanese agricultural products, will raise no problem. But the utmost care will be needed in the case of similar technical assistance in the improvement of rice and cocoon production in the Central-South China region in view of their competitive nature with similar products raised in Japan.

If improving production of rice and silk cocoons might create difficulties, allowing development of Chinese textile, chemical, and machine tool factories would raise an even bigger contradiction.

Despite this theoretical incompatibility of native Chinese capitalists flourishing in a Japanese-dominated co-prosperity sphere, I believe that the issue is more complex than this simple generalization. Many Chinese capitalists did carve out a niche during the period of Japanese occupation. Conditions were not favorable. Most had lost substantial property in the fighting; many had to accept second-class status with Japanese parties; most had to collaborate in some fashion to operate in the occupied areas. Yet a large number of Chinese capitalists who stayed in the occupied areas were able, by 1943–44, to salvage some part of their enterprises.

Why would the Japanese be flexible in dealing with Chinese capitalists? The simple answer was wartime necessity. As Michael Barnhart has noted, "The Imperial Army commenced the China Incident in July 1937 with plans assuming that three divisions, three months, and 100 million yen would be sufficient to conclude the affair." By the spring of 1938, with China still fighting, the Japanese General Staff "found itself preparing new orders . . . Twenty new divisions were to be raised on an emergency basis; over 2.5 billion yen had been appropriated for long-term hostilities, with the promise of more levies to come."<sup>4</sup>

As a consequence, the Army decreed a policy of extracting greater

resources from China itself. The phrase “*yizhan yangzhan*” (using the war to feed the war) described this new policy. Attempting to squeeze more out of China’s economy did not, of course, equal support for indigenous capitalists. In the short term, in fact, this policy undermined the occupiers’ position. Japanese historian Hata Ikuhiko has described it as “ruthless plunder.” Japan compensated for its economic inadequacies, he states, by measures that were reminiscent of early Spanish colonial policy.<sup>5</sup>

Land was seized for the settlement of Japanese immigrants in Manchuria; on the Chinese mainland business and enterprises were confiscated; and Japanese forces fighting in China and later in the Pacific lived off the land. The army purchased daily necessities with excessive issues of unbacked military scrip that inevitably brought local inflation. In modern history there has been no other instance of a foreign expeditionary force’s adopting a policy of local self-sufficiency from the very outset.

This policy, however, merely provided for the immediate needs of Japan’s military on the mainland. A sustained war effort required developing the resources of China, a capital-intensive undertaking at a time when capital in Japan was in short supply.

As early as 1939, Japanese economists began to warn of the potential drain on Japanese capital. “The proposed establishment of a new order in East Asia must, needless to say, be based upon the economic development of China,” wrote Hon’iden Yoshio. Nonetheless, he noted, “it is obvious that no vast amount of Japanese capital will be available for industrial investments in China. Or rather, under the present circumstances, an excessive export of Japanese capital to China might affect unfavorably the expansion program now in full swing in Japan.” The question then was “whether Chinese domestic capital will be made available and mobilized for the development of China.”<sup>6</sup>

In implementing the *yizhan yangzhan* policy, the Japanese thus faced significant constraints of capital and personnel. These circumstances eventually led them to include a greater role for Chinese capitalists, but their policy varied over time and place. The Japanese military had to overcome its hostility to capitalism in general, and its desire to establish complete control over China. Only as the war continued would Japan become more eager for the participation of Chinese capital.

In discussing the evolution of Japan’s *yizhan yangzhan* policy, I have fol-

lowed the chronology of Shan Guanchu of the Politics and Law Department of Shanghai Normal University. He divides the war period into three phases. The first, from the outbreak of the war until November 1938, was characterized by destruction and chaotic attempts to control the economy. Levels of output dropped to one-half of the prewar level. The second phase he dates from November 1938, with the creation of the large Japanese holding companies designed to control and develop the economy of the occupied areas. During this period the Japanese achieved their greatest success with the *yizhan yangzhan* policy. Agricultural production and mining output (mostly in north China) recovered to prewar levels or better. Japanese forces extracted substantial quantities of agricultural and mining products for export to Japan. The final phase, in Shan Guanchu's schema, lasted from early 1943 until the Japanese surrender and was marked by a collapse of the policy. The desperate war situation led to a decline in transportation, raw materials, and economic activity. The economy of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere collapsed along with Japan's military position.<sup>7</sup>

#### PHASE ONE: JULY 1937 TO NOVEMBER 1938

The Lower Yangtze area suffered extensive devastation in the early phase of the war. Transportation by both rail and river reached a near standstill. The industrial, commercial, and banking system was in tatters. Chinese businessmen and government officials alike escaped with the Chinese army or fled to Shanghai, creating a vacuum of power in the occupied zone which the Japanese struggled to fill. Against this backdrop the Japanese initially used a policy of crudely extracting resources from China to cover the escalating costs of the conflict. This approach inhibited economic recovery.

The simplest methods of extraction were imposition of local tariffs (the equivalent of the *likin*), creation of local monopolies in key commodities, and forced procurement of commodities at below-market prices. The puppet Dadao government in Shanghai, for instance, announced a 5 percent duty in March 1938 on virtually all goods entering or leaving the city. Many locales in the interior followed suit. Economic controls were imposed on commodities such as sugar, oil, salt, cloth, soap, matches, and medicines—the prices and movement of which were regulated. Guards around cities such as Hangzhou searched people in transit to regulate the movement of

commodities and to maintain tight control over prices. In Shanghai, a Central Market and Central Marine Produce Market were created to control the prices of virtually all agricultural and fish products in that city.<sup>8</sup>

By controlling the flow of commodities from the countryside to the city, the Japanese authorities could keep rural procurement prices low and city prices high. These price controls created an indirect tax on urban consumption that provided a major source of revenue. Japan's procurement policy was also designed to provide a cheap supply of raw materials for the Japanese military in China and the home market in Japan. By keeping rural prices low and limiting access to urban Chinese markets, the controls reduced the costs which the Japanese military paid for commodities such as rice. The Japanese military also forced Chinese producers to accept military scrip that was issued without a reserve fund by the Shanghai branch of the Bank of Yokohama. Not convertible into yen, the military scrip was not a desirable currency, yet Japanese troops gave the Chinese no choice of rejection.<sup>9</sup>

Japanese market controls were crucial to the procurement policy for the home islands. Tokyo was particularly concerned with the so-called "two whites" (cotton and salt) and "two blacks" (iron and coal) in which Japan was deficient. Chinese cotton, for instance, could substitute for imports from Western countries such as the United States. When north China producers revealed a proclivity to export their cotton to central China and Manzhouguo where prices were kept high, Japanese authorities restricted such shipments, forcing growers to export to Japan despite the lower prices there. The needs of the home country had priority.<sup>10</sup>

The policy of extraction provided immediate results in bringing in income for the military; yet in many ways the policy was counterproductive. Restrictions on trade and the flow of goods inhibited economic recovery in the occupied area. The reduced purchasing power of the Chinese population limited the market for Japanese goods. Moreover, faced with unfavorable terms of trade for their agricultural produce, Chinese farmers had little incentive to market their commodities. When the Japanese offered less than half the market value to north China wool producers in 1938, for example, Chinese shepherds simply held almost two-thirds of their product off the market. Cotton farmers responded to Japanese procurement procedures by curtailing acreage. As a consequence, the Japanese began to modify the policy. In 1939, for instance, Japanese procurement of cotton in central China

was 1,924,000 piculs, which represented 92.4 percent of the entire crop. By 1942 this figure dropped to 1,232,000 piculs, while total production rebounded to 3,405,000. The procurement total was only 33.0 percent of the 1942 harvest in central China.<sup>11</sup>

Japan's policies also inhibited the restoration of industrial production. Chinese factories could make no contribution to the *yizhan yangzhan* policy unless they were in production. This was no easy task in 1938–39. Not only had many plants been devastated by the fighting, but often the facilities had been used as barracks, stables, or hospitals. Japanese authorities used two major approaches to resuscitating Chinese industry. The first was to place the enterprise under direct military management. This approach was most common in north China and most often used for production related to military needs. Mining enterprises, electricity production, and iron foundries often fell into this category of direct military management.<sup>12</sup> The second method was to entrust the rehabilitation of the plant to a Japanese company. This method was more commonly used in central China and for light industry such as textile and flour mills and cigarette and match factories. Altogether, 137 factories came under this category, including 40 textile mills, 18 flour mills, 11 shipbuilding firms, 9 paper manufacturers, 9 rubber plants, and 8 cigarette plants.<sup>13</sup>

Entrusting Chinese factories to Japanese concerns not only extended Japanese control over the economy but was also considered partial compensation for losses suffered by Japanese *zaibatsu* during the China War. In the Shanghai area before July 1937, for instance, 30 of 64 textile mills were Japanese-owned. During the fighting, two of these, the Toyoda No. 1 and No. 2 mills, were totally destroyed; seven others were heavily damaged. Five mills suffered light damage, and only 16 escaped unharmed. Total losses by Japanese firms in Shanghai reached over 268,000 spindles and 4,341 looms. Japanese losses were even more dramatic in Qingdao, where they had totally dominated prewar textile production. Retreating Chinese armies destroyed nine Japanese mills with over 667,000 spindles and 11,544 looms. An additional Japanese mill in Wuhan was seized by the Chinese army and used to make military uniforms. Later the plant was moved to Chongqing.<sup>14</sup>

Japanese mill owners clamored for restitution from the pool of confiscated Chinese mills.<sup>15</sup> The Kanegafuchi Company, which had mills in Shanghai, Qingdao, Tianjin, and Jiaxing (in Zhejiang), received control of

four Chinese mills, including the large Dasheng No. 1 in Nantong and the Shenxin No. 7 in Shanghai whose prewar spindles had totalled 190,492. Nagai Wata, headquartered in Osaka, had mills in Shanghai and Qingdao. It received two plants with about 78,000 spindles. Dōkō Bōseki took over the Dageng and DaHua plants in Shanghai. Toyoda, the largest of the Japanese textile firms in China before the war, had suffered the greatest damage. It received five mills, including the Shanghai Yong'an No. 1 and the Jiafeng mill in Jiading. The Shanhai Bōseki Company, which had been the first Japanese textile firm to invest in China, also received control of several large mills, including the Shanghai Shenxin No. 5 and No. 6 (which together had 123,000 spindles on the eve of the war), as well as the Zhenxin mill in Wuxi. In all, 33 Chinese mills in the occupied areas were entrusted to Japanese firms.<sup>16</sup>

But where were the Chinese capitalists during this process? Were they offered any share in this restructuring? Apparently, even as early as the spring of 1938, Japanese authorities tried to induce major Chinese capitalists to return to their plants and to agree to joint Sino-Japanese operations of their former enterprises. Those overtures were designed not only to give a greater sense of legality to the Japanese takeover but also to lure Chinese capital and expertise into the rehabilitation process. Many of the major Chinese industrialists of the Lower Yangtze had relocated into unoccupied Shanghai. Their liquid capital remained in its banks.

These early offers were largely refused. In the aftermath of the bitter struggle of the early war period, few major capitalists were willing to risk life in the occupied zone. Further, Japanese initial offers were not generous. Chinese partners would have to accept junior status with the Japanese firms to which their plants had been entrusted. Chinese capital would be required for rehabilitation, yet future profits would be shared with the Japanese partners getting the larger portion. Finally, accepting a Japanese offer would require taking on the stigma of collaboration. Therefore, as the *Yinhang Zhoubao* (Bankers' Weekly) reported in April 1938, Chinese owners for the most part rejected the onerous Japanese terms.<sup>17</sup>

The only significant collaboration by Chinese capitalists early in the war was generally done by smaller capitalists, particularly those away from Shanghai, who had few resources on which to fall back. Medium-scale capitalists or even workshop managers accepted Japanese offers as their only option. In the interior, Japanese control over commodity movements virtu-

ally dictated some cooperation with a Japanese partner or access to raw materials was impossible.<sup>18</sup>

#### PHASE TWO: NOVEMBER 1938 TO DECEMBER 1942

In the second phase of the war (following the schema of Shan Guanchu) Japan made a more systematic attempt to organize and develop the economy of the occupied area, beginning with the organization of the large national development companies. As it became evident that the China Incident would drag on and that the haphazard approach of 1937–38 had created economic problems, Japanese leaders drafted plans in April 1938 for the inauguration of broad-based development firms which could control enterprises seized in the war and direct the investment of Japanese capital in China in a manner that would contribute to long-term Japanese economic goals. Through the first, successful year of the Pacific War, Japan achieved progress in developing the economy of China to support the wider war.

On November 3, 1938, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe proclaimed the “New Order in East Asia.” Shortly thereafter the government unveiled two companies, the North China Development Company (*Kita Shina kaihatu kabushiki kaisha*), and the Central China Development Company (*Naka Shina shinkō kabushiki kaisha*), capitalized respectively at 350 million yen and 100 million yen. Half of the capital was to come from the Japanese government, half from the private sector.<sup>19</sup> The North China Development Company began to control the enterprises which the Japanese military had seized, including public utilities, transportation, and communications. It directed an investment program designed to marshal the resources of north China for the Japanese military.

From the beginning, however, Japanese policy toward central and south China differed from that toward the north. Japanese planners had long sought to integrate north China into an economic bloc with Manzhouguo, Korea, and the home islands. Not only did north China have the iron and coal resources that Japan desired, but north China could obviously be more easily integrated into existing projects in contiguous Japanese-controlled territory. Further, north China was viewed as critical to Japanese defense because of the potential for conflict with the Soviet Union.

Japanese planners had not fully anticipated the spread of the conflict to

central China after August 13, 1937. With limited capital available, Tokyo's investments in central China took a backseat to those in the north and in Manchuria. This trend was apparent in the capitalization levels for the two holding firms. Actual investment figures also reflected this trend. Total Japanese investment in China Proper in 1938 was 1.8 billion yen. Of this total 60 percent was invested in north China, 37 percent in central China, and the remainder in south China, Mongolia, and Xinjiang. For the entire war period, investment in north China, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang totaled 71 percent, central China only 22 percent, and south China 7 percent. Meanwhile, government investment in Manzhouguo, which was 45 million yen in 1936, reached 112 million in 1938, and 255 million in 1941. Investment by the South Manchurian Railway Company was 134 million yen, 144 million, and 376 million for the same period.<sup>20</sup>

Faced with its lower priority for available capital, the Central China Development Company (CCDC) initiated fewer infrastructure projects than did its northern counterpart. Instead of beginning new enterprises, it concentrated on rehabilitating and reorganizing existing concerns and extending public utilities. Central China certainly had more to work with than the north, even with war damage. Over 75 percent of existing modern factories in the occupied zone (as of the end of 1938) were located in central China, compared to 15 percent in the north and just under 10 percent in the south and elsewhere. Funds were critically needed, however, to repair many of these facilities.<sup>21</sup>

Under these conditions, the participation of Chinese capital in the Co-Prosperty Sphere in central China would seem more promising and more necessary than in the north. A Japanese economics journal editorialized in 1938, "the bourgeoisie of Central and South China differs from that of the North in that the former's . . . capital accumulation is incomparably larger than that of North China." As a result, the journal concluded "participation by Japanese capital in the industrial development of these regions should be of only a supplementary character; the activities of the Japanese capitalists should be confined to giving assistance to the native Chinese capitalists so that the latter may better serve the interests of the bloc economy."<sup>22</sup>

Japanese authorities were not inclined to take so passive a role in 1938, even in central China. While the subsidiary firms of the parent holding company were said to be joint Sino-Japanese ventures, most of the capital and true control rested with the Japanese side. Of the thirteen largest

CCDC subsidiaries in March 1940, 73.6 percent of their capital actually came from Japanese sources—divided between the Tokyo government and large conglomerates such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi. The remaining 26.4 percent of capital investment was listed as coming from Chinese partners, although this figure was achieved by counting the value of confiscated property as part of the Chinese contribution.<sup>23</sup>

Some of the most important subsidiaries of the CCDC were transportation firms. Commerce had been devastated along the Lower Yangtze, both because of the destruction of commercial ships and the Japanese military's decision to close the river to commercial traffic. The Shanghai Inland Navigation Company (*Shanghai neihe lanchuan gufen youxian gongsi*) was established in August 1938 with headquarters in Shanghai and was given a virtual monopoly on inland river traffic. CCDC eventually subscribed 600,000 yen of the company's 2 million yen in capital. Using ships and docks from Chinese firms, including almost sixty ships seized from the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, the company also received investment from NKK (*Nisshin Kisen Kaisha*). Although the tonnage shipped on inland rivers from Shanghai never recovered to prewar levels, the firm did achieve some success. In 1939 it shipped 580,000 tons; in 1941, 1,716,000 tons; 1942, 1,656,000; 1943, 1,729,000. Only in 1944 did a serious decline set in with only 204,965 tons in the first six months of the year.<sup>24</sup>

Another shipping firm, the China Steamship Company (*Zhonghua lanchuan gufen youxian gongsi*), was established in February 1940 in Shanghai as a CCDC subsidiary. This company, which was involved in transportation both on the Yangtze and along the coastal areas, was capitalized at 17,094,000 yen, of which 3,063,000 came from the CCDC and 4,894,000 from the Japanese *Tōa kaiun kabushiki kaisha* (East Asian Sea Transport). The latter was a Japanese national policy corporation formed in Tokyo in August 1939 and designed to foster Japanese control of shipping in China. The Nanjing puppet government received credit as investor in compensation for Chinese ships awarded to the company.<sup>25</sup>

By creating these shipping concerns, Japanese authorities were able to regulate transport of commodities, a key to the control of prices and commerce. At the same time, promoting a revival of shipping assisted in the restoration of economic vitality to the Lower Yangtze. Similar concerns led to the creation of yet another CCDC subsidiary, the Central China Railway Company (*Huazhong tiedao gufen youxian gongsi*). The Japanese military had

initially assumed direct control of railway lines captured in the conflict. In April 1939 this new subsidiary was created with a substantial infusion of capital from the parent firm to rehabilitate the major lines in central China. In the first year of operation (May 1939–April 1940), the firm carried 6.46 million passengers and 1.78 million tons of freight. Although this was only 41 percent of the passenger traffic and 70 percent of the tonnage of 1935, it still represented a major recovery.<sup>26</sup>

Other transportation units of the CCDC included the Central China Motor Bus Company (*Huazhong dushi zidongche gufen youxian gongsi*), established in November 1938 with an authorized capital of 3 million yen. It took over the bus service in the major cities of the Lower Yangtze, including Shanghai, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Suzhou, and Zhenjiang. Passenger traffic increased through 1942, then began a pronounced decline in 1944.<sup>27</sup>

These subsidiary companies thus gave the Japanese the ability to control and develop transportation by rail, water, and land far more effectively than in the early months of the war. Other CCDC subsidiaries took control of utilities. The Central China Electric Communications Company (*Huazhong dianqi tongxin gufen youxian gongsi*), formed in July 1938, assumed control of telephone and telegraph service in the occupied area, including Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hangzhou. Capitalized at 15 million yen, 6 million supplied by the CCDC, it offered radiogram service from Shanghai to Japan, Hong Kong, and Dairen, and it operated a radio station in Shanghai. The company faced the challenge of restoring telegraph service in the Lower Yangtze, as most lines had been destroyed in the fighting.<sup>28</sup> The Central China Water Works and Electric Power Company (*Huazhong shuidian gufen youxian gongsi*) took over the water and electric power systems in the Lower Yangtze urban areas. The firm decided to merge the heretofore separate systems in Nanshi, Pudong, and Zhabei. CCDC supplied over 16 million yen to this concern whose capitalization was set at 43 million.<sup>29</sup> A third utility company was the Greater Shanghai Gas Company (*Da Shanghai wasi gufen youxian gongsi*), established in December 1938 with a capital of 3 million yen, 1.8 million of which was from CCDC. This enterprise operated the natural gas business confiscated from the Shanghai *Zilao Huo Gongsi*.<sup>30</sup>

Some CCDC subsidiaries were created to make money with little apparent link to military-related industry. The Central China Match Company (*Huazhong huochai youxian gongsi*) was established in April 1943 to operate factories formerly held by the Great China Match Company (*Da Zhonghua*

*huochai gongsi*). The Central China Marine Products Company (*Huazhong shuichan gufen youxian gongsi*) was established in November 1938. Tied to a central fish warehouse in Shanghai, the company controlled and licensed trawler fishing and fish marketing. Profits were said to benefit the Japanese Navy, which was diligent in enforcing the monopoly. In March 1942 the company acquired the facilities of an American cold storage company and later set up fish markets in Nanjing and Wuxi.<sup>31</sup> The Central China Salt Industry Company (*Huazhong yanye gufen youxian gongsi*) was yet another CCDC subsidiary designed to produce revenue. Established in August 1938 with a capital of 5 million yen, it took over property formerly operated by the Salt Gabelle, including the Huaibei Salt fields.<sup>32</sup>

The Shanghai Real Estate Company (*Shanghai hengchan gufen youxian gongsi*) was set up in September 1938 with the announced goal of rehabilitation of properties destroyed in the fighting. One half of the stock was held by the Nanjing government, 25 percent by CCDC, and 25 percent by Japanese firms such as Kanegafuchi and Yūhō Textiles. The Chinese investment was compensation for confiscated municipal property formerly held by the Shanghai city government, including the government center at Jiangwan and wharves at Wusong. In the volatile real estate market of wartime Shanghai, the firm developed a reputation for speculation.<sup>33</sup>

These subsidiaries were established simply to earn income since real estate speculation, salt production, fish marketing, and match production were not fundamental to Japanese war plans. One subsidiary, however, found itself in a dilemma when trying to maximize profits. The Central China Sericultural Company (*Huazhong cansi gufen youxian gongsi*; *Kachū sanshi kabushiki kaisha*) marketed a product in which China and Japan were competitors. Founded in August 1938, the company had a capital of 10 million yen, one-fifth of which was to come from CCDC. The company confiscated filatures from Chinese owners who were eventually offered 30 percent of the stock in the firm in compensation. Japanese participants included Kanegafuchi, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and the Katakura Silk Reeling Company. The Central China Sericultural Company received a monopoly on the sale of cocoons, silk worm cultivation, and silk manufacturing in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Anhui. The export of silk products was also regulated, with the Mitsui Company gaining control over most exports to Japan.

All cocoons produced in these provinces had to be sold through agents of the company. Procurement prices were low, and Japanese buyers sometimes

paid in military scrip, which few producers wanted. Company authorities also limited sales of silk to filatures in unoccupied Shanghai, where many Chinese producers had relocated. This combination of wartime destruction and company policy which hindered production led to a decline in output. Mulberry acreage in Zhejiang, for instance, dropped 65 percent from 1937 to 1945, while cocoon production fell 77 percent.<sup>34</sup>

In April 1940 CCDC and its subsidiary decided that production was being curtailed too severely. The company's production target (which had been set at 19,400 piculs in 1939), was set at 32,400 piculs for the years 1940 through 1942. Corporate leader Kodama Kenji announced that the Sericultural Company would extend loans to farm families to assist in production. But this policy was short-lived. When world silk prices fell in late 1940, Tokyo economic authorities decided that an increase in Chinese silk output would be detrimental to Japanese producers and reversed CCDC's move, ordering Chinese production curtailed. In December 1940 filatures in China were forced to reduce output by 20 to 50 percent. Actual production of raw silk, which had been 17,276 piculs in 1939 and 26,362 in 1940, fell to 15,928 in 1941.<sup>35</sup> Throughout the rest of the war, Japanese policy continued this pattern. Tokyo ordered Chinese production of silk decreased whenever the Japanese market was threatened, and increased when more production was deemed useful.

Tokyo's silk policy gave an early indication of the ultimate nature of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The interests of the home country came first and policies in China were to reflect this reality. Economic development on the mainland ideally would fit Japanese needs, such as iron or coal production, or it might be complementary, such as salt or fish production. It could not be competitive with Japan.

The creation of the Central China Development Company and its numerous subsidiaries did represent a more sophisticated approach by the Japanese to exploit the resources of China. The simple expropriation policy followed in the early phase of the war had not yielded sufficient results for the *yizhan yangzhan* policy. The Japanese Army had difficulty operating and rehabilitating the enterprises such as the railways of central China. CCDC was a method of tying Japanese capital and civilian businesses into a program designed to meet Tokyo's military needs. In central China this meant restoring and controlling the transportation and communication network

and public utilities; it meant developing natural resources for military use, and it meant tapping obvious sources of revenue such as salt production.

But what of Chinese participation in these schemes? Virtually all of the subsidiary firms were labeled “joint Sino-Japanese” ventures. Chinese served on the boards of directors and supervisors. Sometimes the nominal head of the firm was Chinese, the vice-director Japanese. The chairman of the Central China Marine Products Company, for instance, was Zhou Jue, a Chinese who had been educated in Japan and who had served as an official in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The vice-chair was Taguchi Chōjirō. The chair of the Central China Match Company was Chen Bofan; the vice-chair Ueno Ryōsaku.<sup>36</sup> Despite this official setup, most observers felt that this was purely for show; the Japanese were in charge. Zhu Zijia recalled that virtually all of the CCDC Chinese participants were followers of Zhou Fohai or Mei Siping, leading members of the Nanjing puppet government of Wang Jingwei. But Wang’s government could not get the Japanese to accept its authority; it remained a puppet regime.<sup>37</sup>

#### PHASE THREE: DECEMBER 1942 UNTIL THE JAPANESE SURRENDER

The major changes in Japanese policy occurred in the last phases of the war, as the tide turned against Japan. One departure was an attempt to breathe life into the moribund Wang Jingwei government. An Imperial Conference in Tokyo on December 21, 1942, proclaimed a significant alteration of Japan’s China policy, termed the “great departure.” Japan would strengthen the Nanjing regime and permit it to declare war against the Allied Powers.<sup>38</sup> Both parties recognized that Nanjing needed greater authority over economic matters if it were to be taken seriously as a government. Differences emerged, nonetheless, between the two parties. When Wang went to Tokyo in late 1942, he sought control over procurement and the commodity trading system. Wang also requested abolition of the Japanese holding companies, notably the Central China Development Company and its subsidiaries. These would be turned over to his government, as would “enemy property” seized from American and British subjects after December 8, 1941, which was currently held by the Japanese military.<sup>39</sup> Wang also sought to gain rendition of factories and commercial property which had been seized

from Chinese producers, including those which had been entrusted to Japanese firms. Wang fell well short of obtaining these concessions. The Japanese military was reluctant to abolish the national development companies. Although the Japanese made vague promises to work this out in the future, no resolution of the issue was achieved. Yuan Yuquan recalls several attempts, for instance, to persuade the Japanese to abolish the Central China Marine Products Company's monopoly over fish marketing in the Lower Yangtze. This was simply too lucrative a source of revenue for the Japanese Navy, so nothing was achieved.<sup>40</sup> Only very late in the war were even nominal changes made to the prevailing pattern of Japanese military control of the Chinese economy. In June of 1944, the Japanese military held an elaborate ceremony at the Astor Hotel in Shanghai, in which titles to six public utilities in Shanghai, including electricity, gas, waterworks, telephone, telegraph, and tram service, were transferred to the Wang Jingwei government. Zhang Sumin, chief of the Shanghai office of enemy properties, accepted the titles in the presence of representatives from the Japanese consulate, the Japanese Army and Navy, and the directors of the Central China Development Company. The actual operations of the firms, however, did not change.<sup>41</sup>

Wang achieved greater concessions on the issue of commodity control. Tokyo agreed to surrender power to the Chinese side so long as Japan's needs were given top priority. Even here, Tokyo was cautious. Control was to be given to committees which included Chinese businessmen. This was not only because the support (as well as capital and expertise) of China's capitalists was sought at this point: the Japanese apparently did not wish the Wang regime to acquire too much power with this change. A second limitation was that the commodity control committees would answer to an advisory board (*Wuzi tongzhi shen'yi weiyuanhui*: Materials Control Arbitration Commission) with representatives from the Wang government, the Japanese consulate, and the Japanese military. At its monthly meetings, the board would set the general policy direction which the various commissions were to follow.<sup>42</sup>

Because of disagreements between Wang and Tokyo, the commodity control talks dragged on until March 1943, when a visit to China by Premier Tojo himself helped to resolve the issue. The National Commerce Control Commission (*Quanguo shangye tongzhi weiyuanhui*) was created on March 15, 1943, in Shanghai. Subordinate commissions to control rice, cotton,

wheat, oils, and everyday items came into being over the next few weeks. All were to have Chinese business representation; all were to accept the guidelines of the advisory board; all were to recognize Japan's paramount interest in maintaining its supply of resources.<sup>43</sup>

The new Commerce Control Commission and its constituent commissions were to take over from the Japanese military the task of regulating transportation and sale of commodities in the Lower Yangtze.<sup>44</sup> As chair of the Commerce Control Commission, Wang appointed Tang Shoumin, formerly the general manager of the Bank of Communications. Wang's first choice, banker Zhou Zuomin, had declined, although he eventually agreed to serve on the Board of Supervisors. This highlighted a problem faced by the Nanjing government. Tokyo had indicated a strong preference for having Chinese businessmen and bankers participate in the commissions, yet few were eager to identify too strongly with Nanjing. Three prominent business leaders—Wen Lanting, Yuan Ludong, and Lin Kanghou—came on board in response to pressure from Nanjing. Textile magnates Rong Desheng and Guo Shun were more reticent.<sup>45</sup>

Nanjing had various pressures it could use to induce cooperation. Its secret service operated out of No. 76 Jessfield Road in Shanghai and had a notorious reputation for killing and torture. More gentle pressure was also available. Tang Shoumin, who had found refuge in Hong Kong after 1937, was placed under house arrest by the Japanese in December 1941, and was freed only when the Japanese Consul in Hong Kong persuaded him to return to Shanghai.<sup>46</sup> The Chinese capitalists living in the occupied zone realized they had limited options. Nonetheless, Tokyo and Nanjing sought voluntary cooperation and support from capitalists rather than what could be obtained from intimidation. They offered positive enticement to those who came forth.

The major carrot at Japan's disposal was the potential return of enterprises that had been confiscated earlier in the war. There had been discussion for some time of returning these enterprises to their original Chinese owners. The treaty between Nanjing and Tokyo, formally signed on November 30, 1940, had stated that firms should be returned except in a few cases of military necessity; yet little had been achieved in this process by 1941.<sup>47</sup> Now these firms were available as bargaining chips. Industrial magnate Rong Desheng, for instance, would seem to have had much to gain from cooperation, for his family's cotton and flour mills in Shanghai were under Japa-

nese control. Several of the Rong enterprises, including Shenxin mills No. 1, No. 5, No. 6, and No. 7 had been seized in late 1937. Many of these were heavily damaged and had been entrusted to Japanese firms. Numbers 1 and 8 went to Toyoda, No. 5 to Yūhō Textiles, No. 6 to Shanhai Bōseki, and No. 7 to Kanegafuchi. Other Rong properties, Shenxin No. 2 and No. 9, were located in the International Settlement and were not occupied until December 1941. These latter properties were in a precarious position after the outbreak of the Pacific War because they had been registered as British or American firms in 1938 and 1939, as a protection in time of war.<sup>48</sup>

In 1942–43, however, the Japanese were ready to return these plants to the Chinese owners. Not only could this “carrot” be used to entice the Chinese entrepreneurs to come forth publicly to support Wang Jingwei. The Japanese had realized that strains on their manpower and capital made it difficult in any case for them to absorb the new group of plants acquired in Shanghai. Japanese *zaibatsu* who had been eager to take over plants in 1937–38 now found themselves stretched thin.

Under these circumstances, the Japanese made a great show of returning the plants to their Chinese owners. On July 25, 1943, a ceremony was held in Shanghai to celebrate the rendition of twenty-four plants to Chinese control. Yong'an textile industrialist Guo Shun thanked the Japanese on behalf of the Chinese side. Among those returned were Shenxin No. 2 and No. 9, Yong'an No. 3, and the Anda mill.<sup>49</sup> These “gifts” from the Japanese came with strings attached. In exchange, the industrialists had to agree to maintain close relations with the Japanese and to work with the Wang Jingwei government.<sup>50</sup>

The return of property was often fraught with other obstacles. If a Japanese firm had invested in repairs, it frequently insisted that the Chinese owner accept a “joint venture” arrangement. At other times, the Japanese military might block a return. The Japanese Navy, for instance, delayed the return of Shenxin No. 7, because the site of this mill was occupied by the navy, which hoped to convert the facility into a ship manufacturing plant. Only a special appeal by the Rongs, on April 16, 1943, to the Japanese consulate, and recognition by the Imperial Navy that its plans could not be brought to fruition, yielded the return of the property in July 1943. The Rongs then leased Shenxin No. 7 to the Japanese Kōdai textile mill.<sup>51</sup>

Most plants were eventually returned either completely or in partnership with a Japanese concern. The Chinese capitalists began the required coop-

eration with the Nanjing regime, joining the Commerce Control Commission and its subordinate agencies. For instance, when the Cotton Control Commission (*Mianye tongzhi weiyuanhui*) began its work, several Chinese industrialists were members of it. Guo Shun represented the Yong'an mills and Chen Baochu the Dasheng mills of Changzhou. The Shenxin mills were represented by Tong Luqing, Lu Dahuai (from Shenxin No. 9), and Qin Defang (Shenxin No. 2). Rong Desheng, the senior surviving figure among the Rongs, declined to serve, nor would he let his son Rong Erren or nephew Rong Hongyuan participate.<sup>52</sup>

The commission handled the pricing and marketing of cotton in central China, oversaw the inspection of cotton and the insurance of certificates of permission to ship cotton, and arranged for the requisition of cotton supplies for the Japanese military. It was to be a model of Sino-Japanese cooperation, but, in fact, had a stormy existence. By 1943 Japan's war situation was deteriorating, and Japanese reliance on Chinese resources had become greater than ever. Japanese authorities insisted that the various agencies of the Commerce Control Commission give the highest priority to Japanese needs, often leaving little for the Chinese businessmen. As Wang Ke-wen noted in his study of the Commerce Control Commission, the Japanese ordered the cotton committee to forcibly purchase 87 percent of the Chinese-owned cotton yarn from the Shanghai market from August to September 1943 at about one-fourth of the black market price.<sup>53</sup>

In terms of raw cotton, 60 percent was to be used to meet the needs of the Japanese military, 40 percent to supply mills in China. Japanese-controlled mills grabbed the lion's share of the latter, creating a chronic shortage for Chinese mills. Chinese industrialists responded in a number of ways. Some curtailed or closed production, some sneaked equipment into cotton producing areas where they set up small-scale handicraft style production. Many of these facilities would have only 1,000–2,000 spindles. They purchased cotton at black market rates and sometimes bribed puppet police or military officials to overlook their activities.<sup>54</sup>

Similar problems plagued the Rice Control Commission (*Miliang tongzhi weiyuanhui*). Headed by Shanghai Chamber of Commerce leader Yuan Ludeng, it included both Chinese and Japanese rice merchants. Nonetheless, the commission was given the impossible task of meeting the requisition needs of the Japanese military while supplying urban Shanghai. Since the prices paid to producers were set at low rates, most farmers tried

to avoid official sales and deal instead with the black market. In 1943 and 1944, according to Wang Ke-wen, the commission failed to purchase even half of the target quantity. Of 254,000 tons of rice it purchased in 1944, 220,000 were allocated to the occupation forces.<sup>55</sup>

The Wheat Flour Commission (*Fenmai tongzhi weiyuanhui*) faced similar obstacles. From the start the Japanese could not get Wang Yuqing, general manager of the Fuxin mills, to head the group. (He and Shi Fuhou did agree to represent Fuxin on the commission). Sun Zhongwei, general manager of the Fufeng Mill, finally agreed to be chair. Half of the technical personnel were Japanese, half Chinese, with most of the latter coming from the Fufeng or Fuxin mills. Altogether the commission had over 400 employees.<sup>56</sup>

The new terms offered the Chinese capitalists in 1943 were thus rather hollow. They received title to their enterprises again, but at the price of supporting the Japanese procurement system. Given the heavy demands of the Japanese and the general decline of the economy in the last months of the war, few were able to operate their businesses at anything approaching capacity. Tight price controls, hyperinflation common to both occupied and unoccupied China, and severe shortages of commodities and raw materials created conditions in which the black market flourished. Most Chinese businessmen survived, in fact, by relying on speculation and hoarding.

## CONCLUSION

Many Chinese capitalists thus ended the war with possession of at least some of their former property, even if plants and businesses operated at only a fraction of capacity. The price paid for such survival, however, was the risk of being labeled a collaborator. Few of the Chinese businessmen and industrialists had been eager to join the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere. Most had relocated in unoccupied Shanghai if they had the ability to do so. When trapped there or in Hong Kong in December 1941, their options were limited. For most, the lure of regaining their enterprises was such that, with great reluctance in some cases, they began to work with the Japanese and the Wang Jingwei government. Unfortunately for them, many found their enterprises confiscated anew at war's end when returning Guomindang forces labeled them "enemy property."

Japan had proposed the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as an “autonomous zone of peaceful living and common prosperity.” The question posed at the outset of this article was whether or not such a zone really had a place for indigenous capitalists. The answer, I would suggest was largely negative. Japanese activities in China were heavily extractive. Japanese military leaders sought to control China’s resources directly or in tandem with Japanese enterprises in China. Chinese capitalists were welcomed only very late in the game when Japanese resources and manpower were strained to the limit. Even in this final period, Japanese needs for the resources of China took precedence. Chinese factories stood idle; Chinese stomachs remained empty. To most Chinese, Japanese rhetoric was empty: the co-prosperity concept was just a veneer for colonial control.

## Patterns and Dynamics of Elite Collaboration in Occupied Shaoxing County

R. KEITH SCHOPPA

A quarter century has passed since the premiere of Marcel Ophüls's *The Sorrow and the Pity*, a film whose look at Clermont-Ferrand under German occupation shattered much of the French resistance myth that had grown after World War II.<sup>1</sup> At the time, John Boyle noted that the Chinese had not been similarly drawn to examine their life under the Japanese occupation, especially the phenomenon of collaboration.<sup>2</sup> That same judgment still applies today. While scholars have focused on the resisters and argued about who resisted the most, Poshek Fu notes that work on collaboration in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan remains "parochially political."<sup>3</sup> In addition, the comparatively small body of work that has moved beyond archival collection has been cast in baldly moralistic frameworks, with scholars invariably attaching to individuals and groups epithets like *hanjian* (traitor to the Chinese), *kuilei* (puppet), and *wei* (bogus).<sup>4</sup> Given China's historical record—in which people and culture have many times shown themselves capable of prospering under the control of outsiders—such derogation may perhaps be at first somewhat surprising. But Boyle rightly notes that the stigma attached to collaboration after World War II was

rooted in Chinese nationalism, a twentieth-century phenomenon and a powerful force, the final expression of which is still in the process of becoming.

Most studies have focused on resistance and collaboration primarily as an expression of public and private morality. But collaboration, I would argue, was not simply a moral choice between patriotism and betrayal. As Henry Rousso has noted in his study of the memory of Vichy France, the “major division [of collaboration and resistance] masked other [differences] that sometimes ran deeper still.”<sup>5</sup> What were the social, economic, and political realities of collaboration that went beyond moral considerations? The realities and differences obviously varied according to location and context. Collaborators came from particular settings and historical experiences, having played particular social roles and been parts of particular social, political, and economic networks. They chose the identity of collaborator for a host of reasons shaped by personal aims and existential needs and pressures.

Studying a specific collaborationist regime provides a detailed view of the specific contexts, patterns, and dynamics of collaboration in a particular locale. This essay offers a case study of the city of Shaoxing and its immediate environs on the Ning-Shao Plain on the southern coast of Hangzhou Bay. With a reported population of almost a million and a half people in 1939, the city was the birthplace of Lu Xun and the famous native place of thousands of government bureaucrats in imperial times, and of hundreds of businessmen in the financial and commercial worlds of Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Ningbo in the first half of the twentieth century. This analysis explores the connections between the city's collaborationist regime and pre-occupation political, economic, and social trends and situations; it looks at the backgrounds, roles, and interplay between collaborating elites; it raises questions about the fate of collaborators in postwar society; and it probes issues about the politics and meaning of collaboration.

#### SHAOXING: THE SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF COLLABORATION

Long a key cultural and economic center east of the Fuchun-Qiantang Rivers, Shaoxing city was a prefectural capital in late imperial times. Although prefectures were abolished in 1912, the eight counties that had

comprised the local prefecture remained politically and economically centered on their former capital. An important transportation hub, the city was located on the Grand Canal, the Hangzhou-Ningbo Railroad, and the modern highway connecting Xiaoshan and Shangyu counties. A key economic center, it exported to regions near and far its specialties of tinfoil, tea, silk, and wine. Its powerful native banks supplied capital for the salt industry in Yuyao County along the bay to the east; for the tea, silk, and tobacco businesses in the counties of the former prefecture; and for the rice business and soy sauce breweries in the former prefectures of Jinhua, Quzhou, and Yanzhou in south-central Zhejiang.<sup>6</sup>

Besides its economic prosperity, what is striking about Republican Shaoxing was its social disorder. The fault lines were not primarily of class but rather of social networks and connections. Like Chinese society in general, Shaoxing was simultaneously linked and separated by family and lineage; and by social, political, and economic networks and connections. The society and politics of the city and its environs were characterized by individuals in network-cliques struggling for position, wealth, and power; for them the connection to government elites was the key one to be made, cultivated, and milked. Because elite connections to nonelites and even criminal types were the norm in the hurly-burly of Shaoxing life, the line between legitimate and criminal elites, as well as between legitimate and illegitimate action, was blurred. Cases in point were the three essentially criminal gangs (*liumin banghui*) that held substantial power in the city's public life in the mid-1930s.<sup>7</sup> They had their roots in and connections to government or quasi-government policing and taxing institutions. The local "Shaoxing gang" was headed by a captain of the police detective unit headquartered within the county government offices; using the government as a cover, he opened gambling and opium dens, reportedly supported by the area's bullying gentry (*haoshen*) and various underling clients. When He Yangling became magistrate in 1935, he began a crackdown on the gangs, relying primarily on a Special Services Unit (*tewudui*) [hereafter, SSU].

The Cheng County gang, headed by the manager of the Shaoxing branch of the provincial slaughter tax office, and the Taizhou gang, led by two former city militiamen, were also involved in various illegal activities. The latter offers a look at the close relationship between economic and political elites and the underworld: the Taizhou gang leaders were linked and remained loyal to the powerful Xu Xiqi who had trained and commanded

them in a city militia in the late 1920s. Xu was the younger brother of famous Shaoxing anti-Manchu revolutionary Xu Xilin who had been executed for his plot to kill the Anhui governor in 1907. Xiqi had made a career building networks in elite circles, as well as among the socially disreputable. Although he had served as a provincial customs commissioner, his main arena remained Shaoxing where he owned the city's largest candle and cooking oil store. In the 1920s, through personal connections, he won the authority to appoint local elites in Shaoxing as heads of provincial cigarette and liquor tax bureau offices, thereby extending his personal networks. The Chamber of Commerce, the most powerful organization in the city, recognized Xu's stature, ability, and connections when it charged him with organizing and managing the militia units to keep peace during the Northern Expedition.<sup>8</sup> He Yangling's battle against gangs and opium dealers brought into play methods and approaches that served as institutional harbingers of the occupation period. Using rapid prosecution, torture, and punishment of those it arrested, the SSU expanded its power, becoming an increasingly repressive weapon for the expansion of He's own power at the expense of local elites.<sup>9</sup> When Xu Xiqi tried to spark resistance against He's centralizing efforts, the SSU dispatched Xu's client, the Cheng County gang leader, to warn him that his arrest by the SSU was imminent. Xu took the warning seriously and briefly left Shaoxing.<sup>10</sup>

Another of He Yangling's governmental innovations with some impact on the occupation was the establishment in October 1937 of special police units, the Voluntary Police (*yiyong jingcha*).<sup>11</sup> Structured as a military battalion (*dadui*), the Voluntary Police was funded, like Xu Xiqi's 1920s militia, by the Chamber of Commerce. The head of the county police bureau doubled as the Voluntary Police commander, and the vice-commander was Chamber of Commerce head Feng Xuzhou. This voluntary force served as sentries, walked patrols, nabbed thieves and prostitutes, checked hotels for suspicious characters, and helped the fire brigade. Many of the more than four hundred initial voluntary police were proprietors, shareholders, and managers of city shops and businesses. Many were undoubtedly attracted by the provision that their participation meant a postponement of being drafted.<sup>12</sup> Other attractions reportedly were their presumed higher status, sense of power, and even the glamor of military-style uniforms. A number of these Voluntary Police played key collaborative roles in the occupation.

The years before the occupation were marked not only by efforts to deal

with crime and disorder but also by labor strife in the tinfoil industry. The city was one of the largest producers of foil used principally in religious rituals. In 1935 there were over 58,000 workers employed in about nine hundred foil shops producing annually about four million “books” of foil.<sup>13</sup> The Republican period and especially the years 1932–35 had been the most profitable for the industry; yet industry leaders felt their profits threatened from above and below. The central government’s drive to suppress superstition had led it to increase the national tax levied on the foil; and workers’ strikes in the late 1920s had led to wage increases.<sup>14</sup> In 1935 foil industry leaders and the provincial government devised a plan to establish a special firm to monopolize the production and sale of tinfoil. The scheme meant that the hundreds of small foil factory-stores could not sell their product without purchasing shares in the new firm; further, wages of foil workers would be cut from 1.8 to 1.2 yuan per book. Because of its seasonal nature, tinfoil work was a subsidiary occupation for many area farmers, whose livelihoods would have been substantially undercut by the plan. In late May of that year twenty thousand foil workers took to the streets; they had come to focus on Qi Baosheng, foil magnate, head of the foil tax office, and projected head of the new firm. After the workers destroyed about twenty foil businesses, including Qi’s firm, and then demolished his residence, martial law was declared.<sup>15</sup> The crisis seemed to be settled when the county government received permission from Governor Huang Shaohong, a close patron of Magistrate He, to delay the establishment of the new firm. But He’s arrest of five leaders, on the suspicion that they were Communists, brought more violence. A provincial government decision to cancel the plans for the new firm finally ended the unrest, but not the tension. The episode underscored the close relationship between government and big businesses, as well as the volatility of the labor situation; it planted even more seeds of elite anxiety about potential trouble sprouting below the veneer of social peace.

The Shaoxing economy was dominated by a powerful capitalist oligarchy, a network of wealthy businessmen/industrialists with close connections to government. Their leadership was institutionalized in the Chamber of Commerce, the most powerful organization in the city.<sup>16</sup> Chamber of Commerce chairman Feng Xuzhou and vice-chairman Tao Zhongan had played crucial negotiating roles in the 1935 foil crisis. Feng had risen to the top of the Shao-

xing financial-commercial world in the native banking business; he was elected the native bank guild board chair in 1925 and the Chamber of Commerce chair in 1934. Maneuvering to attain positions in other native banks for his three brothers and four other relatives, by the outbreak of war in 1937 he had structured networks of family, proteges, and associates that dominated the Shaoxing financial world.<sup>17</sup> And it was no small world. In 1936 Shaoxing had 50 (26 percent) of Zhejiang's 224 native banks, second only to Ningbo's 60 and many more than Hangzhou's 32. After the occupation, Shaoxing still had 57 of the total 191 native banks (30 percent), more than any other provincial city.<sup>18</sup> The economic power of native banks was translated directly into local political power in the Chamber of Commerce: from 1912 to 1941, all its chairs came from the banking industry, and all but one (who served a very short term) from native banks.<sup>19</sup> It was no exaggeration to say that each industry's financial health depended on its connections to native banks.

Tao Zhongan, the vice-chair of the Chamber of Commerce, owned the county's largest cotton firm and headed the county's textile guild.<sup>20</sup> Like other Shaoxing capitalists, Tao was a landlord whose conservative social views regarding threats from the lower classes were well known. He had been the landlord elites' contact with the military leaders in repressing a 1921 rent resistance movement in the neighboring county of Xiaoshan.<sup>21</sup> Probably the wealthiest Shaoxing businessman was Jin Tanghou, owner of a native bank, investor in firms dealing in rice and kerosene, board chair of the Shaoxing branch of the modern-style Commercial Bank, and transportation magnate who monopolized long-distance bus transportation routes out of the city.<sup>22</sup> In the 1930s, he served as manager of the Shaoxing provincial tin-foil tax office. When he became chairman of the Commercial Bank in 1935, his clout and logic of connections (*guanxi*) "encouraged" many in the tinfoil industry to invest money in or to transfer funds from native banks to the modern-style bank. When Jin in 1932 purchased a park almost four acres in size in the eastern part of the city for his family's personal use, the calligrapher for the votive tablet for Jin's new study was magistrate He Yangling—an obvious indication of shared interests and social space.<sup>23</sup>

In contrast to Feng, Tao, and Jin, the career of Zhu Zhonghua (1897–1988) was built primarily on a foundation of politics and government from which he moved into the world of finance.<sup>24</sup> A student leader at Fudan Mid-

dle School and University from 1913–20, Zhu worked as secretary in both administrations of Shaoxing magistrate Tang Rixin (1928–29, 1930–33). Having worked at a Shanghai bank in the 1920s, he became manager of the Shaoxing County Farmers' Bank in 1932. Playing a traditional gentry role, Zhu founded the famous Jishan Middle School. His close friend and fellow Fudan alumnus, Jin Tanghou, served as first chairman of the school board. The Fudan connections formed an important network that Zhu institutionalized in his 1923 founding of the Shaoxing Fudan Alumni Association.

Zhu also worked with one of the dominant Shaoxing elites of the early twentieth century, Wang Ziyu (1874–1944).<sup>25</sup> Wang, a *xiuca*i degree holder, was a traditional gentry type: throughout his career, he taught and established schools; he organized and edited newspapers; he served in various government posts at the provincial and county levels before the 1911 revolution into the 1940s; he was involved in banking in both Hangzhou and Shaoxing.<sup>26</sup> Wang's nephew, Tao Kanghou, was manager of the most famous retail rice store in the city and served for over a decade as board chair for the rice industry guild. In this capacity, he oversaw the long-distance purchase of rice for this rice-deficit region, cultivating connections both inside and outside the province to make the necessary purchases without difficulty.<sup>27</sup>

A survey of various boards—the Board of Directors of the Farmers' Bank (established in 1932); the Jishan Middle School Board (1933); the Board of Directors of the Commercial Bank (1935); the board of a special provisioning company (1941)—shows the names of this capitalist oligarchy reappearing, though in different configurations: Feng Xuzhou, Jin Tanghou, Zhu Zhonghua, Tao Zhongan, and Wang Ziyu.<sup>28</sup> Like any network composed of individuals who are also part of many other networks—familial, alumni, political, social and business—the oligarchy was subject to many countervailing pressures. It was not always cohesive, and this instability was sometimes reflected in the political institutions of party and government.

#### THE WAR YEARS—BEFORE OCCUPATION, 1938–1941

When Shanghai and Hangzhou both fell before the Japanese onslaught in late 1937, Shaoxing was cut off from two of its most important economic centers. Yet after some initial difficulties, commerce gradually rebounded, in

part spurred by the assumption that the Japanese, having stopped on the north side of the Qiantang, did not intend to cross the river. The city's comparative economic good fortune lured important Hangzhou businesses from the occupied erstwhile provincial capital. But despite the veneer of normality, the war was a continual presence. Bit by bit, the city came to feel its vulnerability, first in three Japanese bombing attacks in June and July 1939, then in Japan's January 1940 seizure of Xiaoshan County, contiguous to the west. From there for the rest of 1940, the Japanese launched destructive raids on the area towns, and in October 1940 on Shaoxing itself.

With the military threat looming ominously, the city experienced an ever more serious provisioning crisis. On the eve of the occupation, the Guomindang county government severely wounded its reputation by its handling of this crisis. Shaoxing county never produced sufficient rice for its dense population; dependent on long-distance provisioning for 40,000 to 50,000 piculs annually, it imported both from within the province—Jinhua, Lanqi, Jiaying—and from outside—Jiangxi, Anhui, Jiangsu.<sup>29</sup> When northern Zhejiang and much of Jiangsu fell to the Japanese in 1937, Shaoxing rice imports became primarily dependent on markets in Shangrao and Jiangxi. Before the war, rice from that area had been transported on the Zhejiang-Jiangxi (Zhe-Gan) Railroad. But in wartime the military had priority use of the railroad, making its use for rice transport difficult on a predictable basis. Grain merchants thus struggled to find approaches and connections that would enable them to purchase any grain, using money and gifts to bribe Zhe-Gan Railroad personnel as well as the politically and militarily powerful. Official regulations to lessen serious shortages were put in place, including prohibitions against transporting grain stored by great households (*dahu*), instead reserving it to stabilize food prices and supply food kitchens.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, the emergency intensified, prompting Jin Bingyan, head of Shaoxing's Qiu Jin ward, to telegraph the provincial assembly in May 1940 to ask for immediate government relief grain.<sup>31</sup>

May 1940 also saw the appointment of new county magistrate Deng Ren, a blood relative of General Liu Jianxu, commanding general of the Guomindang 10th Army. Deng had served as head of the propaganda office of that army and most recently as magistrate in Zhuji and Anji counties. His short magisterial tenure in Shaoxing (May 1940–April 1941) was marked by corruption, impropriety, and scandal; his record at such a critical time can-

not but have helped to deepen the cynicism and distrust the Shaoxing residents felt about the local Guomindang government. When Deng came to Shaoxing, he brought a number of his closest confidants whom he had named to various posts. He appointed one Guan Jianong, a staff officer of the 10th Army headquarters, to be the head (*quzhang*) of Gaopu district, where a number of wealthy families had stockpiled huge quantities of rice. In taking rice for government relief supplies, Guan misappropriated over 100,000 catties (130,000 lb.) from Bao family granaries, some of which ended up on the black market in Shaoxing and some of which found its way into occupied territory. The criminality of Deng and his leaders went unpunished—and unchallenged by such longtime powerful local leaders as Wang and Zhu. The price of rice in June 1940 likely reflects the effects of both the dearth itself and the exacerbating county government actions: in Jinhua, the price was 28 yuan per picul (130 lb.) and in Ningbo, 56 yuan; in Shaoxing the price soared to 117 yuan.<sup>32</sup>

Provincial government reports in late 1940 and early 1941, on the eve of the occupation, point to an ever-worsening problem, while both county government and powerful local elites did little. The provincial government in August sent 100,000 yuan worth of rice to feed unemployed workers in Shaoxing and two nearby counties.<sup>33</sup> In late January 1941 a provincial assemblyman reported that 500 refugee children were starving in the streets of Shaoxing; a late February report noted that the paucity of rice in the city had produced great suffering and growing panic.<sup>34</sup> Finally at the beginning of March Chamber of Commerce and grain industry leaders, meeting at the prompting of the county government, established the Shaoxing County Food Grains Company (*shiliang gongsi*), a private firm controlled by a board composed of the city's capitalist oligarchs.<sup>35</sup>

Why these key elites did not act until the crisis was so severe is unclear; the irony is that with all the assiduous attention given to the structure of the organization, it managed importation of only two or three shipments of grain before the Japanese seized the city (and most of the last batch of grain). If the elites did not distinguish themselves in this situation, magistrate Deng continued to bring opprobrium on the office and the county government. Twice in March he was rebuked by the provincial government, for illegally closing a large soya sauce company and seizing all its property, and for irregularities in reporting the county government's budgetary situation.<sup>36</sup> On the

eve of the occupation, the stature of the county government in Shaoxing could hardly have been lower.

#### THE JAPANESE SEIZURE OF SHAOXING AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE OCCUPATION

After the taking of Xiaoshan County in January 1940, the Japanese Special Services Unit in Hangzhou sent spies into the Ning-Shao region. The Japanese withdrawal from Shaoxing after the raid in October 1940, however, had led many city residents to conclude that the Japanese did not intend to occupy the city for the long term. By this time, the Japanese had pushed well into Hunan and Hubei and the thinking was that Japan's occupying the few small and middle-sized cities along the Zhejiang coast would have no military value.<sup>37</sup> Thus, despite the known presence of Japanese spies, there was little expectation of an attack. A false sense of security led to a lack of readiness, which created greater chaos when the attack came.

Rumors of an impending advance began to sweep over the city on April 14, 1941, impelling elite residents to pack up and move to rural areas. On the afternoon of April 16, on news that Japanese forces were within ten miles of the city, managers of three of the city's modern-style banks (which were county government depositories) tried to meet with Xing Chennan, recently appointed Administrative Inspector and Public Security Commander of the Third Military Region, to get his permission to leave the city, taking cash reserves and precious metals with them. From Xing and magistrate Deng came words of dissuasion: "The Japanese numbers are few; we've sent a division to block up their advance; the situation is tense but stabilized; we need to wait until the 3 a.m. tides to know if they will reinforce what they have already landed. If you pull out now, the masses will panic. Don't do anything now; wait until tomorrow."<sup>38</sup>

Commentators have noted that the city that evening was of two minds: while the economic elites frantically made arrangements to leave with cash reserves and portable property, government and military elites, seemingly nonchalant about the impending attack, were almost all attending a production of Cao Yu's play *Thunderstorm* that was being performed by the drama troupe of the 86th Army. Japanese troops entered the city about midnight, cutting communications between the city and the countryside. Before

dawn they were guarding the former city gate exits and had occupied the city's key points; only one government regiment within the city put up any resistance. The scene in early morning was chaotic: masses of people were in the streets as city residents tried to flee from Japanese troops who, in some areas, had begun indiscriminate killing. In the vanguard of the flight in all directions were government and military leaders. Xing Chennan, who days earlier had stood on a theater stage and yelled "Protect great Shaoxing," put on farmer's clothes and hid in the hold of a boat fleeing west of the city.<sup>39</sup> Other military units stationed in the city fled to the north and south. Magistrate Deng went to the home of transportation magnate Jin Tanghou to disguise himself before he fled; despite the effort, he was shot and killed as he left the city.<sup>40</sup>

Some fled because they feared they were on the Japanese military police "list" to head the occupation's collaborationist organization, the Public Security Support Society (*zhian weichihui*). Rumors that the Japanese would choose someone who had studied in Japan forced the flight of men like Jishan Middle School teacher Xie Naiji.<sup>41</sup> The Japanese obviously sought the most prestigious local leader in order to enhance the legitimacy of their control. Wang Ziyu, reportedly first on the list, fled to the rural home of colleague Shen Fusheng to avoid being dragooned to work with the Japanese.<sup>42</sup> Reportedly third on the list was Chamber of Commerce chair Feng Xuzhou, who was seized by Japanese soldiers as he attempted to flee by boat.<sup>43</sup>

The city had fallen ignominiously. The government leaders' refusal to acknowledge the imminent danger and to allow bankers to leave the city meant that the reserve notes of every modern bank (five to six million yuan) were lost to the Japanese. The lack of military preparedness in the face of certain attack seemed unconscionable. The elite capitalist oligarchy played no role in what might be called this preparedness crisis; city officials must bear the blame. The early flight of military-political leader Xing Chennan outraged city residents. After pressure on the national government from banking leaders, Xing was imprisoned and in 1944 executed for desertion.<sup>44</sup> Though Deng died at Japanese hands, most city residents reportedly remembered him more for his corruption in the rice scandal of 1940 than for his "patriotic" death.<sup>45</sup>

The collaborationist regime was born, then, in a context of popular distrust and suspicion of a county government that had turned increasingly toward repressive techniques; of a corrupt, humiliated and defeated local

Guomindang regime; of a continuing elite ethos of wealth-seeking among what I have called a capitalist oligarchy and their clients; of an absence of any clear demarcation between morally legitimate and illegitimate elites or between moral and immoral political and economic actions; and of elite fears of trouble from below, stemming from labor unrest, hoodlum gangs, and especially the unresolved and desperate problem of grain provisioning.

#### THE COLLABORATIONIST REGIME OF FENG XUZHOU

The capture of Feng Xuzhou provided the Japanese with a powerful local leader. When Feng made clear his unwillingness to head the Public Security Support Society, he was subjected to the entreaties of Kitajima Yu, the head of the Japanese Special Services organ, and a group of Japanese officers who played on Feng's sense of duty and the general fear of chaos. The Japanese made the following plea: with businesses and stores closed, the masses were unable to purchase rice—an increasingly dangerous situation. Robberies in the streets were becoming more frequent, but there was no Chinese cooperation in trying to reestablish social order. They appealed to Feng personally: "How could he bear this in his heart?"<sup>46</sup> Their appeal was desperate: labor and gangster unrest and the potentially dangerous threat spawned by the dearth of rice threatened potential political and economic chaos, a reign of disorder that might undo the system that the Japanese now seemed willing to support. All these considerations must have been powerful forces in Feng's decision. But whether from a sense of noblesse oblige or primarily from a desire for self-protection, Feng yielded—one source says he was "forced to accept"—and on April 20 he began inviting others in his networks to participate.<sup>47</sup>

Close Chamber of Commerce allies, vice-chair Tao Zhongan and secretary Chen Shouya, agreed respectively to serve in key economic and cultural positions. Feng asked relatives like Feng Guaijie, manager of a native bank, and other native bank colleagues, plus business and industry allies, to serve in various economic positions in the Support Society and related organizations, and many complied.<sup>48</sup> The delegitimizing spectacle of the Guomindang government of Xing and Deng and the appearance of longtime city leader Feng who sustained a reputation of leadership and offered stability might have predisposed elites and masses to offer some support to the new

regime. Those elites who chose to work with the Japanese seemed to be motivated at least in the beginning by the recognition of the reality of power in the new order and by thoughts similar to Petain's classic rationalization: "If I could not be your sword, I tried to be your shield."<sup>49</sup> In Feng's case the shield was an economic one. With his control of the Shaoxing financial world and his copious connections to the business world, Feng, named county magistrate in June 1941, was able to facilitate a brisk economic revival beginning by early 1942 and burgeoning into 1943.

Finally, there may also have been another more personal and professional economic motive in the decisions of Feng and many of his colleagues to work with the Japanese. This was the preservation and expansion of the Shaoxing native banks. Although these institutions dominated the city's financial world in the years after 1912, by the mid-1930s they were more and more challenged by modern banks, which lent money to the government and became depositories of government funds. The banking and currency reforms of the Nanjing government, which was increasingly emphasizing central control, targeted the traditional native bank system with its highly discreet firms that often operated in family secrecy. The 1931 bank law theoretically brought all financial institutions under Nanjing's control. The 1932 abolition of the tael and adoption of the standard silver dollar meant the loss of an important source of revenue for native banks—the fee for converting dollars into taels, still the native banks' unit of account. The 1935 new monetary system (the *fabi*) made the notes of the three government banks the only legal tender and outlawed privately held silver, policies that limited the native banks' "ability to create credit."<sup>50</sup> Feng and the leading native bank managers were not identified with the Guomindang, and they quite bitterly opposed the Nanjing regime's fiscal policies. Backed by the government, modern-style banks in Shaoxing strove mightily to challenge native banks in the 1930s. In the words of Gao Kunfang, a native bank manager at the time, modern banks "cast covetous eyes and worked with itchy hands to come up with countless plans to insert themselves into the financial markets."<sup>51</sup>

Gao also noted that the most important prerequisite for the success of financial institutions was the establishment of connections to officials on whom they could subsequently rely.<sup>52</sup> With the Guomindang government now out of the picture, native banks were given the opportunity to revive their flagging fortunes under Japanese patronage. In the initial days of the

occupation the Japanese clearly saw the modern banks as conquered institutions, standing as symbols of the defeated regime and as sources of much needed cash. The Japanese turned the modern banks into their main political and police headquarters: The China Bank became the headquarters not only of the collaborationist Support Society but also of the Japanese Special Services Unit, while the Farmers' Bank became the headquarters of the Japanese Military Police. But the physical occupation of the government's central financial institutions was more than symbolic. The Japanese were ruthlessly determined to seize all the modern banks' cash reserves and precious metals, an opportunity afforded largely by the malfeasance of the county government. For over a month after the April takeover, the Japanese undertook a reign of terror against modern bank managers and all their employees, hunting down, arresting, and torturing them in order to gain further information about possible hidden cash reserves. Zhang Zhonghe, the manager of the Communications Bank, for example, was arrested and tortured more than once. To protect him from further maltreatment, Feng Xuzhou, serving indeed as a shield, brought him and his family to live on an upper floor of the Support Society headquarters.<sup>53</sup> There is no data, however, to suggest that the Japanese took any funds from the native banks throughout the occupation, leaving one to wonder whether Feng's agreement to collaborate may have been a *quid pro quo* arrangement.

After an initial period of wariness following the city's seizure, some native banks reopened. With Feng's strong patronage they began to flourish, even though the collaborationist authorities in Hangzhou had established a number of modern bank branches in Shaoxing. The economic recovery engineered by Feng and the lack of modern bank competition helped make native banks more prosperous than before the war. As the occupation continued, the native banks reportedly became involved in black market activity, hoarding, speculation, and the manipulation of rates of exchange, activities which brought even greater profits.<sup>54</sup> Critics of Feng (and they are legion) argue that the economic revival was a sham, based as it was on rampant speculation in almost every commodity. One study of the economy during the occupation does admit that a number of businesses prospered—native banks, tinfoil and cigarette producers, jewelry shops—but asserts that all others remained depressed.<sup>55</sup> Provincial reports of contract and business tax income from the county in 1942 and 1943 do give evidence, however, of an economic recovery. Though the rate of inflation is not known, from all

accounts it was small compared to the very end of the war or to what occurred after the war. In 1942 contract tax revenue was 7,354 yuan; in 1943 it rose to 92,754 yuan; the figure projected for 1944 was 360,000 yuan. Business tax revenues during the last half of 1942 totaled 279,906 yuan; during the first half of 1943, 531,938 yuan; and during the latter half of 1943, 502,322 yuan.<sup>56</sup> Further evidence of better economic conditions that served to bring back those who had fled in the spring of 1941, as well as to attract new migrants to the city, is to be found in the population data. In September 1941 the city's population was recorded at 455,423, while less than two years later, in June 1943, it had rebounded to 708,366.<sup>57</sup>

Perhaps part of the reason for Feng's ability to ignite and keep alive the economic recovery came from his increased political stature as county magistrate.<sup>58</sup> In that position, he named his own administrative elites, revealing another dynamic of the collaborationist regime. During his service as vice-commander of the Voluntary Police set up in 1937, he established personal connections with many members of the police. He now brought a number of these men into his government. Feng established the "joint management office of the city's six wards" to facilitate tax collection and labor conscription. At least three of the six ward heads were former policemen. One of them, Jin Bingyan, had been a leading figure in the provisioning crisis. Three of the six would be elected to the county assembly in 1946. Two other important collaborators working with Japanese intelligence organs, Zhu Jinsheng and Fan Guangmao, both came from the ranks of the Voluntary Police.<sup>59</sup> Whether Feng served as their patron is not known, but their rise to importance underscores the significance of the Voluntary Police background for a number of important collaborators.<sup>60</sup>

With the closure of many rice firms following the occupation, Feng's administration formed the joint government-merchant Shanglin Company to import rice and other grains. Before the occupation, as we have seen, the government and the business elites had not worked together effectively to handle this problem. A key figure in the new company was Li Xiangrui, who combined in himself characteristics of two Shaoxing collaborator types, the petit bourgeois shopkeeper and those with Japanese connections. A native of Shaoxing, Li had been an apprentice in a local rice store before moving to Shanghai, where he eventually went into business with a Japanese businessman named Miyajima. When the Japanese occupied Shaoxing, Li moved back to the city, accompanied by Miyajima. Li became involved in the grain

company and Miyajima opened a Japanese goods store and managed two shops. Li also organized and served as chair of the board of the Assorted Grain Industry Guild (*zaliangye gonghui*) which, since all rice stores now did business in assorted grains, became a crucial economic player during the occupation. Although difficulties of grain supply remained, the company and the guild seemed to prime the grain business pump, as it were, and the growing prosperity saw the establishment of many assorted grain firms and stores.<sup>61</sup>

The collaborators in Feng's regime participated actively in working with the Japanese occupiers. Though each man certainly collaborated from his own motives, each seemed to act, at least in part, so that life would continue to function with some degree of normality. There were collaborators, specifically educators, who participated in a more passive sense, but whose actions submitted them to direct Japanese control more than the men we have discussed. Prior to and after the occupation, the several middle schools in the city temporarily relocated in the countryside.<sup>62</sup> A county middle school was set up in July 1941 under the Japanese Special Services Unit. It was housed in the former civil service examination hall, and by mid-1944 it had 610 students, indicating that education under Japanese regime was reaching a fair number of students.<sup>63</sup> In addition, one elementary school was established in each city ward. These seven schools were placed under the unified administration of the county education bureau, which followed Japanese guidelines in education policy. Though the names of the principals of each school are available, there is no other extant information about them.<sup>64</sup> The social and political dynamics behind their choices to act under such strict political control and thus take on identities prescribed by the Japanese cannot be gauged—though they may have been motivated by nothing more than a fervent desire to teach or simply move beyond the stunned and frightened immobility of the early occupation period.

#### THE DYNAMICS OF MILITARY COLLABORATION

Some elites in Feng's regime may have acted primarily out of self-interest, but most acted from more complex motives. In contrast, military collaborators, almost to a person, responded to the Japanese occupation opportunistically. This generalization, however, should not conceal the array of military

or military-related people who emerged as significant collaborators: spies, military police, puppet troops of the Wang Jingwei government, and what Chen Yung-fa has called spontaneous or parochial mobilizers.<sup>65</sup> Whereas the Feng regime was composed primarily of capitalist elites and their petit bourgeois followers, military collaborators in Shaoxing County were drawn either from the ranks of the professional military or from the local lumpen-proletariat.

The seizure of Shaoxing was part of the larger Japanese plan to take the Ning-Shao plain. Before the attack on the city, Chinese spies had fed intelligence to the Japanese. Three of the most notorious stayed on to play key roles in the Japanese Military Police during the occupation. Unlike the collaborators in the Feng administration, these men worked in Japanese institutions.<sup>66</sup> The most powerful, Zhou Jinrong, the erstwhile proprietor of a Jiaxing city dumpling stand, was the head of the investigation unit, which used a business firm, the Linji Company, as its front organization. Of the directors of the dummy company, the most infamous was Li Yulin, a man of unknown background, who moved during the occupation into the larger role of anti-Communist military organizer. The third, Zhu Shouzhi, allegedly began his career as a Hangzhou vagrant, and, in the year prior to the Japanese takeover, peddled medicines in Shaoxing while acting as a spy. Zhou, Li, and Zhu launched a reign of terror against Chinese who betrayed any anti-Japanese sentiment or who were just unlucky. Torture with electricity, water, attack dogs, and beatings became the standard weapon against suspects. In addition, the collaborationist regime had its own Political Protection Bureau (*zhengzhi baoweiju*), headed by a former Guomindang member. It established branches in key centers along the Hangzhou-Ningbo Railroad and the Grand Canal, where its use of terror was also well known.<sup>67</sup>

Following their seizure of the city, the Japanese quartered themselves in the Chamber of Commerce building and the nearby former Shaoxing Middle School, and, in the southern part of the city, in the Jishan Middle School. Reports indicate that the occupying force was frequently on maneuvers in the surrounding countryside, so that the number of Japanese soldiers in the city at any one time was generally not more than a hundred.<sup>68</sup> Thus the Japanese military was dependent on a wide range of military collaborators to defend the city and maintain Japanese control. There were two main units headed by non-Shaoxing professional military. The first was the 36th Division of the Wang regime's army, with headquarters at the Xu family res-

idence. The second was the Eastern Zhejiang Public Security Headquarters, located in the Kaiyuan Temple in the city center. It controlled three regiments, whose main task was defense of the eastern approaches to the city, especially the road to the Cao'e River. It was commanded by Yang Zhiqu, who was from Guizhou and who had links to the Baoding Military Academy. Cruel in his dealings with the populace and destructive of the Buddhist statues in his temple headquarters, he displayed most flagrantly the *nouveau riche* mentality—using money gained through corruption, bribery, and extortion to purchase ostentatious gold accoutrements that he sported wherever he went.<sup>69</sup>

In September 1941 two regiments of the Guomindang 86th Army, which was based in southwestern Zhejiang, launched a fierce attack on Shaoxing. This was designed to put pressure on local Japanese defenses depleted by the diversion of troops for a major offensive on Changsha. Though the streets of Shaoxing's southwest sector were strewn with corpses, the Guomindang forces had to retreat when Japanese and puppet units held firm. Nevertheless, the episode underscored the military vulnerability of the Japanese in the area, a situation made more precarious when the Zhejiang-Jiangxi campaign (May-September 1942) spread Japanese troop strength even thinner. As a stopgap tactic, the Japanese developed connections with and came to rely on units that were led by spontaneous mobilizers similar to those on the other side whom Chen Yung-fa has characterized as "predatory forces trying to rationalize their activities in the name of anti-Japanese resistance."<sup>70</sup> Reliance on these forces, as Odoric Wou shows for Henan Province, became even greater after the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941.<sup>71</sup>

Chen's description of spontaneous mobilizers in Jiangsu and Anhui provinces fits those in Shaoxing: men who "tried to make their fortune by occupying a market town or a rich village and carving out a territory."<sup>72</sup> Before the occupation, Hunanese native Tan Kun headed Shaoxing's salt-smuggling police. When the Japanese took the city, he went to Ma'an township, a few miles northeast of the county seat, bringing salt police and local toughs into the Tan Kun anti-Japanese guerrilla unit. At the same time, beggar Lou Hongmao became involved with a gang of toughs at Meishan, north of the city. His fortuitous robbery of boats in the entourage of fleeing Administrative Inspector Xing brought him both cash and a cache of weapons which became the initial arms for his Meishan unit, the goal of which was to "resist Japan and save the nation." Attracting military desert-

ers and roving braves, he joined Tan Kun, demanding from rich and poor alike contributions of money and rice. Both men came to the attention of Japanese units in the city. One co-opted Tan by offering weapons and making him part of the “peace army.” Another unit regarded Lou, who also maintained a city base, as more powerful. They gave him an official military position as commander of the South Bank [of the Qiantang River] Self-Defense Battalion. Both Lou and Tan, who styled themselves majors-general, had ambitions beyond petty military lords. Lou set up a government structure to challenge Feng’s collaborationist regime, focusing especially on establishing district offices and tax collection bureaus.

Tan’s career took another tack and reveals the unexpected contours of collaboration in the complex military arena, underscoring Chen’s contention that “there is no single factor that enables us to predict the political alignment of parochial interests.”<sup>73</sup> Tan became something of a triple agent, turning the Ma’an township middle school into the private Jingshui Higher Middle School to serve as a front for a communications unit linking the Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei regimes. The school was later moved into Shaoxing with Tan’s private secretary serving as principal; the provincial government noted its operations at least into mid-1943.<sup>74</sup> Ceng Shouchang, editor of the *Shaoxing Minguo Ribao* (Shaoxing Nationalist Daily), called it an intermediary structure for communications between the front lines and the rear occupied areas, and noted that its establishment and operation received the implicit agreement of the Japanese.<sup>75</sup> Such cooperation between collaborators on the one hand and Guomintang forces and government on the other was not exceptional. Chen and Wou note similar collusion in Jiangsu, Anhui, and Henan.<sup>76</sup> Japanese complicity in the arrangement may, however, have been unusual.

Despite his links to all three military parties, Tan continued to be involved in struggles with resistance forces. From 1942 to the end of the war, most of the county was under Japanese occupation. Guomintang governmental authority was limited to Pingshui district, southeast of the county seat, and during the latter part of this period to only two of its townships.<sup>77</sup> Beyond Shaoxing city, the occupied county was a hotbed of disorder and random military skirmishes between Japanese, collaborationist, Guomintang, and, in the area northeast of the county seat, Communist forces. County bureaucrat Xu Suiqi not only noted the volatility of these areas but

also the collaborationists' fear of the Japanese.<sup>78</sup> This atmosphere easily gave rise to people like the chameleon-like Tan and others, who might begin their military leadership career fighting for one group and end it fighting for another or simply for themselves.

The most striking attribute of the military elites was not their opportunism, but rather the multiplicity of their identities, reflecting the fluidity and complexity of the military arena that stood in sharp contrast to the simpler scene in Shaoxing city. Whereas one might see the struggles in Shaoxing county as civil war, pitting Japanese and puppet troops against both the Guomindang and Communist troops, in reality there was no strong demarcation between the "sides": united fronts formed and disintegrated and formed again between forces that were presumably antagonistic.

The Japanese, with their troop strength in this area stretched thin, both needed and feared the parochially mobilized forces. They offered titles, weapons, and ammunition to both the sophisticated and the thuggish to entice them to join the cause. Such cooptation gives evidence of the tense, uneasy situation in which the Japanese soldiers found themselves.

#### THE POSTWAR TREATMENT OF COLLABORATORS

The approach in Shaoxing toward collaborators in the immediate aftermath of the war was to make them scapegoats. Like the post-Cultural Revolution era which blamed all evil on the Gang of Four, Shaoxing had its Four Harms (*sihai*). When the Guomindang government returned to the city in September 1945, they were made the object of street demonstrations. The greatest harm was the treason of Feng Xuzhou. The charges? He presided over an administration that was corrupt, that sponsored prostitution, gambling, and opium smoking at a time when starvation was filling the streets with corpses; he was shameless in fawning over and currying favor with the Japanese overlords; he arrogated power to himself and his circle; and he pulled innocent people into his treasonous schemes. The other "harms" were opium, represented by Feng's second-in-command, Tao Zhongan; gambling, represented by Zhu Jinsheng, Voluntary Police organizer in the late 1930s, and involved in Japanese intelligence; and prostitution, represented by Shi Menghong, about whom there is no information. Of these, we know only Feng's fate.

Cursed by his children and denounced by his people, Feng was arrested by the county government and sent to a prison in Hangzhou where he died shortly thereafter.

In contrast to Feng, the military puppets got off scot-free during the Guomindang years (1945–49). Li Yulin, extorter and kidnapper, was arrested by the county government but then released on the order of the Guomindang regime with the rationale that although he had collaborated, he had, more importantly, been active in the anti-Communist struggle. None of the other military collaborators were even touched by the government. They had to wait until the establishment of the People's Republic to be charged and punished. Reportedly Li along with Tan Kun and Lou Hongmao were punished in 1951, though the nature of their punishment is not disclosed. Others who had worked in notable positions with the Japanese secret police were executed or imprisoned in the 1950–53 period.<sup>79</sup> Perhaps the fact that some of them had worked with the Guomindang in the fluid conditions of the countryside caused hesitancy about prosecuting them. Certainly the non-prosecution underscores the Guomindang's considerable tolerance of collaboration at this level.<sup>80</sup>

This absence of moral fervor was also illustrated by the election of collaborators to various positions in the late 1940s. At least two—Chen Yueyun, Guomindang operative who shared information with collaborators, and Jin Bingyan, collaborationist ward head—were elected in 1946 to the county assembly. Furthermore, the native banks and their managers who benefited from collaboration were not shunned or judged after the war. The first native bank opened fully under Feng's patronage during the occupation was managed by Ni Xufan, who was elected to the county assembly in 1947 and to the Chamber of Commerce Board of Directors in 1948.<sup>81</sup> Native banks throughout Zhejiang remained stronger than modern-style banks, and retained their local reputation, which made them in the postwar years the major source of monies for business and industry. In 1946, 70 percent of the reserves in provincial financial institutions were in modern banks with only 30 percent in native banks; but in Shaoxing slightly over half of the reserve funds were in native banks. More tellingly, of all the loans from financial institutions in the province, 65 percent came from modern banks in Shaoxing while 71 percent came from native banks.<sup>82</sup> In short, the native banks experienced no apparent repercussions from their collaboration.

## CONCLUSION

Shaoxing residents were under the rule of the Japanese and their collaborators from April 1941 to September 1945. During that time there was only one episode of violent resistance to Feng's government: in March 1945, a bomb was detonated in a county government building, killing several dozen people.<sup>83</sup> The general "peace" in the city for almost four and a half years held despite the fact that the number of Japanese troops was few and that, according to 1944 provincial government statistics, the number of policemen in Shaoxing was much lower than in any comparable occupied Zhejiang city: 230 in Shaoxing compared to 590 in Jiaking, 456 in Wuxing, and 440 in Jiaohan.<sup>84</sup> Why were the Shaoxing residents so seemingly ready to accept occupation? Why were so many elites willing to collaborate?

Although there is no way to answer these questions definitively, I would argue that much of the reason lies in the political, economic, and social context of the years preceding the occupation. The fears of disorder wrought by terrorizing hoodlum gangs, the seemingly insoluble provisioning problems, and (for the elites) the labor unrest of the tinfoil workers were strong enough for city elites to want to end any potentially destabilizing situation as quickly as possible. The economic progress and successful money-making of the pre-occupation period were threatened by instability; business and industry would have favored a rapid return to order after the initial brutality of the takeover. In addition, the trend towards increasingly authoritarian county government, without the use of additional police and of Special Services organs, likely made the Japanese collaborationist control seem less a shift in kind than of degree. In contrast to the corruption and incompetence of the Guomindang government and its humiliating flight, Feng Xuzhou, a well-regarded city leader for almost two decades, offered leadership marked by capability and at least some measure of respectability; and he invited into his government reputable men from his family, his personal and business networks, and his Shaoxing petit bourgeois clients. Finally, for the large number of native bank figures who became involved in Feng's government, the desire to reassert themselves as chief financial institutions while the modern-style banks had been temporarily shut down must have been a powerful motive attracting bankers to the regime.

The individual decisions to collaborate came for many different reasons and the nature of collaboration varied widely. Werner Rings, in his *Life with*

*the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler's Europe, 1939–1945*, posits certain collaborator types.<sup>85</sup> The history of the Shaoxing occupation reveals them all. The unconditional collaborators, spies, and those who served directly in Japanese military organs supported the occupying power in every way. The largest number of citizens in general and groups like principals and teachers at so-called collaborator schools were neutral collaborators—those who decided that life must continue, who were determined to survive the war, and who would conform in whatever way was necessary. Two other collaborator types point to the reality that collaboration and resistance, “far from being irreconcilable opposites, were as close as two sides of the same coin.”<sup>86</sup> Feng and his regime and the mobilizers of military units were conditional collaborators. Feng’s regime was conditional in its collaboration with the Japanese through maintaining its own separate institutions, making its own choice of bureaucrats, and occasionally standing against the Japanese for a particular Chinese interest. The very fluidity of military loyalty and the connections between Japanese, puppet, Guomindang, and Communist forces clearly underscored the conditionality of military mobilizers’ collaboration. In the military arena, collaboration could turn into resistance the next day. Tactical collaborators, in contrast, performed public service acts that facilitated the workings of society or the economy under the regime, the clearest example being the elite relief work for refugee children.

Finally, an analysis of collaboration in Shaoxing points to a number of significant elements in considering the war period. The Shaoxing occupation, like Communist mobilization in a particular Henan village or Guomindang resistance in a specific Jiangsu township, must be analyzed in the dynamics of its particular context to understand as fully as possible its potential meanings. Even though the collaborationist government was a new regime inserted into the locality by the Japanese, it grew out of and was marked by the social, political, and economic developments and dynamics of the prewar years. Collaboration was not necessarily summed up by the word *betrayal*; resistance did not necessarily connote nationalism. The context helps us evaluate the nature and meaning of collaboration and resistance wherever it occurred. In that vein, we must go beyond a simple moral interpretation of resistance and collaboration. If most of the key Shaoxing elites were not sufficiently motivated by national commitment and patriotism, then we must look elsewhere for an explanation of their choices. People made decisions on the basis of their past experiences relating to family, net-

work, and self-interest. Only these mundane realities can provide some measure of the dynamics of the decision to collaborate or resist.

Finally, this study raises questions about nationalism in Chinese localities. Both flight and collaboration—the choices confronting most of the key Shaoxing political and social elites—are acts that essentially repudiate the nation and its claims for allegiance. Apart from scapegoating Feng, none of these nation-repudiating acts was condemned in the last half-decade of Guomindang rule. Far from it: collaborators were not tried, and, together with those who had fled and now returned, they were elected to leadership positions and continued to amass wealth. Even if we admit that many economic elites had chafed under the anti-Japanese protests and boycotts of the prewar years, what had happened to the nationalism of this medium-sized city in Zhejiang's core?

One possibility is that nationalism had not taken as deep or widespread root, had not blossomed into as fervent a patriotism, as we have come to believe. Nationalism was a force born so comparatively recently even in core zone cities. Have we overestimated what has come to be seen as its determinative role in the country as a whole during the early twentieth century? During the crisis of takeover and occupation, most of the Shaoxing elites refrained from acting in the name of the nation. How instead did they identify themselves? Judged by their actions, those who fled placed the main priority on themselves and their personal interests; their chosen identity in time of crisis, their individual person. Many of the military collaborators also saw themselves as individual players whose potential identities were as unlimited as their ambitions. Other collaborators saw their identities in collectives and communities. Feng saw himself as part of family, business empire, and Shaoxing city; while gentry-types Wang Ziyu and Shen Fusheng saw themselves as part of Shaoxing city, moving back to native place to initiate relief activities. These communities were bounded by the traditional loyalties of kinship, social and business networks, and native place. Feng Xuzhou was thus a shield not for nation but for native place and personal networks. Skinner's picture of local society turning inward as its "external environment" became more threatening seems to portray the Shaoxing elite response to war and occupation.<sup>87</sup> As people grappled with the often brutal realities, and as the community turned inward, it is not so much that nationalism was absent or tenuous as that it was temporarily subordinated to an array of more primordial loyalties and identities.

## Resistance in Collaboration: Chinese Cinema in Occupied Shanghai, 1941–1945

POSHEK FU

Since the end of World War II, popular and academic images of the human condition in occupied China have been framed by a discourse of moral binarism. It was *either* patriotic resistance *or* traitorous collaboration. With this underlying assumption, scholarship became highly politicized. The study of occupied areas meant the identification of national heroes or villains. It became enmeshed, perhaps unknowingly, with the intricate postwar Chinese politics of identity formation and nation-building.

In recent years, new scholarship has begun to challenge this moralizing, nationalistic representation of the occupation. The new notion of ambiguity intervenes to question the either/or, hero-villain polarity, disengaging study of the occupation experience from the nationalist discursive control. By shifting attention to the “grey zone” of moral and political ambiguity inherent in wartime situations,<sup>1</sup> a different horizon of research agendas opens up. Foremost among them are the reevaluation of competing government policies, political behaviors, and motives of dominant elites,<sup>2</sup> and, perhaps more significantly because of the overwhelming emphasis hitherto on political fig-

ures and military events of the wartime experience, the remapping of the cultural practices and moral landscape of occupied life.<sup>3</sup>

This essay aims to combine these political and cultural approaches in exploring the cultural politics surrounding Chinese cinema in occupied China. Shanghai had been the financial and cultural center of Republican China, and its film production had dominated the urban entertainment business across the country. After the onset of the Pacific War in December 1941, Japan occupied the entire city of Shanghai.<sup>4</sup> Shanghai cinema continued operation under Japanese control and was, for the first time in its history, reorganized into one single production-distribution unit. During these four years, it turned out a total of over 200 feature-length films, some of which were immensely popular not only in the occupied regions along the coast but also in the interior under both Nationalist and Communist rule. Although most of the films produced in this period would seem to be entertainment fare of no overt propagandistic concern, the whole cinematic apparatus has been condemned as “traitorous,” and was peripheralized, if not altogether excluded, in both the official propaganda and scholarly studies of the history of Chinese cinema and wartime culture.

Indeed, there had been very little filmic and documentary evidence available for rewriting the history of occupied cinema. But, along with the tremendous political and economic changes in the last two decades, Chinese governments in Beijing and Taipei are beginning to open up archives for academic research. Based on some of these newly available materials, this essay aims to challenge the nationalist representation of wartime Shanghai film as the traitorous “other,” a conclusion derived from a reductionist identification of institutional space with the location of political loyalty. I would argue that although the Shanghai cinema constituted an institutional part of the occupying power, it did not articulate an ideological position to legitimate that power. On the contrary, by structuring its production policy around entertainment, rather than war-related themes, the Shanghai cinema provided the subjects of the occupied area a cultural space in which they could escape collectively inside the darkness of a venue from the day-to-day demands of economic survival and political surveillance, if only fleetingly. The ambiguity of the occupied film culture lies in a collision of resistance and collaboration within an institutional space. A reconstruction of the occupied cinema thus needs to take this ambiguous situation into account.

## I

From the termination of Nationalist resistance in Shanghai on November 12, 1937, until the outbreak of the Pacific War on December 8, 1941, the Foreign Concessions remained outside Japanese control. On the day of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the China Expeditionary Army moved into the foreign areas of Shanghai. The whole of the city was now under Japanese occupation. Japan justified its actions in the ideology of the “New East Asia Order,” proclaiming the “liberation” of the “sinful” city from the yoke of Western imperialism. All non-Axis citizens became “enemies” and were eventually packed off to the concentration camps in the suburbs while their properties were placed under “military control.” Also, in order to destroy the “enemy culture,” which was supposed to have generally infected Shanghai (along with East Asia) with egotism and moral decadence, the Japanese imposed a clampdown on all major mass media. Hence, in the first year of occupation, only a few Japanese-sponsored magazines and newspapers (most notably *Xin Shenbao*: New Shanghai News) remained in circulation.

But in order to create a sense of normality and to maintain Shanghai’s cosmopolitan flavor as possibly a way to show Japan’s continuing commitment to modernity, the Japanese decided to allow the city’s cinema, which was known at the time as the “Hollywood of the East,” to continue operation. A smooth transition required cooperation from the local studio executives. For cooptation and recruitment, the Japanese Army Press Bureau turned to Kawakita Nagamasa. Coming from an old China hand family, Kawakita was educated in Beijing University in the 1920s and spoke fluent Chinese. A well-connected and cosmopolitan entrepreneur, he ran a successful business importing European films to Japan before the war. In 1939 he was enlisted by the Central Expeditionary Army to set up a national policy (*kokusaku*) company, China Movie Co. (*Zhonghua dianying gongsi*, or Zhongdian), in Shanghai to make Japanese propaganda shorts as well as to control film distribution in the occupied areas of Central China. Kawakita accepted the offer after the army promised him “autonomy” in his “business dealings.” Through arranging distribution of Chinese films, he became friendly with major figures of the Shanghai motion picture business.<sup>5</sup>

On December 8, 1941, Kawakita received the Press Bureau’s instruction to visit the three major Shanghai film studios: Xinhua (New China), Yihua

(Chinese Arts) and Guohua (China). He tried to convince the studio heads that the army hoped to see the motion picture business continue after the occupation. Japan, he promised, would guarantee them a continued supply of production materials, namely raw filmstocks and chemicals, which had been dependent entirely on Western suppliers, and a high degree of production autonomy as long as they agreed to stay in the city.<sup>6</sup> He then met with all the distributors and exhibitors of Hollywood films in Shanghai. He told them the army's decision: "Since Shanghai is a cosmopolitan city, there are many people who have nothing to do with the war. In order not to deprive them of their entertainment, we will continue to show British and American movies as long as they are inspected by us." However, as part of the "enemy culture," no new films were to be imported and all copies currently in stock had to be placed under Zhongdian's control. The largest distributor, the American-owned Asia Cinema Company, which ran five plush first-run cinemas in the city, was to become a part of Zhongdian. Following this agreement, all major Shanghai cinemas opened the next day.<sup>7</sup>

As Kawakita greatly expanded Zhongdian's exhibition circuit, he made plans to restructure the production industry. However, in the wake of their military victories in the Pacific, Japanese leaders were ever more convinced of Japan's invincibility and racial superiority. Japan's mission was to rule and guide the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Thus they were privileged by imperial policy to reorganize the freewheeling Shanghai cinema into propaganda machinery for the New Order. But Kawakita, in contrast, opted for cooperation—not domination—because he was concerned that if the reorganization went too far all the major stars and directors would flee to the unoccupied interior in order not to "become traitors." Trying to create instead what he called a "cinema of the Chinese, by the Chinese, and for the Chinese" (*Chugokujin no Chugokujin ni yoru Chugokujin no tame no eiga*), a phraseology that betrayed his cosmopolitan outlook, he proceeded to merge all the studios into one organization, which would become in effect part of Zhongdian and would enjoy "a high degree of production autonomy."<sup>8</sup>

For the plan to succeed Kawakita needed support from the Chinese filmmakers. The filmmaker he first tried to recruit was his business associate Zhang Shankun, the most influential figure in wartime Shanghai cinema. Born in 1905, Zhang was the first Chinese film producer systematically deploying modern publicity techniques to market and package motion pic-

tures. In fact he was known in the industry as the “king of tricks” (*xuetou dawang*). A man of tremendous energy and remarkable ambition, Zhang ran the largest and best-equipped studio (Xinhua Film Company) in the city before the complete occupation. His visibility made him a ready target for Japanese recruitment efforts. Since 1938 Zhang had tactfully refused several Japanese overtures. In 1939 Kawakita met secretly with him in Shanghai. At that meeting, according to Shimizu Akira, Kawakita was able to persuade Zhang to work with him by confiding to Zhang in fluent Chinese that he would most likely be the only Japanese to truly understand and genuinely sympathize with the Chinese cause. To work with him could only serve the nationalist interests of Chinese cinema amidst the political uncertainty of wartime Shanghai. Zhang then agreed, despite the possible risk of political scandal for using Zhongdian to market Xinhua products in the occupied areas of Central China. All other studios followed suit, thereby expanding the small Shanghai film market. Business ties thus brought Zhang into a close relationship with Kawakita, who now again sought his cooperation in reorganizing the occupied film industry. Zhang was offered a top position in the new company.<sup>9</sup>

## II

Again Zhang agreed to cooperate. This decision sparked off a passionate debate which has lasted since then surrounding the nature and meaning of his choice: Was Zhang a *hanjian*, a traitor?<sup>10</sup> For his many critics, Zhang was unquestionably a collaborator who betrayed the ancestral land for personal gain (*maiguo qiurong*). On the other hand, echoing the well-known rhetoric of Wang Jingwei or Zhu Pu or Wen Zaidao, Zhang's friends defended his cooperation as a heroic act of self-sacrifice, by which he meant to save the Chinese cinema from Japanese destruction and “shield” all Shanghai studio employees from the dangers of unemployment and dislocation.<sup>11</sup>

Typifying the moralizing representation of the occupation experience, this debate has oversimplified moral choices under an extreme situation into a clear-cut *either/or* dichotomy. Zhang's choice was actually far more dubious and ambiguous. It consisted of both noble and base, idealistic and opportunistic motivations. By the time Kawakita approached him in early 1942, Zhang had probably already made up his mind that so long as he did

not flee to the interior where the small film industry was both technologically backward and firmly controlled by the Chongqing government, a certain degree of cooperation with the Japanese was inevitable in order to protect his family and property. Since Kawakita had been demonstrably sympathetic to the Chinese cause and understanding in their work relations, Zhang naturally took his promise of production autonomy seriously. A film businessman of tremendous ambition and vision, he also saw cooperation with Kawakita as a rare opportunity to expand his empire through reorganizing the occupied cinema. His dream of becoming the “Number One” of the industry, which had been thwarted by severe business competition since he started Xinhua in 1934, could now be realized by his agreeing to run the new company, under Japanese rule.

At the same time, Zhang was committed to protecting the Chinese cinema, not only because of his well-known passion for moviemaking, but also, in the manner typical of a Confucian patriarch, because of his strong sense of “responsibility” towards his staff who constituted the majority of studio employees in wartime Shanghai. He was painfully aware of the enormous risk and possible price involved in accepting Kawakita’s offer. The reputation of a patriotic and thus respectable filmmaker that he had been slowly building since the 1930s was at stake. In order to minimize the risk as well as mollify his own conscience, Zhang sought “understanding” or “forgiveness” (*liangjie*) from the Nationalist government in Chongqing. He kept close contact with the underground Guomindang leaders of both the *Juntong* (Military Intelligence) and *Zhongtong* (Central, i.e., Party, Intelligence) factions. Through them he was in touch with top party officials in Chongqing (i.e., Dai Li) and the Third War Zone (under General Gu Zhutong). In addition, Zhang’s long-term connection with Green Gang boss Huang Jinrong, who had been protecting his business interests, put him in touch with pro-Nationalist guerrilla forces in Central China.<sup>12</sup> Apart from considering this multiplicity of conflicting motivations, the question of whether Zhang was a *hanjian*, or, more broadly, to what extent the occupation cinema was traitorous, has to be approached in the specific context of what its leaders did in relation to the military interests of the occupying power.

In April 1942 Zhang made arrangements to bring together the eleven Shanghai film companies to form *Zhonghua lianhe zhipian gufen gongsi* (China United Film Company Ltd., or Zhonglian), and became its chief executive officer (CEO). Aimed at centralizing control over the city’s pro-

duction business, Zhonglian was a semiofficial organization, with half of its starting capital of CRB (Central Reserve Bank) \$3,000,000 coming from Xinhua, Yihua, and Guohua, and the other half from Zhongdian.<sup>13</sup> All of the former studio owners were given top positions in the new company, which was presided over, nominally, by the Nanjing government “playboy,” the Foreign Minister Chu Minyi. Real power, however, rested with the vice-president, Kawakita.

Zhonglian was the production arm of Zhongdian, with exclusive distribution rights in areas under the “sovereignty” of the Nanjing regime. Aside from Zhonglian, which was controlled and staffed by Chinese and was designed for making “entertainment” films, Zhongdian also managed the Cultural Film (*Wenhua pian*) Studio, a separate unit run by a Japanese staff and devoted to propaganda films and documentary shorts.<sup>14</sup> Zhonglian owned five studios and commanded a staff of 1,300.<sup>15</sup> With a few exceptions, it put on its payroll practically all the film people remaining in Shanghai. They included the superstars Chen Yunshang, Yuan Meiyun, Zhou Xuan, Chen Yanyan, and Liu Qiong, and such eminent directors as Bu Wancang, Maxu Weibang, and Zhu Shilin. It is thus no exaggeration for Shimizu Akira to call the cast of Zhonglian a “dream team” of the Chinese cinema.<sup>16</sup> Zhang’s charming persuasiveness and his stature in the film industry (in fact, many of the superstars including Chen Yunshang were his protégés)<sup>17</sup> explains this remarkable turnout only in part. Also critical was the need for economic survival. If they decided to stay in Shanghai, actors and directors needed paychecks to put food on the table and clothes in the closet. What other jobs could they find?<sup>18</sup> In fact, not a few filmmakers wondered aloud: was filming any more “traitorous” than, say, removing garbage or fighting fires as a profession?<sup>19</sup> Of course, whether there was a difference depends on the extent to which their films participated, as cultural and social practices, in the legitimizing discourse of the enemy, a question we will turn to shortly.

At the same time, as a result of his working relations with clandestine Guomindang (GMD) agents, Zhang was also able to invoke their authority for staff recruitment. This was effective. According to various sources, before the founding of Zhonglian, Zhang called a secret meeting at his home between Jiang Bocheng, the head of the Shanghai Nationalist operation, and quite a few uncommitted filmmakers. In the meeting, Jiang urged everyone there to join the new company in order to “wrest control of the Shanghai cinema into our hands, and avoid what the [Japanese-controlled]

Manchurian Cinema Association has done in Manzhouguo.” This was possible because, he continued, “Zhang Shankun has struck a secret deal with the Japanese [specifically Kawakita Nagamasa], who have promised him production autonomy. He is our man.” This confirmation helped do away with many of the actors’ and directors’ political suspicions.<sup>20</sup> In fact, throughout the occupation, secret meetings were regularly held between Jiang (or sometimes Wu Shaoshu), and Zhang and his close associates. Zhang would submit preproduction scripts and filming plans to Chongqing for approval and would receive instructions relayed to him by the local GMD leaders.<sup>21</sup>

### III

No sooner had Zhonglian begun operation than it experienced financial difficulties. The trouble arose mainly from rising production costs due to rampant inflation, which raised the shooting cost of a movie from CRB \$100,000 in 1940 to a minimum of \$300,000 in 1942.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, after deducting commissions to all the exhibitors, including Zhongdian and other Chinese theater owners, and paying entertainment taxes to the municipal government, Zhonglian grossed only one quarter of the total income from each picture it made.<sup>23</sup> To solve its financial problem, Zhonglian went public in August 1942. The result was impressive. While the former Guohua owners sold all of their shares and bailed out of the company for both personal and political reasons, Zhonglian drew support from such financial stalwarts in Shanghai as the Wing On (Yungan) Company, Bank of China, and Bank of Communications. Zhonglian had to increase its board of directors to include these new investors (including Wing On owner Guo Shun and banker Percy Zhu) who were interested mainly in profits, not politics.<sup>24</sup>

The tremendous enthusiasm of these investors was a direct response to Zhonglian’s entertainment orientation and market potential. As evidenced in its six opening films, all of them tragic romances, such as *Hudie furen* (Madame Butterfly, dir. Li Pingqian), *Mudanhua xia* (Under the Peony, dir. Bu Wancang), and *Yan Guilai* (Return of the Swallow, dir. Zhang Shichuan), Zhonglian did not appear to have deviated from the industry’s pre-1941 stress on entertainment values.<sup>25</sup> The concentration of film talent, for the first time in the history of Chinese cinema, gave the Shanghai cinema a

slight edge over Hollywood movies which, after the banning of foreign imports in 1941, were reduced to a limited stock of old copies for exhibition.

In fact, Hollywood films were soon to disappear. In January 1943 the Nanjing government officially declared war on the Allies. Seeking to gain more political autonomy from Japan, it began to take measures to strengthen its military and ideological control by trying to turn Central China into a “bastion” of the “Greater East Asia Order.”<sup>26</sup> To show its opposition to Western imperialism, the regime prohibited showing of Hollywood movies. As a consequence, Zhonglian had the Central China market all to itself. Japanese and Manchurian films had been exhibited in the occupied areas since the 1930s, but, due to the lack of local interest, their audiences were mainly Japanese. Even after 1942, when Zhonglian turned one of the best cinemas in town, Roxy (Dahua), into an exclusive venue for Japanese films, few Chinese went.<sup>27</sup>

In order to meet growing demand, Zhonglian had to increase its output from the current three to at least six films each month. At the same time, however, due to the wartime scarcity of chemicals in Japan, the Army Press Bureau threatened to reduce its supply of Fuji negatives.<sup>28</sup> This threat also resulted from the occupying power’s displeasure with the production policy of Zhonglian. Over two-thirds of its twenty-four films released between April and December 1942, including the six opening romances, were of popular genres, mainly tragic romances.<sup>29</sup> As the writer Zhang Ailing wrote in one of her film reviews for the German magazine *XXth Century*: “A summary of recent Chinese film productions shows that they are practically all on the subject of love, love which leads to respectable marriages. This is a topic that has also monopolized the older fields of Chinese entertainment since time immemorial.”<sup>30</sup>

Thus, instead of inspiring audiences with the “New East Asian Order,” and educating them in the “true nature” of the Greater East Asia War, these popular films only indulged them in the tradition of Chinese entertainment. All the Zhonglian films were, therefore, ideologically irrelevant. Moreover, in contrast to Japanese propaganda about “liberating” the Chinese cinema from servitude to “Anglo-American cultural imperialism,” the Shanghai screen continued to be imbued with Hollywood images and ideas. The biggest hits of 1942 and 1943 stand as examples: *Huanghua xudu* (A Waste of the Best of Times) by Chen Yanyan was adapted from Robert Stevenson’s *Back Street* (1941); *Bingdilian* (Two-stalked Lotus) by Gu Lanjun was based

on George Cukor's *A Woman's Face* (1941); and *Taoli zheng chun* (Struggle for Spring) by Chen Yunshang originated in Edmund Goulding's *The Great Lie* (1941).<sup>31</sup>

Under pressure, Zhonglian reorganized in early 1943. The main effect of the reorganization seems to have been the creation of a cost-effective and modernized production system along Hollywood lines. Before the reorganization, Zhonglian was run, like all pre-1941 Chinese film studios, according to a director-centered system. All decisions about film production and budgeting were made by individual directors who required only final approval from Zhang. In his turn, Zhang would consult with Kawakita. As a result, there were many instances of financial abuse and personnel conflict, as well as overlap and waste of resources.

Now, Zhang had to share his executive power with three committees (Publicity, Materials, and Design), each of which was made up of both top Zhonglian and Zhongdian executives. With local initiatives being stressed, studio heads worked with their directors to prepare detailed budgets and shooting scripts for each film to be made. Once executive approval was given, all studios then had to follow the plan closely and limit shooting time to one month for each film, with 12,000 feet of negatives the maximum supply. The five studios were also encouraged to compete with each other for the company's limited pool of funds and resources, rather than simply follow Zhang's instructions as before.<sup>32</sup>

This reorganization had little effect on the production line of Zhonglian, due to Kawakita's "protection." Kawakita placed Ishikawa Toshishige and Hozumi Tsuneo, his top aides at Zhongdian, in the three new committees, to ensure that Zhang (who headed the Promotion Committee) would continue to exert control over film production. For his consistent support of Chinese cinema, Zhang's friends and defenders have heaped hagiographic praises on Kawakita. There is no doubt that Kawakita was a cosmopolitan film businessman who was sympathetic toward the Chinese. But he also had political reasons to be "protective" of Zhonglian. In fact, in 1938, he was one of the earliest Japanese pioneers to try to open a film market in China. He went to Changchun, Manchuria, to make a film about "Peace" in East Asia, which, like all the later Manzhouguo-produced films, was a financial disaster. No Chinese came to see it when it opened in Beijing and Tianjin.<sup>33</sup> Kawakita was convinced thereafter that Chinese audiences in occupied regions would accept only films made with local talent and with no Japanese

propaganda content. Without the cooperation of Zhang and his talented cast, it would thus be impossible to run an occupation cinema that was, in contrast to Japanese-sponsored film studios in Beijing and Manzhouguo, financially self-sufficient and artistically vibrant. Thus Kawakita insisted that a laissez-faire policy toward the Shanghai cinema be maintained.<sup>34</sup>

Under this policy, Zhonglian continued after the reorganization to churn out entertainment movies of no political relevance. Critics close to the Nanjing regime were indignant at its failure to realize the propagandistic power of moving images and to cleanse the Chinese cinema of Hollywood "pollution": "Among the 40 or more pictures produced by Zhonglian . . . eight out of ten are love tragedies limited to a tiny circle of individuals . . . and the few artistically accomplished films are mere parodies of Hollywood pictures!"<sup>35</sup> Zhang and several of his confidants at Zhonglian, notably directors Zhu Shilin and Bu Wancang, justified the entertainment orientation as an acceptance of necessity, that is, the audience's preference, referred to in the business as the "box office concern" (*shengyi yan*). Operating in an inflationary economy without government funding and without exhibition rights, these directors demanded to know what a film studio could do if the audiences did not want to pay to see "ideologically significant" films.<sup>36</sup> Although not intending to defend Zhonglian, Zhang Ailing articulated the logic of the argument that Zhang and his colleagues put forth, including a touch of biting irony: "Political topics are rarely favored because our private lives are already packed full of politics."<sup>37</sup>

By making only entertainment movies of no propagandistic relevance, Zhonglian was in effect making a political statement. The Shanghai film community cooperated with the enemy to the extent of keeping themselves as well as the Chinese cinema alive. And they lived to entertain Shanghai but not to propagandize for the New Order. Zhonglian's commercial orientation, thus, highlighted the ambiguity of art under authoritarian regimes: apolitical art can become political in a highly politicized situation. Indeed, in occupied Shanghai, entertainment film became an ambiguous site of passive defense against the Japanese attempt to politicize Chinese cinema.

This ambiguity was amply illustrated by one filming strategy Zhonglian deployed to resist making propaganda to legitimate the occupying power. In July 1942 the Japanese Army Press Bureau and Manzhouguo Cinema Association, along with North China Studio and Zhongdian, organized a Conference on Mainland Cinema. Aiming to strengthen unity between all the

Japanese-sponsored studios in China, meetings were held from July 16 to 31 in Changchun, Beijing, and Shanghai. In Shanghai, after a private screening of the Disney hit, *Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs*, and the Zhonglian romance, *Hen bu xiangfeng wei jia shi* (Regret for Not Meeting Each Other before Marriage; dir. Wang Yin 1943), the ultranationalist members of the conference denounced the political irrelevance of Shanghai cinema and called for a more concerted cinematic effort to project Pan-Asianism in the occupied regions. According to the Zhongdian manager Shimizu Akira, Kawakita was repeatedly taunted and threatened in the meeting.<sup>38</sup>

The Conference pressured Kawakita and Zhonglian to make a film with an anti-Anglo-American theme. They yielded to the pressure, but on the condition that the film be made in Shanghai and with a local cast. The result was the multimillion dollar, all-star cast *Wanshi liufang* (Eternity), a collaborative production with the Manzhouguo Cinema Association, which sent its superstar Li Xianglan (originally Yamaguchi Yoshiko) to the city for filming.<sup>39</sup> It was released in January 1943 to tremendous box-office success in the occupied area. Its theme song, *Maitang ge* (Come Buy Candies) by Li Xianglan, became an instant hit in the whole country.<sup>40</sup>

Directed by Zhu Shilin and Bu Wancang, and written by the venerable dramatist Zhou Yibai, *Eternity* takes as its narrative line the anti-Western, anti-opium campaign of the Qing Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu in 1839. As Li Xianglan and Huang Tianshi later testified, this was in fact a highly ambiguous theme that could be read as anti-Anglo-American imperialism or more broadly as antiforeign exploitation, the latter because the Japanese were widely known to be behind the rampant opium trafficking in occupied China.<sup>41</sup> The ambiguity was accentuated further by the narrative focus on the romantic triangle between Lin Zexu (Gao Zhanfei), his wife (Yuan Meiyun) and a virtuous girl Zhang Jingxian (Chen Yunshang). Zhang falls in love with the young Lin, who was then staying with her gentry family, but, typical of Chinese romantic melodrama, Lin mistakenly takes her show of affection as indecency. He marries Yuan instead. Humiliated and disgraced, Zhang vows to stay chaste. Inspired later by Lin's anti-opium cause, she devotes her life to rid China of the drug. For his part, Lin feels torn between his love for his virtuous wife and his guilt toward the chaste girl. The film ends with Lin Zexu's deep sorrow over Zhang's death in her fight against foreign invasion.

Except for a subplot unfolding the struggle of the singsong-girl Feng Gu

(Li Xianglan) to save her fiancé (Wang Yin) from drug addiction and debts, the film devotes little narrative space to exploring the anti-British stance of Lin Zexu or the anti-British battles in South China (which, incidentally, were the focus of Zhao Dan's historical spectacle *Opium War*, 1959). Thus by stressing romantic love within a politically ambiguous narrative, Zhonglian was able to escape making a public statement on behalf of the Japanese. This subtle and metaphorical strategy of filmic resistance was, according to various sources, most probably developed in conjunction with local GMD officials.<sup>42</sup>

#### IV

Apparently frustrated by Zhonglian's commercial orientation, the occupying force sought to reorganize the Shanghai screen once again. They closed Zhonglian and, in May 1943, integrated production, distribution, and exhibition under one corporation, *Zhonghua dianying lianhe gongsi* (China United Film Company; better known as Huaying). Huaying was a "Sino-Japanese joint government and merchant venture" (*Zhongri guanshang heban*) with a claimed operating capital of CRB \$75,000,000. Probably in order to improve the Nanjing regime's public image, Japan and Manzhouguo remained "minor" owners of Huaying, while the Chinese held a 60-percent share. Together with leading executives from Zhonglian and other Japanese-sponsored studios, all Zhonglian investors and Chinese cinema owners became members of Huaying's board of directors.<sup>43</sup>

Huaying made an average of three films a month for a total production between 1943 and August 1945 of about 100 films. It had a film crew and staff of over 3,000 (among whom 300 were Japanese) which, except for Chen Yunshang who retired after marriage, included all the directors and stars from Zhonglian. But unlike Zhonglian, Huaying was directly under the control of the Nanjing regime's Ministry of Propaganda. Its president was the Minister Lin Bosheng, and its three honorary directors were Chu Minyi, Zhou Fohai, and Shanghai Mayor Chen Gongbo. The CEO was Feng Jie, head of the Ministry's Shanghai branch. Huaying's various departments were also staffed by cadres of the Ministry.<sup>44</sup>

In the new company, Zhang became Associate CEO and production head, while Kawakita retained the vice-presidency, where real power rested.

But day-to-day operations, which included budget control, personnel decisions, and production planning, were now largely in the hands of Feng Jie, who had no previous experience in cinema. Huaying thus represented political control of culture, which was to be the reality of the post-1949 Chinese cinema. Huaying marked the first nationalization of Chinese cinema, with the intent being, however, to make it more subservient to Japanese interests. "At Zhonglian, I was responsible for production, budget allocation, the supply of film negatives as well as the approval of scenarios," Zhang commented on his loss of power at a meeting of Huaying staff. "Now there are not only special departments to make budget decisions, allocate film negatives and review scenarios, but production policy which used to be my jurisdiction is decided from above. I simply follow instructions. So I don't think I will make any more mistakes."<sup>45</sup>

But available evidence shows that Zhang exaggerated his loss of power. Certainly, in the organizational hierarchy of Huaying he had to cede much of his formal authority to Feng Jie, yet his commanding prestige as the "king" of the industry, his hobnobbing with senior Nanjing leaders like Zhou Fohai and Chen Gongbo (who were in factional conflict with Lin Bosheng), and the "protection" offered him by Kawakita, who remained at the helm of the occupation cinema, gave Zhang informal power that the Ministry of Propaganda could hardly afford to ignore. Indeed, Zhang and Feng Jie were in constant rivalry with each other throughout their Huaying tenure.<sup>46</sup>

Actually, Zhang's exaggeration of his loss of power may have been his strategy to avoid public identification as much as possible with Huaying. Since the new company was organizationally under the Nanjing government and most of its top executives were either Japanese or Nanjing officials, it carried the more obvious and obnoxious stigma of being a "traitorous" public organization. And the institutional space in which Zhang could maneuver and expand his power was all the more limited. Yet the choice he had made earlier to cooperate with the Japanese seems, probably, to have carried a force of its own to push him yet to another political compromise. After throwing in his lot with Zhonglian, it would have been arduous for him to build a movie empire anywhere else. Thus, his only option was to seek ways within the limited horizon of filmic possibilities to prove his patriotic commitment.

These possibilities lay largely in the financial problems of Huaying. To

survive an almost uncontrollable inflation, in which production costs skyrocketed from about CRB \$1,000,000 in 1943<sup>47</sup> to over \$10,000,000 in January 1945,<sup>48</sup> the giant Huaying<sup>49</sup> had to extend its market beyond Shanghai (where few could afford a first-run movie ticket, whose cost had risen from \$8 in late 1942 to \$60 in 1945) and the occupied areas in Central and South China. In 1942, Huaying captured the Hong Kong market after the Cantonese film industry there closed down in defiance against the Japanese occupation. But it failed to make further inroads into the vast Manchurian and North Chinese market, which was monopolized by the Manchurian Cinema Association. As for Southeast Asia, it became an insignificant market because of transportation problems and war disruptions after 1942. Thus, how was the company to continue operation without becoming a financial burden on the Nanjing regime, which was seriously underfunded, or on Japan, which was under enormous economic pressure because of the scarcity of war materials? The answer lay in ignoring the political needs of the occupying power, and giving full attention instead to “box office concerns.”

Thus, among the 36 movies released in 1943 by Huaying, as one film critic testified, only 25 percent were entertainment movies. The other 75 percent were billed as “social” films, but they were in fact “thematically confusing” and short of a well-defined pro-Japanese message.<sup>50</sup> In fact, a close reading of the scenarios of these films reveals that they were principally social and family melodramas, projecting not the vision of a Greater East Asia Order, but juxtaposing alternative ideological themes, including the Confucian virtues of a positive attitude toward life (Zhang Shichuan’s *Kuailie tianshi*: A Happy Angel), friendship (He Shaozhang’s *Chongfeng*: Reunion), and public service (Zhu Shilin’s *Di’erdai*: The Second Generation), as well as May Fourth notions of anti-feudalism (Yue Feng’s *Jiliu*: Torrent) and freedom of marriage (Zheng Xiaoqiu’s *Taohun*: Elopement). There were also adaptations made of Chinese classics (e.g., Bu Wancang’s *Honglou meng*: Story of the Stone).<sup>51</sup>

The entertainment trend became even more prominent in 1944. According to a Japanese writer, 70–80 percent of the 40 films exhibited that year were devoted to love triangles and family affairs.<sup>52</sup> And the few box-office hits in 1943–44, including Zhou Xuan’s *Yujia nu* (Fishergirl, dir. Bu Wancang) and Chen Juanjuan’s *Qubai qingtao* (Romantic Turmoils), were, as in Zhonglian’s time, boy-and-girl romances and family dramas. Moreover, despite the increasing propaganda efforts by the occupying power after 1942

to promote an anti-Western ideology, a pro-Nanjing Huaying scriptwriter lamented as late as 1945 that what he was told to do all day at his office was browse through old Hollywood film magazines and synopses for story concepts.<sup>53</sup>

But, under the watchful gaze of the Ministry of Propaganda, Huaying made two collaborative pictures with Japan. The first one was *Wanzi qianhong* (A Myriad of Colors). Directed by Fang Peilin in 1943, this was a lavish Hollywood-inspired romantic musical featuring the glamorous star Li Lihua and the Japanese Takarazuka dancers who toured Central China early that year to celebrate the Nanjing regime's declaration of war. The film, as Zhang Ailing reported, charmed audiences with its endless jokes and lovely numbers, although it may have disappointed some males who saw the star "show her famous [bare] legs only once."<sup>54</sup> It was a smash hit, but its romantic theme and entertainment value were far from what the Japanese wanted.

In March 1944 Huaying was pressured to make what was hailed in the press as the first truly Sino-Japanese joint production, a "watershed" in the history of the "Greater East Asian cinema." It was *Chunjiang yiheng* (Remorse in Shanghai). Begun in March 1944 and released in November, it was a huge-budget picture produced in cooperation with Great Japan Pictures (*Dai Nippon eiga kaisha*). The script was written in 1943 by a Japanese writer and was edited by the Huaying scriptwriter Tao Qin. The leading cast consisted of both Chinese and Japanese stars (Li Lihua, Yan Jun, Lu Yukun, and Banto Tsumasaburo). Co-directed by the young Yue Feng and Inagaki Hiroshi, it narrates three heroic, savior-like Japanese samurai seeking to deliver China from British exploitation during the 1860s. But the Taiping leader Li Xiucheng (Yan Jun), who represents beleaguered China, refuses to accept their "service" due to his Sinocentric arrogance and lack of foresight, and is defeated by the British army. Flagrantly pro-Japan, this film was far less ambiguous than *Eternity* in its unabashed projection of Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere ideology. *Remorse in Shanghai* was in effect a propaganda film, and its beautification of the Japanese war effort stigmatized and disgraced all Huaying people, especially its production crew. For example, Lu Yukun, forty years later, was still bitter and remorseful of his role in the film. He was incensed in particular by Zhang's loss of production autonomy.<sup>55</sup>

Probably as an attempt to limit the damage to his and other Huaying employees' reputation and to proclaim his nationalism, Zhang founded the

*Lianyi yanyi gongsi* (United Arts Performance Company) to stage patriotic drama. Drama was at the time less regulated and more heavily commercialized, and thus an important potential site of intellectual resistance in Shanghai. Managed by Zhang's chief aide at Huaying, Shen Tianyin, it staged several immensely popular costume dramas. The most famous among them was *Wen Tianxiang*, written by Wu Zuguang, which was a paean to the selfless idealism and anti-foreign heroism of the famous Song loyalist of that name. Supported with big money and performed by top actors, this patriotic drama sold to full houses for three months.<sup>56</sup> According to Tsuji Hisakazu, Zhang invited Kawakita to the premiere, at which the audience was so captivated by the patriotic performance that Kawakita said to his host, "We love our countries."<sup>57</sup>

Despite the above efforts, the horrendous rise in the cost of living in the last year of the war and the widespread fear of forthcoming retribution at the hands of the returning Chongqing regime generated an exodus of movie talents from Huaying.<sup>58</sup> At the same time, Huaying reduced its operations to survive the inflation.<sup>59</sup> The macro-political situation was equally bleak. Wang Jingwei died in Japan in November 1944, and with his death the factional rivalries within the Nanjing regime became ever more intense, paralyzing its administrative efficiency. Its attempts to legitimate the occupation failed. By May 1945 Germany had surrendered and U.S. B-29s had begun to appear over Shanghai. The days of the Nanjing regime were numbered.

Amidst this turmoil, in January 1945 Zhang was arrested by the Kempeitai. He was arrested because of his connection with the underground GMD boss Jiang Bocheng. In late 1944 the Japanese secret police arrested Jiang and found in his house telegrams between Zhang and Chongqing officials as well as many of the Huaying scripts. This evidence confirmed their suspicions as to the true identity and political allegiance of Zhang, who had resisted in varying ways their efforts to control and politicize the Shanghai cinema. Detained and tortured for some twenty-nine days, Zhang was freed only through the intervention of Kawakita (and perhaps also Zhou Fohai).<sup>60</sup>

A few months after his release, knowing that his film career had ended in Japanese Shanghai, Zhang fled to Chinese-held Tunxi in western Zhejiang. He expected to take advantage of his connections with Wu Shaoshu, the Tunxi GMD boss who formerly ran the underground Shanghai Party branch. But Wu had just left on a business trip to Chongqing and Zhang, presuming himself to be a part of the GMD Resistance, proceeded to tour

around this interior town with his entourage in their glamorous Shanghai style. The reaction of the local press was to vilify the “cultural traitor” (*wen-hua hanjian*) and demand his arrest. In the midst of great public outcry Zhang was arrested by the Chinese military police and he remained in custody until the end of the war.<sup>61</sup>

Zhang’s arrest by the Japanese, and then by the Chinese, shocked the Shanghai film world. Many stars and directors had left Huaying, and the much reduced company was now in a state of confusion and unease. Without the energy, creative vision, and connections of Zhang, Kawakita saw little hope for the occupation cinema. Huaying produced only a few more films before closing in August 1945, when Shanghai was liberated.<sup>62</sup>

V

This essay probes the moral binarism that has structured our perceptions and evaluations of the occupation experience. If we understand collaboration, or *hanjian*, as serving the interests of the foreign invaders, and resistance, or *kangRi*, as defending the national interest (although the nation has also become a contested site of partisan debate between Communists and Nationalists), the Shanghai cinema does not seem to fit into either of these moral-political categories. It was an institutional part of the Japanese propaganda machine, but by almost exclusively making entertainment films it resisted legitimating the occupying power. It did not participate in the legitimizing discourse of the occupation, yet it did contribute to the normalization of the banality of occupied life. At the same time, like many of the Zhonglian and Huaying stars, Zhang Shankun chose to cooperate with the enemy from a cacophony of disparate motives and intentions. He hobnobbed with the occupying force, he enjoyed his power and glamor, and he expanded his movie empire, but he did not serve the occupiers’ political interests. He made connections with individual GMD officials and sought counsel and approval from Chongqing for his production decisions, but he was not directly engaged in Shanghai’s resistance movement, either military or intellectual. The double imprisonment by the Japanese Kempeitai and by the Chinese military police was thus emblematic of his mixture of idealism and opportunism, *passive collaboration* and *indirect resistance*.

It is time now indeed to transcend the either/or mode of perception in

understanding and judging occupation experiences. These experiences were too fluid, disparate, heterogeneous, and contradictory to be subsumed into a clear-cut and ready-made formula of moral polarity. Instead, the occupation experience might be approached as a *both/and, in-between* situation. In the case of Zhang and the Shanghai cinema, there was resistance in collaboration. In other cases, we may discover collaboration in resistance. The culture, politics and social formation of occupied China demands to be rewritten in a new conceptual framework that is attuned to the subtlety and multiplicity of the human condition in an extreme situation.

PART FOUR

The Hinterland:  
Collaboration, Resistance, and Anarchy



## The War Within a War: A Case Study of a County on the North China Plain

PETER J. SEYBOLT

This essay is a study of a single county, Neihuang, in northern Henan Province. Its conclusions are drawn from the experience of that county alone, but the author suggests that those conclusions might well have much broader applicability and invites other researchers to treat them as hypotheses to be tested elsewhere.

The fiftieth anniversary of the end of War of Resistance against Japan was celebrated in China with the publication of more than fifty books and dozens of journal articles examining the war period. These works cover a variety of topics, but three themes predominate: Japanese aggression and brutality; sacrifices and suffering of the Chinese people; and united, heroic resistance against Japan, especially that led by the communists. This study of Neihuang County bears out the analysis implicit in these themes—the Japanese were indeed aggressive and brutal; Chinese citizens of Neihuang suffered terrible loss of life and property; and there are many documented cases of resistance and heroism. But that is not the whole story. Certain other themes are neglected in these recently published works. One of them is the principal argument of this essay: During the eight-year period of the

war, most of the fighting in Neihuang was between contending Chinese forces, not between Chinese and Japanese. Chinese forces did fight the Japanese Imperial Army on several occasions, but those engagements were a small percentage of the total number of battles fought during the war; and even in battles between Chinese and Japanese forces, many—usually most—of the participants on the Japanese side were Chinese collaborators. The recognition of widespread collaboration, while important to the argument I am presenting, is only part of it. Many of the battles fought among Chinese had little to do with collaboration or resistance. They were struggles for power and economic spoils that pit central authorities against local authorities, local authorities against each other, bandits against merchants and landlords, secret societies against bandits, Guomintang members against Communists, and so on.

The causes of so much fighting among Chinese during a period of warfare against a foreign power are many and complex, but underlying all of them is a single comprehensive cause: The disunity and lack of order that followed the end of the Qing dynasty still prevailed in Neihuang at the time of the Japanese invasion. The Guomintang appeared to be in the process of restoring unity and order in the mid-1930s, but the fragile control edifice they had constructed quickly collapsed before the Japanese had even arrived, and the welter of forces that had vied for political and economic dominance during the post-Qing warlord period reemerged in full force. In other words, there was a power vacuum in Neihuang that had been exacerbated, but not caused, by war with a foreign power. The struggle to fill that vacuum had begun before the Japanese invasion, and it continued after the Japanese left. Seen in the perspective of this long-term struggle, the war with Japan could be considered an important component of a larger struggle for political dominance and internal unity in China. That perspective also helps explain the widespread phenomenon of collaboration between Chinese and Japanese during the war. Just as the Japanese were using Chinese to pursue their imperialist interests during the war, many Chinese were using the Japanese to pursue their domestic interests. That is certainly why so many Chinese collaborators proved to be such unreliable allies for the Japanese. They used the Japanese when convenient, and abandoned them, or turned against them, when it was advantageous to do so.

In the struggle for power in Neihuang, some of the contenders, such as bandit gangs, had limited resources and could aspire to no more than local

power, while others, such as the Japanese, the Guomindang and the communists, had major resources and national aspirations, but all of them contributed to a chaotic and violent situation during the war. The principal significance of this phenomenon for long-term power relationships in the county is fourfold. It discredited the Guomindang's claim to political legitimacy; it destroyed or seriously undermined existing local political and economic elites in both town and countryside; it initially helped the Japanese occupy and administer the area, but ultimately it had the opposite effect; and it provided conditions favorable to eventual communist predominance.


#### NEIHUANG COUNTY: THE PHYSICAL ARENA

As mentioned, this study concerns Neihuang County alone, but it is implicit in my argument that events in that small area have relevance elsewhere in China, particularly on the north China plain. It is important therefore to indicate the physical nature of the area and the effects it might have had on local politics, economics, and society.

Neihuang County is located in northern Henan Province, approximately twenty miles northwest of the Yellow River.<sup>1</sup> It borders Hebei Province to the north, and is only twenty miles from Shandong Province to the east. Historically its boundaries have fluctuated considerably. Parts of the county, as administratively defined today, have been under the authority of six of the seven surrounding counties at various times since the Ming Dynasty.<sup>2</sup> These administrative shifts are evidence of a lack of natural boundaries defining Neihuang. The county is an indistinguishable part of the broad, flat central plain of north China. The shifts also indicate that the Neihuang area is a border region, on the periphery of larger administrative centers, and thus is in the margin of official surveillance and jurisdiction. Such areas have often encouraged illicit activities and have been relatively unstable politically.<sup>3</sup>

The borders as drawn today (see map) define the arena being analyzed in this essay. Within an area approximately 60 miles long and 30 miles wide, there were 17 market towns, 518 natural villages, 120,017 households, and 556,697 people at the time of the 1982 census. In 1949, the last year covered by this study, a population of 312,784 lived in 75,750 households.<sup>4</sup>

A major river, the Wei, flows north along the western border of Neihuang and then northeast through the upper third of the county. It is a navigable



Nei Huang County

waterway that until recently connected Neihuang with the Grand Canal, and eventually the city of Tianjin.<sup>5</sup> Chuwang, a market town on the Wei River, had the greatest access to external markets and therefore was the most prosperous center of commerce in the county. The Japanese made it their headquarters in Neihuang during the War of Resistance.

The soil in Neihuang and surrounding counties has, until recently, supported only meager agricultural production. Salts, deposited by the Yellow River when its main channel traversed the area in the past, had made 15 percent of the soil useless for farming, and most of the rest of it marginal. Only 15 percent was categorized as “excellent” in the local gazetteer.<sup>6</sup> Before the 1960s when soil problems were systematically addressed (by leaching, draining, irrigation from deep wells, and tree planting) average wheat production per mu (one-sixth of an acre) was only 50–60 jin (one jin = 1.33 pounds). Today the average mu produces 500 jin, and some fields have produced as much as 800 jin.<sup>7</sup>

The topography varies little in Neihuang. Like most of the central plain it is generally flat except in areas where the wind has blown residual Yellow River sand into dunes. Those dunes areas are mostly covered with Chinese date trees (*zaoshu*), an important part of the economy of the county, supplying both food and wood.<sup>8</sup> The trees and sand hills also provide the only cover for those who wish to hide on the flat plain. Not surprisingly, they were the lair of some of the area’s notorious bandits, and the base of communist guerilla operations during the war with Japan.

In short, Neihuang County during the war years was a poor, heavily populated area, like most of the rest of the central plain of north China. It was distinguished from some other areas on the plain by its distance from major administrative centers, its shifting jurisdictional lines, its particularly poor soil, and its proximity to a navigable river. But these characteristics have little relevance for explaining events that might distinguish Neihuang from dozens of other counties in the same general area during the war with Japan. Of much greater significance is a characteristic that these counties share—they have immense strategic importance. The broad, flat plain is the main corridor connecting north and south China between two mountain ranges. Four rail lines link all points of the compass. Control of the area is a minimum requisite for controlling all of China. Easily traversed, the plain is difficult to defend. It would be the scene of endemic violence during the Sino-Japanese War.

## THE COLLAPSE OF THE GUOMINDANG

The Guomindang began to establish military and political dominance in Neihuang County in February 1928 after defeating the remnants of warlord armies that had been in contention in the area since 1916, but it took another seven years for them to establish anything like effective control there. During the warlord era the armies of Cao Kun, Wu Peifu, Feng Yuxiang, Zhang Zuolin, and numerous minor warlords had fought to control the central plains area.<sup>9</sup> In this chaotic situation, bandit gangs rose in profusion, numerous sectarian Red Spear societies were formed to protect lives and property, and militia units were organized by local elites to try to keep order.

During this period, functions that had once been the prerogative of the state had been assumed by local elites. New taxes had been levied and retained locally; a secondary school had been established, financed, and run locally; and legal and political institutions had been taken over by local elites. In short, the authority of the central government had disappeared in Neihuang, as in the rest of the central plains area. It would be a difficult task for the Guomindang to restore it. Initial attempts to do so suggest that it was ill-prepared for the task.

In the first three years after its triumph over warlord armies, the Guomindang appointed four different magistrates to preside over the new government.<sup>10</sup> There is no information on the tenure of subsequent magistrates, but continuing confusion and institutional instability is evident in the slow process of establishing a Guomindang party organization in Neihuang. Not until 1931 did the Guomindang send a representative to establish a county party branch. That representative, Wang Xingzhou, "did nothing but some routine work" and "established few contacts with local notables and officials." When he was transferred after two years, "nothing had been accomplished," and the party branch was discontinued until October 1935.<sup>11</sup>

But, beginning in late 1935, the Guomindang began to assert control in Neihuang and became politically predominant. They began by sending an energetic representative, Sheng Shaohan, to head the party organization. He concentrated his energies first on winning over the educated elite who were teachers and staff of local schools, and then on merchants' associations and other locally organized groups. "He was a good talker and went to all the meetings."<sup>12</sup> Soon he persuaded many locally prominent people to join the Guomindang and cooperate with the state government. In 1936 he orga-

nized a chapter of the Chinese National Revival Society (*Zhonghua minzu fuxingshe*) to root out communists and other Guomintang opponents. Aided by Guomintang forces throughout the area, he was remarkably successful in that endeavor. By mid-1936, most local Communist Party members were dead, in jail, or inactive,<sup>13</sup> and bandit gangs and secret religious societies had markedly curtailed their activities. By the time the war with Japan began, the Guomintang appeared to be in control. But events in the first few months of the war proved otherwise. The underlying weakness of the edifice the Guomintang was building was fully exposed by events in the first days of the War of Resistance against Japan, and the whole structure collapsed in a remarkably short time, with very little pressure from the Japanese.

The war that began on July 7, 1937, near Beijing reached Neihuang County in November when the Guomintang 29th Army commanded by Song Zheyuan retreated into the central plains area. Without pausing at the fortification line of trenches and blockhouses built in Neihuang and nearby counties at great expense earlier in the year,<sup>14</sup> they fled south, pursued by the Imperial Japanese Army. Song's 37th Division rested briefly in Neihuang.<sup>15</sup> When it left, the county had little protection.

By December 1937 Japanese troops had occupied Anyang and Daming cities, approximately fifteen miles to the northwest and northeast of Neihuang respectively. When news of that crisis reached the Guomintang-appointed Neihuang County magistrate, he reacted by absconding with public funds. The Guomintang party leader, Sheng Shaohan, also fled south before the enemy arrived.<sup>16</sup> Thereafter, the situation deteriorated rapidly. Prisoners broke out of jail in Neihuang County seat and looted and burned stores. The panicked citizenry raided the "Charitable Storehouse" (*yizang*) and made off with its contents.<sup>17</sup> In February 1938, taking advantage of the generally chaotic situation, a coalition of four bandit gangs led by He Jiuxiang, Zheng He, Guo Qing, and Du Erbao (all of whom appear prominently later in this account as collaborators with the Japanese) seized the opportunity to attack the town, hoping to loot it. For three days they fought the local militia before withdrawing and then plundering a local village. Three hundred people had been killed.<sup>18</sup>

Several days later, two of those same bandit leaders, He Jiuxiang and Zheng He, teamed up with another bandit, Si Huasheng, to attack Xiaoguilin Village on the Wei River. Three hundred more people died. A month

later, He Jiuxiang's gang set out to plunder Houhua Village. There they unexpectedly encountered a rival bandit gang with similar intentions led by Hu Zhengxiu. The two groups began firing at each other just as the first contingent of Japanese troops to enter Neihuang happened to be passing the village en route to Puyang, a Guomindang stronghold. Thinking they were under attack, the Japanese entered the village, rounded up all the able-bodied men they could find, stripped them naked, and put them in a building which they torched with kerosene. Those who tried to escape were machine-gunned. One hundred sixty bandits and 80 innocent Houhua villagers died in the incident.<sup>19</sup> The bandit He Jiuxiang escaped. Within a year he would be collaborating with the same Japanese army that had murdered members of his gang. Thus, in the early days of the War of Resistance, at least 840 citizens of Neihuang County had been violently killed, 600 by their Chinese compatriots, and 240 by the Japanese.

On the day of the massacre at Houhua Village, the Imperial Japanese Army troops had passed through Neihuang County seat, killing nine people and contributing to the panic there. The town militia leader Lin Jiugao, together with other city notables and merchants, attempted to restore order by convincing a locally prominent citizen, Zhai Guanghe, the recipient of a civil service degree (*shengyuan*) in the Qing dynasty, to become magistrate. Accepting with reluctance, Zhai soon received an official commission from the Guomindang.<sup>20</sup> Shortly thereafter, Zhai capitulated to the Japanese. Militia leader Lin Jiugao was once again the persuasive voice behind that action. Lin had been convinced by Li Tai, the former commander of the Guomindang 29th Brigade, and a native of nearby Anyang city, that it was futile to resist the Japanese. Having made that decision earlier himself, Li Tai had been commissioned by the Japanese to be Commander of the North China Communist Suppression 2nd Route Army.<sup>21</sup> Lin and Zhai would have been similarly rewarded by incorporation into the new Japanese-dominated administration had they not run afoul of the local branch of the Sacred Way Society, one of numerous Red Spear organizations that had risen throughout Henan and many other areas in China in the 1920s and 1930s in response to the depredations of warlord armies and bandit gangs in those years.<sup>22</sup>

The Sacred Way Society reacted to the defection of magistrate Zhai and militia leader Lin by leading an attack on the county seat, Neihuang town, in late March. For twenty days there was a standoff, until peace was negoti-

ated by notables and merchants. When accommodation was imminent, it was discovered that militia leader Lin had assassinated the Sacred Way Master of Religious Instruction (*dianchuan shi*) and four others in Weiliuhe Village, the headquarters of the Sacred Way Society. The Sacred Way military leader Wei Zilong, head of one of the wealthiest families in Neihuang, then marshalled a reported 10,000 Red Spears to renew the attack on Neihuang town. The murder of one of their own had roused more anger and more direct action by the Red Spears than had capitulation to foreign invaders. Militia leader Lin and magistrate Zhai fled. Lin was killed, and Zhai was caught and sent to the headquarters of the local Guomindang Commander, Ding Shuben. Ding buried him alive.<sup>23</sup>

A year later, in July 1938, Red Spear members from three counties, including Neihuang, attacked an important Neihuang County market town, Dougong, which had become the base of operations of two Chinese traitors introduced above—Li Tai the former Guomindang officer, and He Jiuxiang, the bandit with the blood of 600 innocents on his hands.<sup>24</sup> He Jiuxiang, like Li Tai, had now gone over to the Japanese and was fleeing the populace under their auspices. The Red Spears, in attacking Dougong, were playing their traditional role as protectors of property. That was their main purpose, not the expulsion of a foreign invader and its puppets. This became evident when, before long, many Red Spears began to cooperate with the Japanese themselves.

Ding Shuben was the highest-ranking Guomindang military officer in the Neihuang area when the war began. He held the titles “Special Commissioner” (*zhuan yuan*), and Hebei-Shandong-Henan Public Security Commander for Eight Counties. His headquarters was in Puyang County bordering Neihuang to the southeast. His response to the Lin and Zhai incident was to appoint one of his own men to replace Zhai as magistrate of Neihuang.<sup>25</sup> When that man was transferred out of the area a month later (for reasons not stated) the remnant Guomindang Henan Provincial Government sent in a replacement, but Ding made so much trouble for him he left after a few months. Then Ding appointed a man named Tian, one of his cronies from his hometown in Hebei Province. Tian, together with his relatives and friends, then extorted funds from the local citizens for over eight months, until the Red Spear Sacred Way Society rallied its members once again and drove him out in September 1939.<sup>26</sup>

Several more magistrates occupied the Neihuang County seat, but briefly.

One, Jiang Beihua, a Guomindang appointee, stayed only long enough to rob the treasury before fleeing, like his Guomindang predecessor.<sup>27</sup> An eighteen-year-old Communist Party member, Ma Guangun, then seized the opportunity to proclaim the establishment of a new order, the “Anti-Japanese Democratic Government in Neihuang.” It lasted for two days before a Japanese bombing raid drove Ma and his followers into the countryside.<sup>28</sup> Later, the Sacred Way Society military leader, Wei Zilong, having protected the county from traitors and corrupt politicians since the beginning of the war period, decided to assume the top county office himself. He was commissioned Neihuang County magistrate by the Henan provincial government, but he never filled the post. Enroute to the Neihuang County seat with sixty followers, he was ambushed, captured, and buried alive by the Japanese.<sup>29</sup>

By late 1939 the Neihuang County seat had ceased to function as the locus of political power in the county. Thereafter, the political center shifted to Chuwang, a market town on the Wei River in northern Neihuang, which the Japanese would make their headquarters in the county, and to Jingdian, a market town in the south of the county, which became the center of communist-led guerilla activities. Guomindang power and influence had diminished rapidly in the first months of the war, and virtually ceased to exist in Neihuang when Ding Shuben, the Special Commissioner for the area, capitulated to the Japanese in March 1940. He left the area, taking his troops with him.<sup>30</sup> (Ding later repudiated his collaboration with Japan and went back to the Guomindang. He was sent back to the neighboring county of Puyang after the war, but was soon driven out again by the Communists.)

#### THE DESTRUCTION OF COMMERCE AND COMMERCIAL ELITES: THE CASE OF LI TONGXUAN

Of all the market towns in Neihuang, Chuwang was, by far, the most prosperous. Before the war began in 1937, it had more than 100 stationary (*zuo*) merchant houses (as distinct from travelling merchant enterprises and those operating from transportable stalls). No other market town in the county had even a quarter as many.<sup>31</sup> Dominating the Chuwang commercial scene was the “King of Chuwang” (*Chuwang wang*) Li Tongxuan.<sup>32</sup> Li was a man who could draw on diverse resources to maintain his dominance. From 1924

until his death in 1938 he was chairman of the Chuwang Merchants' Association, an organization begun by his father. The Association was responsible for registering commercial accounts, arranging for long-distance commerce, resolving disputes between enterprises, and representing its members individually and collectively in affairs involving the local and central government.<sup>33</sup> The Association had its own armed militia force with about forty guns. It was under Li's personal control and militia members served as armed guards accompanying Li wherever he went. All shops in Chuwang had to belong to the Association and pay monthly dues; the amount was determined by Li himself. "No one dared ask how the money was used."<sup>34</sup>

Li's other resources included a grain trading shop and a store selling cakes and sweets. He also owned a considerable amount of land farmed by tenants. The size of his agrarian holdings is not mentioned in the county gazetteer, but that document states that he was "a major landlord." Obviously he was an absentee landlord. He lived in Chuwang town in a walled compound protected by armed guards.<sup>35</sup>

Li's power was such that he controlled local government political offices, taking a special interest in the bureaus for civil affairs, finance, and education. "Nothing could be done without his nod." On one occasion he temporarily shut down the Chuwang Secondary School (the only secondary school in the county) because he did not like the contents of a particular dramatic production.<sup>36</sup>

Supplementing the legal resources Li employed to maintain local dominance was an illegal one. He was a member of the notorious Green Gang that operated out of Shanghai. Li travelled to Shanghai in 1934 to pay his respects to Green Gang leaders Du Yuesheng and Huang Jinrong. They returned the compliment by commissioning him a "twenty-third generation warrior." At the height of its power the Green Gang had a membership in Neihuang County numbering more than 2,000. There is no information about Li's activity in the gang, but it is probable that he profited handsomely when the Green Gang took charge of awarding contracts for building a railroad line from Daokou, in neighboring Hua County, to Chuwang in 1936.<sup>37</sup>

When the war with Japan broke out in 1937, Li Tongxuan took steps to defend Chuwang from bandit gangs that emerged in great numbers in northern Henan and southern Hebei as civil authority collapsed. He gathered together 300 men from public and private militia units in the region and solicited funds from Chuwang merchants and wealthy families. The

effort was in vain. On November 15, 1937, the major bandit Guo Qing from Lin County, Hebei Province, bordering Neihuang to the north, attacked Chuwang with over 1,000 men and stripped it clean. The bandits loaded hundreds of carts with merchandise and sold outside the town everything they could not take with them. Soon thereafter, two petty bandits from northern Henan raided the town and robbed all of the local citizens, most of whom had not been robbed by Guo Qing's bandits.<sup>38</sup> The Wei River silted up during the war, and Chuwang did not regain its prosperity until long after the war had ended.

The Chuwang calamity was partly caused by Li Tongxuan himself. The cotton harvest in Lin County, immediately to the north, had been particularly bountiful in 1937. "Peasants came to Chuwang in an endless stream" to market their crops. Li Tongxuan, seeing an opportunity to profit, levied an illegal tax of 35 yuan (an enormous sum at the time) on each cart as it entered the city gate. When the bandit Guo Qing raided the town, he claimed to be avenging the wrong done to the farmers from his county.<sup>39</sup>

Thus Li Tongxuan's self-serving strategy had led to the destruction of his resources. But he was not yet finished. Claiming to be acting in the interest of national defense, he fled west (to Anyang and Ji counties), raised a force of 300 men and rifles, acquired a specious Guomindang commission, and moved back into Neihuang with the intent to occupy the county magistrate's office. He was soon arrested by the magistrate appointed by Guomindang military commander Ding Shuben, and executed by Ding himself, with permission from higher authorities. The charge was that Li had paid his troops with currency that had been declared obsolete by the Guomindang government and was guilty of contributing to "currency chaos," a capital offense in wartime. The real reason for his execution, according to people who remember the incident, was that his schemes to dominate Neihuang County resources conflicted with those of Ding Shuben's personal appointee, the one who was later driven out of Neihuang by the Red Spears for his uncustomary greed (see above).<sup>40</sup>

The fate of merchants elsewhere in Neihuang County was little better than that of their fellows in Chuwang. Dongzhuang merchants were left destitute by bandits in 1937; thereafter Dougong and the other major market towns (except Jingdian, which was controlled by the communists), were occupied during much of the war by Chinese officials and troops collaborating with the Japanese. Merchant activity practically stopped. Thus, com-

merce, and the commercial elites, were practically destroyed during the War of Resistance. The Japanese had provoked the crisis that led to the destruction, but Chinese did the actual work of destruction.

THE DECLINE OF THE LANDED ELITES: THE CASE OF  
THE WANG FAMILY OF HOUHE, AND HU JINXIU

Neihuang County records indicate that prior to land reform in the late 1940s, landlord households constituted about 1.7 percent of the total number of households, and owned about 16 percent of the land. Rich peasant households made up 6 percent of the populace and owned about 20 percent of the land. Poor peasants constituted two-thirds of the population and owned about 33 percent of the land. The remaining 30 percent of households were owned by middle peasants. Average per capita distribution of land (where it was surveyed) was 24.2 mu per person for landlords, 11.2 for rich peasants, 4.4 for middle peasants, and 1.7 for poor peasants.

These figures make it clear that land was a major resource for some Neihuang elites prior to communist dominance in the late 1940s and early 1950s, even though landlordism was not as significant a phenomenon in the north as it was in areas farther south in China. The importance of land as a resource was particularly evident in the case of the seven households in the county that owned more than 10,000 mu of land.<sup>41</sup> But all the power and influence that such holdings brought certain families was not sufficient to protect them from the depredations of other Chinese during the war years. The case of the Wang family of Houhe township in southeastern Neihuang is instructive.

The Wangs were known locally as the four Five-Blessings (*si wufu*). Their father Wang Tongjian had presided over the family estate, called Five Blessings Hall (*Wufutang*), until it was divided among his four sons in 1919. Each son then built a separate walled residence in different parts of Houhe town, but they continued to draw on their resources collectively. Their material resources included extensive agricultural land holdings in two counties (over 10,000 mu), more than 3,500 date trees, five credit houses (proto-banks) in various locations outside the county, and two pawnshops. These properties were guarded by a private militia armed with more than 100 guns. One of the brothers had purchased a *juren* degree for 2,000 ounces of

silver toward the end of the Qing dynasty. Another brother held government office. He was chief of a county ward (*quzhang*) giving him direct access to the magistrate.<sup>42</sup>

The family's activities before the war can only be described as exploitative. Thirty-one percent of the peasants of Houhe tilled the Wangs' land for wages barely sufficient to feed them. Long-term tenants received 30 percent of the harvest; seventy percent went to the Wangs. In the 29 villages near Houhe, 3,661 households (of a total of 4,223) had borrowed money from the Wangs. Forty percent could not repay their loans and were forced to sell or forfeit 4,925 mu of land and 1,089 buildings, while 241 households were stripped clean, their residents forced to beg for a living, and 167 households sold women and children to survive.<sup>43</sup>

The Wangs used their government connections to sustain their power. This was evident in 1938 when, after they had spent a considerable amount of money purchasing weapons, they charged the local people a fee to pay for the guns and to support militia. The peasants, already heavily taxed, and realizing that the militia would protect only the Wangs, sent a representative to negotiate an end to the burden. The Wangs refused to discuss the issue, tied up the peasant representative, and sent him to the Guomindang county magistrate in Puyang, which had jurisdiction over Houhe at the time. Accused of "disturbing local peace and order," the peasant representative was sentenced to be buried alive. He was saved only by popular protest. The Wangs' connections made them practically immune to civil law. They were later accused of numerous cases of rape, for which they were never apprehended or tried. One brother alone is said to have raped at least twenty-seven young women.<sup>44</sup>

Given such exploitative and cruel use of local power, it is not surprising that the neighboring citizenry was passive when the Wangs received their comeuppance. The war had provided the opportunity for people of modest resources to rise quickly to positions of dominance. One of those people, a man named Hu Jinxiu, brought the Wangs to their knees. Hu is described in the *Neihuang* gazetteer as a shiftless loafer leading an aimless existence when the war began in 1937.<sup>45</sup> He was a man without a family who had been engaged in bandit activities for years, but not in a leadership position. Like many others in his situation, Hu seized the opportunity provided by the war to build an ostensibly legitimate armed force. Using the current slogan, "resist Japan, protect the family," he called himself commander of a self-

defense force and “planted his flag.” Soon he had thirty followers, most contributed by local bandits as an “investment” in his enterprise. Hu traveled to numerous villages soliciting arms and food, and “deceitfully convincing hungry people to join his movement.”<sup>46</sup> In early 1938 he led several hundred followers to attack the Wang family of Houhe. Despite their prestige, connections, and armed strength, the Wangs, for reasons not explained, submitted without a fight to this “national defense” force. Perhaps they had hoped to negotiate a deal. If so they were wrong. Hu Jinxiu stole all their guns, 20,000 rounds of ammunition, 3,000 silver yuan, and more than 10 tons of grain. He then established a temporary headquarters in the Wangs’ great hall and hounded the local peasantry for money and food. Hu was no Robin Hood. He burned the houses and sometimes killed those whose contributions did not meet his expectations.<sup>47</sup>

As Hu Jinxiu’s reputation grew, so did his army. In March 1938 a cavalry unit of the Guomindang 29th Army (most of which had retreated to the south) joined him. With as many as 5,000 well-armed men, Hu began looting and pillaging nearby counties in the name of national defense. Using the same pretense, he occupied the county seat in Hua County on Neihuang’s southern border for more than two months, calling himself county magistrate. Hu Jinxiu’s downfall came when his “national defense” army, preoccupied with looting a market town, actually encountered Japanese forces. Using artillery and machine guns, the Japanese decimated his force. Soon thereafter, again while he was robbing a village, the Japanese attacked and killed hundreds more of his men. Hu retired to his home village where he acted the petty tyrant until assassinated by one of his own guards.<sup>48</sup>

Hu Jinxiu had raised a powerful military force in the name of patriotism, but it is clear that, from the beginning, he intended to use that force against other Chinese, not against the Japanese. He avoided the latter whenever possible. Although Hu Jinxiu was eventually destroyed by the Japanese, he had used them to foster his own ends. Such would also be the case with many ostensible collaborators with the enemy.

#### THE JAPANESE AND THEIR CHINESE COLLABORATORS

When the Japanese sought to establish political control in Neihuang County, they chose as their headquarters the market town Chuwang rather

than the old county seat. Chuwang was in the northern part of the county, distant from many of the villages from which the Japanese tried to collect taxes, but it was conveniently situated on the Wei River, the main communications artery in Neihuang, and was close to major Japanese Imperial Army encampments in Anyang, Daming, and Handan.

As we have seen, the commerce and the commercial elites of Chuwang had been destroyed by bandits in the first months of the war, before the Japanese arrived. The first Japanese to enter the city, in January 1939, were no more than a squad (*xiaofendui*) of about 20 soldiers. They were accompanied by a larger force of Chinese composed of former Guomintang troops, led by Li Tai, previously Commander of the Guomintang 29th Brigade (see above), and of the armed forces of bandit leaders Du Erbao and Cheng Daohe who had thrown in their lot with the Japanese. Two months later, Japanese control was reenforced by the arrival in Chuwang of Li Ying, a former high level Guomintang military officer, now commissioned by the Japanese as "Commander of the East Asian Alliance Self-Rule Army Third Brigade" (*Dongya tongmeng zizhijun sanlu luzhang*). Li's brigade (probably about 1,000 troops) was supported by one company (*lian*, probably about 200 troops) of the Japanese Imperial Army.<sup>49</sup> In the last year of the war, Li would lead over 10,000 Chinese troops against the communists in a vain effort to maintain his authority in the area.<sup>50</sup>

Measures to provide for their safety indicate how insecure the Japanese felt in the area they occupied. They sealed two of the four gates in the town wall and placed sentries and machine gun mountings at the other two. Those who passed in and out had to lower their heads and not glance sideways. When a Japanese soldier drew near, citizens of the town had to stand at attention and bow low. Outside the town wall, the local populace was conscripted to dig two encircling moats, each fifteen to eighteen meters wide and more than six meters deep. Beyond the outer moat they constructed a wood and barbed wire barricade. Inside the town General Li Ying occupied the residence of Li Tongxuan, the former head of the Chuwang Merchants' Association (see above). The Japanese lived in the great courtyard and houses of the wealthy Tan family. Residences around the courtyard were all torn down. Inside the Tan family courtyard, a watchtower thirty meters high was constructed from which all parts of the town and the surrounding area could be viewed through a telescope.<sup>51</sup>

Within this bastion of fear, the Japanese and their collaborators established the institutions of political control through which they would attempt to govern the county. During the six years of their occupation of Chuwang, from August 1939 through mid-July 1945, three Chinese citizens from other parts of China (Manchukuo, Anyang, and Kaifeng) would be brought in to serve as Neihuang County magistrate. The former Guomindang government offices were maintained. Protection was provided by a police station (*jingchasuo*) with over 500 police and a garrison team (*jingbei dadui*) of more than 100 men. Rural pacification bureaus (*qingxiangju*) were established in many villages. All personnel staffing these institutions were Chinese except for a military police squad (*xianbingdui*) of Japanese troops and an office for Japanese intelligence agents (*tewu jiguan*). The whole operation was overseen by a Japanese advisor named Fukutomi Toshi.<sup>52</sup>

Beyond the new county seat, Neihuang was divided into four districts (originally six), each headed by a Chinese district chief (*quzhang*) who was responsible for collecting taxes and keeping order. The principal vehicle for accomplishing these tasks was the *baojia* mutual responsibility system, employed in various forms in China for two millennia. It divided villages, and groups of villages, into units of four sizes, each individually and collectively liable for the tax remittances and behavior of its members.<sup>53</sup> Twice a year, after the spring and autumn harvest, troops would accompany civil officials from the district to the villages to collect taxes from the *baojia* leaders. The way the system usually worked in fact during the war years is that the peasants buried or otherwise hid what they could and fled when troops approached, and the latter grabbed whatever they could find. It was difficult to find willing, not to mention enthusiastic, *baojia* leaders. Those who cooperated were often victims of revenge later.<sup>54</sup>

Supplementing the *baojia* system were procedures for household registration and household inspection. In addition, everyone in the Chuwang area was obliged to carry a photographic identification card. Those who qualified also carried a "good citizen certificate" (*liangminzheng*). These measures for physical control were complemented by an institution for reshaping people's thoughts, the New People's Associations (*Xinminhui*), which propagated Japanese doctrines proclaiming a "New Order in East Asia" and "fraternal relations between Chinese and Japanese people."<sup>55</sup> Available evidence suggests that these associations had limited effect in urban areas, and were

rarely more than empty forms in the countryside, in places where they existed at all.<sup>56</sup>

Japanese methods of control rested not only on these relatively uniform, official institutions and procedures, but also on a motley array of makeshift and semi-independent gangs of armed men with such official designations as “peace preservation corps” (*baoandui*), “peace maintenance associations” (*weichihui*), “communist suppression work teams” (*jiaofei gongzuotuan*), and “anti-Communist self-defense brigades” (*fangong ziweidui*). In Neihuang, most were led by bandits or Red Spear chieftains. Aside from a certificate of commission, the Japanese supplied nothing to these quasi-official organizations. Their leaders were responsible for raising their own funds and recruiting and arming their own troops in any way they could. This “system” assured abuses. Resort to this type of “control” made it impossible for the Japanese to win popular support. It was a regime of outright exploitation based on fear—a crude and unimaginative approach to the “New Order in East Asia,” inspired, in part, by the paucity of Japanese troops.

The two leaders of such irregular forces who caused the greatest damage in Neihuang County were the quasi-bandit Wu Lantian and the Red Spear leader Sun Buyue. Both had originally opposed the Japanese, but eventually capitulated to them. The Japanese employed them to counter the main source of resistance to Japanese control, the communists. Wu became the “Northern Henan Communist Suppression Work Team Leader,” and Sun the “Regimental Commander of the Anti-Communist Self-Defense Regiment.”<sup>57</sup>

Wu Lantian was an embarrassment to the communists because he had been one of them from 1929 to 1940. He was from a rich peasant family and fairly well educated, but in his school days he was already consorting with bandits, helping them kidnap people for ransom. His career as a party member is nowhere recorded, but at the time he went over to the Japanese, he was head of the Organization Bureau of the Northern Henan Local Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). His defection, according to one account, was due to resentment of party discipline for his numerous sexual liaisons, which he carried on in addition to conjugal relations with two wives.<sup>58</sup> After he was commissioned by the Japanese, he was known to the local populace as the “Great God of Plague” and the “Living King of Hell.”<sup>59</sup> Operating first out of a market town in southwest Nei-

huang County and later from a larger town (Baidaokou) in neighboring Hua County, Wu Lantian's forces of 600–700 men are reported to have killed 3,000 people in the five years he served the Japanese. He specialized in killing Communists. He, his brother, and one of his wives reportedly took sadistic pleasure in personally torturing and murdering Wu's former comrades. Accounts by witnesses detail the most ghoulish crimes imaginable and unanimously agree that the Wus were more vicious than the Japanese.<sup>60</sup>

Sun Buyue at various times teamed up with Wu Lantian to destroy communist-led forces.<sup>61</sup> In the early years of the war, Sun had served under his brother, Sun Xiangbu, in a Red Spear organization from Hua County. He had participated in the attacks on collaborators in the Neihuang County seat and Dougong market town when the Japanese first arrived (see above). But later, like other local Red Spear leaders, he capitulated to the Japanese, perhaps because he came to regard the Communists as a greater threat to his interests than the foreign aggressor. Most Red Spear associations had been organized by landlords and rich peasants. The Communists threatened not only the Red Spears' material interests, but also the metaphysical props for their power, calling their incantations and magic charms superstitious nonsense. As early as January 1939, Sun Xiangbu, leading more than 2,000 Red Spears, had attacked communist-organized National Salvation Associations and self-defense teams in southern Neihuang County.<sup>62</sup> Later that year communist-led troops surrounded and captured Sun Xiangbu and 600 of his Red Spears. Sun was executed. His younger brother Sun Buyue immediately capitulated to the Japanese. Commissioned "Commander of the Anti-Communist Self-Defense Regiment," he was encouraged to kill Communists and their adherents wherever he could find them.

With the help of collaborators like Wu Lantian and Sun Buyue, the Japanese sought to eliminate all opposition to their rule by launching several brutal "mop-up" campaigns. The most destructive in Neihuang County took place April 12–20, 1941. In that nine-day period, 15,000 troops, accompanied by 110 tanks and other motorized vehicles, 20 artillery pieces, and two airplanes set out to terrorize the sand region of Neihuang and surrounding counties. Of the 15,000-man mop-up force, approximately 8,000 were Chinese; some were fighters, others were bearers and auxiliary personnel. It is impossible to judge their motives; no doubt, many had been conscripted by force and participated unwillingly. But, 3,000 troops of the mop-

up force were bandits and Red Spears who had joined forces with the Japanese willingly.<sup>63</sup> In the nine-day massacre, 141 villages were totally destroyed, and more than 4,000 people were killed. Crops were destroyed, drinking wells were stuffed with corpses, and more than a million date trees were cut down.<sup>64</sup> In one of the two villages for which Red Spear leader Sun Buyue was particularly responsible, Xue Village, 180 people were killed, 931 structures were burned, 37 animals were killed or stolen, and hundreds of pounds of grain were destroyed or stolen.<sup>65</sup>

Sun Buyue and Wu Lantian were the most notorious of the Chinese collaborators with the Japanese in the Neihuang area, but their willingness to serve under the banner of a foreign aggressor against their Chinese compatriots was not unusual. Of the four Red Spear organizations active in Neihuang and neighboring areas during the war—the others being the Sacred Way, the Fast Knives, and the Gate of Heaven<sup>66</sup>—three eventually collaborated with the Japanese, while one, the Sacred Way, seems to have become inactive after the death of its leader, Wei Zilong. It is not mentioned in Neihuang historical materials after 1941. Thirteen bandit gang leaders are mentioned in the Neihuang County records. Of them, ten accepted commissions from the Japanese, and two joined the Communist-led resistance movement. The allegiance of the remaining one is not recorded. Fifteen civil and military officials appointed by the Guomindang are mentioned in the wartime chronicle of Neihuang County. Three were civil officials; two of those absconded with public funds when their lives were threatened by war, and the third was executed, ostensibly for corruption, by a Guomindang military commander. The other twelve were military officials. Of those, seven capitulated to the Japanese; two others are accused, in Neihuang records, of having cooperated with the Japanese in suppressing Communists while never officially capitulating; and three joined the Communist-led resistance, one after having served the Japanese.<sup>67</sup>

Although the nature and causes of Chinese collaboration with the Japanese are complex and difficult issues requiring separate study, at least one issue is clear: There is no evidence that collaboration in Neihuang was based on any allegiance to the Japanese and their cause. Japanese interests were different and ultimately antagonistic to the long-term interests of the collaborators. Chinese and Japanese used each other as a means to achieve separate ends. The result was a series of violent confrontations in which competing Chinese forces were frequently at war with each other.

THE NATURE OF RESISTANCE  
IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

Support for the argument that there was an internal struggle among Chinese concurrent with an external war against Japan is found also in the statistics compiled by the Communists during the war. The *Chronology of Major Events for the Ji-Lu-Yu Communist Base Area*,<sup>68</sup> of which Neihuang was a part, states that in 1942 (the first year for which such statistics are given) the Communists fought 1,636 skirmishes and battles in which they killed or wounded 1,647 Japanese troops and 5,764 Chinese collaborators. They captured 10 Japanese and 6,435 Chinese. Thus, total enemy casualties were 13,856, of which 12 percent were Japanese. In other words, the Communists killed, wounded, or captured 8.36 times as many Chinese as Japanese. The *Chronology* lists Communist losses as 4,672 killed, wounded, and missing.<sup>69</sup> [These figures make no distinction between those Chinese who officially collaborated with the Japanese (*wei*) and those who just cooperated with them in opposing the Communists (*wan*)].

The figures for 1943, the only other year for which a distinction of nationality for enemy casualties is made in the *Chronology*, provide even more dramatic evidence of the internecine character of the war. In 2,701 armed confrontations, which included only 4 large battles, total enemy casualties recorded were 33,309. They include only 1,060 Japanese troops killed or wounded, and 21 captured. Thus Japanese casualties were 3.35 percent of the total; casualties among Chinese collaborators were 30 times as great.<sup>70</sup>

These statistics apply to all of Ji-Lu-Yu. What of Neihuang County? Unfortunately, casualty figures for Neihuang do not distinguish between Chinese and Japanese, but accounts of battles make it obvious that the combatants and the casualties were mainly Chinese. The *Neihuang County Chronicle* records 23 military engagements within, or partially within, Neihuang County in which Communist troops participated. Six were fairly large battles with more than 1,000 troops participating on each side. The other battles were small skirmishes, usually involving only several hundred combatants.<sup>71</sup>

It would be tedious to recount these battles in detail, though sufficient information exists to do so. Probably in none of them did Japanese troops constitute a majority of those confronting the Communists and their allies, and in only two—a “mop-up” in June 1940, and the devastating mop-up in

April 1941 in which 4,000 villagers were slaughtered—did the number of Japanese troops come even close to the number of Chinese collaborators. Three other major battles pitted Communist troops against units of the collaborationist Imperial Assistance Army (*Huangxiejun*). One of these was fought between Communist troops and those of three Guomindang commanders cooperating, though not formally, with the Japanese. The small battles were all between Communist units and local armed forces headed by bandit and Red Spear leaders with commissions from the Japanese.<sup>72</sup>

For a number of reasons, the Communists were able to launch an offensive effort for the first time only in the last year of the war.<sup>73</sup> Not the least of those reasons was that in late 1943 and early 1944 the Japanese pulled many of their troops out of Ji-Lu-Yu and transferred them to areas in the Pacific where the Imperial army and navy were beginning to suffer heavy losses. Total Japanese troop strength in Ji-Lu-Yu was reduced by approximately half. The remaining troops were not the veterans who had fought throughout the war; they were inexperienced new recruits with poor fighting ability who were either very young or very old.<sup>74</sup> As Japanese forces declined in number and quality, Communist forces in Ji-Lu-Yu were supplemented by veteran troops sent in from well-established bases in the north.<sup>75</sup> Under these circumstances, the Communists quickly seized the initiative.

The war in Ji-Lu-Yu had now become even more an internal Chinese affair. The collaborators, without the heavy weaponry of the Japanese, were no match for Communist-led troops. Furthermore, the various leaders of collaborationist troops had little basis for cooperation with each other in large-scale battles; any internal cohesion they formerly had was provided by the Japanese. Most collaborationist troops were attached to a particular area, usually centered on a market town, and were mainly interested in maintaining their own little kingdoms, the source of their income and power. Furthermore, they had neither espoused any higher cause nor initiated any social programs that might have gained them popular support. The Communists could attack and defeat them one by one with superior moral and physical force.

When the Communists began their offensive in early 1944 they controlled no county seats in a base area that had grown to include parts of 116 counties.<sup>76</sup> Among the first three county seats they captured was Neihuang, which they occupied in May 1944. By the end of 1944, they still controlled only 10 county seats; by April 1945 they had 20, and by the end of the war,

in mid-August 1945, they had taken 57<sup>77</sup>—almost half of the 116 in the Ji-Lu-Yu base area. As the Communists gained the upper hand, the collaborators surrendered in droves—32,929 in 1944 and 15,261 in the first five months of 1945.<sup>78</sup> Surrender figures do not exist for the last three months of the war, but unquestionably they were even higher in that period of accelerated Communist success.

Japanese unconditional surrender in August 1945 was not the end of the fighting in Ji-Lu-Yu. On the contrary, the war that had always been fought primarily among competing Chinese forces intensified after the Japanese left. It had now become solely an internal Chinese war. In the month and a half after Japanese surrender, the Communists captured all but eight of the remaining county seats. Recruiting efforts during this period and later were greatly accelerated. Local militia supporting the main Communist forces grew from 40,000 to more than 100,000 by the end of 1946.<sup>79</sup> In other words, many more young men were engaged in armed struggle on the Communist side after the war had become purely a Chinese affair than when the Japanese were involved.

Just when complete Communist victory seemed assured, there was a temporary reversal. Jiang Jieshi sent troops, the New Fifth Army, to recover Neihuang and neighboring areas in December 1946. The New Fifth was accompanied by a “Homecoming Regiment” (*Huanxiangtuan*) made up of people who opposed the Communists, including former landlords, bandits, Red Spears, and others. Communist troops were outnumbered and outgunned. They retreated north to more secure Communist bases. There followed an orgy of vengeful bloodletting referred to in local records as “58 days of terror.”<sup>80</sup> It ended only when units of the recently designated People’s Liberation Army launched a counterattack that, before long, would unify all of China under Communist rule, and bring to a close a half century of internal warfare in Neihuang county.

## CONCLUSION

The evidence presented above strongly supports the principal argument of this essay: During the eight-year Sino-Japanese war, Chinese in Neihuang County fought each other more than they fought Japanese. The fundamental cause of that phenomenon, I submit, was an internal struggle for power

that preceded the war against a foreign invader, and continued after the defeat and withdrawal of that invader. That power struggle dramatically affected the course of the Sino-Japanese war and, in turn, was affected by it. In the beginning of this essay, I suggested that the war within a war in Neihuang had four principal effects on long-term power relations in the county. In this concluding section, I will examine those effects in more detail. Some of the conclusions I reach go beyond the evidence presented above, but can be inferred from it. I present them here as hypotheses.

First, the Guomintang, which had become politically dominant in Neihuang in the mid-1930s, lost its power at the very beginning of the war; of greater significance, the circumstances of that loss discredited any future Guomintang claim to legitimacy and popular allegiance. The Guomintang county magistrate robbed the treasury and fled before the first Japanese soldier arrived, and the leading military commander withdrew after offering only token resistance to the foreign invader, but not before extorting as much money as he could from the local populace. Represented by such unreliable and rapacious officials, the Guomintang lost credibility. Any residual claim to allegiance was diminished further when many Guomintang officials offered their services to the Japanese. They, and the party they represented, eventually would share the opprobrium of defeat with their erstwhile patron. Although Jiang Jieshi had not capitulated to the Japanese, his New Fifth Army would find little local support when it tried to recover the county for the Guomintang after the war. The road was open for other claimants.

Second, the power of former local elites, in both town and countryside, was substantially undermined during the war years, establishing conditions for a new social, as well as political, order. We have seen how the collapse of Guomintang civil and military authority offered an opportunity for bandits and other *déclassé* elements to attack and destroy the rich and powerful in the early war years. But those elements lacked the resources to sustain their newly acquired power. Most of them soon became subordinate to the Japanese, and eventually all were obliterated by the Communists. The latter, when they set out to alter commercial and agrarian relations after the war, benefitted from having much of the preliminary work already done for them.

Third, the power struggle in Neihuang County initially benefitted the Japanese, but ultimately undermined their authority. The foreign invaders

conquered and administered the county largely through the use of Chinese personnel. Various Chinese collaborated for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was a private long-term quest for wealth and power. Collaborating Chinese used the Japanese for their own purposes, just as the Japanese used the Chinese. But Chinese collaborators ultimately undermined Japanese authority in two ways. First, because they had separate agendas, the ostensible collaborators proved to be unreliable allies; essentially, they were rivals. Second, the fact that many of the collaborators were bandit leaders who already had a reputation for preying on the people precluded any possibility that the Japanese could win popular allegiance. Bandit collaborators only exacerbated the bad reputation that the Japanese had already earned through their own actions.

Fourth, the principal beneficiaries of the events and circumstances discussed above—the Guomindang collapse, the weakening of traditional commercial and landed elites, and the inherently flawed relationship between the Japanese and their collaborators—were the Communists. It is not the purpose of this paper to examine the many and complex reasons for the triumph of the Communists, but one can conclude with confidence that their ambitions were facilitated by the destruction of their main rivals in the course of the war within a war.

## Communist Sources for Localizing the Study of the Sino-Japanese War

ODORIC Y. K. WOU

To date, the study of the Sino-Japanese War has been dominated by a number of premises. First, the question of “Who lost China?” has overshadowed the field.<sup>1</sup> To refute the presumption that it was the lack of American military support that finally led to the debacle of the Nationalist regime, Lloyd Eastman (1984) demonstrated in his work that the “seeds of destruction” came not so much from an incorrect American foreign policy, but rather from Chiang Kai-shek’s own shortcomings: his “manipulative politics,” fear of mass-based movements, loss of popular support, weakened army, and post-war inflationary monetary policy.<sup>2</sup>

Recent revisionist approaches (Hsiung and Levine), however, try to give Chiang more credit for his efforts in prosecuting the war.<sup>3</sup> Instead of dwelling on the question of “Who lost China?” (thus simultaneously confronting the question on the other side of the coin—“Why did the Communists win?”—historians and political scientists of the Sino-Japanese War have lately shifted their angle of analysis to emphasize the “achievement,” “legacy,” and “contribution” (*gongxian*) of the Nationalist government,

which, after all, was the main architect and winner of a war that was conducted under the most strenuous circumstances.

Chiang and the Nationalists were credited with three accomplishments: creating a modern state structure in the prewar era, and further developing that structure during wartime; mounting a military effort which, despite all its weaknesses, was “a very impressive accomplishment”; and promoting economic and legal reforms that became the bedrock on which the Communists built a modern state in the postwar period.<sup>4</sup> Western scholarship is not alone in adopting such a revisionist approach. In recent Communist literature, the Nationalists, if for nothing else, have been credited with bearing the brunt of the war in the region the Communist historians term the “front battlefield” (*zhengmian zhanchang* or Nationalist front).<sup>5</sup> The dilemma comes, however, from the fact that if the Nationalists brilliantly won the war they somehow lost the country to the Communists afterward. How can we explain this phenomenon?

Those who study Communist activities during the war invariably focus their attention on the particular wartime conditions that gave the Communists the unique opportunity to manipulate and propel themselves to power.<sup>6</sup> There is therefore a tendency to paint an especially bleak picture of wartime China and to adopt a highly critical approach to Guomindang policies, particularly those directed towards the impoverished peasant masses.<sup>7</sup> Communist research has emphasized political deterioration under the Japanese occupation, social and economic injustice, “misery” in the countryside during wartime, the correctness of the Second United Front (insofar as it was an expression of pure nationalism and the party’s tactical skills), and the glorious triumphs of the Party and the Red Army, the two indispensable instruments of the Communist victory.<sup>8</sup>

Literature on Japanese involvement in the war has focused mainly on wartime diplomacy, particularly war decisions made by Japanese leaders at home and the connection between the latter and the army in China.<sup>9</sup> Only recently has there been a shift towards studying, in Joshua Fogel’s term, “Japan in China.” The works on two leading Japanese activists in China, Ito Takeo in North China and Tachibana Shiraki in Manchuria, are examples of this trend.<sup>10</sup> Presently, there is little information on the occupied areas and the Japanese collaborators. Poshek Fu’s study, *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration*, fills a small though important gap by looking into the responses of intellectuals to the Japanese occupation.<sup>11</sup>

Obviously, the information and answers we get are determined by the questions we pose: Who is to blame for the loss of China? How did China win the war? What factors underlie Communist state-building and the Communist victory? What is the Nationalist legacy to the modern Chinese state and economy? Our research is also continuously shaped by the changing images created by the recent economic success of both Taiwan and the People's Republic. If we assume that the economic miracles in Taiwan and China today have their roots in the Nationalist period, we will then be looking for the foundations of such success in the prewar years. On this question, historians and social scientists of the Sino-Japanese War tend towards a more favorable view of the Nationalist government and credit it with a more important role in both the prewar and wartime eras than was hitherto the case.

When we look at the state of the academic field of the Sino-Japanese War, there are two general tendencies, or rather shortcomings, to be noted. First, the study of the war is somewhat truncated. Researchers with a scholarly interest in one aspect of the war (be it the GMD, the Japanese, or the Communist) tend to focus predominantly on that particular side of the war. This may be due to the researcher's own scholarly interest, but it is also due to the scattered and voluminous nature of the historical materials. Those who work on the Taiwan materials obviously focus their attention on the Guomindang side of the story, and the same is true for those who work on the Japanese and the Communists. (I admit my own guilt here). It seems that it is time for scholars to adopt a more collaborative, comparative, and interactive approach. After all, these three power centers—the Nationalists, the Japanese, and the Communists—were incessantly interacting in wartime. It therefore requires a collaborative effort if scholars are to cover such a wide spread of materials. Take, for instance, the various strategies devised by the Nationalists, Communists, and the Japanese/puppets for mobilizing community defense, or revitalizing local trade, or manipulating nationalistic sentiment. A thematic and comparative approach should cast better light on these complex topics.

Second, there still remains a pronounced tendency to focus on high-level policy at the government level. Even though Steve Levine has urged scholars to take a "holistic approach" and has outlined five main areas of research in the introduction to *China's Bitter Victory*, even that book does not go far in answering the question, "What was the impact of the war on society?"<sup>12</sup> No

one denies the significance of looking at high-level politics, or at military campaigns, or the economy. But if we are to grasp what Marvin Williamsen has called the “human dimension to warfare . . . the human reality of the battlefields,” we will have to take a more localized approach to the study of this war.<sup>13</sup>

Recent scholarship on the Sino-Japanese War is, in fact, moving in that direction. Chang-tai Hung’s recent study of the war and popular culture not only takes a cultural approach but has shifted our attention to cultural resistance at the local levels.<sup>14</sup> In the study of the Communist revolution, there is a similar shifting of focus downward to the localities. Tony Saich has stated: “the Communist revolution was also a local revolution that depended on the good knowledge and astuteness of local Party members to adapt central policy directives to local conditions.”<sup>15</sup> My own research on the Communist Revolution in Henan demonstrates that Communist revolutionaries were forced to continuously adapt their policies and mobilization methods to local conditions. Party policies that seemed to work perfectly in one county somehow failed to work in neighboring counties because of different political, social, economic, and cultural environments.<sup>16</sup>

The findings we have on the Communist side should be applicable to the study of the Sino-Japanese War as a whole. Unless we pay better attention to the varying local socioeconomic contexts and the adaptation of policy to those contexts, we will not have a good understanding of the nuances and complexities of the war. Joseph Esherick has recently urged scholars to adopt an anthropological approach to the study of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This approach will allow us to understand the “recruitment and socialization of its agents, the invention and propagation of its rituals, the development and implementation of its methods of social co-optation and patterns of political domination.”<sup>17</sup> Esherick’s advice is equally applicable to the study of the Sino-Japanese War as a whole.

It is also absolutely essential that scholars put the spatial and temporal dimensions back into the war. The Sino-Japanese War spanned eight years, from 1937 to 1945 (or fifteen years if the war is dated from the Japanese takeover of Manchuria). Change took place over time, and from place to place. In order to assess such issues as the degree of sociopolitical breakdown, the nature of political opportunity, the trajectory of particular movements, the mobilization of resources by various powerholders, the potential for alliance-making, the motivations of collaborators and resisters, the

repressive capability of the GMD state and the Japanese invaders, and the challenge presented by the CCP, we will have to adopt a microhistorical approach. Such study of “action space” or sites of localizing politics will enable us to explore the complexity of the issue in question, while we bear in mind the larger inter-regional and national perspective.

Many of the problems we face in our study of the war are the product of generalized statements and impressions, a good illustration of this being the determination of whether, on balance, the GMD collaborated with or resisted the Japanese. The record shows, however, that GMD collaboration and resistance varied from locality to locality and group to group, and even within specific groups themselves. Thus, if we are to clarify the phenomena of collaboration and resistance, and draw up a repertoire of strategies and tactics used by the powerholders, or map out patterns of motivation and behavior on the part of the political actors, we will have to descend the ladder and adopt a more localized and ethnographic approach to the study of the war.

With the recent outpouring of historical and party materials from the People's Republic, we are now in a position to adjust our research agendas and perspectives on the Sino-Japanese War. Researchers can now localize their study and look at the war from the bottom up rather than only from the top down. Communist materials can provide us with the answer to the question, “What was the impact of the war on society?”

Communist primary materials consist mainly of three types: *wenshi ziliao* (local history and literature), *shizhi ziliao* (gazetteers), and *dangshi ziliao* (party historical materials). The *wenshi ziliao* are familiar to most scholars doing local studies. These are materials collected since liberation, written by Nationalist officials or local leaders who stayed behind in China after the Communist takeover (though occasionally one finds articles by Communist researchers). These materials are published by the provincial committees of the Chinese Political Consultative Council and the *wenshi ziliao* research committees.<sup>18</sup>

China scholars have for the most part confined themselves to the provincial *wenshi ziliao*. Only the few specializing in the county and subcounty levels collect and utilize the county *wenshi ziliao*. Even though the county *wenshi ziliao* vary immensely in quality (depending on how vigorous the researchers and compilers are), these materials nevertheless contain a wealth

of rich and detailed information on the politics, society, and economy of the localities.<sup>19</sup>

Another source is to be found in the new gazetteers published by the Communist government. Materials on the Sino-Japanese War normally can be found in the chronologies of historical events and in the sections on soviet areas, party politics, and, of course, military affairs. Nevertheless, much information remains scattered about, buried in places such as the biographical sketches of local notables. Each section of the gazetteer is a distillation of the draft version, which is often several times longer and much greater in detail. Thus the original versions contain much more information than is available in the published version.<sup>20</sup>

Journals published by the gazetteer compilers also contain materials of great use. These contain a great deal of primary material as well as corresponding analysis by the researchers.<sup>21</sup> During the process of compiling the gazetteers, Chinese researchers collected an enormous quantity of extremely valuable materials. Most of those not published are to be found in the county archives.

The most detailed and useful materials come from the Chinese Communist Party archives. In 1985, the central leadership in China gave the provincial organs ten years (1985–95) to compile materials and write their history. Since then the state has poured much money into the project. Many provincial and county histories have already made their appearance.<sup>22</sup>

Party historical materials fall into the following four categories: (1) provincial party materials (*sheng dangshi ziliao*, for example, *Henan dangshi ziliao*), (2) rural base materials (for example, JinJiLuYu, Taiheng, EYuWan), (3) regional materials (*difang dangshi ziliao*, for example, Shangqiu, covering eastern Henan, or Xinyang, covering southern Henan, and (4) county party materials (*xian dangshi ziliao*).

Take Henan province as an example. Each volume of provincial party materials is divided into three major sections: original party documents, reminiscences of leading participants, and newspaper materials.<sup>23</sup> Occasionally one finds tables and lists of chronological events in the appendices. The first four volumes cover the province as a whole. The remaining volumes have a topical focus, such as the Red Army, the Henan Kangda fourth branch school, propaganda work, local mass movements, and wartime Zhugou (the Communist headquarters in southern Henan).<sup>24</sup>

Detailed treatment of wartime socioeconomic conditions in the base areas can be found in the *caizheng jingji shi ziliao* (historical materials on finance and the economy), commonly known as the *caijing shiliao*. (See for example the two huge volumes, totalling 3,000 pages, of *caijing shiliao* of the JinJiLuYu, i.e. Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan, base area).<sup>25</sup>

The *caijing shiliao* are particularly rich in socioeconomic data on both the rural bases and the war zones. Communist revolutionaries frequently conducted socioeconomic surveys of target areas before launching a campaign or a reform. The detailed information obtained, particularly at the village level, is invaluable. (In my opinion it is comparable to the *Mantetsu* materials, but done in greater detail, with many more villages and locations covered.) Such materials not only give us an idea of the economic structure of the localities (including village finance) and party policies (such as cooperatives, and rent and interest reduction), but also contain vital information on topics such as grain production and grain stock, title deeds, local taxation, military expenditure, debt, natural calamities and relief, transportation, monetary problems, rural credit, industry and trade (the latter rendered as *di, wo, you*, literally the enemy, ourselves and friends, i.e., Japanese, Communist, and Nationalist trade). At the end of the two volumes of the *JinJiLuYu caijing shiliao* (*Historical materials on finance and the economy in JinJiLuYu*), there are, for example, roughly 160 pages of socioeconomic survey materials on the Taihang rural base area between 1943 and 1945.<sup>26</sup>

Such useful information can be found for other base areas (e.g., JinChaJi) or sub-base areas (e.g. JiLuYu, i.e., Hebei-Shandong-Henan).<sup>27</sup> The JiLuYu materials consist of a series of volumes (19 to date) compiled by the three provinces that formed the regional sub-base.<sup>28</sup> Aside from the *caijing* volumes and one on the general history of the base, there are further ones on propaganda and the mass movement. A quick look at the two mass movement volumes will illustrate the kind of topics that can be pursued in a localized study of the Sino-Japanese War.

The bulk of the material, as expected, deals with issues such as land reform, tenancy arrangements, and Communist mobilization of the peasants in both the Communist-controlled areas (old districts or *laoqu*) and newly conquered areas (*xinqu*). But topics such as labor, women, youth, militia, writers' unions, and sectarian movements are included. There is also information on the "anti-Japanese joint defense" (*kangRi lianfang*) movement at the subcounty and village levels.<sup>29</sup>

There is certainly no lack of materials on specific socioeconomic matters in the rural bases. For instance, there is one volume dealing exclusively with industrial and commercial taxes in the EYuWan base area.<sup>30</sup> Or one may point to some of the topics covered in the January 1943 social survey of Liqiji village (in Neihuang County, northeast Henan) in the *JiLuYu caijing ziliao* (Henan section): (1) post-war transformation, (2) present situation, (3) local population, (4) culture, education, religious beliefs, and customs, (5) exploitative relationships, (6) redistribution of land and class transformation, (7) political work, and (8) military work. In this twenty-page survey of socioeconomic conditions in a single village, there are sixteen tables dealing with population distribution, age, migration, army enlistment, rent, debt, sale and purchase of property, taxation, employment changes, and village cadres.<sup>31</sup>

It should be noted, however, that county party historical materials vary widely in quality. (Also to be noted is that most of the county materials are “in-house” publications, for internal circulation only.) Understandably, important counties or major centers of revolutionary activity have received more attention. For instance, there are fifteen volumes of county (or rather prefectural) materials for Xinyang, one of the EYuWan rural bases and the site of party headquarters for southeastern Henan.<sup>32</sup> Some topics, such as party organization, the women’s movement, the Liu Bocheng/Deng Xiaoping army, and the resistance war in southern Xinyang, receive their own treatment in separate volumes.<sup>33</sup> Shangcheng, part of the EYuWan base, has published eleven volumes of party and local history materials.<sup>34</sup> One volume deals with the revolution at the township (*xiang*) level.<sup>35</sup> The detail one can obtain here is stunning.

Nevertheless, even though some counties have published multivolume sets of party materials, these materials are not always impressive (for example, the set on Guangshan, headquarters of the EYuWan base area).<sup>36</sup> Other counties have suffered from lack of funds.<sup>37</sup>

Military operations, naturally, are scattered throughout the party materials. Specific campaigns, such as the southward thrust of the Liu Bocheng/Deng Xiaoping army into southern Henan, the Huaihai campaign, the Zhengzhou campaign, and the East Henan campaign, have their own separate volumes of materials.<sup>38</sup> There is a volume to be found on “*zhanqin*” or civilian war service.<sup>39</sup> Numerous biographies and reminiscences are to be found of major military leaders, such as Xu Xiangqian, Liu Bocheng, Wang

Shusheng, and Peng Xuefeng.<sup>40</sup> A volume has been published dealing with the whole Sino-Japanese War in Henan; another consists of essays written to mark the fortieth anniversary of the outbreak of the war.<sup>41</sup>

Separate volumes, composed mostly of newspaper materials, provide a vast amount of information on Japanese military campaigns and on atrocities committed by Japanese troops and puppet units. Other topics include mop-up campaigns, local economic control, monetary disruption, establishment of puppet governments, and recruitment of puppet forces.<sup>42</sup> However, while information on Japanese collaborators can be systematically gleaned from the provincial/county party materials, it is rare that such collaborators are the subject of specific studies. (The volume on Zhang Lanfeng, whose control of the Shangqiu area extended over several counties in eastern Henan, is one of the exceptions.) The four volumes on Shangqiu prefecture are full of details on occupation politics and Communist strategies of army subversion (*junyun*).<sup>43</sup>

Information gathered on the above can be cross-checked in a number of other sources. Multivolume biographies record the wartime political and military work of leading revolutionaries, often in exceptional detail.<sup>44</sup> Chronological listings of events (*dashiji*), whether of Communist party activities and military campaigns, or even of noteworthy local happenings (such as floods), are extremely helpful in reconstructing the historical record.<sup>45</sup> There has also been a deluge of personal reminiscences in recent years. These narratives are so detailed that frequently the same incident will reappear (Communist coercion of a particular puppet county mayor to join the resistance cause being a case in point).<sup>46</sup>

Titles of these reminiscences frequently put one in mind of novels, as in "The Sparks of Jiaozuo" (*Jiaozuo xinghuo*) and "Spring Thunder in the Central Plain" (*Zhongzhou chunlei*).<sup>47</sup> But scholars should not be misled by such apparent dramatization. These personal recollections of Communist revolutionaries, drawn in some cases from diaries kept by them, often prove sources of vital information about the war.

As Communist rural bases were usually sandwiched between the Japanese occupied areas and the Nationalist rear areas (*da houfang*), Communist materials are especially rich in information on the Nationalists and their affiliated commanders, as well as on the Japanese enemy and their collaborators.<sup>48</sup> There is a wealth of information on the socioeconomic background of local elites, the local power structure, the changes to that structure in

wartime, and the strategies and tactics adopted by these elites in dealing with the Communists, Nationalists, and Japanese and their puppets during the war. Conversely, from these materials we can also construct a detailed picture of how the Nationalists, Communists and Japanese accommodated themselves to the local authority structure.<sup>49</sup>

All this information is crucial to helping us grasp the nuances and complexities inherent in the question, "What was the impact of war on society?" With the great quantity of new and detailed information pouring forth from the People's Republic in the last ten years, the time has come for us to reorient our perspective. We must now adopt a more localized, comparative, and interactive approach if we are to acquire a deeper knowledge and understanding of the social dynamics of the Sino-Japanese War.



# Notes

## INTRODUCTION

### *Occupied China and the Limits of Accommodation*

1. James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine, eds., *China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937–1945* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1992); and Ch'i Hsi-sheng, *Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937–1945* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982). The comprehensive history of the Sino-Japanese War remains to be written in English.

2. Yu Zidao, "Wang Jingwei Guomin Zhengfu de 'qingxiang' yundong" [The 'rural pacification' movement of the Wang Jingwei National Government], in Fudan Daxue Lishixi Zhongguo Xiandai Shi Yanjiushi [Fudan University Department of History Modern China Research Group], ed., *Wang Jingwei hanjian zhengquan de xingwang* [The rise and fall of the traitorous Wang Jingwei regime] (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1987), pp. 302–49; Chen Yung-fa, "Challenge and Survival: Japanese Attacks on Base Areas, 1941–1945," part 1, chapter 2, in *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 78–117.

3. Michael Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 91.

4. Vasilii I. Chuikov, *Missiya v Kitae: Zapiski Voennogo Sovetnika* [Mission to China: Memoirs of a Military Adviser] (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), p. 100.

5. For Tojo's statement, see Nobitaka Ike, trans. and ed., *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 229–30; for minimum Japanese demands on China, see Ike, pp. 209–11.

6. Fei Zheng, Li Zuomin, and Zhang Jiaji, *Kang Ri shiqi de wei zhengquan* [Puppet regimes of the resistance war period] (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1993).

7. George E. Taylor, *The Struggle for North China* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940). Client regimes in North China and Inner Mongolia are discussed in John H. Boyle, *China and Japan at War, 1937–1945: The Politics of Collaboration* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).

8. Fei Zheng et al., *KangRi shiqi de wei zhengquan*, pp. 115–31.
9. These themes are stressed in “Securing Peace with Honour: Statements and Other Declarations by Wang Ching-wei,” in the *People’s Tribune*, vol. 27, nos. 1–6, (August–October, 1939), pp. 63–81. *People’s Tribune*, published in Shanghai, was the English language organ of the “peace movement.”
10. For the June talks, see Huang Meizhen and Zhang Yun, eds., *Wang Jingwei Guomin Zhengfu chengli* [The establishment of the Wang Jingwei National Government] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1984), pp. 88–116; for the Chong-guangtang negotiations, see Huang Meizhen and Zhang Yun, eds., *Wang Jingwei jituan toudi* [The defection to the enemy of the Wang Jingwei clique] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1984), pp. 298–325, and John H. Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, pp. 256–76; for the Basic Treaty, see David J. Lu., ed., *Sources of Japanese History* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), vol. 2, pp. 139–41.
11. “Zhonghua Minguo Riben jian tongmeng tiaoyue” [Treaty of alliance between the Republic of China and Japan], in Cai Dejin, ed., *Zhou Fohai riji* [The diary of Zhou Fohai] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 1986), vol. 2, pp. 1273–74.
12. For the “last will,” see John H. Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, pp. 395–97.
13. H. Roderick Kedward, *Occupied France: Collaboration and Resistance, 1940–1944* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 40–41.
14. U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, *China Area Operations Period: Command of the China Expeditionary Army*, Japanese Monograph no. 129 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, 1952), pp. 2–3.
15. Liu Qikui, “Wang wei hanjian wenhua gaishu” [A survey of traitors’ culture under the Wang puppets], in Fudan University Department of History, *Wang Jingwei hanjian zhengquan de xingwang*, pp. 217–62.
16. David Strand, “City People under Siege: The Impact of Warlordism,” in *Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in the 1920s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 198–221.
17. This is the underlying cause of communist success advanced by Chalmers A. Johnson in *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).
18. John H. Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, Gerald E. Bunker, *The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War, 1937–41* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972). For works on French collaboration, see note 6 in notes for chapter 4 below.
19. Zhang Yun, “Wang wei zhengquan de fumie yu hanjian de shenpan” [The collapse of the Wang puppet regime and the trials of the traitors], in Fudan University Department of History, *Wang Jingwei hanjian zhengquan de xingwang*, pp. 458–81.
20. Yuan Yuquan, “Wang wei zhengquan kuatai qianhou jianwen suoji” [Scattered reminiscences of the last days and aftermath of the Wang regime], in Zhu Jinyuan and Chen Zuen, eds., *Wang wei shoushen jishi* [Records of the trials of the

Wang puppets] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1988), pp. 131–32.

21. Sadao Asada, ed., *Japan and the World, 1853–1952: A Bibliographic Guide to Japanese Scholarship in Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp. 26–27.

22. Frederick W. Mote, *Japanese-Sponsored Governments in China, 1937–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954).

23. Cai Dejin and Li Huixian, *Wang Jingwei wei Guomin Zhengfu jishi* [Chronology of the puppet Wang Jingwei] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 1982); Cai Dejin, *Lishi de guaitai: Wang Jingwei Guomin Zhengfu* [A historical malformation: the Wang Jingwei National Government] (Guangxi Shifan chubanshe, 1993); for Fudan University, see Fudan University Department of History, *Wang Jingwei hanjian zhengquan de xingwang* and the works by Huang Meizhen and Zhang Yun cited in note 10.

24. Examples of each genre are, respectively, Huang Meizhen, ed., *Wei ting youyinglu: dui Wang wei zhengfu de huiyi jishi* [Shadows of the false court: remembrances of the Wang puppet government] (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1991); and Zhang Wenjie, ed., *Heise dang'an: touri jujian shouchang ji* [The black archives: the end of the big traitors who defected to Japan] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo diantai chubanshe, 1995).

25. Three volumes were published: the two edited by Huang Meizhen and Zhang Yun on Wang Jingwei's defection and the establishment of the Wang regime (cited in note 10); and a third edited by Yu Zidao, Liu Qikui and Cao Zhenwei, *Wang Jingwei Guomin Zhengfu "qingxiang" yundong* [The 'rural pacification' movement of the Wang Jingwei National Government] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1985).

26. For a wide-ranging survey of materials available for "grassroots" history of the wartime period, see chapter 11 in this volume by Odoric Y. K. Wou, "Communist Sources for Localizing the Study of the Sino-Japanese War."

27. Zhao Mingzhong and Li Zuoming, eds., *Zhongguo Di'er Lishi Dang'anguan zhinan: Guide to the Second Historical Archives of China* (Beijing: Zhongguo dang'an chubanshe, 1994).

## CHAPTER ONE

### *Wang Jingwei and the Policy Origins of the "Peace Movement," 1932–1937*

1. Scholars in the People's Republic of China, without exception, accept this interpretation. See, for example, Zhang Tongxin, *Jiang Wang hezuo de Guomin Zhengfu* [The National Government under the Jiang-Wang coalition] (Heilongjiang: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 1988). For a study of Wang's "peace movement," see Gerald E. Bunker, *The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War, 1937–1941* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972).

2. For a discussion of Wang's attitude toward Japan during the Manchurian cri-

sis, see Donald A. Jordan, "Shifts in Wang Ching-wei's Japan Policy During the Kuomintang Factional Struggle of 1931-1932," *Asian Profile*, vol. 12, no. 3 (June 1984), pp. 199-214.

3. "Yizhoujian guoneiwai dashi shuping" [Weekly news review], *Guowen zhoubao*, vol. 9, no. 6 (February 1, 1932), pp. 2-3, 5-6; Wang Zhaoming (Jingwei), "Zishu jiuyiba zhi yandian zhi zhuzhang" [An explanation of my positions from the Manchurian Incident to the 1938 announcement], GMD (Guomindang) Party Archives, 715.1/261.

4. Wang Jingwei, "Yimian dikang yimian jiaoshe" [Resisting while negotiating], in Lin Bosheng, ed., *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zuijin yanlunji* [Recent speeches by Mr. Wang Jingwei] (Shanghai: Zhonghua ribaoguan, 1937), p. 15. For Wang's statements during the incident, see Jingchi, "Zhengfu qianLuo shiyu baoRi jue dou" [The government moves to Luoyang and vows to fight the Japanese], *Guowen zhoubao*, vol. 9, no. 7 (February 22, 1932), pp. 2-3, 5-6.

5. Jiang himself had considered direct negotiations with Japan as early as November 1931. See *Gu Weijun huiyilu* [The Memoirs of Wellington Koo], vol. 1 (Beijing, 1983), p. 425; Wellington Koo's telegrams to Zhang Xueliang, *Minguo dang'an*, no. 2 (1985), pp. 20-22.

6. Wang Jingwei, "Lao hua" [Old words], in *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zuijin yanlunji*, pp. 43-48.

7. "Yizhoujian guoneiwai dashi shuping," *Guowen zhoubao*, vol. 9, no. 21 (May 30, 1932), pp. 7-8.

8. *Yong bao* (Beiping), June 17, 1932.

9. "Yizhoujian guoneiwai dashi shuping," *Guowen zhoubao*, vol. 9, no. 32 (August 15, 1932), pp. 1-6.

10. For the various speculations on Wang's motives in attacking Zhang, see Parks M. Coble, *Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 61-67.

11. Wang Zhaoming, "Rehe wenti yu gongfu guonan" [The Jehol issue and the national crisis], in *Geming wenxian* [Documents on the revolution], vol. 38 (Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang dangshi bianzuan weiyuanhui, 1965), pp. 2187-88; Chen Gongbo, *Kuxiaolu* [Bitter smile], edited by N. Lee, W. S. K. Waung, and L. Y. Chiu, (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1979), p. 283.

12. Lei Ming, *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zhuan* [A Biography of Mr. Wang Jingwei] (Nanjing: Zhengzhi yuekanshe, 1944), p. 234; Zhang Tongxin, *Jiang Wang hezuo de Guomin Zhengfu*, pp. 52-53.

13. Li Yunhan, ed., *Kangzhanqian Huabei zhengju shiliao* [Historical materials on the political situation in north China before the war of resistance] (Taipei, Zhengzhong shuju, 1982), pp. 6-7.

14. Wang Zingwei, "Xingzheng yuanzhang Wang Zhaoming dui baoRi qinlue xuanyan" [Manifesto on Japanese aggression by Premier Wang Zhaoming], *Geming wenxian*, vol. 38, pp. 2198-2200.

15. "Yizhoujian guoneiwai dashi shuping," *Guowen zhoubao*, vol. 9, no. 32, p. 4. See also Wang Jingwei, "Ruhe dapu junren geju de jumian" [How to destroy military separatism], in *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zuijin yanlunji*, pp. 27–34.
16. Li Yunhan, ed., *Kangzhanqian Huabei zhengju shiliao*, pp. 233–34.
17. "Yizhoujian guoneiwai dashi shuping," *Guowen zhoubao*, vol. 9, no. 32, pp. 3–4.
18. See Wang Ke-wen, "The Left Guomindang in Opposition, 1927–31," *Chinese Studies in History*, vol. 20, no. 2 (Winter 1986–87), pp. 25–32.
19. Wang Jingwei, "Xingzheng yuanzhang Wang Zhaoming dui baoRi qinlue xuanyan," pp. 2198–2200.
20. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed., *Hu Shi laiwang shuxinxuan* [Selected letters of Hu Shih] (Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), pp. 210–11.
21. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed., *Hu Shi laiwang shuxinxuan*, p. 223; Wang Jingwei, "Zuihou guantou" [Final moment], in *Wang Jingwei xiansheng kangzhan yanlunji* [Speeches on the war of resistance by Mr. Wang Jingwei] (Chongqing: Duli chubanshe, 1938), pp. 8–12.
22. Wang Jingwei, "Dikang yao you juexin hai yao you liliang" [Resistance needs not only determination but also strength], in *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zuijin yanlunji*, p. 36; Li Yunhan, ed., *Kangzhanqian Huabei zhengju shiliao*, p. 235.
23. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed., *Hu Shi laiwang shuxinxuan*, pp. 210–11.
24. Li Yunhan, ed., *Kangzhanqian Huabei zhengju shiliao*, p. 234.
25. Jiang Tingfu (T. F. Tsiang), "Zheyi xingqi" [This week], *Duli pinglun* [Independent review], no. 62 (August 13, 1933), p. 4.
26. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed., *Hu Shi laiwang shuxinxuan*, pp. 210–11.
27. Shen Yiyun, *Yiyun huiyi* [Memoirs of Yiyun] (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1971), pp. 479–93. Privately, however, Wang indicated his lack of confidence in Huang Fu's integrity and ability: Chen Gongbo, *Kuxiaolu*, p. 335.
28. Chen Gongbo, *Kuxiaolu*, pp. 296, 405.
29. Wang Jingwei's telegram to He Yingqin, in *Geming wenxian*, vol. 38, pp. 2123–24. See also "Yizhoujian guoneiwai dashi shuping," *Guowen zhoubao*, vol. 10, no. 21 (May 29, 1933), p. 3.
30. "Yizhoujian guoneiwai dashi shuping," *Guowen zhoubao*, vol. 10, no. 40 (October 9, 1933), pp. 2–3.
31. "Yizhoujian guoneiwai dashi shuping," *Guowen zhoubao*, vol. 10, no. 35 (September 4, 1933), pp. 1–3; Coble, *Facing Japan*, pp. 138–40.
32. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed., *Hu Shi laiwang shuxinxuan*, pp. 220–21, 228–30.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 220–21.
34. Chen Gongbo, *Kuxiaolu*, pp. 297–98.
35. Both Wang and Jiang gave instructions during the negotiations. At critical junctures, however, it was Huang Fu who insisted on yielding to Japanese demands.

See Yang Tianshi, "Huang Fu yu Tanggu xieding shanhou jiaoshe" [Huang Fu and the post-Tanggu Truce negotiations], *Lishi yanjiu*, no. 3 (1993), pp. 73–87.

36. See *Hudang lunwen xuanji* [Selected essays on defending the party] (Guangzhou: Zhongyang daobao, 1935), pp. 2–43, 89–106.

37. Shen Yunlong, *Huang Yingbai xiansheng nianpu changbian* [A detailed chronology of the life of Mr. Huang Fu] (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshe, 1976), p. 636.

38. Wang's telegram to He Yingqin and Huang Fu, cited in Yang Tianshi, p. 78.

39. Coble, *Facing Japan*, pp. 136–48; Zhang Tongxin, *Jiang Wang hezuo de Guomin Zhengfu*, pp. 206–14, 360–68.

40. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed., *Hu Shi laiwang shuxinxuan*, pp. 225–27.

41. *Dagongbao* (Tianjin), June 2, 1933, and June 21, 1933; "Wang Zhaoming dui baogaoshu yijian" [Wang Zhaoming's comment on the Lytton Commission report], *Geming wenxian*, vol. 38, pp. 2198–2200. See also Chen Gongbo, *Kuxiaolu*, p. 332.

42. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed., *Hu Shi laiwang shuxinxuan*, pp. 225–30, 260; Wang Jingwei, "Lao hua," p. 47.

43. Wang Jingwei, "Yimian dikang yimian jiaoshe," p. 12; "Dikang yao you juexin hai yao you liliang," p. 40; "Dajia yao shuo laoshihua dajia yao fu zeren" [We shall speak the truth and take responsibility], in *Wang Jingwei xiansheng kangzhan yanlunji*, pp. 12–17.

44. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed., *Hu Shi laiwang shuxinxuan*, pp. 229–30.

45. Wang Jingwei, "Liangnianlai tiedao jiaotong zhi jianshe" [Reconstruction in railways and communications in the past two years], in *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zuijin yanlunji*, pp. 139–54; "Maitou kugan" [Devote ourselves to hard work], in Lin Bosheng, ed., *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zuijin zhi yanlun* [Recent speeches by Mr. Wang Jingwei] (Shanghai: Zhonghua ribaoguan, 1937), pp. 73–81.

46. Nankai Daxue Maliezhuyi jiaoyanshi, ed., *Huabei shibian ziliao xuanbian* [Selected materials on the North China incident] (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1983), p. III.

47. Lei Ming, *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zhuan*, pp. 240–41. For Jiang's own argument on postponing war with Japan for "three to five years," see *Jiang zongtong milu* [The secret history of President Jiang] (Taipei: Zhongyang ribao, 1975), vol. 9, p. 90.

48. "Dihu youhu" [Enemy or friend?], *Geming wenxian*, vol. 72 (1977), pp. 133–62.

49. Cai Dejin, ed., "Xi'an shibian qianhou Wang Jingwei yu Chen Bijun deng laiwang dianhan" [Communications between Wang Jingwei and Chen Bijun before and after the Xi'an incident], *Jindaishi ziliao* [Materials on modern history] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe), vol. 60 (1986), pp. 119–20; Qin Xiaoyi, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian dui Ri kangzhan shiqi* [A preliminary compilation of important historical materials of the Republic of China: the period of the war of resistance against Japan], series 1, vol. 1 (Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang dangshi bianzuan weiyuanhui, 1981), p. 681.

50. An additional rationale given for Wang's trip to Europe was to negotiate a possible anticommunist alliance between China, Japan, and Germany. This effort was soon aborted. Wang Zhaoming, "Shinianlai heping yundong zhi jingguo" [The peace movement in the past ten years], GMD Party Archives, 715.1/174.

51. This interpretation is especially popular among PRC scholars. See, for example, Li Yibin, "Huabei shibianhou Guomindang zhengfu dui Ri zhengce de bianhua" [The Guomindang government's policy change toward Japan after the North China incident], *Minguo dang'an*, no. 1 (1989), pp. 92–106.

52. For Jiang's speech, see *Dagongbao*, November 20, 1935.

53. Cai Dejin, "Xi'an shibian qianhou Wang Jingwei yu Chen Bijun deng lai-wang dianhan," pp. 117–18, 122–30.

54. *Ibid.*, pp. 133–36.

55. Wang Jingwei, "Annei yu rangwai" [Domestic pacification and external resistance], in *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zuijin zhi yanlun*, p. 30.

56. Wang Zhaoming, "Shinianlai heping yundong zhi jingguo" [The peace movement in the past ten years], GMD Party Archives, 715.1/174.

57. See, for example, Wang Jingwei, "Duiwai yao baowei guotu duinei yao tuan-jie minzhong" [Externally, we should defend our national territory; domestically, we should unite our people], in *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zuijin zhi yanlun*, pp. 15–19.

58. Wang Jingwei, "Zenyang shixing sanzong quanhuì de jueyi" [How to implement the resolutions of the third plenum], in *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zuijin zhi yanlun*, p. 44.

59. Wang Jingwei, "Zenyang jiuwang tucun" [How to save the country], in *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zuijin zhi yanlun*, pp. 7–13.

60. Chen Gongbo, *Kuxiaolu*, p. 335.

61. Cai Dejin, "Xi'an shibian qianhou Wang Jingwei yu Chen Bijun deng lai-wang dianhan," pp. 119–20.

62. See, for example, Mengzhen (Fu Sinian), "Zhongguo xianzai yao you zhengfu" [China needs a government now], *Duli pinglun*, no. 5 (June 19, 1932), pp. 6–9; Jiang Tingfu (T. F. Tsiang), "Jiuyiba liangnian yihou" [Two years after the September 18th incident], *Duli pinglun*, no. 68 (September 17, 1933), pp. 2–5.

63. Ironically, this Japanese preference reinforced the Chinese perception of Wang as being "pro-Japanese." For such examples of Japanese opinion, see Nankai University, ed., *Huabei shibian ziliao xuanbian*, pp. 102–3, 107–11; *Yong bao*, August 24, 1935. A rare case of Japanese criticism of Wang is quoted in Lei Ming, *Wang Jingwei xiansheng zhuan*, pp. 244–45.

64. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed., *Hu Shi lai-wang shuxinxuan*, pp. 259–60.

65. Jiang's remark was quoted by Hu Shih. Huang Meizhen and Zhang Yun, eds., *Wang Jingwei jituan toudi* [The defection of the Wang Jingwei group] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1984), p. 212.

66. Wang Jingwei, "Fu Huaqiao moujun shu" [A letter of reply to an overseas Chinese], in *Wang zhuxi heping yundong zhi yanlun* [Writings on the peace move-

ment by President Wang], (Guangzhou: Zhongguo Guomindang Guangdong sheng zhixing weiyuanhui, 1940), pp. 15–21; Huang Meizhen and Zhang Yun, eds., *Wang Jingwei jituan toudi*, p. 212.

67. *Nanhua ribao* [*South China daily news*], ed., “Hezhan wenti zhi taolun” [A discussion of the issue of war or peace], (Hong Kong, 1939), pp. 53–54, 57–62.

68. Wang Jingwei, “Ju yige li” [To give an example], in Zhongshan Qiaofu, ed., *Wang Zhaoming yanlunji* [Writings of Wang Zhaoming] (n.p., n.d.), pp. 39–49.

69. Imai Takeo, *Jinjin Wufu huiyilu* [The memoirs of Imai Takeo], trans. Tianjin Municipal Political Consultative Conference (Tianjin: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1987), pp. 283–84, 302–3.

70. Wang first used the term “jumping into the fire” to describe the unpopular task of negotiating the Tangu Truce with Japan following his return from Europe in 1933. “Xingzheng yuanzhang Wang Zhaoming dui shiju tanhua” [Premier Wang Zhaoming’s remarks on the current situation], in *Geming wenxian*, vol. 38, p. 2220.

## CHAPTER 2

### *Regional Office and the National Interest*

The following abbreviations are used in the notes to this chapter:

- BMC Beiping Branch Military Council
- GS *Gendai shi shiryō*, vol. 8 (Tokyo: Misuzu, 1982).
- HYBNP *Huang Yingbai xiansheng nianpu changbian* (Taipei: Lianying, 1976).
- HYQSJ *He Yingqin shangjiang jiuwu jishi changbian*, vol. 1 (Taipei: Liming, 1984).
- PAC Political Affairs Commission
- QQSB “Qi qi shibian zhi Ping-Jin hou Jing-He-Song deng midian xuan,” (Beijing: Lishi dang’an, 1985, no. 1).
- SZYWJ *Song Zheyuan wenji* (Taipei: Dangshihui, 1985).
- SZYYJ *Song gu shangjiang Zheyuan jiangjun yiji* (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue, 1985).
- WSZL *Wenshi ziliao xuanji: hedingben* (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1986).
- ZRWJ *Zhong-Ri waijiao shiliao congbian* (Taipei: Zhonghua Minguo waijiao wenti yanjiuhui, 1964).
- ZYSL *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian* (Taipei: Dangshihui, 1986).

1. This paper draws on my doctoral thesis, *Song Zheyuan, the Nanjing Government and the North China Question in Sino-Japanese Relations, 1935–1937* (University of Durham, 1993); my thanks are due to the British Academy, the Japan Foundation Endowment Committee and the Pacific Cultural Foundation for their support in this research.

2. See, for example, a series of articles by Nanjing's critics in *Duli pinglun* in early 1935; and the article "Di hu? You hu? Zhongri guanxi zhi jiantao" in the special December 1934 edition of *Waijiao pinglun*, pp. 1–22. This article is discussed in detail in Parks Coble, *Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931–1937* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1991), pp. 182–87; Chen Bulei, *Chen Bulei huiyilu* (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1981), p. 93.
3. Lü Weijun, *Song Zheyuan* (Jinan: Shandong daxue, 1989), pp. 1–8. Other works on Song include a brief autobiography, "Ming xuan zi ji," reprinted in *SZYYJ*, pp. 68–95; Li Yunhan, *Song Zheyuan yu qi kangzhan* (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1978); Chen Shisong, ed., *Song Zheyuan yanjiu* (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1987); Chen Shisong, *Song Zheyuan zhuan* (Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 1992).
4. Lü Weijun, *Song Zheyuan*, p. 5.
5. "Ming xuan zi ji" in Lü Weijun, *Song Zheyuan*, pp. 8–13.
6. Li Yunhan, *Song Zheyuan yu qi kangzhan*, pp. 24–25; "Nianpu" in *SZYYJ*, p. 66.
7. Yi lu pan jie, ed., *Song Zheyuan xue zhan sha di ji* (Shanghai: Huabei zhanshi xinwenshe, 1933); Li Jianweng, *Song Zheyuan* (Shanghai: Aiguo shudian, 1933).
8. James Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yuxiang* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 271.
9. M. Dryburgh, "From Delegation to Devolution: Central Power and Regional Institutions in Republican China" (EARC Research Papers 1, University of Sheffield, 1996).
10. Xiao Zhenying, *Huabei weiju jishi* (Beijing: Guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1989), p. 48.
11. Text of truce agreement in Li Yunhan, ed., *Kangzhan qian Huabei zhengju shiliao* (Taipei: Zhengzhong, 1982), pp. 273–74.
12. Report, Huang Fu to Executive Yuan, November 27, 1934; Executive Yuan Archive 2.905, Second Archive, Nanjing; letters, Yu Xuezhong to Chiang Kai-shek, May 22, 1935, *ZYSL*, supp. vol. 1, part 1, p. 668; Yu Xuezhong to He Yingqin, May 25, 1935, *HYQJ*, p. 399.
13. Li Yunhan, p. 61; Chinese record of discussions in *HYQJ*, pp. 385–87.
14. Nanjing's acceptance of these and other demands constituted the He-Umezu Agreement of June 1935. Letter, Yu Xuezhong to Chiang Kai-shek, May 17, 1935, *ZYSL*, vol. 1, pp. 665–67; He Yingqin's correspondence with Nanjing on this issue is reproduced in *HYQJ*, pp. 391–401.
15. Liu Jianqun, "Wo yu Song Zheyuan jiangjun de jici laiwang," *SZYYJ*, pp. 1134–35; Xuan Jieqi, "Song Zheyuan yu teshu de ershijiu jun," *SZYYJ*, pp. 1073–74.
16. Studies of the PAC and the BMC include Xie Guoxing, *Huang Fu yu Huabei weiju* (Taipei: Liming wenhua shiye gongsi, 1985); *Beiping junfenhui san-nian* (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue lishi yanjiusuo, 1984).
17. Liu Jianqun, "Wo yu Song Zheyuan jiangjun de jici laiwang," *SZYYJ*, pp. 1138, 1141.

18. Telegrams: Shang Zhen to Executive Yuan, October 30, 1935, *ZYSL*, vol. 1, pp. 705–8; He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek, October 4, 1935, *HYQSJ*, p. 441; Shang Zhen to Chiang Kai-shek, October 15, 1935, *ZYSL*, vol. 1, pp. 703–4; BMC to He Yingqin, October 5, 1935, *HYQSJ*, p. 442; records of conversations of Tang Youren with Amamiya Tatsumi, November 19, 1935, *ZRWJ*, vol. 5, pp. 348–49; Tang with Suma Yakichirō, November 3, 1935, *ZRWJ*, vol. 5, pp. 353–54.

19. Records of the discussions dealing with these demands appear in all the major Chinese documentary collections: a representative sample is in *HYQSJ*, pp. 394–439; Japanese versions appear in *GS*, pp. 77–102.

20. Zeng Kuoqing, “He-Mei xieding qianhou Fuxingshe zai Huabei de huodong,” *WSZL*, vol. 4, part 14, pp. 131–46; Yu Xuezhong, “Wo shi zenyang bei Rikou bi chu Huabei de,” *WSZL*, vol. 4, part 14, pp. 166–76.

21. He Yingqin to Huang Fu, June 10, 1935, in Shen Yunlong, ed., *HYBNP*, p. 879; to Chiang Kai-shek, June 12, 1935, *ZYSL*, vol. 1, p. 684; Huang Fu to Yang Yongtai, June 13, 1935, *HYBNP*, p. 881.

22. Telegrams: Shang Zhen to Chiang Kai-shek, October 8, 1935, *ZYSL*, vol. 6, pp. 75–76; Yuan Liang to Chiang Kai-shek, October 10, 1935, *ZYSL*, vol. 6, pp. 76–77; BMC to He Yingqin, November 9, 1935, *HYQSJ*, pp. 446–47.

23. Chinese sources do not generally mention the organizational background of pro-autonomy activists, apart from one reference to the “Universal Peace Society” (*Puan xiehui*) in telegram, Shang Zhen to Foreign Ministry, November 25, 1935, *ZRWJ*, vol. 4, pp. 182–83; Himeno Tokuichi, *Hokushi no seijo* (Tokyo: Nisshi mondai kenkyūkai, 1936), pp. 43–47, lists a number of organizations extant in December 1935 and dedicated to the promotion of autonomy. With few exceptions, these organizations were established in the Japanese concession in Tianjin in October–November 1935, and appear to have been ephemeral.

24. The resolution of the east Chaha’er incident of 1935 was a case in point: *HYQSJ*, pp. 384–85; letter, Yu Xuezhong to Chiang Kai-shek, May 22, 1935, *ZYSL*, vol. 1, pp. 667–68.

25. Telegrams: Huang Fu to Yang Yongtai, April 26, 1935, *HYBNP*, p. 860; July 22, 1935, *HYBNP*, p. 888; BMC to He Yingqin, November 18, 1935 (no. 2), *HYQSJ*, p. 449.

26. Wang Shijiu, “Ji-Cha teshuhua qian Song Zheyuan he Jiang Jieshi de gouxin doujiao,” *WSZL*, vol. 6, part 22, pp. 42–46; Qi Xiemin, “Song Zheyuan yu Ji-Cha zhengquan,” *Tianjin wenshi ziliao*, vol. 2 (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1979) pp. 51–60.

27. Xiao Zhenying, *Huabei weiju jishi*, pp. 41–42; Liu Rumeng, *SZYYJ*, p. 1169.

28. Telegrams: Shang Zhen to Chiang Kai-shek, October 8, 1935, *ZYSL*, vol. 6, pp. 75–76; Yuan Liang to Chiang Kai-shek, October 10, 1935, *ZYSL*, vol. 6, pp. 76–77; He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek, October 4, 1935, *HYQSJ*, p. 441.

29. Telegrams: BMC to He Yingqin, November 18, 1935 (no. 1), *HYQSJ*, p. 449; Shang Zhen to Chiang Kai-shek, November 20, 1935, *ZYSL*, vol. 1, p. 715; BMC to He Yingqin, November 20, 1935, *HYQSJ*, p. 453; BMC to He Yingqin, November

23, 1935, *HYQSJ*, p. 457; Wang Shijiu, "Ji-Cha teshuhua qian Song Zheyuan he Jiang Jieshi de gouxin doujiao," *WSZL*, vol. 6, part 22, pp. 44–6.

30. Song Zheyuan to Chiang Kai-shek, November 19, 1935, *ZYSL*, vol. 1, p. 714; cf. Xiao Zhenying, p. 48.

31. Liu Jianqun, "Wo yu Song Zheyuan jiangjun de jici laiwan," pp. 1139–40.

32. Japanese text of agreement in *GS*, pp. 285–86; telegrams: Fang Weizhi to Foreign Ministry, May 19, 1936, Xiao Zhenying, Qin Dechun to He Yingqin and reply, April 18, 1936; April 20, 1936, *HYQSJ*, pp. 553–54; press reports (*Guowen zhoubao* and *Sanminzhuyi yuekan*) cited in Chang Kai and Cai Dejin, "Shilun Ji-Cha zhengwu weiyuanhui," *Jindai shi yanjiu*, no. 4 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 1985).

33. "Ribei zhixing Zhong-Ri jingji tixi juti fang'an," Foreign Ministry Archive 18.184, Second Archive, Nanjing; telegram, Yan Guan to He Yingqin, February 6, 1936, *ZRWJ*, vol. 5, pp. 460–61.

34. Nakamura Takafusa, "Japan's Economic Thrust into North China, 1933–1938; The Formation of the North China Development Corporation," in Akira Iriye, ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 234. Song's report to the Executive Yuan is dated variously as October 6 and October 27; the internal dating of the telegram suggests that the latter date is more probable, *SZYWJ*, p. 184.

35. J. T. C. Liu, *Sino-Japanese Diplomacy in the Appeasement Period, 1933–37* (Ph.D. thesis: Pittsburgh, 1950), pp. 187–88; Zhang Yueting, "Wo zai qi qi shibian qianhou zai Song Zheyuan budui de jingli he jianwen," *WSZL*, vol. 19, no. 54, p. 78.

36. Executive Yuan order 07136, December 5, 1936, *ZRWJ*, vol. 5, p. 467.

37. General Staff to Foreign Ministry, October 8, 1936, *ZYSL*, vol. 6, p. 100.

38. Telegrams Kuwahara (Beiping) to Tokyo, December 2, 1936, *GS*, p. 627; Matsumuro (Beiping) to Tokyo, December 4, 1936, *GS*, p. 617; Katō (Beiping) to Arita, December 12, 1936, *GS*, p. 658; Liu Ruming, *SZYYJ*, p. 1168.

39. Telegram, Kubota (Beiping) to Tokyo, December 6, 1936, *GS*, p. 627.

40. Wang Shijiu, "Song Zheyuan dui Xi'an shibian de taidu," *Xi'an shibian qinli ji* (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1986), pp. 306–14.

41. Foreign Ministry report, July 12, 1937; in "Lugouqiao shibian hou Guomindang zhengfu junshi jiguan zhangguan huibao di zhi shiwu ci huiyi jilu," part 1, *Minguo dang'an*, vol. 2 (1987), pp. 6, 11; telegram, He Yingqin to Qin Dechun, July 14, 1937, *QQSB*, p. 57.

42. Opinion of Tang Shengzhi, July 14, 1937, "Logouqiao shibian hou Guomindang zhengfu," p. 7; see also record of July 16, 1937, meeting, *ibid.*, p. 9.

43. Song Zheyuan to He Yingqin, July 22, 1937, *QQSB*, p. 65.

44. Telegrams: Xiong Bin to Chiang Kai-shek, July 14, 1937, *QQSB*, p. 57–58; Sun Lianzhong to Chiang Kai-shek, July 21, 1937, *QQSB*, p. 64; Beiping to Foreign Ministry, July 17, 1937, Yan Kuan to He Yingqin, July 20, 1937, *QQSB*, p. 63; *ZRWJ*, vol. 4, p. 201; undated report by Yang Kaijia and Sun Zhoulin, *ZRWJ*, vol. 4, pp. 198–99.

45. Telegrams: Sun Lianzhong to Chiang Kai-shek, July 21, 1937, *QQSB*, p. 64; He Yingqin to Song Zheyuan, July 23, 1937, *QQSB*, p. 67.

46. Wu Xiqi, Wang Shijiu, "Song Zheyuan ji qi budui zai kangzhan chuqi de huodong," *Qi qi shibian* (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1986), p. 289; Wang Shijiu, "Xi'an shibian," p. 312.

47. For example, letter of Feng Yuxiang to Song Zheyuan, September 18, 1936, in Chen Senfu, *Xi shuo Xibei jun* (Tainan: Dehua chubanshe, 1977), pp. 502–4.

48. Telegram, BMC to He Yingqin, November 18, 1935 (no. 2), *HYQSJ*, p. 449; report, Yang Xuancheng to He Yingqin, July 22, 1937, *QQSB*, p. 66.

49. Report, Yang Xuancheng to He Yingqin, July 22, 1937, *QQSB*, p. 66.

50. Zhang Ziyang, "Wo yu Song Zheyuan jiangjun de yi duan gongzuo jingyan ji qi baoguo de juexin," *SZYYJ*, p. 1089.

51. "Chen Guihua koushu," *SZYYJ*, pp. 980, 987; Liu Zhensan, p. 1170.

52. Wang Zhanghai, "Song gu jiang Mingxuan dui wo zhi zhiyu"; Liu Zhensan, "Cong ershijiu jun de qiyuan shuodao Song Mingxuan xiansheng de wei ren"; Xuan Jieqi, "Song Zheyuan jiangjun de yihan," *SZYYJ*, pp. 1170, 1078, and 1096–98; key speeches from 1933–37 are reprinted in *SZYWJ*.

53. Song Zheyuan to Feng Yuxiang, February 4, 1936, *SZYWJ*, p. 180; this is a recurring theme in Xiao Zhenying's account of Song's dealings with the Japanese.

54. General Staff to Foreign Ministry, August 20, 1936, *ZYSL*, vol. 6, p. 99.

55. Yang Xuancheng to He Yingqin, July 22, 1937, *QQSB*, p. 66.

56. Tianjin to Foreign Ministry, February 17, 1937, *ZRWJ*, vol. 5, pp. 487–88.

57. Tianjin to Foreign Ministry, telegrams: Tianjin to Foreign Ministry, January 22, 1937, *ZRWJ*, vol. 5, pp. 486–87; February 4, 1937, *ZRWJ*, vol. 5, p. 412; February 17, 1937, *ZRWJ*, vol. 5, pp. 487–88.

58. Quoted in Foreign Ministry telegram to Hebei-Chaha'er Political Council, July 9, 1937, *ZRWJ*, vol. 4, p. 195; record of talks, Hidaka Shinroku and Wang Chonghui, July 12, 1937, *ZRWJ*, vol. 4, pp. 222–25.

## CHAPTER 3

### *Nationalist China's Negotiating Position During the Stalemate, 1938–1945*

1. Hu Egon took part in the 1911 Revolution and later served as Vice-Minister of Education in Beijing. In 1937 he became political and economic adviser to Kong Xiangxi. His operational code was 750.8090.

2. Disansuo Nanjing shiliao zhenglichu, ed., *Zhongguo xiandai zhengzhishi ziliao* [Materials on modern Chinese political history], vol. 3, part 9 (Beijing: Zhongguo kexue lishi yanjiusuo).

3. Lu Dacheng, ed., "Kangzhan shiqi Guomindang zhengfu yu Riben dangju mimi jiechu shiliao ji" [Collected materials on secret contacts between the Guomindang and Japanese authorities during the resistance war], *Dang'an shiliao yu yanjiu* [Archival resources and research], no. 2, 1991.

4. For the Five Ministers' decision of June 6, 1939, see "Zhongguo xin zhongyang zhengfu shuli fangzhen" [Guidelines on establishing a new central Chinese government], *Nihon gaiko nempyo oyobi shuyo bunsho* (1840–1945) [Japanese diplomatic chronology and major documents (1840–1945)], vol. 2, pp. 412–13.

5. Lu Dacheng, ed., "Kangzhan shiqi Guomindang zhengfu yu Riben dangju mimi jiechu shiliao ji."

6. Fan Guang studied in Japan before the 1911 Revolution and joined the *Tongmenghui* there. He later held middle-ranking political appointments in Zhejiang Province. His operational number was 751.202.

7. Imai Takeo, *Jinjing Wufu huiyilu* [Memoirs of Imai Takeo], (Shanghai: Yiwen chubanshe, 1975), p. 186.

8. Lu Dacheng, ed., "Kangzhan shiqi Guomindang zhengfu yu Riben dangju mimi jiechu shiliao ji."

9. Imai Takeo, *Jinjing Wufu huiyilu*, p. 186.

10. Lu Dacheng, ed., "Kangzhan shiqi Guomindang zhengfu yu Riben dangju mimi jiechu shiliao ji."

11. Jia Cunde, "Kong Xiangxi yu Riben 'hetan' de pianduan" [Episodes in Kong Xiangxi's "peace negotiations" with Japan], in Shou Chongyi, ed., *Kong Xiangxi qi ren qi shi* [Kong Xiangxi; a life], (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1987), p. 129.

12. "Xiaochuan Pingji zhi Jiang Jieshi dian" [Telegram: Kogawa Heikichi to Jiang Jieshi], May 29, 1939, in *Kogawa Heikichi bunsho* [Documents on Kogawa Heikichi], vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1973), p. 632.

13. "Du Shi biji" [Notes on Du Shisan], in *Kogawa Heikichi bunsho*, vol. 2, pp. 615–16.

14. *Kogawa Heikichi bunsho*, vol. 2, pp. 634–35.

15. "Du Shisan zhi Xiaochuan Pingji Xuanye Changhe han" [Letter: Du Shisan to Kogawa Heikichi and Kayano Nagatomo], in *Kogawa Heikichi bunsho*, vol. 2, p. 625.

16. "Xuanye Changhe zhi Xiaochuan Pingji han" [Letter: Kayano Nagatomo to Kogawa Heikichi], August 24, 1939, in *Kogawa Heikichi bunsho*, vol. 2, p. 625.

17. *Taiheiyo senso e no michi* [The road to the Pacific war], vol. 4; *Nitchu senso* [The Sino-Japanese war], vol. 2; (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai seiji gakkai, 1963), p. 233.

18. Xiyi Xianzhu [Nishi Yoshiaki], trans. Ren Changyi, *RiHua "heping" gongzuo mishi* [Secret Japanese "peace" operations with China] (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1992), pp. 238–39.

19. Cai Dejin, ed., *Zhou Fohai riji* [Diary of Zhou Fohai], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1986), p. 373.

20. *Nihon gaiko nempyo* (1840–1945), vol. 2, p. 464.

21. Cai Dejin, *Zhou Fohai riji*, vol. 2, p. 373.

22. For the December 24, 1942, decision of the Government-GHQ Liaison Conference, see "Cushi Chongqing qufu de gongzuo fang'an" [Workplan to induce Chongqing to surrender], in *Riben diguozhuyi duiwai qinlue shiliao xuanbian*

(1931–1945) [Selected historical materials on Japanese imperialist aggression (1931–1945)] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1975), p. 384.

23. *Nihon gaiko nempyo (1840–1945)*, vol. 2, pp. 604–5.

24. “Tianjun Liu riji” [Diary of Hata Shunroku], September 14, 1944, in *Riben junguozhuyi qinHua ziliao changbian* [Enlarged edition of materials on Japanese militarist aggression in China] (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1987), p. 374.

25. Okamura Yasuji, *Gangcun Ningji huiyilu* [Memoirs of Okamura Yasuji], trans. Zhonghua shuju (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1988), pp. 551–52.

26. *Jiang Jieshi milu* [Secret records of Jiang Jieshi], (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1988), vol. 4, p. 58.

27. Imai Takeo, *Jinjing Wufu huiyilu*, p. 224.

#### CHAPTER 4

##### *The Creation of the Reformed Government in Central China, 1938*

Research for this chapter was funded by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

1. Shi Xiang, “Zhonghua minguo weixin zhengfu shi zenyang chulong de” [How the Reformed Government of the Chinese Republic was hatched], *Nanjing shizhi* [Historical notes on Nanjing]: (1987, no. 4), pp. 8–9.

2. Tōa dōbunkai [East Asia Common Culture Association], *Shin Shina gensei yōran* [Outline of conditions in New China] (Tokyo: Tōa dōbunkai, 1938), p. 682; Tōa kenkyūjo [East Asian Research Institute], *Shin kokumin seifu no seijiteki chii* [Political stance of the new republican government] (Tokyo: Tōa kenkyūjo, 1941), p. 61; Weixin zhengfu xuanchuanju [Bureau of Propaganda of the Reformed Government], *Chūka minkoku ishin seifu gaishi* [General history of the Reformed Government of the Republic of China] (Nanjing: Xingzheng Yuan, 1940), pp. 9–11.

3. On the Anfu faction, see Arthur Waldron, *From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924–1925* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 36–37.

4. Weixin zhengfu xuanchuanju, *Weixin zhengfu chengli chuzhou jiniance* [Commemorative volume on the first anniversary of the founding of the Reformed Government] (Shanghai: Kimura Insatsujo, 1939), p. 7.

5. For a strong argument for the dialogic nature of colonialism, see Eugene Irschick, *Dialogue and History: Constructing South India, 1795–1895* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). A recent study highlighting the compromises of wartime occupation is Robert Zaretsky, *Nîmes at War: Religion, Politics, and Public Opinion in the Gard, 1938–1944* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).

6. Henri Rousso first applied the term “syndrome” to this selective remembering of the war in his pathbreaking study of the Vichy regime, first published in French early in the 1970s (*The Vichy Syndrome* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992]). Prior to that, studies of the Second World War were dominated by *résistancialisme*, the myth that the French people as a whole resisted German occu-

pation. This view took form in the final year of the war and was useful thereafter to rally nationalist political forces in the Cold War and confirm the legitimacy of Charles de Gaulle's leadership. Only as the political cadre that benefitted from *résistancialisme* passed away did the postwar generation begin to raise questions about the wartime conduct of their elders. In what became known as the *mode rétro*, this generation began to revisit, even romanticize, the occupation and to raise questions about the wartime conduct of their elders (Alan Morris, *Collaboration and Resistance Reviewed: Writers and the Mode Rétro in Post-Gaullist France* [New York: Berg, 1992]). Some declared that France, far from having been a "nation of resisters," as de Gaulle would have it, was a nation of "collaborators in a functional sense" (Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944* [London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1972], p. 235). Although the pendulum of scholarly opinion swung back late in the 1980s (John F. Sweets, "Hold that Pendulum: Redefining Fascism, Collaborationism and Resistance in France," *French Historical Studies* 15 (1988): pp. 731–58), historians of France continue to widen their explorations into what one has termed France's "totalitarian temptation" (John Hellman, *The Knight-Monks of Vichy France: Uriage, 1940–1945* [Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993], p. 234).

7. John Boyle, *China and Japan at War: The Politics of Collaboration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 363.

8. Poshek Fu, *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai, 1937–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. xiv.

9. Michael Kelly, "The View of Collaboration during the 'Après-Guerre'," in *Collaboration in France*, ed. Gerhard Hirschfeld and Patrick Marsh (Oxford: Berg, 1989), p. 240.

10. Weixin zhengfu xuanchuanju, *Weixin zhengfu chengli chuzhou jiniance*, pp. 3–4.

11. James Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 358.

12. Chū Shi hōmengun shireibu [Headquarters of the Central China Area Army], "Kongo no seiji bōryaku taikō" [Outline of future political strategy] (December 4, 1937), in Bōei kenshūjo [Self-Defense Research Institute], Tokyo, Shina: Shina jihen: zenpan, file series 315.

13. The original text in English of the January 16 declaration is included in W. N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1984), pp. 657–58.

14. These two texts are reprinted in Usui Katsumi, ed., *Nit-Chū sensō* [The Sino-Japanese war], vol. 5 (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1966), pp. 125–27.

15. Hata Shunroku, *Rikugun: Hata Shunroku nikki* [The continental army: The diary of Hata Shunroku], published as vol. 4 of *Zoku gendaishi shiryō*, (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1983), p. 120.

16. Chū Shi hōmengun tokumubu [Special Service Department, Central China Area Army], "Chū Shi bōryaku kika" [Plan for strategy in Central China] (January 18, 1938), in Bōei kenshūjo, Shina: Shina jihen: zenpan, file series 315.

17. Chū Shi hōmengun tokumubu, “Chū Shi hōmen shin seiken juritsu ikisatsu” [Complications concerning the establishment of a new regime in the Central China Area] (February, 1938), in Bōei kenshūjo, Shina: Shina jihen: zenpan, file series 315.

18. Tang Shaoyi's name continued to circulate through February as the prospective president of the forthcoming regime; British Consulate (Shanghai), “China Summary,” 1938, no. 2, p. 6, in National Archives of Canada, Ottawa, File #6045-40c. Tang was approached again on March 27 in a last-minute unsuccessful bid to enhance the status of the new regime; Shi Xiang, “Zhonghua minguo weixin zhengfu shi zenyang chulong de,” p. 9. When Tang was approached a third time in September as plans for a unified occupation regime were advancing, Dai Li had him killed; Waijiaobu [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], “Qingbao” [Intelligence reports] 1938–39, no. 32, in Hoover Institution, Stanford.

19. The Anfu faction was also identified early on for its participation in Wang Kemin's Provisional Government; see, e.g., Medlicott and Dakin, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939*, p. 574.

20. “Chūka minkoku shin seifu shokuin ryakurekisho” [Brief biographies of personnel of the new government of the Republic of China] (1938) in Bōei kenshūjo, Riku Shi mitsu dainikki [Secret Army diaries on China] S13-7, entry 30.

21. H. Stewart Forbes to Dr. Armstrong, January 21, 1938, in United Church of Canada Archives, Toronto, Finding Aid 186, box 9, file 136.

22. British Consulate, “China Summary,” 1938, no. 3, p. 2.

23. Shi, “Zhonghua minguo weixin zhengfu shi zenyang chulong de,” p. 8.

24. Chū Shi hōmengun tokumubu, “Chū Shi hōmen shin seiken juritsu ikisatsu” (February 1938), in Bōei kenshūjo, Shina: Shina jihen: zenpan, file series 315.

25. Telegram from Harada to vice-minister, February 22, 1938, in Gaimushō gaikō shiryōkan (Diplomatic Record Office, Tokyo), A6-1-1-8-3.

26. “Zhonghua minguo xin zhengfu niding zhenggang” [Proposed political program of the new government of the Republic of China], in Bōei kenshūjo, Riku Shi mitsu dainikki, S13-7, entry 30.

27. Usui, *Nit-Chū sensō*, pp. 131–32.

28. Ibid., pp. 129–30.

29. Medlicott and Dakin, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939*, p. 659.

30. “Zhonghua minguo zhengfu dagang” [Outline of the government of the Republic of China], Bōei kenshūjo, Riku Shi mitsu dainikki, S13-7, entry 30. This document is reprinted in Usui, *Nit-Chū sensō*, p. 131.

31. Shi, “Zhonghua minguo weixin zhengfu shi zenyang chulong de,” pp. 7–8.

32. Telegram from CCEA chief of staff to Army vice-minister (March 10, 1938), in Bōei kenshūjo, Riku Shi mitsu dainikki, S13-7, entry 103.

33. “Weixin zhengfu zuzhi dagang” [Organizational outline of the Reformed Government], in Zhongguo di'er lishi dang'anguan (Number Two China Historical Archives), Record Group 2001, file 85.

34. “Zhonghuo minguo xin zhengfu niding zhenggang,” in Bōei kenshūjo, Riku Shi mitsu dainikki, S13-7, entry 30.
35. Hata, *Rikugun*, pp. 126–27; “Zhonghua minguo zhengfu zuzhi dagang” [Organizational outline of the government of the Republic of China], Zhongguo di’er lishi dang’anguan, Record Group 2001, file 2; Telegram from CCEA chief of staff to Army vice-minister (March 11, 1938), in Bōei kenshūjo, Riku Shi mitsu dainikki, S13-7, entry 196.
36. Hata, *Rikugun*, p. 127.
37. Usui, *Nit-Chū sensō*, p. 138; Shi, “Zhonghua minguo weixin zhengfu shi zenyang chulong de,” p. 9.
38. Hata, *Rikugun*, p. 127; Telegram from Army vice-minister to CCEA chief of staff (March 14, 1938), in Bōei kenshūjo, Riku Shi mitsu dainikki, S13-7, entry 196; Shi, “Zhonghua minguo weixin zhengfu shi zenyang chulong de,” pp. 8–9.
39. Usui, *Nit-Chū sensō*, p. 141.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 140, 142–43.
41. “Hoku Shi oyobi Chū Shi seiken kankei chōsei yōryō” [The essentials of the adjustment of the relationship between the North China and Central China regimes] (March 24, 1938), in Bōei kenshūjo, Riku Shi mitsu dainikki, S13-9, entry 157. This text is also reprinted in Usui, *Nit-Chū sensō*, p. 144.
42. Hata, *Rikugun*, p. 128.
43. Usui, *Nit-Chū sensō*, p. 145.
44. Hata was inspecting troops in Suzhou on March 28 and so sent his chief-of-staff to the inauguration. He speculates in his diary that the strained relations between his and the Navy chief of staff must have made the day uncomfortable for both (Hata, *Rikugun*, p. 128).
45. Telegram from CCEA to Army vice-minister (March 26, 1938), in Bōei kenshūjo, Riku Shi mitsu dainikki, S13-9, entry 155.
46. Harada Kumakichi, “Hoku Shi oyobi Chū Shi seiken kankei chōsei ni kansuru kakuan” [Memorandum regarding adjustment of the relationship between the North China and Central China regimes] (March 30, 1938), in Bōei kenshūjo, Riku Shi mitsu dainikki, S13-II, entry 88.
47. Zhongguo tongxunshe (China News Agency), “Ishin seifu shokikan no gyōsei kikō” [Administrative structure of the various organs of the Reformed Government] (1938), p. 3.
48. Telegram from Kita to Army vice-minister (April 9, 1938), in Bōei kenshūjo, Riku Shi mitsu dainikki, S13-II, entry 131.

## CHAPTER 5

### *The Wang Jingwei Regime, 1940–1945*

1. For the Vichy regime a classic account is Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944* (New York: Knopf, 1972). More recent works

treating the occupation-collaboration phenomenon are John F. Sweets, *Choices in Vichy France: The French under Nazi Occupation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Mark Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941–44* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

2. For the Beiping regime see George E. Taylor, *The Struggle for North China* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940). For the 1938–40 negotiations between Wang Jingwei and the Japanese, see John H. Boyle, *China and Japan at War, 1937–1945: The Politics of Collaboration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972); and Gerald E. Bunker, *The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War, 1937–1941* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).

3. A number of documentary collections on the Wang regime have been published in China. For an introductory survey, see Cai Dejin, *Lishi guaitai: Wang Jingwei Guomin Zhengfu* [A Historical malformation: The Wang jingwei National Government] (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1993).

4. See, for example, the documents issued by Wang's rival Sixth Congress of the Guomindang (September 1939), in Huang Meizhen and Zhang Yun, eds., *Wang Jingwei Guomin Zhengfu chengli* [The establishment of the Wang Jingwei National Government] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1984), pp. 324–57.

5. This theme is forcefully expressed following the Wang regime's declaration of war on Britain and the United States in January 1943. See Wang's address to the nation, "Tashang baowei Dongya di zhanxian" [Stepping into the battleline to defend East Asia], in *Zhengzhi yuekan* [Political Monthly], vol. 5, no. 2 (February 1943), pp. 5–6; and *Women weishemma yao canzhan* [Why we must join the war] (Guangzhou: Guangdongsheng xuanchuanbu, 1943).

6. Tao Juyin, *Wang zhengquan zalu* [Random notes on the Wang regime] (Macau: Dadi chubanshe, 1963), pp. 26–32; Zhang Runsan, "Nanjing Wang wei jige zuzhi ji qi paibie huodong" [Several groups within the Nanjing Wang regime and their factional activities], *Wenshi ziliao xuanji (quanguo)* [Selected historical materials (National edition) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju wenshi zihao chubanshe, n.d.)], vol. 99, pp. 157–70.

7. Wu Lanxi, "Wang wei zhengfu mori ji" [The last days of the Wang regime], in Huang Meizhen, ed., *Wei ting youyinglu: dui Wang wei zhengfu di huiyi jishi* [Shadows of the false court: remembrances of the Wang regime] (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1991), pp. 333–42.

8. An excellent photographic record of the Wang regime is Wan Renyuan, gen. ed., *Wang Jingwei yu Wang wei zhengquan* [Wang Jingwei and the Wang Regime], two vols. (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1994). Text and photographs were provided by the Second Archive, Nanjing. (Some photographic identifications are erroneous.)

9. The New Life Movement is treated by Arif Dirlik, "The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution," *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 34, no. 4 (1975), pp. 945–80. A short memoir of the New Citizens Movement by one of its leading officials is Dai Yingfu, "Wang Jingwei Xin Guomin

Yundong neimu" [The inner history of the Wang Jingwei New Citizens Movement], in *Wang wei zhengquan neimu* [The inner history of the Wang regime], *Jiangsu wenshi ziliao*, vol. 29 (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1989), pp. 264–75.

10. The "Fundamental Principles" ["*Xin Guomin Yundong Gangyao*"] may be found in Yu Zidao, Liu Qikui, Cao Zhenwei, eds., *Wang Jingwei Guomin Zhengfu "qingxiang" yundong* [The 'rural pacification' movement of the Wang Jingwei National Government] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1985), pp. 371–73. Wang explicated these at greater length in "Xin Guomin Yundong gangyao jiangshou shu" [Lectures on the fundamentals of the New Citizens Movement], in *Wang zhuxi yanlunji* [Addresses by President Wang], vol. 5 (Guangzhou, 1943), pp. 194–214.

11. Dai Yingfu, "Wang Jingwei Xin Guomin Yundong neimu," pp. 265–66.

12. A survey of the Wang regime's main propaganda organ, *Zhongyang ribao* [Central Daily News], for 1944–45 reveals only occasional brief mentions of the movement. In June 1945 the movement was officially terminated and its branches absorbed into the Guomindang.

13. See William Wei, *Counterrevolution in China: The Nationalists in Jiangxi during the Soviet Period* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1985) for the early 1930s precedent. For a survey of rural pacification under the Wang regime, see Yu Zidao, "Wang Jingwei Guomin Zhengfu di 'qingxiang' yundong" [The 'rural pacification' movement of the Wang Jingwei National Government], in Fudan Daxue Lishixi Zhongguo Xiandaishi Yanjiushi, ed., *Wang Jingwei hanjian zhengquan di xingwang* [The rise and fall of the traitorous Wang Jingwei regime] (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1987), pp. 302–49.

14. See Wei, *Counterrevolution in China*, chapters 3 and 4, pp. 50–81. Wang Jingwei stressed this in his tour of the First Pacification Zone in September 1941; see Yu, Liu, and Cao, eds., *Wang Jingwei Guomin Zhengfu "qingxiang" yundong*, pp. 3–13.

15. Tang Shengming, "Wo feng Jiang Jieshi mingling canjia Wang wei zhengquan di jingguo" [My experience in the Wang regime after joining it upon Chiang Kai-shek's instructions], in *Wenshi ziliao xuanji (quanguo)*, vol. 40, pp. 25–26.

16. A good summary of the early rural pacification campaigns is Chen Yung-fa, *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937–1945* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 81–97.

17. Wang Manyun, "Qian li aihong shuo 'qingxiang'" [For a thousand *li* about they wail of 'rural pacification'], in Huang, *Wei ting youyinglu*, pp. 278–332, 282–85, 302–4. Wang Manyun was deputy secretary of the Rural Pacification Commission.

18. Xu Tingsun, "Wei Junshi Weiyuanhui Weiyuanzhang Subei Xingying" [The North Jiangsu Field Headquarters of the chairman of the puppet military commission], in *Wang wei zhengquan neimu*, pp. 81–100, 81–84.

19. For the *baodui*, see Yu, Liu, and Cao, *Wang Jingwei Guomin Zhengfu "qingxiang" yundong*, pp. 298–305.

20. For the *baojia*, see *ibid.*, pp. 223–28.
21. For example, “Distribution of Chinese ‘Puppet’ Forces, August 1945” (London: Public Record Office, FO 371/46212), in which British Intelligence credited the Nanjing regime with 265,000 regular and peace preservation troops (plus 140,000 in Hubei and Guangdong).
22. Xu Xiangchen, Yang Weiyun, Zhang Yaohen, “Wang wei junshi zuzhi he weijun di bianqian” [The military organization of the Wang regime and the redeployment of the puppet army], in *Jiangsu wenshi ziliao xuanji*, vol. 5 (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1980), pp. 203–18.
23. Yu Zidao, “Wang wei junshi lilian fazhan yu xiaowang” [The development and decline of the Wang regime’s military strength], in Fudan Daxue Lishixi Zhongguo Xiandai Shi Yanjiushi, ed., *Wang Jingwei hanjian zhengquan di xingwang*, pp. 127–80, 162–68.
24. Zuo Shi, “Wang wei junshi jigou ji weijun gaikuang” [The military organs of the Wang regime and a survey of the puppet army], in *Jiangsu wenshi ziliao xuanji*, vol. 12 (1983), pp. 149–96, 157–58. Li Changjiang’s defection was given much attention in *Zhongguo ribao*, February 20, 1941, and March 8, 1941.
25. Zuo, “Wang wei junshi jigou ji weijun gaikuang,” pp. 162–64; Yu, “Wang wei junshi lilian,” p. 154.
26. Zuo, “Wang wei junshi jigou ji weijun gaikuang,” p. 167.
27. This theme is stressed in numerous articles in *People’s Tribune*, a Shanghai English-language publication which was the organ of the “peace movement.” See “Securing Peace with Honour: Statements and Other Declarations by Wang Ching-wei,” vol. 27, numbers 1–6 (August–October 1939), especially the sections entitled “The truth about the resistance,” and “A reply to certain allegations,” pp. 68–73 and 79–81. See also the essay by Wang Ke-wen, Chapter 1 in this volume, “Wang Jingwei and the Policy Origins of the ‘Peace Movement,’ 1932–1937.”
28. See ‘The peace proposals of December 29, 1938,’ ‘Why China should end the war,’ and ‘Facts about the peace proposals’ in “Securing Peace with Honour,” *People’s Tribune*, vol. 27, numbers 1–6, pp. 55–67.
29. For Wang’s meetings with Itagaki, see Huang and Zhang, *Wang Jingwei Guomin Zhengfu chengli*, pp. 64–69, 92–94, and especially 109–16.
30. The Shanghai (Chongguangtang) negotiations are described in Boyle, *China and Japan at War*, pp. 256–76. The Basic Treaty reproduced the secret agreement Wang signed on December 30. For Chiang’s negotiating position with Japan, see the essay by Huang Meizhen and Yang Hanqing, Chapter 3 in this volume, “Nationalist China’s Negotiating Position During the Stalemate, 1938–1945.”
31. Yuan Yuquan, “Wang wei zhengquan kuatai qianhou jianwen suoji” [Scattered reminiscences of the last days and aftermath of the Wang regime], in Zhu Jinyuan and Chen Zuen, eds., *Wang wei shoushen jishi* [Records of the trials of the Wang puppets] (Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1988), pp. 115–44, 131–32.
32. Contemporary political and military reports on the Far East held in the

National Archives in Washington, D.C. and the Public Record Office in London strongly suggest that it was not until 1941 that the belief started to become widespread that war with Japan was inescapable.

33. Doubts about the survival of the Chiang Kai-shek government appear in many 1943–44 reports from the British Embassy in Chongqing. See for example G. V. Kitson, “Political report on occupied China for 1943” (Public Record Office: FO 371/41624).

## CHAPTER 6

### *Survival as Justification for Collaboration, 1937–1945*

1. In conversation with Inukai Ken, Gao Zongwu said he would do his best for the peace movement but would leave the moment he found himself accused of being a *hanjian*. Inukai Ken, *Yosuko wa ima mo nagarete iru* [The Yangtze River Flows On] (Tokyo: Bungei shunjusha, 1960), p. 47.

2. Zhou Fohai argued that in collaborating with the Japanese the Chinese had nothing to lose. See “Guanyu zuzhi zhongyang zhengfu” (December 9, 1939), in *Zufu huandu yanlunji* (Guangzhou: Zhongguo Guomindang Guangdong sheng zhixing weiyuanhui, 1940), pp. 13–27.

3. *Shen Bao* [Shanghai News] (April 17, 1946).

4. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 154.

5. The New Citizens Movement was launched on January 1, 1942, shortly after the American declaration of war on Japan. Initially kept from joining the war by the Japanese, the collaborationists nevertheless began to take their own initiatives in the area of war mobilization. One of the results of this maneuvering was the New Citizens Movement. Wang Jingwei took particular interest in the movement. He personally lectured at the summer camps set up for public servants and youth league members. Wang Jingwei, “Xin guomin yundong gangyao jiangshou dayi,” *Wang Zhuxi yanlunji*, vol. 5 (Guangzhou: Zhongguo Guomindang Guangdong sheng zhixing weiyuanhui, 1943), pp. 194–213.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 208–10.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 211.

8. Hu Naian, “Wang Jingwei shengqian shenhoushi xiaolu,” *Zhuanji wenxue*, vol. 23, no. 3 (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxueshe, November 1984), pp. 23–27.

9. Wang Jingwei, “Dui lujun junguan xunliantuan biye xueyuan xunci” (February 20, 1940), in *Wang Zhuxi heping yundong zhi yanlunji*, vol. 1 (Guangzhou: Zhongguo Guomindang Guangdong sheng zhixing weiyuanhui, 1940), pp. 119–23.

10. This theme is treated extensively in Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964).

11. Wang Jingwei, “Zhongyao shengming” (April 9, 1939), *Wang Zhuxi heping yundong zhi yanlunji*, vol. 1 (Guangdong, 1940), pp. 12–14.

12. Wang Jingwei, "Fu Huaqiao mou jun" [A reply to an overseas gentleman] (March 30, 1939), *Wang Zhuxi heping yundong zhi yanlunji*, vol. 1, pp. 15–22.
13. Zhou Fohai, "Guanyu zuzhi zhongyang zhengfu," pp. 13–27.
14. Hobbes's contractarian theory is such that one can read him both as a "liberal author" and "an advocate of sovereign power": see "Introduction," in Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. xviii.
15. Wang Jingwei, "Fu Huaqiao mou jun" (March 30, 1939), *Wang Zhuxi heping yundong zhi yanlunji*, vol. 1, pp. 15–22.
16. Luo Junqiang, "Xishuo Wang wei" (part 2), in *Zhuanji wenxue*, vol. 62, no. 3 (March 1993), pp. 111–12.
17. Zhou Fohai, "Shengshuai yuejin hua cangsang," in *Chen Gongbo Zhou Fohai huiyilu* (Taipei: Yuesheng, 1988) pp. 165–97. Cai Dejin, *Zhaoqin muchu de Zhou Fohai* (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1992), pp. 72–89.
18. Huang Meizhen, ed., *Wang wei shi hanjian* (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1986).
19. *Huabei guanliao qunxiang* (Yibaoshe, n.p., n.d.); Yan Jiali, "Ji laopai hanjian Yin Rugeng," pp. 152–73; Huang Pingsun, "Liang Hongzhi ersan shi," pp. 174–79; Li Wenbin, "Chen Qun qiren," pp. 180–95 in *Fujian wenshi ziliao*, vol. 14 (1986); Tang Erhe, Qi Xieyuan, Jiang Chaozong, Yin Rugeng, Wang Yitang, Wang Kemin, Liang Hongzhi, Chen Qun, and Zheng Hongnian all fall into this category.
20. Jin Xiongbai, *Wang zhengquan de kaichang yu shouchang*, vol. 2 (Hong Kong: Wuxingji shubaoshe, 1974), pp. 12–13.
21. Xing Hansan, *Riwei tongzhi Henan jianwenlu* (Henan: Henan daxue chubanshe, 1986), pp. 206–7.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 206–7.
23. Lloyd Eastman, "Facets of an Ambivalent Relationship: Smuggling, Puppets, and Atrocities During the War, 1937–1945," in Akira Iriye, ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 284–92.
24. Lucian W. Pye, *Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Modernization of Republican China* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), chap. 1.
25. Jerry Dennerline, *The Chia-ting Loyalists: Confucian Leadership and Social Change in Seventeenth-century China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).
26. Lai Huimin, "Mingmo shizu xingcheng yu moluo," unpublished conference paper.
27. Reminiscences of Wang Ying, "In the Name of the Emperor" (videotape documentary produced and distributed by Christine Choy and Nancy Tong, 1995).
28. For measures taken by the Ministry of Justice and Administration with regard to its employees, see Secretariat of the Ministry of Justice, ed., *Zhanshi sifa jiyao* (Taipei: Secretariat of the Ministry of Justice, 1971 reprint of 1948 publication), pp. 413–21.
29. "Huang Chen hanjian shenpanlu," Military History and Translation Bureau, Ministry of National Defense: 013.11/4480 (Taipei).

30. Shen Min, *Zhanhou falu wenti* (Bati Bookstore, 1945), n.p., pp. 21–22.

31. The following discussion is based upon my study of collaboration in Zhengzhou during its short occupation in 1941. Lo Jiu-jung, “Lishi qingjing yu kangzhan shiqi ‘hanjian’ de xingcheng: yi yijiusiyi nian Zhengzhou weichihui wei zhuyao anli de tantao” [Historical circumstances and the emergence of *hanjian* during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945: the case of Zhengzhou in 1941], *Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan: Jindaishi Yanjiusuo jikan* [*Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History*], vol. 24, part 2 (Taipei, June 1995), pp. 817–41.

32. Wu Futang had been director of the Auditing Department of the Hebei-Chahar Committee under Song Zheyuan. Chen Jisan was bureau chief of the Military Judicial Department of the Lichun Battalion, Sixth Division. See the record of their interrogations in ‘Wu Futang kuogong jilu,’ and ‘Chen Jisan kougong jilu,’ in “Xi Jianxun deng hanjian an” [Trial cases of Xi Jianjun and other traitors] (Taipei: Guo Fangbu shizheng bianyizu [Ministry of National Defense: Military History and Translation Bureau], file no. 013.11/2043, March–July 1942).

33. “Zhu Limin xiansheng fangwen jilu” [Reminiscences of Mr. Zhu Limin], *Oral History Series No. 59* (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1996), pp. 46–48.

## CHAPTER 7

### *Japan's New Order and the Shanghai Capitalists*

1. Quoted in Tsunoda, Ryusaku, William Theodore De Bary, and Donald Keene, eds., *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 295.

2. Katsuji, Nagakane, “Manchukuo and Economic Development,” in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 141.

3. Quoted in Institute of Pacific Relations, *Industrial Japan: Aspects of Recent Economic Changes as Viewed by Japanese Writers* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), pp. 51–52.

4. Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 91.

5. Hata Ikuhiko, “Continental Expansion, 1905–1941,” in *The Cambridge History of Japan: The Twentieth Century*, vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 302.

6. Hon’iden Yoshio (Akio Honyiden) in *The Economist* (Tokyo), June 11, 1939, quoted in Institute of Pacific Relations, Secretariat, *Industrial Japan: Aspects of Recent Economic Changes as Viewed by Japanese Writers*, pp. 55–56.

7. Shan Guanchu, “Ribei qinHua de ‘yizhan yangzhan’ zhengce” [Japan’s policy of ‘using the war to feed the war’ in its invasion of China] *Lishi yanjiu* [Historical research], no.4 (1991), pp. 86–88.

8. Robert W. Barnett, *Economic Shanghai: Hostage to Politics, 1937–1941* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), p. 184; Norman D. Hanwell, “Economic Disruption in Occupied China,” *Far Eastern Survey*, vol. 8, no. 6 (March 15, 1939), p. 64; He Zupei, “Banian lunxian hua Hangxian” [Talking of Hangzhou county during eight years of occupation], *Zhejiang wenshi ziliao xuanji* [A collection of literary and historical material, Zhejiang province], no. 2 (1962), pp. 176–77; Lu Yangyuan, and Fang Qingqiu, eds., *Minguo shehui jingji shi* [A social and economic history of the Republican period] (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 1989), p. 691.
9. He Zupei, “Banian lunxian hua Hangxian,” pp. 176–77; Chen Dingwen, “Hangzhou lunxian shiqi qunchou lu” [A record of the evils of the occupation period in Hangzhou], *Zhejiang wenshi ziliao xuanji*, no. 21 (1982), pp. 200–203.
10. *Far Eastern Survey*, July 19, 1939, p. 176; Du Xuncheng, *Riben zai jiu Zhongguo de touzi* [Japanese investment in old China] (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1986), p. 59.
11. Tōa kenkyūjo, *Shina senryōchi keizai no hatten* [The development of the economy of the occupied areas of China] (Tokyo: Tōa kenkyūjo, 1944), pp. 74–75.
12. Lu Yangyuan and Fang Qingqiu, *Minguo shehui jingji shi*, p. 684.
13. Du Xuncheng, *Riben zai jiu Zhongguo de touzi*, p. 57; Chen Zhen and Yao Luo, eds., *Zhongguo jindai gongye shiliao* [Historical materials on modern Chinese industry], (Beijing: Sanlian chubanshe, 1957), vol. 1, p. 81; Zhang Xichang et al., *Zhanshi de Zhongguo jingji* [China’s wartime economy] (Guilin: Kexue shudian, 1943), pp. 172–73; Lu Yangyuan and Fang Qingqiu, *Minguo shehui jingji shi*, p. 684.
14. Du Xuncheng, *Riben zai jiu Zhongguo de touzi*, p. 199.
15. Du Xuncheng, *Riben zai jiu Zhongguo de touzi*, pp. 200–201.
16. Yan Zhongping et al., eds., *Zhongguo jindai jingji shi tongji ziliao xuanji* [Selected statistics on modern Chinese economic history] (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 1955), pp. 144–45; Du Xuncheng, *Riben zai jiu Zhongguo touzi*, pp. 204–13; Takeo Itō, *Problems in the Japanese Occupied Areas in China* (Tokyo: Japanese Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), p. 21.
17. *Yinhang zhoubao*, April 19, 1938, p. 3; Robert Barnett, *Economic Shanghai*, p. 89; Jack Shepherd, “Salvaging the Textile Industry in China,” *Far Eastern Survey*, vol. 8, no. 15 (July 19, 1939), pp. 174–75; Zhongguo di’er lishi dang’anguan, ed., “1942 nian qian Riben zai Zhongguo lunxianqu lueduo gongsi gongkuangye jingying ji shouyi diaocha” [Materials concerning the investigation of Chinese industrial and mining enterprises robbed by the Japanese aggressors before 1942], *Minguo dang’an* [Republican archives], 1992, no. 1, p. 31.
18. Robert Barnett, *Economic Shanghai*, pp. 89–90; He Zupei, “Banian lunxian hua Hangxian,” pp. 177–78.
19. Kobayashi Hideo, *Daitōa kyōeiken no keisei to hōkai* [The formation and collapse of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere] (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō, 1973), pp. 180–84; Usui Katsumi, “The Politics of War, 1937–1941,” in *The China Quagmire: Japan’s Expansion on the Asian Continent* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 325; Hara Akira, “Daitōa kyōeiken no keizaiteki jittai” [The eco-

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## CHAPTER 8

### *Patterns and Dynamics of Elite Collaboration in Occupied Shaoxing County*

The following abbreviations are used in the notes for this chapter:

- SWZ    *Shaoxing Wenshi Ziliao* (Shaoxing)  
 SWZX    *Shaoxing Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji* (Shaoxing)  
 ZWZ    *Zhejiang Wenshi Ziliao* (Hangzhou)  
 ZWZX    *Zhejiang Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji* (Hangzhou)

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14. "Labor Conditions in Zhejiang," *Chinese Economic Journal* 2, no. 1 (1927), p. 220; and "Shaohsing—Its Special Products," *Chinese Economic Bulletin* 15, no. 4 (1929), p. 44.

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33. *Zhejiang sheng zhengfu gongbao* (August 1, 1940), p. 23.
34. Ibid. (February 11, 1941), p. 13; (February 21, 1941), p. 20.

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52. Gao and Sun, "Shaoxing qianzhuangye zayi," pp. 154–55.
53. Li, "Shaoxing jiaotong yinhang lunxianshi zaojie shimo," pp. 76–77.
54. Gao and Sun, "Shaoxing qianzhuangye zayi," pp. 154–55.
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and Ceng, "Shaoxing lunxian jianwen," p. 189; Bawu Laoren, "Shaoxing lunxian shiqi jianwenlu," pp. 188, 192.

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70. Chen Yung-fa, *Making Revolution*, p. 449.

71. Odoric Wou, *Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 173.

72. Chen Yung-fa, *Making Revolution*, p. 449.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 496.

74. *Zhejiang sheng zheng gaikuang*, p. 169.

75. Ceng, "Shaoxing lunxian jianwen," p. 190.

76. Chen Yung-fa, *Making Revolution*, p. 463; and Wou, p. 172.

77. Shan Wenji, "Minguo shiqi Shaoxingde difang xingzheng jigou," *Mobilizing the Masses*, "Shaoxing lunxian jianwen," p. 153.

78. Xu Suiqi, "Wo zenyang zuo xianzhengfu keyuan?" [How do I work at the county government bureau?], *Zhejiang sheng difang xingzheng ganbu shunliantuan tuankan* [Zhejiang journal of the local administrative cadre training corps] (December 1941), pp. 53–59.

79. Zhou Jinrong, who masterminded the reign of terror for the secret police, was executed during the winter of 1950; his equally criminal colleague Zhu Shouzhi was imprisoned in 1953.

80. Zhu Yunjian, "Shaoxing lunxian qianhou," pp. 243–44; Bawu Laoren, "Shaoxing lunxian shiqi jianwenlu," p. 200; and Chen Jican, "Gucheng lijie ji," p. 231.

81. Jin Ju'nan, "Jiefangqian gongshangjiède zuzhi," p. 145.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

83. Wang Wenquan, "Shaoxing kangRi zhanzheng banian da shiji (chugao)," p. 223.
84. *Zhejiang sheng zheng gaikuang*, p. 184.
85. Werner Rings, *Life with the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler's Europe, 1939–1945*, trans. J. Maxwell Brownjohn (New York: Garden City, 1982), pp. 73–149.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
87. G. William Skinner, "Chinese Peasants and the Closed Community: An Open and Shut Case," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 13, no. 3 (1971), p. 278.

## CHAPTER 9

### *Resistance in Collaboration*

1. See Poshek Fu, *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai, 1937–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). See also John H. Boyle, *China and Japan at War, 1937–1945: The Politics of Collaboration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972).
2. New works in this line of research include chapters by David Barrett (chap. 5), Parks Coble (chap. 7), Lo Jiu-jung (chap. 6), and Wang Ke-wen (chap. 1) in this volume; and Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "*Hanjian* (Traitor)!: Collaboration and Retribution in Wartime Shanghai," unpublished paper, 1996.
3. For an example of this research agenda, see Poshek Fu, "Projecting Loyalty: The Marginality and Ideological Ambivalence of Occupied Shanghai Cinema," paper presented at the Luce Seminar on Twentieth Century Urban Shanghai, University of California at Berkeley, 1993. See also Edward Gunn, "Literature and Art of the War Period," in James Hsiung and Steven Levine, eds., *China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937–1945* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), pp. 235–74, for a fine introduction to the wartime cultural scene.
4. Between November 1937 and December 1941, Shanghai was only partially occupied due to the neutrality of the Western powers who ruled the foreign concessions, which constituted the heart of metropolitan Shanghai. This was the period of the "Solitary Island," in which a drama of resistance, assassinations, press wars, economic privation, and contests among different political powers was played out. See Poshek Fu, *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration*; Tao Juyin, *Gudao jianwen* [My experience in the solitary island] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1984); and Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
5. For Kawakita's family background, his negotiations with the army, and the formation of Zhongdian, see the memoirs of his friends and colleagues: Tsuji Hisakazu, *Chuka den'ei shiwa: ichi heisotsu no Nitchu eiga kaisoki, 1939–1945* [An informal history of Chinese cinema] (Tokyo: Gaifusha, 1987), pp. 150–58; and

Shimizu Akira, *Shanghai sokai eiga watakushi shi* [A personal history of the Shanghai foreign concession cinema] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1995), pp. 65–73 and 81–84. For the business and political relationships between Kawakita and the Shanghai film industry before 1941, see Poshek Fu, “Projecting Loyalty: The Marginality and Ideological Ambivalence of Occupied Shanghai Cinema,” paper presented at University of California, Berkeley, 1993.

6. This discussion is based on Tsuji Hisakazu, *Chuka den’ei shiwa*, pp. 158–75, who as the Bureau sub-chief went along with Kawakita to see the studio heads. See also Su Yadao, *Lunjin yinhe* [An exhaustive discussion of the cinema] (Hong Kong, 1982), p. 124. According to Su, while promising material aid and production autonomy, Kawakita suggested that they shoot three anti-Anglo-American pictures after resuming operation. This raised the suspicion of the Chinese filmmakers. For a detailed analysis of Japanese policy toward Shanghai’s show business, see Poshek Fu, “Struggle to Entertain: The Political Ambivalence of Shanghai Film Industry under Japanese Occupation, 1941–1945,” in Law Kar, ed., *Cinema of Two Cities: Hong Kong-Shanghai* (Hong Kong, 1994), pp. 52–53.

7. Tsuji Hisakazu, *ibid.*, pp. 171–74; quotation from p. 173.

8. See Shimizu Akira, *Shanghai sokai eiga watakushi shi*, pp. 81–89; Tsuji Hisakazu, *Chuka den’ei shiwa*, pp. 34–56; Su Yadao, *Lunjin yinhe*, pp. 120–28. See also John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986); and Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (London and New York: Longman, 1987).

9. For Zhang’s background and rapid rise in Shanghai show business, see personal interview with Tong Yuejuan (Zhang’s wife), June 1994; Chen Dieyi, ed., *Daonian Zhang Shankun* [In consolation of Zhang Shankun] (Hong Kong, n.p. n.d.); Su Yadao, *Lunjin yinhe*, chaps. 17–20; Huang Tianshi, “Yiduan bei yiwang de Zhongguo dianying shi” [A forgotten episode in the history of Chinese cinema], unpublished manuscript, pp. 1–10; Poshek Fu, “Struggle to Entertain,” pp. 52–53.

10. For an excellent study of the semantic and cultural-political meaning of *hanjian*, see Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “*Hanjian* (Traitor)!”

11. For the two sides of the debate, see, for example, Cheng Jihua et al., *Zhongguo dianying fazhan shi* [A history of Chinese cinema], vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, 1980), pp. 113–18; Chen Dieyi, *Daonian Zhang Shankun*; Huang Tianshi, “Yiduan bei yiwang”; Personal interview with Wang Danfeng, June 3, 1993; Zhu Xining, “Buying yiwang er bei yiwang de” [An event ought not to be forgotten but is], *Xibai ji*, pp. 143–46.

12. Understanding the intention of historical agents is a difficult problem, and it is even more difficult to understand the motivations of those accused of treason. First, there is a dearth of archival materials relating to “collaboration.” Second, it is always difficult to distinguish motive from justification, even if the agent is clear of his own (sub)conscious desires. My above account of Zhang is based on reconstruction from various sources: see Chen Dieyi, *Daonian Zhang Shankun*, pp. 1–16; Tsuji Hisakazu, *Chuka den’ei shiwa*, pp. 195–97; Huang Tianshi, “Yiduan bei yiwang,” pp.

36–52; Personal interview with Tong Yuejuan, Hong Kong, June 12, 1994; Shimizu Akira, *Shanghai sokai eiga*, pp. 65–93; Tao Guanqi, “Zhang Shankun yu Huaying” [Zhang Shankun and Huaying], *Dacheng*, no. 8 (July 1974), p. 51; Gongsun Lu, *Zhongguo dianying shi hua* [An informal history of Chinese cinema], vol. 2; Fang Bian, *Zhang Shankun xiansheng zhuan* [Biography of Zhang Shankun] (Hong Kong: n.p., n.d.), pp. 12–18; Du Yunzhi, *Zhongguo dianying qishi nian* [Seventy years of Chinese cinema] (Taipei: Dianying tushuguan chubanshu, n.d.), pp. 287–99.

13. Liu Sze-hsun, “Chinese Movies,” *XXth Century*, vol. 4, no. 2 (Feb. 1942), p. 139.

14. Huang Tianshi, “Yiduan bei yiwang,” pp. 28–32; and Shimizu Akira, “Shanghai kara ihitai koto” [My report from Shanghai], *Eiga hyoron*, no. 18 (May 1943), p. 26.

15. Shimizu Akira, *Shanghai sokai eiga*, pp. 90–91.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

17. For a systematic study of Xinhua’s wartime launching of Chen Yunshang in its star-making campaign, see Poshek Fu, “Selling Fantasies in War: Production and Promotion Practices of Shanghai Film Industry, 1937–1941,” paper presented at the Conference on Republican Shanghai’s Commercial Culture, Cornell University, 1995.

18. For a study of some filmmakers such as Ke Ling and Fei Mu, who decided for patriotic reasons to leave the cinema for the stage, see Poshek Fu, *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration*, pp. 96–102.

19. For this line of thinking, see, for example, Law Kar and Poshek Fu’s interview with the actress Wang Danfeng, June 3, 1993; and Piao Liu, “‘Yue laoye’ Yue Feng” [‘Master Yue,’ Yue Feng], *Zhongwai yinghua*, no. 52 (1978).

20. Personal interview with Yu Muyun, April 29 and May 17, 1993; Piao Liu, “‘Yue laoye’ Yue Feng,” *Zhongwai yinghua*, no. 52.

21. Personal interview with Tong Yuejuan, June 1994; Tao Guanqi, “Zhang Shankun yu Huaying”; Piao Liu, “‘Yue laoye’ Yue Feng”; Yu Muyun, “Cong *Wan-shi liufang* dao Huaying” [From *Eternity* to Huaying], *Li Xianglan zhuan* (Li Xianglan Special) (Hong Kong: Urban Council, 1992), pp. 19–21; Huang Tianshi, “Yiduan bei yiwang,” pp. 23–28.

22. Qu Shanzhao, “Jiejue zhi jian” [The critical point of resolution], *Xin yingtan*, no. 6 (April 1943), p. 15.

23. Qu Shanzhao, “Jiejue zhi jian,” p. 15.

24. See Su Yadao, *Lunjin yinhe*, pp. 124–25; Liu Sze-hsun, “Chinese Movies,” p. 140; Shimizu Akira, *Shanghai sokai eiga*, pp. 134–35.

25. See Shimizu Akira, *Shanghai sokai eiga*, pp. 91–92; Huang Tianshi, “Yiduan bei yiwang,” pp. 40–42.

26. For the political and diplomatic background of the Nanjing regime’s decision to declare war, see John H. Boyle, *China and Japan at War, 1937–1945*.

27. See Shimizu Akira, *Shanghai sokai eiga*, pp. 124–29.

28. See *Xin yingtan*, no. 7 (May 1943), p. 42.

29. *Xin yingtian*, no. 2 (December 1942), p. 15. For a complete list of feature films produced by Zhonglian, see Yu Muyun, "Pianmu" [List of titles], unpublished manuscript; and Tsuji Hisakazu, *Chuka den'ei shiwa*, pp. 228–36.

30. Eileen Chang, "On the Screen: Wife, Vamp, Child," *XXth Century*, vol. 4, no. 5 (May 1943).

31. *Xin yingtian*, no. 2 (December 1942), pp. 34–35; Eileen Chang, "On the Screen."

32. *Xin yingtian*, no. 3 (January 1943), p. 42; Huang Tianshi, "Yiduan bei yiwang," pp. 38–42; Tsuji Hisakazu, *Chuka den'ei shiwa*, pp. 176–202. For an excellent discussion of the Hollywood production system, see Janet Staiger, ed., *The Studio System* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995).

33. See "Ribei qinlue Zhongguo dianying de yinmou teji" [Special issue on the Japanese conspiracy to invade Chinese cinema], *Wenxian*, no. 4 (Jan. 1939), section I, pp. 20–23.

34. See Huang Tianshi, "Yiduan bei yiwang," pp. 22–28. For a general discussion of other Japanese-sponsored studios in Manchuria and Beijing, see Li Xianglan, *Wo de bansheng* [My life], trans. Jin Ruojing (Hong Kong: Baixing wenhua shiye, 1992).

35. *Xin yingtian*, no. 7 (May 1943), p. 12.

36. For examples of this defense logic, see Zhang Shankun, "Zhonglian yinian" [One year of Zhonglian], *Xin Yingtian*, no. 7 (May 1943), p. 16; "Yu Zhu Shilin duitan" [A discussion with Zhu Shilin], *Xin yingtian*, no. 6 (April 1943), p. 30; Qu Shanzhao, "Jiejue zhi jian," p. 15.

37. Eileen Chang, "On the Screen."

38. See Tsuji Hisakazu, *Chuka den'ei shiwa*, pp. 204–26; Shimizu Akira, *Shanghai sokai eiga*, pp. 94–102.

39. Li Xianglan was a Manchurian-born Japanese constructed by the Manchukuo Cinema Association into a "Chinese." Through her screen roles as helpless, innocent "Chinese" girls in *Song of A White Orchid* (1939), *China Night* (1940), and *A Night in Suzhou* (1941), she became a household name in Japan for her successful creation of the "illusion among the Japanese that they were loved by the good people of China." See Sato Tadao, "Li Xianglan and Yoshiko Yamaguchi," in *Li Xianglan Special*, pp. 4–9. For her biography and self-reflections, see *Wo de bansheng*.

40. Li Xianglan, *Wo de bansheng*, pp. 228–29.

41. See, for example, Chen Chunren, *Kangzhan shidai shenghuo shi* [A History of wartime life] (Hong Kong, Changxing shuju, n.d.), pp. 156–77.

42. Tao Guangqi, "Zhang Shankun yu Huaying," Li Xianglan, *Wo de bansheng*, pp. 214–34.

43. *Xin yingtian*, vol. 2, no. 6 (May 1944), pp. 18–19; and Shimizu Akira, "Shina eigakai jihyo" (Current events in the Chinese cinema), *Eiga shunpo*, no. 11 (Sept. 1943), p. 21.

44. For a more detailed discussion of the organizational structure of Huaying,

see Poshek Fu, "Struggle to Entertain," pp. 56–57. For a complete list of Huaying's administrative staff and film crew, *Shen bao nianjian* [Shen Bao Almanac] (Shanghai, 1944), pp. 1016–17.

45. Zhang Shankun, "Wo de hua" [My words], *Xin yingtan*, vol. 2, no. 6 (May 1944), p. 19.

46. Like all movie tycoons, Zhang was a public relations genius. In order to cultivate high-level connections with the Nanjing regime, Zhang regularly sent his female stars to entertain and socialize with top officials including Zhou Fohai, Chu Minyi, Chen Gongbo, and Luo Junqiang, all of whom sat on the board of Huaying and were in conflict with the faction associated with Propaganda Minister Lin Bosheng. See Du Yunzhi, *Zhongguo dianying qishi nian*, pp. 295–96; Zhu Zijia, *Wang zhengquan de kaichang yu shouchang* [The beginning and end of the Wang regime] (Hong Kong: Wu Xingji shubao she, n.d.), vol. 1–3. For the conflict between Zhang and Feng Jie, see Shimizu Akira, *Shanghai sokai eiga*, pp. 199–203.

47. *Xin yingtan*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Oct. 1943), pp. 28–29.

48. *Xin yingtan*, vol. 2, no. 4 (Feb. 1944), p. 23.

49. To meet political and technological needs, Huaying expanded steadily in 1943 and 1944. In October 1943, a research institute headed by Huang Tianzuo was created to study and teach (mainly European) film theory and acting technique as a way of "elevating" the "aesthetic taste of the Chinese." A year later, Zhonghua dianqi gongye gongsi (China Electrical Industry Company) was set up as a subsidiary to build and repair film equipment, which now had no foreign suppliers. The company inherited from Zhongdian about 150 cinemas and operated 60 travelling movie units in the areas under the Nanjing regime. See *Xin yingtan*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Oct. 1943), pp. 17–18 and vol. 2, no. 6 (May 1944), pp. 18–22.

50. Luo Chuan, "Mantan dianying de neirong wenti" [A random talk about the problem of film content], *Xin yingtan*, vol. 2, no. 5 (March 1944), p. 21.

51. For samples of these stories, see *Xin yingtan*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Oct. 1943) through vol. 2, no. 5 (March 1944).

52. *Xin yingtan*, vol. 2, no. 5 (March 1944), p. 25. For a different version of this attack, see Kang Xin, "Mantan dianying de renqing wei" [On the human flavor in movies], vol. 2, no. 6 (May 1944), p. 19.

53. Bangong, "Tan Weihan zhege ren" (This man, Tan Weihan), *Xin yingtan*, vol. 3, no. 6 (Apr. 1945), pp. 15–17.

54. Eileen Chang, "On the Screen," *XXth Century*, vol. 5, no. 4 (Oct. 1943).

55. Interview of Lu Yukun by Yu Muyun, Chongqing, 1986.

56. See Gu Zhongyi, "Shinian lai de Shanghai huaju yundong" (The Shanghai dramatic movement of the last ten years), in Hong Shen, ed., *Kangzhan shinian lai Zhongguo de xiju yundong yu jiaoyu* [The dramatic movement and education during the past ten years of the war of resistance] (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1948), pp. 175–77; Du Yunzhi, *Zhongguo dianying qishi nian*, pp. 297–98. For stage drama as a major vehicle of resistance in occupied Shanghai, see Poshek Fu, *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration*, chap. 2.

57. Tsuji Hisakazu, *Chuka den'ei shiwa*, pp. 272–76.
58. For a detailed discussion of the Huaying stars' resignations and job changes, see Poshek Fu, "Struggle to Entertain," pp. 58–59.
59. *Xin yingtian*, vol. 2, no. 7 (May 1945), p. 25.
60. See Chen Dieyi, *Daonian Zhang Shankun*, pp. 14–19; Shimizu Akira, *Shanhai sokai eiga*, pp. 265–70. According to Zhu Zijia, who was close to Zhang and top Nanjing leaders, Zhou Fohai was instrumental in the release of Zhang, and of Jiang Bocheng later. But this is not mentioned in any sources on Zhang. See Zhu, *Wang zhengquan de kaichang yu shouchang*, vol. 6, pp. 128–39.
61. Du Yunzhi, *Zhongguo dianying qishi nian*, p. 298–99; Chen Dieyi, *Daonian Zhang Shankun*; Su Yadao, *Lunjin yinhe*, chap. 27.
62. Huang Tianshi, "Yiduan bei yiwang," pp. 51–53; Li Xianglan, *Wo de ban-sheng*, pp. 235–65; Tsuji Hisakazu, *Chuka den'ei shiwa*, pp. 328–40.

## CHAPTER 10

### *The War Within a War*

The following abbreviations are used in the notes to this chapter:

- JLYKG* JiLuYu bianqu Henan bufen dangshi bianxiezhu, ed., *JiLuYu kangRi genjudi* [The Hebei-Shandong-Henan anti-Japanese base area], vol. 1 (N.p.: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1985).
- JLYKGFS* "JiLuYu bianqu kangri genjudi fazhan shilue" [A brief history of the development of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border region during the war of resistance against Japan], *JLYKG* (1944), p. 66–106.
- KSNS* Wen Minfa et al., eds., *Kangzhan shiqi di Neihuang shaqu* [The Neihuang sand region during the war of resistance] (Neihuang: Zhonggong Neihuang xianwei dangshi ziliao zhengji bianxuan weiyuanhui bangongshi, 1984).
- NGR* Li Shizhuo, Shi Qixian, eds., *Neihuang xian gujin renwu xuan* [Selected biographies from ancient times to the present in Neihuang county] (Neihuang: Neihuang xian difang shizhi bianweihui, 1986).
- NSZX* Neihuang xian difang shizhi bianxuan weiyuanhui, ed., *Neihuang xian shizhi ziliao* [Selection of materials from the Neihuang county history gazetteer] (Neihuang: Neihuang xian difang shizhi bianxuan weiyuanhui, 1985).
- NSZZ* Neihuang xian difang shizhi bianxuan weiyuanhui, ed., *Nei-*

- huang xian shizhi ziliao zongbian* [Summary of materials in the Neihuang county history gazetteer] (Neihuang: Neihuang xian shizhi ziliao zongbian zongbianshi, 1983).
- NWZ Shi Qixian, Feng Lianhe, eds., *Neihuang xian wenshi ziliao xuanbian* [Selection of history materials about Neihuang county] (Neihuang: Neihuang xian difang shizhi bianweihui, 1989).
- NXNB Neihuang xian difang shizhi bianxuan weiyuanhui zongbianshi, ed., *Neihuang xianzhi: nongye bian* [Neihuang county gazetteer: agriculture volume] (Neihuang: Neihuang xian difang shizhi bianxuan weiyuanhui zongbianshi, 1987).
- NXSB Neihuang xian difang shizhi bianxuan weiyuanhui zongbianshi, ed., *Neihuang xianzhi: shehui bian* [Neihuang county gazetteer: society volume] (Neihuang: Neihuang xian difang shizhi bianxuan weiyuanhui zongbianshi, 1987).
- NXZB *Neihuang xianzhi: zaimao bian* [Neihuang county gazetteer: finance and trade volume] (Neihuang: Neihuang xian difang shizhi bianxuan weiyuanhui zongbianshi, 1987).
- ZGHN Zhonggong Henan Shengwei dangshi ziliao zhengji bianzuan weiyuanhui, ed., *Zhongguo Gongchandang Henan sheng Neihuang xian zuzhi shi ziliao, 1921–1987* [Materials on the organizational history of the Communist Party of China in Neihuang county, Henan province, 1921–1987] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1991).
- ZJBDD Zhonggong JiLuYu bianqu dangshi bianweihui, ed., *Zhonggong JiLuYu bianqu dangshi dashiji* [Major events in the history of the Communist Party of China in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border region] (Jinan: Shandong daxue chubanshe, 1987).
- ZJBDZX Wang Chuanzhong, Zhang Yupeng, eds., *Zhonggong JiLuYu bianqu dangshi ziliao xuanbian* [Selected materials on the history of the Communist Party of China in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border region], Vol. 2 “Documents,” 3 books (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988).
- ZJBDZX Zhonggong JiLuYu bianqu dangshi ziliao xuanbian bianjizu, eds., *Zhonggong JiLuYu bianqu dangshi ziliao xuanbian* [Selected materials on the Communist Party of China in the

Hebei-Shandong-Henan border region], vol. 1.2 (Jinan: Shandong daxue chubanshe, 1985).

*ZNDD* Wen Mingfa et al., eds., *Zhonggong Neihuang xian dangshi dashiji* [Record of major events in the history of the Communist Party of China in Neihuang county] (Neihuang: Zhonggong Neihuang xianwei dangshi ziliao zhengbian weiyuanhui bangongshi, 1986).

1. *NSZZ* (1983), p. 1.
2. *NSZZ* (1983), pp. 6–7.
3. Cf. Phil Billingsley, *Bandits in Republican China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
4. Xiao Guoying, “Gujin renkou fazhan zhuangkuang” [Population expansion from ancient times to the present], *NSZX* (1985), pp. 234–37; *NSZZ* (1983), p. 10.
5. Liu Jingxian, Shi Qixian, “Weihe shihua,” [Discussion of the history of the Wei river], *NSZX* (1985), pp. 46–58, *NSZZ* (1983), p. 2.
6. *NXNB*, p. 1.
7. *NXNB*, p. 1; Village Interviews (Interviews with residents of the area conducted by the author during 1987–90).
8. Liu Jingxian, Shi Qixian, “Weihe shihua,” pp. 221–26.
9. Li Shizhuo, “Yijiuerba nian ZhiLu lianjun weigong Chuwang” [Chuwang surrounded and attacked by the Hebei-Shandong allied army in 1928], *NWZ* (1989), pp. 13–16; Neihuang County gazetteer editorial committee, eds., *Neihuang xianzhi: dashiji* [Neihuang county gazetteer: record of major events] (Neihuang: Neihuang xian difang shizhi bianxuan weiyuanhui zongbianshi, 1987), pp. 27–30.
10. Gan Yonghe, “Wo dui minguo nianjian ji jianshi de huiyi” [My recollection of several events during the Republican era], *NSZX* (1985), p. 93.
11. Tan Shibing, Qiao Wenzhang, “Neihuang xian Guomindang xiandangbu he sanqingtuan de jianli qingkuang” [The establishment of the Guomindang county party bureau and Three People’s Principles youth corps], *NSZX* (1985), pp. 100–102.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
13. Wang Zhuoru, “Wang Zhuoru tongzhi di tanhua jilu” [Record of a talk with Comrade Wang Zhuoru], *NGR* (1986), pp. 136–43.
14. He Zhihua, “Guanyu Huabei fangxian de xiujian qingkuang” [On the construction of the north China defense line], *NSZX* (1985), p. 99–100.
15. *Neihuang dashiji* (1987), p. 38.
16. Tan Shibing, Qiao Wenzhang, “Neihuang xian Guomindang xiandangbu he sanqingtuan de jianli qingkuang,” p. 101.
17. Li Shizhuo, “KangRi zhanzheng shiqi de Neihuang xian Guomindang Zhengquan” [Guomindang political power in Neihuang county during the war of resistance], *NWZ* (1989), p. 16.
18. *Neihuang dashiji* (1987), p. 39.

19. Ibid.; Village Interviews, 1987–90.
20. Li Shizhuo, “KangRi zhanzheng shiqi de Neihuang xian Guomindang Zhengquan,” p. 17.
21. Ibid.; Chen Zaidao, *Chen Zaidao huiyilu* [Recollections of Chen Zaidao], vol. 1 (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1988), p. 385.
22. Chen Chuanhai et al., eds., “Henan hongqianghui ziliao xuanbian” [Selection of materials on the Red Spears in Henan]; Henan province local history gazetteer editorial committee, eds., *Henan shizhi ziliao* [Henan history gazetteer materials], vol. 6 (Zhengzhou: Zhengzhou University Press, 1984), pp. 1–158.
23. Li Shizhuo, “KangRi zhanzheng shiqi de Neihuang xian Guomindang Zhengquan,” p. 18; *Neihuang dashiji* (1987), p. 40.
24. *Neihuang dashiji* (1987), p. 40.
25. Li Fanjiu et al., “Ding Shuben zai Pudaqu ‘KangRi’ fangong toudi shimo” [An account from beginning to end of Ding Shuben’s anti-Communist capitulation to the enemy while ‘resisting Japan’ in the greater Puyang area], Henan province committee of the Chinese People’s political consultative assembly history materials research committee, eds., *Henan wenshi ziliao xuanji* [Selections of Henan history materials] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1980), p. 145.
26. Ibid., p. 145.
27. Li Shizhuo, “KangRi zhanzheng shiqi de Neihuang xian Guomindang Zhengquan,” p. 19.
28. Ma Guangun, “Kangzhan chuqi Neihuang xian de dangzheng jianshe” [The establishment of the party and government in Neihuang County in the early period of the war of resistance], *JLYKG* (1985), p. 93; *Neihuang dashiji* (1987), p. 43.
29. Li Shizhuo, “KangRi zhanzheng shiqi de Neihuang xian Guomindang Zhengquan,” p. 20; *Neihuang dashiji* (1987), p. 49.
30. Guo Chuanxi, Xu Youli, “JiLuYu bianqu kangRi genjudi de chuangjian” [The establishment of an anti-Japanese base area in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border region] (n.p., n.d.), p. 19; Li Fanjiu, “Ding Shuben zai Pudaqu ‘KangRi’ fangong toudi shimo,” p. 143; *Neihuang dashiji* (1987), p. 44.
31. *NXZB*, pp. 7–11.
32. Tan Shibing, Qiao Wenzhang, “Neihuang xian Guomindang xiandangbu he sanqingtuan de jianli qingkuang,” pp. 349–54.
33. Liu Jingxian, “Weihe shihua,” pp. 228, 229.
34. Tan Shibing, Qiao Wenzhang, “Neihuang xian Guomindang xiandangbu he sanqingtuan de jianli qingkuang,” p. 349.
35. Ibid., p. 349.
36. Gan Yonghe, “Wo dui minguo nianjian ji jianshi de huiyi,” p. 98; Tan Shibing, Qiao Wenzhang, “Neihuang xian Guomindang xiandangbu he sanqingtuan de jianli qingkuang,” pp. 349–50.
37. *NXZB*, pp. 77–78.
38. Tan Shibing, Qiao Wenzhang, “Neihuang xian Guomindang xiandangbu he sanqingtuan de jianli qingkuang,” pp. 349–54; *NXZB*, p. 9; *NXSB*, p. 89.

39. Tan Shibing, Qiao Wenzhang, "Neihuang xian Guomindang xiandangbu he sanqingtuan de jianli qingkuang," p. 350.
40. Li Fanjiu, "Ding Shuben zai Pudaqu 'KangRi' fangong toudi shimo," p. 155.
41. *NXNB*, p. 9.
42. Guo Yaoxi, "Jiefangqian de 'si wufu'" [The 'four five-blessings' before liberation], *NSZX*, (1985), pp. 147–50.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
45. Liu Jingxian, Tian Zhongyi, Liu Jingxian, Tian Zhongyi, "Hu Laoxiu feituan shimo" [The bandit troop of Hu Laoxiu from beginning to end], *NGR*, pp. 346–49.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*
48. *NXSB*, p. 89; Liu Jingxian, Tian Zhongyi, "Hu Laoxiu feituan shimo," pp. 346–49.
49. Tan Shibing, Qiao Wenzhang, "Neihuang xian Guomindang xiandangbu he sanqingtuan de jianli qingkuang," p. 104.
50. *Neihuang dashiji* (1987), p. 49.
51. Tan Shibing, Qiao Wenzhang, "Neihuang xian Guomindang xiandangbu he sanqingtuan de jianli qingkuang," pp. 104–6.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
54. Village Interviews, 1987.
55. Tan Shibing, Qiao Wenzhang, "Neihuang xian Guomindang xiandangbu he sanqingtuan de jianli qingkuang," p. 106.
56. Village Interviews, 1987.
57. Huang Heming, Shen Guoming, "Dui pantu Wu Lantian douzheng de bufen shiji" [Some achievements in the struggle against the turncoat Wu Lantian], Henan province committee of the Chinese people's political consultative assembly history materials research committee, eds., *Puyang wenshi ziliao* [Puyang history materials], vol. 2 (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1986), pp. 49–50; *Neihuang dashiji* (1987), p. 42.
58. Zhang Qiaocu, "Wo suo zhidao de pantu Wu Lantian de yixie qingkuang" [Some of the things I know about the traitor Wu Lantian], *Dangshi tongxun ziliao* [Party history news materials] (Hua xian: Hua xian dangshi ban, 1984), p. 46.
59. Huang Heming, Shen Guoming, "Dui pantu Wu Lantian douzheng de bufen shiji," p. 49.
60. Wen Mingfa, "Sharen mowang Wu Lantian" [The murderous king of demons Wu Lantian], *NWZ*, pp. 180–82.
61. *Neihuang dashiji* (1987), p. 48.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
63. "'Si-yi-er' dikou dui shaqu de 'juewang saodang'" [The desperate mop-up of the sand region by enemy invaders on April 12], *KSNS*, p. 147; "Rikou 'Si-yi-er' da

saodang de cuixing” [The crimes of the Japanese invaders during the April 12 mop-up], *KSNS*, p. 140.

64. Chen Chuanhai et al., eds., “Henan hongqianghui ziliao xuanbian,” p. 412.

65. Xia Chuan, “Rikou da ‘saodang’ shaqu zaohaojie” [Major devastation of the sand region from the Japanese invaders’ ‘mop-up’; written 1941], *Geming huiyilu*, [Recollections of the revolution], vol. 15 (1985) (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1985), pp. 181, 183.

66. Wang Congwen, “‘Kuaidaohui’ shimo ji” [An account of the ‘Fast knives’ from beginning to end], *KSNS*, pp. 113–16; Fu Lingyun, “Zhiqu ‘Tianmenhui’” [Outsmarting the ‘Gate of heaven society’], *Liaoyuan* [Prairie fire], vol. 6 (1982), pp. 142–50.

67. The names of all the people mentioned above are recorded in the *Neihuang dashiji* and in numerous other sources cited in this paper.

68. The Ji-Lu-Yu Base area encompassed large parts of southern Hebei, eastern Shandong, and northern Henan provinces, and smaller parts of northern Jiangsu and Anhui provinces. Its physical size and population differed considerably over the course of the war. By the end of the war, the population approached 13,500,000, not all of whom were under effective jurisdiction of the communist-led government.

69. *ZJBDD*, p. 178.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

71. *Neihuang dashiji* (1987), entries 1938–45.

72. *Neihuang dashiji* (1987), entries 1938–45; Chen Zaidao, *Chen zaidao huiyilu*, pp. 385–87; Guo Chuanxi, Xu Youli, “JiLuYu bianqu kangRi genjudi de chuangujian,” pp. 17–19; Wei Hongyun and Zuo Zhiyuzn, *Huabei genjudi shi* [A history of anti-Japanese base areas in north China] (Beijing: Dang’an chubanshe, 1990), p. 17.

73. See *JLYKGS* (1944); Odoric Wou, *Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

74. *ZJBDD*, p. 200.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 197.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 212.

77. Zhang Wenjie, “JiLuYu KangRi genjudi de minsheng minzhu douzheng” [The struggle for democracy and livelihood in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan base area], *Zhongzhou xuekan* [Central region periodical], vol. 5 (1986), pp. 125–27; or Zhang Wenjie, “JiLuYu KangRi genjudi minzhu minsheng douzheng chutan” [Preliminary investigation of the struggle for democracy and livelihood in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan base area], *Zhonghua minzu de zhuangju* [The magnificent feat of the Chinese nation] (N.p.: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1986), pp. 209, 211.

78. *ZJBDD*, pp. 211, 214.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 226.

80. *Neihuang dashiji* (1987), pp. 56–58; *Liucun xiang xiangzhi chugao* [Liucun township gazetteer, first draft] (Liucun: Liucun xiangzhi lingdao xiaozu, 1985), pp. 72–74; Village Interviews, 1987.

## CHAPTER II

*Communist Sources for Localizing the Study of the Sino-Japanese War*

1. Lloyd Eastman, "Who Lost China? Chiang Kai-Shek Testifies," *China Quarterly* 88 (December 1981), pp. 658–68.
2. Lloyd E. Eastman, *Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937–1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984).
3. James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine, eds., *China's Bitter Victory: The War With Japan, 1937–1945* (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1992).
4. Hsiung and Levine, eds., Introduction, in *China's Bitter Victory*, pp. xxiii–xxiv. For a reassessment of the overall performance of the Nationalist government, see also Andrew J. Nathan, "Some Trends in the Historiography of Republican China," *Republican China* 17, no. 1 (November 1991), pp. 117–31; and William C. Kirby and Stephen C. Averill, "More States of the Field," *Republican China* 18, no. 1 (November 1992), pp. 206–24.
5. He Mingzhou, "Kang Ri zhanzheng shiqi de Henan zhengmian zhanchang" [The front battlefield in Henan during the Sino-Japanese War], *Henan shizhi ziliao* [Materials on Henan local history] 9 (December 1985), pp. 94–102 (Zhengzhou: Henan sheng difang shizhi bianzuan weiyuanhui).
6. Yung-fa Chen, *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Kathleen Hartford and Steven M. Goldstein, eds., *Single Sparks: China's Rural Revolutions* (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1989); Tony Saich, *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party* (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1996); Steven Levine, *Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1948* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Odoric Y. K. Wou, *Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).
7. For a review of the field, see Stephen Averill, "More States of the Field Part Two: The Communist-led Revolutionary Movement," *Republican China* 18, no. 1 (November 1992), pp. 225–55. See Mark Selden, *The Yen'an Way in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); Fernando Galbiati, *P'eng P'ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); Ralph Thaxton, *China Turned Rightside Up: Revolutionary Legitimacy in the Peasant World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Robert B. Marks, *Rural Revolution in South China: Peasants and the Making of History in Haifeng County, 1570–1930* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984).
8. This is reflected in, for instance, Hou Zhiying, Cai Kangzhi, and Zhang Yupeng, eds., vol. 1, in *Zhonggong Henan dangshi* [The Henan Chinese Communist party history], *Zhonggong Henan shengwei dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui* (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1993).
9. Lincoln Li, *The Japanese Army in North China 1937–1941: Problems of Political and Economic Control* (Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1975).

10. Joshua A. Fogel, *Life Along the South Manchurian Railway: The Memoirs of Ito Takeo* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988); Lincoln Li, *The China Factor in Japanese Thought: The Case of Tachibana Shiraki (1881–1945)* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).

11. For the phenomenon of collaboration, see Gerald E. Bunker, *The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War, 1937–1941* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972). Poshek Fu, *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai, 1937–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).

12. Hsiung and Levine, eds., *China's Bitter Victory*, p. xxii.

13. Hsiung and Levine, eds., *China's Bitter Victory*, chapter 6, pp. 135–56.

14. Chang-tai Hung, *War and Popular Culture: Resistance in Modern China, 1937–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

15. Tony Saich, "Introduction: The Chinese Communist Party and the Anti-Japanese War Base Areas," *China Quarterly* 140 (December 1994), p. 1006.

16. Odoric Y. K. Wou, *Mobilizing the Masses*.

17. Joseph W. Esherick, "Deconstructing the Construction of the Party-State: Gulin County in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region," *China Quarterly* 140 (December 1994), p. 1079.

18. For instance, the *Henan wenshi ziliao* [Henan materials on literature and history] (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe).

19. The twelve volumes of *Gongxian wenshi ziliao*, a county *wenshi ziliao*, contain materials such as trade and industry in towns (*zhen*) and market towns (*ji*), recollections by revolutionaries, county education, warlord activities, floods, the Xiaoyi arsenal, education, local operas, mining, etc. Compiled by *Gongxian zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui* (Gongxian, Henan: Gongxian zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, 1983–84), twelve vols.

20. I collected some drafts of the Guangdong gazetteer during my trip to several counties in the Pearl River delta in 1989. According to Professor Yu Yanguang of Jinan University (Guangzhou), who served as an adviser to the county gazetteer compilers, the drafts contained much more information than the published version, which is frequently only a summary of the original version.

21. For Henan, for instance, there are nine volumes of the *Henan shizhi ziliao* (for publication data, see note 5 above). One volume contains materials on the Red Spears movement.

22. For instance, we have: for the provincial level, the *Zhonggong Henan dangshi* [The Henan party history], Hou Zhiying, Cai Kangzhi, and Zhang Yupeng, eds., (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1992); for the border region, *JiLuYu bianqu gemingshi* [The history of revolution in the JiLuYu border region], compiled by JiLuYu bianqu gemingshi gongzuozu (Jinan: Shandong daxue chubanshe, 1985); for the county level, *Zhengyang xian geming douzhengshi* [The history of revolutionary struggle in Zhengyang county], compiled and published by the Zhonggong Zhengyang xianwei dangshi bangongshi in 1989.

23. A typical volume contains a summary of the topic, followed by documentary materials (*wenxian ziliao*), then newspaper materials (*baokan ziliao*), and reminiscences (*huiyi ziliao*). In some volumes, there might be organizational charts, research summaries on special topics, reference materials, and chronological listings of events.

24. *Jianku de licheng: Zhongguo gongnong hongjun disi fangmianjun geming hui-yilu xuanji* [The arduous journey: A selection of reminiscences on the role played by the Fourth Front Army of the Chinese worker and peasant Red Army in the revolution] two vols. (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1985); Zhonggong Zhuma diwei dangshi ziliao zhengbian weiyuanhui, *Kangzhan shiqi de Zhugou* [Zhugou during the Sino-Japanese War] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1985); Zhonggong Henan shengwei dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui, *Kangda si fenxiao xiaoshi ziliao xuanbian* [A selection of materials on the Fourth Branch School of the Resistance University] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1990); Zhonggong Xinyang diwei dangshi ziliao zhengbianwei and Zhonggong Huangchuan xianwei dangshi ziliao zhengbianwei, *Kangdi qingnian juntuan* [The anti-Japanese youth corps] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1990).

25. JinJiLuYu bianqu caizheng jingji shi bianjizu and Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, Henan sheng dang'anguan, *KangRi zhanzheng shiqi JinJiLuYu bianqu caizheng jingji shi ziliao xuanbian* [Selected historical materials on the finance and economy of the JiJiLuYu border region during the Sino-Japanese War], two vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1990).

26. See *Ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 1309–69.

27. For the JinChaJi border base, there are four volumes of materials dealing with the general situation, finance and money, industry and trade, and agriculture. See JinChaJi bianqu caizheng jingji shi bianxiezuzhu, Hebei sheng dang'anguan, Shanxi sheng dang'anguan, *JinChaJi bianqu caizheng jingji shi ziliao xuanbian* [Selected historical materials on the finance and economy of the JinChaJi border area] (Tianjin: Nankai daxue chubanshe, 1984).

28. There are four volumes of *JinJiLuYu kangRi genjudi caijing shiliao xuanbian: Henan bufen* [Selected materials on the finance and economy of the JinJiLuYu anti-Japanese base: Henan] (Beijing: Dang'an chubanshe, 1985); three volumes of *Zhonggong JiLuYu bianqu dangshi ziliao xuanbian* [Selected historical materials on the CCP JiLuYu border base] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988); eight volumes of *Zhonggong JiLuYu bianqu dangshi ziliao xuanbian* [Selected historical materials on the CCP JiLuYu border base] (Jinan: Shandong daxue chubanshe, 1991); two volumes (hardback, one volume) of *JiLuYu bianqu qunzhong yundong ziliao xuanbian* [Selected materials on mass movements in the JiLuYu border area] (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe); one volume of *JiLuYu bianqu gemingshi* [The JiLuYu border revolutionary history] (Jinan: Shandong daxue chubanshe, 1991); and one volume on *JiLuYu bianqu xuanjiao gongzuo ziliao xuanbian* [Selected materials on propaganda/education work in the JiLuYu border base] (Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991).

29. See the two mass movement volumes published by Hebei Province.

30. Henan sheng shuiwuju, Anhui sheng shuiwuju, Hebei sheng shuiwuju, and Henan sheng dang'anguan, *EYuWan geming genjudi gongshang shuishou shiliao xuanbian* [Selected materials on industrial and commercial taxes in the EYuWan border base] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1987).

31. Gong Zhizhan, "Neihuang Li Qiji cun de diaocha" [A social survey of Li Qiji Village in Neihuang County], Jan. 13, 1943, *Zhonggong JiLuYu bianqu dangshi ziliao xuanbian*, vol. 2, no. 2 (document section), pp. 465–85.

32. Zhonggong Xinyang diwei dangshi ziliao zhengbian weiyuanhui, *Fengbei* [Monument], fifteen vols. (Xinyang: Zhonggong Xinyang diwei dangshi ziliao zhengbian weiyuanhui, 1987).

33. Vol. 11 deals with the anti-Japanese resistance movement in southern Xinyang; vol. 10 with the organizational structure during the "democratic revolutionary period"; vol. 9 with the role of women in the revolution; and vol. 4 with the activities of the Liu Bocheng/Deng Xiaoping army in various counties in the EYuWan area.

34. There are four volumes of *Shangcheng geming shi ziliao* [Historical materials on the revolution in Shangcheng]; one volume of *Shangcheng gemingshi* [A history of the Shangcheng revolution]; one volume of *Shangcheng yinglie* [Shangcheng brave martyrs]; one volume of *Zhonggong Shangcheng xian lishi dashiji* [Chronological events of the Shangcheng CCP]; one volume of *Shangcheng qiyi* [Shangcheng uprising]; two volumes of *Shangcheng wenshi ziliao* [Materials on literature and history in Shangcheng]; and one volume of *Dabie shan fenghuo* [Flames of battle raging in Dabie Mountains], a comprehensive historical account. Other collections on the revolution in the Dabie Mountains, the Liu/Deng army, Xinyang, and EYuWan also contain materials on Shangcheng.

35. Vol. 3 of *Shangcheng geming shi ziliao* contains materials on two town (*zhen*) soviets and twenty township (*xiang*) soviets.

36. For instance, *Guangshan dangshi ziliao* [Guangshan party historical materials], published by Zhonggong Guangshan dangshi ziliao zhengbian weiyuanhui.

37. For instance, Puyang, which was a seedbed of revolutionary activities. Wang Congwu, an upright cadre who was in charge of the distribution of funds, intentionally gave more money to other areas/counties than his home-county of Puyang in order to demonstrate his impartiality. After Wang's retirement, his successors were not so generous in return. The two volumes of Puyang party historical materials made available to me contain some useful materials. I was told in 1993 that there was some indication that the party might proceed with a project to collect materials on the Sandy District (*shaqu*), a seedbed of the peasant movement (particularly among the salt peddlers).

38. For the Liu/Deng army, see *Liu/Deng dajun qiangdu Huanghe* [The Liu/Deng army fights its way across the Yellow River] (Jinan: Shandong daxue chubanshe, 1987); Yang Guoyu and Chen Feiqin, *Liu/Deng dajun nanzheng ji* [The southern campaign of the Liu/Deng army], two vols. (1982); for the Huaihai cam-

paign, see *Renmin zhuang jun wei* [The people strengthened the power of the army] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1989); for the Zhengzhou campaign, see *Zhengzhou zhanyi ziliao xuanbian* [Selected materials on the Zhengzhou campaign] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1985); for the east Henan campaign, see *Yudong zhanyi* [The East Henan campaign] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988).

39. Wang Shucheng and Gu Zhengfan, eds., *Zhanqin gongzuo ziliao xuan* [Selected materials on war services] (Shandong: Huanghe chubanshe, 1988).

40. Xu Xiangqian, *Lishi de huigu* [A look back on history], two vols. (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1984); Peng Xuefeng, *Peng Xuefeng shuxin riji xuan* [A selection from the letters and diary of Peng Xuefeng], ed., Peng Xuefeng shuxin riji xuan bianjizu (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1980); Li Ying, ed., *Peng Xuefeng jishu* [Letters sent by Peng Xuefeng to his family] (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1985); Yi Peng Xuefeng tongzhi bianjizu, *Yi Peng Xuefeng tongzhi* [A recollection on comrade Peng Xuefeng], two vols. (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1981); Lu Sheng, *Wang Shusheng dajiang* [General Wang Shusheng] (Zhengzhou: Haiyan chubanshe, 1987); Liu Bocheng, *Liu Bocheng huiyilu* [Recollections by Liu Bocheng], two vols. (Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe, 1985).

41. Zhonggong Henan shengwei dangshi ziliao zhengji bianxuan weiyuanhui, *Henan kangzhan shilue* [A brief history of the Sino-Japanese War in Henan] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1985); Zhonggong Henan shengwei dangshi ziliao zhengji bianxuan weiyuanhui, *Zhonghua minzu de zhuangju: Henan sheng jinian kangRi zhanzheng shengli sishi zhounian wenji* [The heroic deeds of the Chinese people: A collection of essays in memory of the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Sino-Japanese War in Henan] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1986).

42. Chen Chuanhai, Xu Youli, Liu Haitao, Su Zhigang, and Zhang Binyuan, *Rijun huoyu ziliao xuanbian* [Selected materials on the calamity the Japanese troops brought to Henan] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1986); Zhonggong Henan shengwei dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui, *Qin Hua Ri jun zai Henan de baoxing* [The atrocities committed by the invading Japanese troops in Henan] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1989).

43. Wu Bingli, Jin Yiguan, Yang Mingxun, and Xie Gongyi, eds., *Dang de guanghui zhao quanqiu* [The glory of the party radiates through the ages], four vols. (Shangqiu: Zhonggong Shangqiu xianwei dangshi bangongshi, 1985–87).

44. Hou Zhiying and Zhang Yupeng, *Henan dangshi renwu zhuan* [Biographies of party historical figures in Henan], ten vols. (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1987); Henan sheng difang shizhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Henan renwu* [Historical figures of Henan], three vols. (Zhengzhou: Henan sheng difang shizhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, 1985); Henan sheng minzhengju, *Lieshi yongsheng* [Long live the martyrs], twelve vols. (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1979–87). There are also collections of biographies of county figures, for instance: Zhonggong Anyang xianwei dangshi ziliao zhengji bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Anyang yinglie* [Brave martyrs of Anyang] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 1991); Zhonggong Nanyang diwei

dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui, *Yongheng: Nanyang dangshi renwuzhuan* [Eternity: Biographies of party figures in Nanyang] (Nanyang: Zhonggong Nanyang diwei dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui, 1987).

45. Wei Hongyun, Liu Jianqing, Zhang Hongxiang, Gao Defu, and Zuo Zhiyuan, *Huaibei kangRi genjudi jishi* [Chronological events of the anti-Japanese border base in North China] (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1986); Zhonggong Henan shengwei dangshi ziliao zhengji bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Zhonggong Henan dangshi dashiji* [Chronological events of the Henan CCP] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1986). Wang Tianjian, Pang Shouxin, Wang Quanying, and Feng Wengang, *Henan jindai dashiji* [Chronological events in the modern history of Henan] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1990). At the county level, there is, for instance, Zhonggong Nanyang diwei dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui, *Zhonggong Nanyang diqu dangshi dashiji* [Chronological historical events of the CCP in Nanyang] (Nanyang: Zhonggong Nanyang diwei dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui, 1988).

46. For instance, there are several accounts in the twelve volumes of *Gongxian wenshi ziliao* (for full reference, see note 19), and in the twelve volumes of *Gongxian dangshi ziliao* [Materials on Gongxian CCP history] of the co-opting of Yao Yunting, the Nationalist army officer who was mayor of Gongxian and a Japanese collaborator. Gongxian is located midway between Zhengzhou and Luoyang. *Gongxian dangshi ziliao* is compiled by Zhonggong Gongxian xianwei dangshi ziliao zhengbian bangongshi (Gongxian, Henan: Zhonggong Gongxian xianwei dangshi ziliao zhengbian bangongshi, 1985–90), twelve vols.

47. Zhonggong Henan shengwei dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui, *Jiaozuo xinghuo* [The sparks of Jiaozuo] (Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1991); Zhonggong Henan shengwei dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui, *Zhongzhou chunlei* [Spring thunder in Henan] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1990).

48. Zhonggong Henan shengwei dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui, *Henan (Yuxi) kangRi genjudi* [The Henan (West Henan) anti-Japanese base] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988). EYu bianqu gemingshi bianjibu, *Zhongyuan di hou fengyun* [Windstorm behind the enemy line] (Hubei: Hubei renmin chubanshe, 1985); JinYu fenghuo bianweihui and Zhonggong Jiaozuo shiwei dangshi ban, *JinYu fenghuo: Balujun JinYu bian youji zhidui huiyilu* [Flames of war on the Shanxi-Henan border: Reminiscences of the Shanxi-Henan border guerrilla detachment of the Eighth Route Army] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1989).

49. This was the impression conveyed by the *wenshi ziliao* and *dangshi ziliao* of Gongxian, which I utilized while working on the topic of occupation, collaboration, and resistance in that county.

# Index

In this index “f” after a number indicates a separate reference on the next page, and “ff” indicates separate references on the next two pages. A continuous discussion over two or more pages is indicated by a span of numbers. *Passim* is used for a cluster of references in close but not consecutive sequence.

- Abe Nobuyuki, 68
- Aite ni sezu* declaration (1938), 36, 57, 66, 87
- Anfu clique, 80, 89, 91, 124
- Ariyoshi Akira, 31
  
- Bai Chongxi, 64
- Banditry, 158–59, 167, 207–8, 211–13, 224
- Baoandui*, see Peace Preservation Corps
- Baojia*, 109, 217
- Barnhart, Michael, 137
- Beiping Branch Military Council (BMC), 42, 45ff
- Beiping Political Affairs Council (PAC), 42, 45f
- Boyle, John H., 12, 14, 83, 156
- Bunker, Gerald E., 12, 14
  
- Cai Dejin, 15
- Caijing shiliao* (Historical materials on finance and economy), 232–33
- Cairo Declaration (1943), 69, 74
- Cao Kun, 46, 206
- Central China Area Army (CCAA), 84–91 *passim*
- Central China Development Company (CCDC), 143f; and subsidiary companies, 145–50
- Central China Expeditionary Army (CCEA), 8, 91, 92–96, 98, 182
- Chen Bijun, 33, 35, 104, 118f
- Chen Gongbo, 27f, 35, 104f, 110, 114, 117, 192, 272n46
- Chen Qun, 90f
- Chen Yung-fa, 172ff
- Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), 2, 5, 13, 27–34 *passim*, 49f, 53, 88f, 105; and Wang Jingwei (pre-1937), 22, 26, 29–37 *passim*, 123; and anti-communism, 23, 36, 58f, 62, 64f, 75–76; and Japan (pre-1937), 27, 31, 36, 57; as war leader, 36, 58, 65, 69; and Wang Jingwei Regime, 60–68 *passim*
- China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, 145
- China Movie Company (Zhongdian), 182–92 *passim*
- China United Film Company (Huaying), 192–96, 197, 272n49
- China United Film Company Ltd. (Zhonglian), 185–93 *passim*, 197
- Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 114, 218, 221–23, 227, 230–31

- Cho Isamu, 92  
 Chongguangtang negotiations, 6  
 Chu Minyi, 186, 192, 272n46  
 Chuikov, Vasilii, 3  
 Collaboration: as general issue, 4, 8–10, 80–82, 115, 177–79, 180–81, 197–98, 225, 230, 234–35; justifications of, 113, 116–22, 130–32, 168; as issue in specific locales, 128–30 (Zhengzhou), 156–57, 171 (Shaoxing), 216–20 (Neihuang)  
 Collaborators, fate of, 13–14, 127, 175–76, 197  
 “Convergence” (Nanjing and Chongqing), 59, 65, 66–67, 73f  
 Crowley, James, 86  
  
 Dadao government (Shanghai), 139  
 Dai Li, 66  
*Dangshi ziliao* (CCP historical materials), 231, 233–34  
 Deng Ren, 163–66 *passim*  
 Dennerline, Jerry, 125  
 Ding Shuben, 209f, 212  
 Doihara Kenji, 46ff, 60  
 Du Shishan, 61–64  
 Du Yuesheng, 211  
 Duan Qirui, 46, 80, 89  
  
 Eastman, Lloyd, 226  
 Esherick, Joseph, 229  
*Eternity* (*Wanshi liufang*), 191–92, 195  
  
 Fan Guang, 60  
 Feng Jie, 192f  
 Feng Xuzhou, 159f, 162, 166–71 *passim*, 175–79 *passim*  
 Feng Yuxiang, 40ff, 52f, 206  
 Fogel, Joshua, 227  
 France: and World War II, 8, 83, 156.  
     *See also Résistancialisme*; Vichy Regime  
  
 Fu, Poshek, 83, 156, 227  
 Funatsu Tatsuchiro, 59, 67  
  
 Gao Zongwu, 57, 117f, 257n1  
 “Great Departure,” *see* New China Policy  
 Greater East Asia War, 69, 188  
 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 135ff, 139, 144, 148, 154–55, 183  
 Greater East Asianism, 5, 8f, 106, 112f; and cultural “New East Asian Order,” 11, 182f, 188, 190, 194f, 217  
 Gu Zhutong, 72, 185  
 Guandong Army, *see* Kwantung Army  
 Guo Shun, 151ff  
 Guomindang (GMD), 22, 25, 33, 65, 105f, 123, 206–7, 227, 230  
  
 Han Fujun, 51  
 Harada Kumakichi, 90, 95–96, 98–99  
 Hata Ikuhiko, 138  
 Hata Shunroku, 60, 84, 91–97 *passim*, 253n44  
 Hata-Terauchi agreement, 96ff  
 He Shizhen, 72, 74  
 He-Umezu Agreement (1935), 32, 46, 54  
 He Yangling, 158–61 *passim*  
 He Yingqin, 28, 32, 42, 45f, 50, 57, 64, 71  
 Hebei-Chaha’er Political Council, 39, 47, 49, 52  
 Hiranuma Kiichiro, 60, 62  
 Hirota Koki, 92  
 Hobbes, Thomas, 117–22 *passim*, 131  
 Hon’iden Yoshio, 138  
 Hoover Institution, 14–15  
 Houhua Village massacre, 208  
 Hu Egong, 58ff  
 Hu Hanmin, 25, 29, 33  
 Hu Jinxiu, 214–15  
 Hu Shih, 27f, 30f, 35

- Huang Fu, 27–32 *passim*, 42, 45f, 52, 241n35
- Huang Jinrong, 185, 211
- Huang Meizhen, 15
- Huaying, *see* China United Film Company (Huaying)
- Hung Chang-tai, 229
- Imai Takeo, 58, 60, 64, 72
- Imperial Assistance Army, 222
- “Industrialize Japan, Agriculturalize China,” 136–37
- Inner Mongolia: Japan demands to station troops, 3, 65, 70, 74f
- Itagaki Seishiro, 60–61, 63, 66, 113
- Japanese Army: occupation policy in Manzhouguo, 41, 43f, 73; China policy, 71, 234; punitive (“mop-up”) campaigns, 107, 219–20, 221–22, 234; economic policy toward occupied areas, 137–38, 149–50, 155; commodity procurement policies, 140–41, 147–48; management of Chinese enterprises, 141, 148f, 152, 154. *See also* Central China Area Army (CCAA); Central China Expeditionary Army (CCEA); North China Area Army (NCAA); North China Garrison Army (NCGA)
- Japanese Army Press Bureau (Shanghai), 182, 188f
- Jia Cunde, 60–61
- Jiang Bocheng, 186, 196
- Jiang Jieshi, *see* Chiang Kai-shek
- Jiang Menglin, 45
- Jin Tanghou, 161f, 166
- Juntong (Central Military Intelligence), 66, 185
- Kanegafuchi Textile Company, 141–42, 147, 152
- Kawakita Nagamasa, 182–97 *passim*, 269n6
- Kayano Nagatomo, 61ff
- Kempeitai, 8, 196f
- Kita Seiichi, 60, 98–99
- Kogawa Heikichi, 62–63
- Koiso Kuniaki, 70, 71–72
- Kong Lingkan, 58
- Kong Xiangxi (H. H. Kung), 30, 57, 58–61, 63
- Konoe Fumimaro, 6, 36, 87, 112, 143. *See also* Aite ni Sezu declaration
- Kuomintang, *see* Guomindang (GMD)
- Kusumoto Sanetaka, 95, 98
- Kwantung Army, 24, 37ff, 46, 48, 54
- Levine, Steven I., 226, 228
- Li Changjiang, 111
- Li Hongzhang, 27, 31; “Task of Li Hongzhang,” 26f, 37
- Li Shiqun, 108
- Li Sihao, 89f, 96
- Li Tongxuan, 210–11, 212, 216
- Li Zeyi, 90
- Liang Hongzhi, 6, 80, 89–91, 93ff, 98–99, 103f, 124
- Lin Bosheng, 192, 272n46
- Lin Kanghou, 151
- Lin Zexu, 191–92
- Liu Jianqun, 45, 49
- Liu Jianxu, 163
- Liu Yunlong, 61
- Lo Wengan, 29f
- Lugouqiao Incident (Marco Polo Bridge), 1, 51, 53f, 56f, 74f
- Luo Junqiang, 124
- Manchukuo, *see* Manzhouguo
- Manchurian Incident (1931), 22, 24, 37, 74
- Manzhouguo, 37f, 45, 86, 134, 138, 143f, 189; Japan demands Chinese recog-

- nition of, 3, 57, 66, 70f, 74, 113; and  
 question of recognition of, 6, 27, 33,  
 36; China offers "tacit" recognition  
 of, 61, 65, 75  
 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, *see*  
 Lugouqiao Incident  
 Materials Control Arbitration Com-  
 mission, 150  
 Matsui Iwane, 86, 88ff  
 Matsuoka Yosuke, 63, 66–68  
 Mei Siping, 149  
 Miao Bin, 71–72  
 Ming Loyalism, 125f  
 Mitsubishi: investment in China,  
 145, 147  
 Mitsui: investment in China, 145, 147  
 Mote, Frederick, 13  
  
 National Commerce Control Commis-  
 sion, 150–51; and subordinate control  
 commissions, 153–54  
 National Policy Companies (Japan):  
 investment in China, 145, 182  
 "National Survival," 118–22. *See also*  
 Collaboration  
 Native banks, *see under* Shaoxing  
 New China Policy, 7, 69, 110, 149  
 New Citizens Movement, 7, 105–7,  
 120, 257n5  
 New Life Movement, 105ff  
 New Order in East Asia, 103. *See also*  
 Greater East Asianism  
 New People's Association, 217  
 Nishi Yoshiaki, 66–67  
 North China Area Army (NCAA), 5,  
 84, 86, 96, 98–99  
 North China Development Company  
 (NCDC), 143  
 North China Garrison Army (NCGA),  
 39, 44, 49f  
 North China Political Council, 5, 110  
 North China Regime (Beijing), *see*  
 Provisional Government of  
 North China  
 Northern Expedition, 40, 124  
  
 Okamura Yasuji, 71, 76  
 Operation Ichigo, 2, 71  
 Ophuls, Marcel (*The Sorrow and the*  
*Pity*), 156  
  
 Pang Bingxun, 125  
 Peace Preservation Corps (*Baoandui*),  
 13, 43, 107, 109, 218  
 Peace Preservation (Public Security)  
 Committee (*Weichihui*), 128–29,  
 166  
 People's Anti-Japanese Allied Army, 41  
 People's Liberation Army, 223  
 Petain, Philippe, 168  
 Provisional Government of  
 North China, 5, 59, 84ff, 88f,  
 93, 96–102 *passim*, 113. *See also*  
 Wang Kemin  
 Pye, Lucian, 125  
  
 Qian Operation, *see* Qian Yongming  
 Qian Yongming, 66ff  
 Qin Dechun, 42, 49  
 Qing (Manchu) Dynasty, 113, 121,  
 130, 202  
  
 Rape of Nanjing, 79, 126  
 Red Spears, 206, 208f, 218ff, 222  
 Reformed Government (Nanjing,  
 1938–40), 4f, 59, 80f, 84–86, 88, 94,  
 100–101, 103f, 124. *See also* Liang  
 Hongzhi  
*Remorse in Shanghai (Chunjiang*  
*Yiheng)*, 195  
 Ren Yuandao, 95f, 104, 110  
*Résistancialisme*, 250–51n6  
 Rings, Werner, 177  
 Rong Desheng, 151, 153

- Rousso, Henry, 157, 250n6  
 Rural Pacification, 7, 107–9, 217
- Sacred Way Society, 208–9, 210  
 Saich, Tony, 229  
 Second Archive (Nanjing), 16  
 Shan Guanchu, 139, 143  
 Shanghai Incident and Truce (1932),  
   22–24, 25  
 Shanghai Municipal Archive, 16  
 Shanhai Boseki Mills, 142, 152  
 Shaoxing: Chamber of Commerce,  
   160–61, 164, 167, 264n16; modern  
   banks, 161f, 165f, 168–69, 176; native  
   banks, 161, 167, 168–69, 176f  
 Shen Fusheng, 166, 179  
 Shibayama Kaneshiro, 70  
 Shigemitsu Mamoru, 72  
 Skinner, G. William, 179  
 Song Meiling, 61f  
 Song Zheyuan, 11, 39–42, 46–55, 207  
 Song Ziliang (Zeng Guang), 64  
 Song Ziwen (T. V. Soong), 28ff, 90  
 South Manchuria Railway Company,  
   144  
 Soviet Union, 3, 73, 143  
 Special Services Department (SSD:  
   Tokumubu), 87–93, 95, 99f  
 Strand, David, 10  
 Sugiyama Gen, 72  
 Sun Buyue, 218–19, 220  
 Sun Dianying, 125  
 Sun Fo, 22, 29  
 Sun Yat-sen, 63, 90, 114, 123; and Three  
   Principles of the People, 5, 9, 53, 106;  
   and Pan-Asianism, 9, 103, 112  
 Suzuki Kantaro, 72  
 Suzuki Takuji, 64
- Tachibana Shiraki, 227  
 Tajiri Aigi, 67  
 Tan Kun, 173–75, 176
- Tang Shaoyi, 89, 252n18  
 Tang Shoumin, 151  
 Tang Youren, 29, 32  
 Tanggu Truce (1933), 27f, 43f, 244n70  
 Tao Zhongan, 161f, 167, 175  
 Tashiro Kan'ichiro, 50  
 “Three Principles” (1938), 6, 112. *See*  
   also Konoe Fumimaro  
 Tojo Hideki, 3, 70, 111, 150  
 Tong (Kiri) Operation, 64–66  
 Toyama Shuzo, 63  
 Toyoda Textile Mills, 141, 152  
 Trautmann, Oskar: Trautmann media-  
   tion, 57, 72, 95  
 Tsuda Shizue 58–59  
 Twenty-one Demands, 75
- Ugaki Kazushige, 70  
 “Using the war to feed the war,” *see*  
   Yizhan Yangzhan  
 Usuda Kanzo, 89, 92f  
 Usui Shigeki, 64f
- Vichy Regime (France), 12, 102, 157,  
   250n6
- Wang Jingwei, 5–8, 9, 12, 21, 58–65 *pas-  
 sim*, 72–76 *passim*, 99, 117, 184, 196;  
 and peace movement, 5f, 21, 34–37,  
 57ff, 76; character traits, 35, 37, 105,  
 114, 120–21; and issue of collabora-  
 tion, 113ff, 117, 120ff, 123, 130ff,  
 243n63  
 Wang Jingwei regime (Nanjing,  
 1940–45): establishment of, 5, 60–66  
*passim*, 80, 102, 104, 113; policies of,  
 5ff, 103, 105–9, 131, 149–52, 194f; rela-  
 tions with Japan, 6f, 64f, 67–71, 73ff,  
 111–13; military effectiveness of, 13,  
 107, 109–12, 124–25  
 Wang Kemin, 86, 94–99  
 Wang Ke-wen, 153f

- Wang Zihui, 60f  
 Wang Ziyu, 162, 166, 179  
 Wen Lanting, 151  
 Wen Zongyao, 80, 90f, 94f  
*Wenshi ziliao* (Literary and historical materials), 14, 230–31  
 Wou, Odoric, 173  
 Wu Lantian, 218–19, 220  
 Wu Peifu, 46, 59, 206  
  
 Xi'an Incident, 33f, 36, 47, 50, 117  
 Xiao Zhenying, 48f  
 Xing Chennan, 165ff, 173  
 Xu Xiqi, 158–59  
  
 Yan Xishan, 41, 123  
 Yang Jie, 62  
 Yichang offensive (1940), 61, 65  
 Yin Rugeng, 47, 49  
*Yizhan yangzhan*, 138–41, 148  
 Yu Xuezhong, 43–48 *passim*  
 Yuan Ludong, 151, 153  
 Yuan Yuquan, 150  
 Yuho Textiles, 147, 152  
  
 Zhang Ailing, 188, 195  
 Zhang Qun, 32  
 Zhang Shankun, 183–98 *passim*, 272n46, 273n60  
 Zhang Xueliang, 24ff, 33, 41, 45, 50f, 117  
 Zhang Yousan, 64  
 Zhang Zhiping, 64  
 Zhang Zulin, 206  
 Zhili clique, 124  
 Zhongdian, *see* China Movie Company  
 Zhonglian, *see* China United Film Company Ltd. (Zhonglian)  
 Zhongtong (GMD Central Intelligence), 185  
 Zhou Fohai, 67f, 104, 110, 117, 124, 149, 192, 196, 272n46  
 Zhou Zuomin, 66–67, 151  
 Zhu Zhonghua, 161–62, 164  
 Zhu Zijia (Jin Xiongbai), 149, 273n60